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Mechanical instrumentation equipment i s often used i s control and safety 
shutdown systems for such installations as nuclear reactors and chemical 
plants. The reliability of these systems i s dependent, among other things, 
on the failure rates of the individual equipments which ess be calculated by 
means of a prediction technique, ty considerv g the effects of each component 
failure, and allocating the relevant failure rate for the component fault node 
considered, a prediction can be made of the failure rate of s complete equip-
ment of components. As an example, the effects of failure of some of the more 
important components of s simple pressure switch era analysed. 
Typical fsilure rates are given for components and equipment*, and the 













TABLES I - I I I l - 3 
FIGURES 1 * J *•' 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Mechanical equipment - cons i s t ing of mechanical, pneumatic and hydraulic components -
i s often used in control and safety shutdown srstems for such i n s t a l l a t i o n s »* nuclear reactors 
and thw. i t*I p lants . Vhere the overal l r e l i a b i l i t y of a system o f tquipocat* o f t h i s type 
needs to be founJ, i t i s necessary to hav* • knowledge o f the equipment f a i l are ra te s aa well 
as other factors such as the grouping- o f the equipments and the proof t e s t i n t e r v a l . Equipment 
f a i l u r e rates can be found as a re su l t o f sample t e s t i n g , from f i e l d experience or by predic-
t ion , »here eiaiipxent of a new design i s used and oniv few o f the equipments hav« been manufac-
tured prior to the ir i n s u l t at ion in the plant, i t i s improbable that the f a i l u r e rate wi l l be 
known by means of sample t e s t i n g or f i e l d experience. The predic t ion technique then becomes a 
PREDkCTION TEM.IME 
CospiMMt Failure Rales 
2. The prediction technique makes use of the fact that whilst an equipment may be new or 
untried, the nnjjøritv of i ts components will not. Much information i s now afailable relating 
to the failure r^tes of mechanical and pneumatic components* < ' and example* of these, as 
applicable to the automatic protective systems of land-based nuclear installations, are given 
in Table 1. By fnnsidering the effects of eacli component failure and allocating the relevant 
failure rate for the component fault mode 
TålLE I considered, the assessor can sumnate the 
individual failure rates for the different 
fault categories to find, for example, the 
"dangerous", "safe" and "overall" fault 
rates of the equipment. This technique can 
be illustrated by referring to Figure 1 
which is a diagrammatic arrangement of a 
conventional tvpe of pressure switch. Oily 
a few of the more important components of 
the pressure switch are shown for clarity, 
the principle of operatic« being as des-
cribed in the following text. 
3. Wien a pressure signal i s applied 
to the bellows this expands, the free 
end of the bellows monnft tip-
wards causing the beam tø »ove in an anti-
clockwise direction about the pivot. As 
the signal pressure increase*, » point i s 
reached where the micro-»witch i s actuated 
by the beam, thi* being the trip setting point. Acting against the force of the bellows i s a 
spring, the tension of which (and hence the range of the switch) can be adjusted by means of 
the range adjustment bolt. For thi? applicatinn, i t may be considered that a trip signal (a 
signal which restores plant safety by causing the shutdown system to trip and shut down the 
plant) i s given *h*n the pressure signal falls, i .e . a fail-safe fault on the loss of pneumatic 
supply. 
4. Given the above infonaation, the efftcts of failure of some of the switch components 
can be asaessed. As can be seen from Figure 1, fracture of the spring would *ean that there 
«aa no force opposing the action of the bellow ao that the micro-switch would only be 
de> actuated when the bellows pressure fell to i very low level, perhaps a few1 percent of full 
aeale deflection, instead of at the trip setting of, aay, 50% f.s.d. Thi a i* obviously a fail-
danger fault aim* a trip signs] (micro-switch de-actuated) would only take place when the 
prneare signal M fallen to a level very muci lower than that at which a trip signal should 
••ve bean given. On the other hand, rupture of the bel Iowa ia » safe fault since Una caaaee 
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F I G . 1. PRESSURE SWITCH FAfLUHE RATES. 
a trip tibial to be given iunediately. A atnoV of the effects of each fault enables a "fault 
category" eoluan to be completed as in Figure 1, the failure ratea for the cMpoMBto being 
added fros Table I . 
S> I t ceo be seen that by aamating the failure rate« of the couponanta uMch result in 
dangerous, aad siailarly safe failures, the feil-deageroue and fa-:-, afe ratea resaltiai free 
the failure of aosie half daian coapouaMs ew be band (l'T an! 6-S faults/Mr hours, raeaarti-
rely), ty addias, tofether these tao auaaieted laluea, the total failure rata «aa be {sand for 
the aaabet of ceapoaaata considered. A couplete pressure »i tch usaM ieeorperute ate** thirty 
mayinnui. the oyeteii failure rate far • f w t i c * ] « » i t d i hårlag seta predicted as 
IS faalu/W* hours or 0-13 faults/year. ! r ,.^: *m,..K 
t. A typical psaanti« traa^itur coald »Ml at of eea% « # * imftfMt 
» t . art IsrttTlwiiiWtOT Wft« rate.Tif*« imltrtP feurtf '*» Mt ta« i 
2 
or disphrasstf ahich, in comparison,have high failure rates (5, 6 and 8 faults/10* hours, 
respectively). Normally there are about foor or five of chess "vulnerable" ceaamaenta i* a 
transmitter bit because of their coaparatitely high failure rates, thi a aaall percentage of the 
total number of conponeata (aay 590 ashes up aoac 50% of the total equipment failure rata. I t 
follows then that i f by careful design, the Majority of these "vulnerable" components caa be 
•ade to fail-safe, the equipment fail-danger fault rate caa be kept low; especially aa 
failures in Many of the other components will have the saw «ffect aa a failure of the mere 
active ('Vulnerable") coaoonent in that particular stage or section of the equipment. 
7. Since the validity of the prediction is dependent on the accuracy of the coapoaeat 
faolt rates used, i t i s important that as much information aa possible should be collected on 
these fault rates. Ideally, the fault statistics used should be relevant to the environmental 
conditions appertsining st the location of the equipment concerned. In the ataance of aueh 
specific faalt data, the prediction c* be completed using "basic" component fault rates which 
are aa given in Table I for a typical land-based reactor, and multiplying these by appropriate 
stress factors. Table II i s extracted from Reference 1 and give« the stress or K (multiplying) 
factors for general enviiDaaental conditions. As shown in the Table, components used in 
general purpose ground-based equipments have a K, factor of 1; thi« factor increasing to 2, 3 
or greater dependent on whether the equipment 
TålLE II i s housed in a ship or in a vehicle travelling 
by road, rail or air. Other K factors can be 
Compoiant Stress Fitters oaed in the prediction to allow for conponenta 
being used at higher or lower ratings and 
temperatures than those for which they mere 
designed' '. 
8. In a recent reliability assessment, 
the designer expressed doubt aa to the accuracy 
of the fail urn rates attributed to maul 
bellow« aa aaed in control valves. Since many 
control valves were used in the ayatam being 
assessed, and the bellows failure rate aede a 
significant contribution to the fail-danger 
rate of the valve, i t mas evident that the con-
fidence in the aaaessed value for the reliabi-
l i ty of the control system waa dependent on 
the accuracy of the bellows fsalare rate. An 
investigation waa then made into their failure 
rates on an identical plant in the same factory, fly searching through the maintenance records, 
i t was found that twenty-four bellows had failed and been replaced in four handred and fifty 
valve veers of operation. This gave a bellows failure rate for that particular plant of 
6/10* hoars, which compares well with the basic rate of 5/10* houra aa given in Table L 
9. Ibilat i t ia convenient for the pressure switch example to consider all component 
fail area as being either safe or dangerous, this can be an over-aiaplification especially 
where mora complex equipment i s used. As shown elsewhere'*', a more rigorous prediction would 
also tak« account of "neutral" faults and othera giving only a alight shift in calibration, 
fttitheiawre, die fault category, which takes the form of a fijmr 1 attar code, would also signify 
whether the fault waa "revealad" or "unrerealed" and i f the former, which facility would 
i adze ate this. 
EtflfmalT MILØK llTEf 
General environaental condition 
Ideal, static conditioBs 
Vibration free, controlled 
environment 















10. In t*e coara« of eawaaina the adeonac* of Htonatic snatooan nyattaa far aoreral 
noalaar and Mn-mclaar cfcsnical pleete''*, predictions k m been an*, of t i e failure rate« of 
rarioaa •echanical eanipnonts. A »election of these i a (iron in Table i n taentJnK « d t tke 
3 
Fallura Sat« af 





Magnetic level switch 
Differentia] pressure 
transmitter 


















correspondina; practically-experienced failure rates. As right be expected, there i s less 
information available on the failure rates of large items of equipment than on the type of 
ias trusten tat ion equipment listed in 
"• !£ III Table III. This could sten from the grow-
ing demand for highly reliable shutdown 
systems and, consequently, the fsnlt data 
relevant to than. Although the collection 
of this data does not in i tself lead to 
improvements in the failure rates of 
individual equipments, i t enables the 
designer/operator to demonstrate that the 
system reliability i s up to the required 
standard, or, i f not, to raise i t to that 
standard by additional redundancy or more 
frequent proof testing. 
11. In the field of safety one i s 
•ore concerned about fail-dangerous rather 
than fail-safe faults, but the latter are 
particularly irksome on poser reactors and 
many other plants, since unscheduled shut-
downs can be very costly, (h one particu-
lar plant, many shutdowns were attributed 
to the protective system mid i t was 
decided to keep a log of the number of 
times that the protective system gave a 
spurious trip signal and shut down the 
plant. Che object of this aright have bees 
to show that the cost of modifying the 
protective system - to reduce i t s spurious 
tripping rate - would have been more t a n 
offset by the consequent increase in p i n t 
production. For completeness, all plant 
faults were recorded. I t was revealed by this study that only a small proportion of plant 
shutdowns were, in fact, due to faults in the protective systea, the majority being due to 
failures of large machines, e.g., feed pompa, gas compressors, or failures in pipework. 
12. As a result of this analysis and the unexpected infomation i t produced, i t was 
decided to record all eguipawnt faults that occurred on three large important plants. The 
purpose of this was to identify the equipments that contributed mostly to the tine for which 
the plant was non-productive. Uth this information to hand, i t would then be possible to 
either rearrange or add to the existing equipment, so as to give greater plant availability. 
Ovar the past two years sone 10,000 fault events have been recorded, some of which are s t i l l 
being sorted. From this and other scarce«, information has been collected on the failure 
rates of large itens of mechanical equipment. Vhereaa the overall failure rate of protective 
instruments generally l i e s within die range of 0*1 • 1*0 faults/year, that of such items sa 
boiler pumps mad compressors appears - not unexpectedly - to be mach higher. T*tss= range 
between 1-15 fnltoAoar for beiler feed pomps and u t n d to 50 fnlts/y*sr for high pressure, 
high powered gas enprenora (including saxiliary equipment). 
13. Flaiesc devices a n soe being subject to reliability analysis ia die &&.A. and i t 
i s reported by Adler«*' that a test programår has ben initiated to w*M« the ral a b i l i t y of 
these devices to he estisxrtsd. tasts have ban coadactad in ojieb the ioAnsae* of f i i n n w , 
teateratnre and c n t n i n t i n apM the reliability of the device* has ban stemmed. Toe 
device« used ia the taste cnoistsd of six fivavstag* regiseeta, each regi stor eWUtalftf » 
digital eleents. Aldmfh ana iafbnetion ia given n fdiares, tao toaw ante oe*«! U * 
*0riginal prediction completed in 1964 using 
limited component fault data. The figure 
shown in brackets (68) i a the failure rate 
that would result from using the component 




frequency pneumatic pulses (120 cycles/second). Hence, the apparent poor reliability, 
expressed in the mean tie« between failure of registers - which varied fnat three to ten days -
•as a high reliability in t e n s of the nunber of pulses correctly processed between failures 
(of the order of 10*). It i s the view of Adler that "probably the Bøst important result of 
this phase of the reliability test activity was the discovery that all failures experienced in 
the test relate to a temporary loss of information". None of the failures was catastrophic, 
so conponent reflacenent was unnecessary. 
14. In an example of a quantitative analysis of the reliability of a j e t engine control 
syatea embodying fluidic de-ices, use is made of what i s claiaed to be one of the amat useful 
tools for reliability prediction and design assurance, "the failure ana* and effects analysis". 
The latter i s , of course, the eethod ape lied to the prediction of pressure switch reliability 
previously in this report. The fsilurt rates for the fluidic devices were taken from ihe teat 
data and from other sources such as F Art A DA (FAilure RAte OAta progress« sponsored and 
run by the U.S. Amy, Navy, Air Force and NASA). For a fluid anplifier the failure rates 
vary between O'Ol failures/10* hours for external breakages, per connection, and 0*35 failures/ 
10* hours for contamination of a 20 nil povt. Using these and othe*- failure rates, i t h u been 
calculated that the overall fault rate of c fluidic computer consisting of a doxen parameter 
control and logic units such as pressure ratio, speed and tenperetore, i s approximately 260 
failures/10* hours or 2*3 faults/year. 
SISTEf lELUIiLITY 
15. As discussed in the introduction, one of the purposes of calculating equipment 
failure rates i s to enable the reliability of a systen of equipments to be calculated. Such a 
system could be largely made up of the equipments listed in Table III, e g . flow transnitter, 
pressure switch, pneunatic shutdown valve, Uri 1st only the overall failure rates of these have 
been given, i t would normally be expected that the fail-danger fault rate would be not more, 
sod often much less, than 50% of the overall fault rate; that of the pressure switch being 
some 20% of the total. To improve systen reliability, i t i s the practice to make as many 
equipments as possible fail-safe on the loss of the pneumatic, hydraulic or electrical supplies. 
16. By using redundancy mid/or diversity in the sensing equipment, switching circuits and 
shutdown valves; and reducing the proof test interval, i t i s possible to attain n high order 
of reliability for a systen. But, experience suggests' • ' that i t becomes increasingly 
difficult to reduce the probability of failure (to danger) when thin geta down in the region of 
10' to 10" \ At this order of reliability, i t becomes more difficult to substantiate many of 
the assumptions implicit in the simple mathematical model used in the nmnerical calculation of 
reliability, e.g., that the equipments are all working in their useful l i f e phase, failures 
are independent, testing i s perfect and repair ia perfect. Hence, the chance of a common 
failure taking place, which can affect a whole family of equipments, becomes n distinct rather 
than s remote poasibility. In one application the resilient seat rings of a whole series of 
ral ves snifered rapid deterioration when the tenperatare at the valves rose well above the 
design conditions. Has occurred even though considerable care bad been taken to limit die 
Unperatare to an acceptable value, the designers having been well aware of this problem in 
advance. 
17: moera such items na pneumatic shutdown valves are airanged to fail-safe on the loss 
of supply end a minimum of two are used, there i s normally l i t t l e likelihood of n common fault 
affecting both valves. Oca i f the aigaal pressure lines were run in clow proximity, most 
oonuou faults sonld fracture the limes earning a safe shntdnen actio«. There i s the remote 
ppssibUity, houever, that the linea can be sealed off by • single cannon fault, thus prevent-
ing the sir fros being vented from the valve actuators end inhibiting n trip action. In am 
install adorn on M plant i t was fomnd convenient to ran the pressure line« to the valve 
mementom acne* a wmlkwny, alongside the process pipe«. Although i t was intended that s 
•sard or c o w would he erected over the pipes, this work was not completed when the plant was 
5 
conpieaioned. Aa cut be seen fron Figure 2, i t would be a aiapie natter Cor soneone to walk 
onto both pipes, which were run very close together, thereby sealing off the lines - one of 
the pipes had already been dasaged in thia way! 
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18. To redact the probability of consult faults from inhibiting the correct action of a 
•hntdown aystwa, the oystea ahould be designed Co conform with certain basic design 
principles'''. One of tbese atipulates thet, to retain conplete rednndwicy between different 
eonipMnts, the ripeJ pipee (or cables) roneing to siniilu redaadent eqaipnentB ahonld bare 
•dea n u physical separation. Nad thia principle been net in the shore exaaple, the probabi-
l i ty of both waives being rendered ineffective by a single i inenajn fealt eosld here baa* 
acceptably aaell i s coapariara eich that dee to their coincident feilare becesaa of randan 




19. By mews of the Method outlined, i t has been found possible to predict the failure 
rates of mechanical instrunentation equipments. Provided that the component failure rates arc 
know) and also the environmental conditions likely to be met, i t should be possible to extend 
this technique to ouch larger items of equipment, e.g., punps, biosers, engines. Where several 
equipments are used to make up a highly reliable system such as a plant shutdown system, the 
overall reliability that can be achieved may be dependent on the frequency of cannon faults. 
20. It should be borne in mind, however, that for the quantitative assessment of reliabi-
lity to be meaningful, there i s a prior need for the capability of die equipment or system con-
cerned to have been shown to be adequate. This can be done by nesns of an independent ssfety 
sssessnentt*' in which the performance of the pmt^tive system is appraised, usually i s terns 
of i t s accuracy and response, end cesspared with the response of the plant under sll relevant 
fault conditions. When, by this method, the system i s shown to hsve the required capability 
and to conform with the basic design principles, the "failure mode and effect« analysis" 
becomes a most useful tool for predicting the reliability of mechanical instrumentation equip-
ment for proce&L control. 
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Introduction 
In order to assess whether a system is adequate or not to the purpose 
it should be applied to, first of all it i s necessary to define clearly the 
function the system is charged to perform and how long and under what 
stipulated conditions, the system i s required to work. Just after that 
it will be possible to determine whether the considered system i s able 
to perform the required function under the stated conditions, that is 
whether It functioning capability is adequate, and whether the system 
has the required attitude to keep such a capability for the required 
time, that is to say whether its reliability is adequate. 
The reliability requirements are normally dependent upon both econo-
mic and safety considerations and in order to assist in the understand-
ing of what is required and to permit logical thinking, the quantification 
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of reliability estimate i s an important attribute. I t i s not just the 
value of the numerical expression which is salient but rather the 
information conveyed and the use made of such information 
Fur thermore , the limiting of subiectiveness helps to improve com-
munication and reliability estimates carr ied out in a quantified 
fashion also lead to the constitution of cri teria for the selection of 
courses of action which affect reliability. (1) 
A t the system level, it is almost impossible to have reliability data 
obtained or obtainable from the experience on the same systems 
already working under the same conditions. More usually the system, 
as such, to be analised i s new and decisions have to be made at the 
"paperwork" stage. Therefore it i s necessary to apply to some form 
of prediction. Generally speaking, as reliability data a re most p ro -
lific at the component part level, the prediction methods a re based 
on sectioning the system into elements of which reliability data a re 
available and on determining what effects the various failure modes 
possible, of the above mentioned elements, produce tofme\aJ]|«ystem 
performance. 8 ) 
The amount and depth of statistical data needed'for any analysis 
depend upon the characteris t ics of the system being analysed and 
also upon the requirements against which such a system i s to be 
Judged. 
F r o m the failure ra te knowledge of the single elements into which 
the system has been divided, a reliability synthesis of system can 
be obtained by suitable mathematical modelling 0 , 4 ) 
There are different prediction methods and each ft them Is • different 
approach to the same problem of making s reliability analysis. 
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3. 
Each of these methods differ from one another for the different basic 
assumptions that define the scopes, the characteristics > nd the limit« 
of their application. In solving real cases, the choice of suitable 
method or methods must be done in verifying the adequacy of the 
basic assumptions to the real case. 
It is not the intention of this paper to discuss any further the criteria 
that should lead in carrying out a reliability assessment of a system 
but to give an example of applied reliability analysis to a system made 
up mainly by mechanical components. The chosen example concerns 
a fire protection system installed in a laboratory for Plutonium hand-
ling. 
System description 
In the considered laboratory, Plutonium handling is carried out by 
operators in glove* boxes. 
The rooms which contain such gbve-boxes are protected against.fire 
by two different systems. The first one protects each individual 
glovavboxss from fire which may start in the inside of it The second 
one is a protection against fire which may start at the outside of the 
glove-boxes and against those fires which spread from the inside to 
the outside of the glove-boxes^n case the first fire protection system 
should not work efficiently. 
Our examination will deal just with the second fire protection system; 
its main scope is to prevent the release to the outsUe of the labora-
tory ;bf dangerous substances which might damage the neighbouring 
population, 
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The main function of the fire protection eyatem ia to introduce CO, 
in the room where the fire Mas started From each room a group 
of CO bottles baa been provided, and located outside the laboratory. 
The system can work automatically, but allows at different atagea 
the manual intervention from the part of the work staff or of the 
operators during work-time. In fig. 1, the main part of the consider-
ed system are shown schematically. Each room ia provided with fire 
detectors, variable In number, according to the dimensions of the 
room itself. The fire detectors are of two different kinds. 
In the case of fire in a room, one or more of them send a signal to 
a control panel which, by ita term, immediately supplies optical and 
acoustic signals, and with a fixed delay« of a few minutes, 
operates the solenoid valve of the nitrogen servo control bottle 
related to the concerned room; such bottle is placed in the corridor 
in front of the exit door of the room. 
The above mentioned delay allows the staff, present in the room 
where the fire took origin, to make the suitable arrangements to 
fight against it or to leave the place. 
The nitrogen will be sent, by means of a piping, to the switching 
valve of the room and to two valves, called primary, allowing through 
CO,, the opening of all the other valves of the bottles. 
The outlet gas of the bottles ts collected in suitable collectors, and 
conveyed to the main switching collector which sends It into the con-
cerned room. 
The bottles are placed ia an individual system of automatt« wÉtsWagi 
an alarm signal is provided in order to indicate decreasing ta welghy 
of about30* tor ersnhial self-dtecberge of * • cmnalaaa* aws., i'wo«« 
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S. 
In the same time CO, is introduced, some operations are carried 
out. using the sigral supplied by two pressure-switches: the first si-
tuated on the exit of nitrogen bottles and the second on the exit of the 
•witching valve. The operations are the following: stopping of the fans 
which »end the ventilation air to the rooms: closing the Inlet air-lock 
in the concerned room, performing reduction of the suction air in 
all the rooms of the laboratory^«! dosing the auction sir locks in 
the concerned room; opening of an air-lock placed on the upper part 
of th? room during the period of COj intake in order to avoid a 
preasurixation of the rosm-
In order to support all those operations which gc on automati-
cally, the plant staff can carry out the following interventions in 
case some parts of the system should fail to work; signaling to the 
central-panel, through push-button, of the presence of fire in the 
room; operating of the quick plant intervention, by the means of a 
device farmed by a nitrogen bottle, with manual opening valve, si-
tuated near the first automatic control bottle; manual operating of 
switching valve and of the two primary valves on CO, bottles; and. 
In case of need, insertion,' on the intake piping, of CO, drawn 
from a group of bottles relating to a room in which there is no 
Ire, by the operation of the sectioning valves. 
Reliability assessment 
It appears clear that It is of no use to assess a system reliability, 
that is Its ability to keep certain performance, if first one has not 
become sure that the system is able to perform in the desired 
manner, that is if th* capability of the system has not yet been 
assessed 
Thus, also in the examined system the capability analysis was 
carried c-t before the reliability analysis. The result of such 
analysis has shown the adequacy of the system to the required 
function. 
It is not the scope of our work to deal in detail with the analysis 
of the system capability. However we would like to hint at some 
aspects that have been particularly examined, 
A n accurate investigation has been made about the characteristics 
of the materials which could be involved in the Are; about the fire 
load in the room, about the quantity of air necessary to the combu 
stion. Such investigation has made it possible to assess the ade-
quacy of the detectors, particularly their sensitivity to the fire 
effects on which mostly the system sensibility depends; to ascertain 
that the right sensors have been placed in the right positions, and 
provided in a number sufficient to give an adequate detection 
threshold for the types of fire most likely to be encountered <5). 
Besides, the assessment of the response of the system and the 
assessment of the rate of spread of the flame have 
been userurto judge whether the delay time between the fire 
detection and CO, inlet, was adequate or not 
A nother aspect which has been examined concerns the role that 
can be played by the air-locks in case they should not work 
properly. Thus it has been made sure that both on the inlet and 
on the outlet of the ventilation, the malfunctioning of the only 
air lock or of the only fane, attll allows an effective fire extinction. 
Moreover it has been ascertained Oat the CO, introducticn system 
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and the quantity of C 0 2 let in are able to saturate the room and 
that CO is able to estinguish the fires caused by the materials 
contained in tna'. room. 
A fter having ascertained that the system i s able to work as re-
quested
 (it itt possible to go on with the reliability assessment 
Such analysis could be done taking into account the failure of 
all the system components. However such method gives just 
a rough result which could be useful for example for mainte-
nance purposea In fact it is necessary to realize that the possible 
failures in a given system do not all cause the same consequences, 
therefore the prfiability of failures, dangerous to the desired 
operation, is less than the one which i s obtained taking into account 
all the possible failures, 
I n our case, the first element of interest is the reliability of the 
automatic interventation of the fire protection system. The dan-
gerous situations are caused by those failures which prevent the 
system from working, whenever requested to a fire. In order to 
gel the probability of suj i dangerous situations, being not available 
failure rate information from previous operation of the system or 
similar systems, it is necessary to apply to a detailed study which 
takes into account all the possible system component failures. Once 
defined and classified the consequences of all the possible failures, 
it will be possible to individuate the dangerous failures in the above 
mentioned meaning. Onee known the rates of the failure modes it is 
possible to calculate theoretically the system reliability parameters. 
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a. 
In a system of such kind ID which the functioning request is casual, 
the parameter of most interest is the fractional dead time, that is 
the mean prr portion of the total relevant time in which system is in 
the failed state. «6) 
In fact, as the probability of getting a fire, which is not put out by 
other means, is a rather Infrequent event and likely with constant 
rate of demand, the probability of a release of toxic product« out-
side is given by the fractional dead time multiplied by the probability 
of getting a fire which is not put out by other means. 
The fractional dead time is made up by two terms; the first due to 
unrevealed failures, and the second to the revealed ones. 0 ) 
From an investigation of the failure modes of the system elements 
it has been found out that most failures are unrevealed and only a 
small part is revealed, which moreoever, presents short repair-
time and small failure rate. Therefore the calculation have been 
done neglecting the influence of revealed failures, as the term thus 
neglected is included in the incertainties inherent in calculations 
of such Und 
JUté 
the calculation of the fractional dead time it is now necessary 
to know the expression of the function of the system failure proba-
bility, as such fractional dead time represents the mean failure 
probability with a fixed time interval between the successive system 
tests, 
A s to the calculation of the fsilure probabilities, the followne baste 
assumptions have been made, which ire think apeUcsbl s in our esse: 
failures are random, failures ars independent, op coMfmsifnf. 
failures, testing tim« is negligible, repair of devisee t»p»rlwsV 
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Moreover, a failure rate, constant In the time, has been used for 
all the components In the case of mechanical components, we have 
thought it permissible,«* it is reasonably to be supposed that during 
the plant life there should be no wear out because tile various me-
chanical elements are not usually working. In such conditions the 
failure probability is calculated with the exponential function, and 
taking into account that the exponents are very small, we have used 
the approximate expression 
P * A.t 
where A is the rate of a particular element expressed in faults/year 
and t is the test interval which in our case Is 0.25 years. 
A s to the failure rates it has been used the values given In referent? 
8 X Considering the fact that the system is installed in a nuclear 
research center, the standards of the devices, of their installation 
and maintenance, and the environment conditions have been supposed 
equal to those of which, the basic values shown in reference 8 ) , 
refers to. Where necessary it has been taken into account the stress 
level of some mechanical components, introducing suitable K factors. 
Kfactor has been determined taking Into account the following points: 
components are only operated occasionally; most of the system is not 
usually operated at pressure except during alarm condition; under 
conditions of occasional operation, the probability of sticking la 
greater; the gases used are clean so that blockage and sticking due 
to oily or dusty deposits are unlikely to occur; during »be periodic 
cheeking the equipment is inspected to ensure that it is remaining 
in good condition. 
In table I, the assumed failure rates andK factor* are « K T - \ 
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In fig. 2 we have shown the logic system diagram from the point 
of view of dangerous failures. The single block represent accor-
ding to the cases single components or, as in the esse of the elec-
trical parts, group of components and devices for which a detail-
ed reliability evaluation have been calculated previously. F o r each 
block the system function and the failure probability are shown, 
The evaluation of the fractional dead time has been calculated using 
the NOTED computer program (7) and the result has been as follow*: 
D - 2 . 8 x 1 0 " * 
This value has been considered adequate referred to the reliability 
requirements made to the usera. From the detail of the calculations 
it has been possible to notice that the greatest contribution to the 
-2 * total value i s given by the switching valve (0.65 . 1 0 ), by the sols-
_2 
noid valve on the bottle of nitrogen (0. SS . 10 ) and by the control 
.2 
panel elements (0. TS . 10 1. 
A s to the last ones It i s possible to suppose that the used value of 
the rate i s sufficiently near to the real value because just a certain 
number of simple components are involved such as wirings and 
contacts of which the failure rate i s known with some confidence. 
A • to the valves the rate is a value obtained from the average of 
data relative to valves with similar functions, but different reali-
zations. A s it i s a question of complex components, a remarkable 
variability can be expected regarding the particular realisation. 
In order to make sure that the real rates of the valves do not con-
siderably exceed the utillxed vaktes a failure survey program of 
those valves has been arranged in agreement with the manufacturer. 
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A s soon as a significant statistics Is available, it will be possible 
to give a final judgement which will make it possible either to confirm 
the adequacy of the present system or to si'ggest the opportunity of 
modifications. 
In our system, as impossible to operate tLs system manually when 
the staff is in, it is of interest to calculate also the plant reliability 
taking into account the different manual interventions previously de-
scribed. This Implies the discussion of the human intervention re-
liability. In such a case there are difficulties of different kinds such 
as : 
a) taking into consideration the environment and psycological 
conditions in which the staff will be operating during a fire; 
b) the care requested for not customary operations; 
c) the lack of guarantee as to the availability of the staff such 
as to make is sure an opportune intervention. 
Notwith standing all that a fractional dead time calculation has been 
tried, supposing that the intervention of human operator is success-
ful 9 times out of tea Such rather low value has appeared to us 
reasonable, taking into account the literature data and all the above 
mentioned considerations, in the scheme of fig. S, the dotted con-
nections refers to manual interventions. 
In this case it comes out that the fractional dead time is: 
D - 0.74 x lo"8 
mainly determined by the switching valve. 40,65 xlO % The cal-
culated value shows the positive influence of the manual intervention 
probability. However the human intervention is esclnded from the 
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switching valve which, in such way, results to be the critical 
point of the system. 
Since spourlous CO, inlet, not preceeded by the optical and 
acoustic signals, could be dangerous for the staff, another element 
of interest is the knowledge of the rate of such an event in our plant. 
The logic functional scheme of the system from the point of view of 
the spourious CO inlets not signalised i s shown in fig. 4. 
The calculation has given the following value for the probability of 
spourious CO. inlet in a period of three months: 
P ' 4 . 8 xlO"3 
A s it can be seen, this value i s mainly determined by the probability 
.3 
of leakage in the valves of nitrogen bottle, that i s 5 x 10 . 
The rate of spuriousCO, not signalized i s then: 
1.9 s 10 immissions/y 
The rate of spurious interventions preceeded by alarm have been 





The theoretical reliability assessment, carried out in a numerical 
way for the lire protection system, has shown how the switching 
valve is the critical point in the whole system and, comparing the 
results with the reliability requirements fcr the system, has allow-
ed so far to judge the adequacy of the system even taking into account 
the existing uncertainties in the knowledge of the actual failure rates. 
Since the theoretical assessment represents one of the initial steps 
in a performance evaluation and is of enhanced use if supported by 
practical results from actual field experience, a data collection 
system on the behaviour of the plant has been initiated with particular 
regard to those components which have been determined-from this analysis 
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Su—lary 
The example of two real lead scram systems ia taken to show that 
a system that has to perform the sane job on request simultaneous-
ly for many of independent customers (control rods), can be built 
•rare reliable and more economic,if a highly redundant network of 
components is used instead of a systeai composed of Many independent 
blocks« This is true even if soae of these custoaiers need not be 
supplied* 
The analysis showed that coasMWily used failure rates »r« too 
poor for the carefully fabricated and thoroughly controlled com-
ponents of reactor stand-by systems. 
In detail, it is pointed out to what extent system sTailability may 
be maintained by reduction of control time in the case that one 
component of a redundant system needs repair and the others are 
not available during test. 
1. Introduction 
In a boiling water reactor (BVR), the entire operational reactivity 
is controlled by contrtl rods. With the present core configuration, 
1 control rod is needed per 17 NV thermal power. This results in 
•ore than 100 control rods for a 640 MMe plant and nearly 300 
control rods for a 1100 MVe plant which have to be hydraulicly 
Injected within about 3 « « • in case of a scram. 
In US BWRs and the former German ones, every rod is fitted with its 
own scran system (fig. i), consisting of a pressure tank filled 
with water afld nitrogen, of several valves and pipework and of 
the re« drive mechanism. With Increasing reactor power, this system 
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becoaes Bor« and more intricate and vol m i nous since conai sting of 
too many parts. Therefore, for tha Wirgasaen power station a scram 
system is being built consisting of only six large pressure tanks, 
three of them discharging into a cossion ring header, and each of 
the two headers feeding every control rod drive* For a scran, 
water injection out of only two tanks is needed, the systea thus 
having ample redundancy* 
Reliability Analysis 
For comparison, a systea analysis was performed for both systeas 
on the basis of the following assumptionst 
1* A scram signal arrives correctly 
2. Failure rates X are independent of each other and independent 
of time (tested components, no wear and tear) 
3. Reliability R is only a function of tiae, 
R - 1 - e ~ X t (1) 
4. Both systeas are usually controlled every 8 weeks (vide-flj). 
The functional diagram for the analysis of the former system is 
siaplei All components of a subsystem for one control rod are 
arranged in series, and all subsystems are parallel and independent 
of each other* Therefore, froa the failure probability of one rod, 
the failure probability of x rods is easily derived by use of the 
binoainal distribution fa]. 
Fig. 2 shows a siaplified version of the functional diagram used 
for the now systea« The brief and bandy tiae sharing program taken 
for the analysis is not able to handle a general network of com-
ponents, but only parallel branches leading independently to success« 
with the exception of the fact that r oat of n s in liar and parallel 
components or branche« are required, now the diagraa shews that it 
ia sufficient, If two of the three tanks (l) connected to either 
ring header (2) feed water through one of the two headers. The case 
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that only one tank per header works, had to be neglected. However, 
thia eaae is negligible, since the probability of occurence per 
header ia of the order FZ, if F is the failure probability of one 
tank, wherias the probability that no tank faila ia of the order 1. 
Failure rataa were taken fros the best sources available. A failure 
of a acrasi tank and the piping directly connected waa regarded as a 
conditional probability: a Mechanical damage has to occur, and the 
control instrumentation has to fail sismltaneoualy. 
The result of the analysis is plotted in fig. 3. failure probability 
of z rods vs. x. The dashed lines show the first outcome. Two points 
are significantt 
1. The naw aystem is by far better than the former one, if a limited 
number of rods is regarded. Thia is due to the high redundancy 
involved in the new aystem. 
2, For the former system, the most probable effect predicted ia 
failure of one rod. This ia in contradiction to every experience 
and muat be attributed to too peeaimistie failure rates. 
Nov, failure ratea were reduced by a factor of 10, thoae foi piping 
and walda by a faktor of 100. The pipes are uaually under reactor pressure 
of 70 bar, and they are only loaded by deaign pressure of about ISO bar 
during a acram. 
The result ia shown by the full lines. Failure probability of the former 
system appears quantitatively correct, however still worse than proven 
by experience. The acram systene of the reactor« VAK, KRB and KWL (former 
design) have now been in operation for a total of ca 4,2 • 10 h (operation 
time multiplied by numbe' of control rods). Prsdictlon would be 7.8 failure«. 
None waa abaerved. With a confidence level aequivalent toiff", thia means 
that system failure rate is up to now lower thaa the reduced one by a 
factor of 3. Therefore it appeara justified to reduce common failure rates 
f-r application to aechanical reactor stand-by ayatama at leaat by a fac-
tor of 10. 
Up to five rasp, aaven rods, the probability polygons of both system« 
have similar trend« la fig. 31 
Failure probability ia determined by the component« without redundancy. For 
the now cyatea, however, a simultaneous failure of about 5 rods is aa pro-
bable as a breakdown of the entire nystes, the probability of which is 
given by a failure of both ring headers. This seems to be a disadvantage 
of the new system. But the forser systea should behave 
equally, because a common mode vill certainly underliv 
* simultaneous failure of sove five rode and will then affect a 
lot of or all other rods. too. 
At first sight, a failure probability for two rods of 5 • 10 
per sera* sight seem relatively high. It must be considered, 
Hoverer, 
- that the result given in fig. 3 is still rather conservative, 
as already mentioned; 
- that the plot is valid for the end of the control period of 
8 weeks« For a systen needed sometime within the control 
period £" , the average reliability 
R « £ I R(t)dt (2) , i j R , t 
is »ore representative, end this one is noticeably lower i 
- that reactor conditions causing a sera«, are only in very rare 
rases such that only one rod any fail (seras) during start-up 
of the cold reactor)| 
- that in these cases not any two rods, but two defined rods 
have to fail, and this by itself reduces failure probability 
by about 4 orders of magnitude* 
So we feel that the VUrgassen system has reached a notably high 
level of reliability. 
Availability Considerations 
The overall plant availability shall be iapalred as little as 
possible by subsystems such as the scraa system. If as a eon* 
sequence of failures detected the aystem reliability is toe low, 
the reactor ha« to be abut dmos* Therefore minimum reliability 
should be maintained in seme way, if one of the more possible 
failures should occur. 
Vatsr level and pressure control have by far the highest failure 
ratesf repair should be possible without restriction in availability. 
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The same applies to the scram valves, the only active part in 
the system regarded. 
For the former system, a high availability is given by the 
possibility to insert a rod mechanically by the control rod 
drive, if the scram mechanism should be found not workinq properly. 
Further reactor operation is possible when keeping this rod in-
serted, and tank or scram valve can be repaired when the usually 
open valve behind the scram valve is shut. The only penalty might 
bi a restriction in reactor load towards the end of a fuel period. 
With the new system, there is no equal possibility, because every 
tank feeds all control rods. Therefore surplus tanks must be in-
stalled to maintain the availability the former system had. Indeed, 
a sensitivity analysis of the new system proved among others that 
only four 50%-tanks, each equipped with two scraa valves, are 
sufficient! If the thus reduced system is tested everj k weeks 
instead of 8, failure probability will raise only by 10 %. So one 
tank of the three feeding in one header and the scram valves 
affiliated may be switched off for repair without reducing the 
reliability of the system or the performance of the reactor. 
4. Influence of Control Time and Control Duration 
Under the assumption* listed in paragraph '<£, reliability of a 
component is equal i immediately after a successful control, and 
it diminishes as time goes on. So usual]v syatem reliability 
increases if control timeZT - the time between two controls -
is decreased. This may be used to maintain a required reliability 
of a redundant system, if one romponent needs repair. 
Now, a new problem arose with an advanced version ot the new scram 
system. It proved to be more economic and more rpliable to furnish 
the system with fo»r l00*-tanks, each equipped with oite scram valve, 
instead of six 50%-tanke, each of them equipped with two scram 
Al 
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ralves. During the test of a sera* valve, which meane to open 
the valve and shut it again, the tank is not available, because 
the BOtor operated check valve (fig. l) haa to be closed during 
the test in order to avoid a sera«. This kind of teat obviously 
•eana a reduction of the average systea reliability, aa defined 
by eq. (2); fig« 4 illustrates the fact. In addition, optimum 
average reliability nay no longer be obtained for permanent con-
trol, but for a finite control time* An estimation of tha in-
fluence is briefly given in the following. 
A syatesi be composed of n similar and parallel components, »* of 
which are necessary for success, and R be the reliability of on« 
component, F - 1 - H its failure probability. Then tha reliability 
It of the system is given by 
fltin.rl * IE ( ") f & (3) 
V'-f 
vid«J~2j. If eq. (l) is inserted and the reeulting expression 
linearised, ve here 
Rsth.r) - "/"" (r>-fft)()-tl
 (4) 
As fig. 5 illustrates, the reliability of a f-at-a arete, is 
reduced to that of a -f-of-(n - l) systea durina the test of 
the first component. If the test is successful, R^ juaps up to 
that of a (-T - 1) -of- (n - l) systea. tt easily can be ahem 
that the areas A and A-, being proportional to the syste. failure 
probability, differ by a factor of the order of the component 
failure probability, 
*2 * Al " 0 < " ( J ) 
Therefore it it sufficient to take account of the area A or the 
respective largest. By attending to •«. (2) and Ik), tha average 
syate. reliability then reaults in 
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where tn stand« for the test duration. The expression obviously 
approaches a maximum fojr 7~-+- o, if tse system is redundant (1>**)| 
otherwise optisnui control time is finite* (7) 
Based on this theory, the influence of the test duration t_ on 
the reliability of the advanced four tank system shall be valued. 
The system be simplified to a l-of-4 system with a total failure 
probability ,T , 
% \l\tfdt -- -f£> 
in the average, which means A " 6,251 * 10/h. If the components 
are tested auccessfully, the influence of t_ is negligible. But 
if one tank is found failed, the control time has to be reduced 
from X • 5b days to 
Z* » o days if tn = 10 minutes, 
Z:'**ll days if t • O minutes 
if the reliability of tbe full system shall bs maintained. Ob-
viously the case that components are available during the test, 
is implied in tbe above theory if t_ is put zero. In a more general 
•anner, this result is plotted in fig. 6. If the full system re-
liability (to"9) is 10 times better than required (10 ), the re-
duced control times will bet 
V' » 20 days if tn - 10 minutes, 
Z~* a» 22 days if tn - O minutes. 
A* a result of this paragraph, it may be summarised that also for 
the advanced version of the new scram system, the accumulators of 
which are net available during the test (lasting a few minutes),the 
required availability is guaranteed. 
- 8 
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Fiy. 1: Principle drawing of two scram systems 
left: new system with few tanks 
and ring headers 
right: former system with separate tanks 
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check val ves,piping 
3 •' throttling valve, 
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piping 
Fig. 2: Functional diagram for system 
analysis of the new scram system 
v -; km'j *£rftn i i y i 
4 6 8 10 12 
number of failed rods 
H 16 
Fig. 3: Failure polygon of the former and the new system 
for low rod numbers 
Dashed lines: First outcome with conventional data 
applied to stand-by system 
Full iines:Conservative result with improved data 
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time t 
Fig. 4 s Reliability R vs. time t of a stand by 
component with failure rate A that 
is not available during test durationtD. 
Average reliability R~ is optimized for 
for control time Topt,. 
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Fig.5: System reliability RsvsJime valid 
for a system of n parallel components 
r of which are necessary. 
Components are not available during 
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'b) fuilsystem reliability 10 times 
better than required. 
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SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY 
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RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF A NOVEL LIQUID ROD SHUT-DOWN SYSTEM 
S. Galli de Pa rate si, L. Ghiurghi, H, Muaik 
Automation and Control Section 
EURATOM, Joint Nuclear Research Centre, lepra, Italy 
S u m m a r y 
A few pressure tube reactors have encountered difficulties in finding a 
suitable solution for the installation of safety rods and related mechanisms. 
This i s because of the lack of available room in the reactor top and bottom 
spaces and the intricated inlet and outlet coolant tubes configuration. 
To overcome these and other difficulties, special systems of liquid shut-
down rods have been developed at the C.C.R. Euratom of Ispra, and a proto-
type system is now under completion. The studies have been carried out in 
the framework of Euratom D , 0 development programs. The full scale pro-
totype, which follows a feasibility mock-up, has been deemed necessary 
mainly for long term operation and reliability tests , before putting the s y s -
tem in actual service in whatever reactor. 
Being this new system an emergency shut-down device, its reliability 
requirements cannot be overstressed. This paper is an attempt to predict 
the system reliability before any practical result can be drawn from the pro-
totype exploitation. The prediction is based on published failure rate data for 
electro-mechanical devices . As imposed by available data, the exponential 
distribution i s used throughout. Calculations will include fractional dead time 
for unrevealed and revealed faults and the relevant probabilities and •purlou* 
trip probabilities. 
The numerical results of the prediction are intended as a preliminar eva-
luation, to be confirmed and/or completed with data gathered during the pro-
totype operation and bench tests on components! 
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List of Symbol« 
D fractional dead t ime 
F(t) = P(T <t) probability of the device to fail in interval 0 , t 
f(t) = ~*t PTot>ab>Uty density function of the lifespan of the 
device 
f .(t) probability density of emergency shut-down demands 
Pl(Tc) probability that the sjrtent will »utter one åmgeienm fail-
ure within the period T when it was thoroughly checked 
and without faults at time sero 
p.(t) probability of a hazard arising by time t 
T, mean failed time for all interval« 
B random emergency shut-down demand rate 
generic valve failure rate 
. assumed failure rate for solenoid valve blockage 
. flange joint failure rate 
assumed failure rate for solenoid valve spurious opening 
c time interval between system overhauls 
r time to repair a revealed fault 
t interval between two subsequent valve routine testa 







In 1966 a research activity on liquid rod shut-down systems was ini-
tiated in the frame of the ORGEL program, concluded at the end of 1968; 
it is now under way in the frame of the D2O reactors assistance program. 
This activity has been given the name of EUL.ER PROGRAM. 
Research in this field ia justified by the desirability of avoiding the 
difficulties that the installation of normal solid rods would raise in some 
reactor. In particular, in pressure tube reactors the installation of solid 
rods becomes extremely difficult, sometimes impossible, because the 
available space between the channel ends, above and below the core, i s 
very limited. In addition, the fuel element loading and unloading facilities 
often prevent any other installation in at leasi one of the zones over and 
under the core, while the latter is sometimes inaccessible for high tempe-
rature reasons. Since liquid rods are essentially tubes of small diameter 
in which a neutron absorbing solution is injected at the moment of the 
shut-down action, they easily fit the most complicated configurations and 
follow any path through the shield. Besides, all the drive mechanisms jean 
be" located in areas accessible for maintenance. / 
The studies began with the evaluation of several possible systems. 
Mock-ups were erected to test the feasibility and the dynamic performance 
of the two chosen systems called "bubble tube" and "gravity drop/type 
respectively. The goals of the mock-ups were achieved, and a Completely 
instrumented full scale prototype of the "gravity drop" type is, now under 
completion. The purpose of the prototype i s not only to Serve1 as a general 
test facility, before putting the system in actual work on a reactor, but al-
so in particular for reliability studies and observation of long term perform-
ance of the component parts. It has been designed following the specifications 
imposed to the system which will actually be installed in/a D2O moderated 
pressure tube reactor. 
The system being a fast acting emergency shut-down device for power 
reactors, no wonder that very much attention has been given to its reliable 
and safe operation. We will show the basic features that make the system 
very reliable from the reactor safety viewpoint. Then we will try to predict 
the interesting reliability parameters, i . e . fractional dead time, failure 
probabilities, mfnrioaa trip probabilities. 
2 . SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The *y»tem it ihown in Eig. 1, It 1* bated on the principle of the U-tube, 
in a »imilar way to what ha« bsen done in some Canadian reactors with the 
"ga» balancing lyitem" to drop the moderator level in the case of «m»r|fMy. 
In our case th« application o*l L»*t csnc*pt, Dropossd by the WS£ ifts/yj*,***-
c«rn# »mail qu**tUi«» ei FtQi*Qft«g- solution U i&de>«Jw3*J* J*^«tf»4, tyb##^*K 




held out of the reactor core (at normal level) by means of a controlled dif-
ferential gas pressure between the header tanks T-l and T-2. Automatic 
fast opening valves V-l through V-6, operated by means cf a 2 out of 3 
logic, are energized and closed, while the manual block valves upstream 
and downstream of the former are locked open. 
Level control is performed through valve V-8, in a very simple way. 
That valve is open and injects a small quantity of gas into the rod system, 
via the header tank T-2, and into tank T-5. The latter is an auxiliary de-
vice, in parallel with the rods, in such a way that the liquid level in it is 
always the same as in the rods. The gas injected through V-8 is continu-
ously transferred from T-5 to T-l , bubbling in the vertical connection pipe. 
If, for system leakage or upset, the pressure in T-2 drops, thus making 
the level in the rods and T-5 rise, the extremity of the bubbling tube is 
closed, so allowing the pressure in the rods to be restored at the set value, 
and the level will return to normal value. If, on the opposite, a system up-
set causes pressure in T-2 to rise, the level in rods and T-5 goes down, 
so causing the extremity of the bubbling tube (which is properly shaped) to 
open wider, allowing the discharge of more gas, until the normal level is 
restored. This kind of level control has proven very precise, and extremely 
reliable because no control loop is involved. 
Shut-down action is performed by opening valves V-l through V-6, and 
the rods are filled with solution up to the header T-2. At the moment of shut-
down, valve V-8 is closed. 
Each rod is part of an independent loop. An automatic stop valve is 
placed at the bottom ( i . e . the lowest point) of each loop, valves V-9-1 through 
V-9-N. The bottom of each rod is connected also to a second, smaller dia-
meter loop, the purpose of which is to circulate the solution by means of 
pump P during reactor normal operation in order to prevent any possible 
deposit formation or disuniform concentration. The bottom of the circulation 
loops i s also provided with valves, V-10-1 through V-10-N. After shut-down, 
by opening valves V-16, V-15, V-l2 and V-9, the solution i s circulated in the 
rods and through the solution tank T-3 by means of pump P - l , to prevent it 
from overheating by gamma irradiation in the in-core portion of the loop. 
Closing again all valves, the I«vel controller can be re-energized and the rods 
withdrawn to their norma] working level. 
If required, the rods can be rinsed out before resetting the system. Of 
course, this operation requires the reactor to be put in a safe position by 
other means than the liquid rods, e. g. by lowering the moderator level or 
remove part of the fuel. The solution is discharged into tank T-3 by opening 
valve« V-9, V.IO, V - l l and V-15. Then valve« V - l l and V-15 are do»ed, 
V-l 3, V-M and V-16 opened and demineralized water i* admitted to the 
bottom of t h . loop« and discharged via T-2, V-16 and V-14 • • long as re-
quired to clean the rods from the reiidual lolution. Cloiing V-l 3, the System 
Is thsh drained, and closing V-11, opening V-12, energising V-1 through V-6 
and the level controller, it can be refilled with solution by means of pump P - l . 
^ • ^ • r * aormal levsl in T-l n reached (level i«,»h» rod 1« aiUtraatlcally coo-
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trolled), the pump is stopped, all valves closed and the system is reloaded« 
Compressor C-l takes care of gas pressure control, and keeps pressure in 
T-l and T-3 near to atmospheric value, pumping into accumulator tank T-4. 
3. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
Preliminary qualitative considerations must be given before attempting 
a more rigorous approach, in order to point out the basic advantages of the 
system and where the reliability analysis must be centered. 
Liquid rods consist of empty tubes, passing through the core, which 
are filled with a suitable solution every time an emergency shut-down is re-
quired. It is easily seen that this operation is by far easier and more safe 
than dropping a solid rod into a guide tube. In fact liquid rising in a pipe 
cannot stick to the walls, even if these are rough or rusted. Even a distorted 
or ovalized tube cannot prevent the correct shut-down. A frequent cause of 
dangerous troubles with rods, so simply does not exist in liquid rod systems, 
and this i s a big advantage from a safety standpoint. Even the extreme case 
of an in-core pipe rupture (due e .g . to a pressure tube explosion) would not 
cause loss of safety. Of course, what would follow in that case cannot be 
considered a regular shut-down, because the moderator would be contami-
nated by the solution, but the reactor safety is still guaranteed. 
Proper rod operation depends on gas pressure for level control. Loss of 
gas supply, whatever the reason, will always result in a spurious shut-down* 
i . e . in a safe operation. In fact, the driving force, being gravity, can never 
fail. As in the rest position of the system the rods are full of solution, one 
can hardly imagine an unsafe accident. 
Really gravity driven solid rods share this property (apart from the 
possible rod sticking). Nevertheless, even though gas boosters could be 
simply designed in order to accelerate the shut-down action (which, in a sense, 
are similar to the accelerating mechanisms used in solid rods), liquid rods 
have the big advantage that they can be made faster only by increasing the 
gravity head and/or the ratio between the diameters of the vertical out-of-c ore 
pipes coming out of T-l and the rod tubes. 
Scram valves V-l through V-6 are arranged, in order to increase the sy s -
tem reliability and allow on-line testing, in a 2 /3 logic as shown in Tig. 2. 
Still, the safety channel instrumentation (sensors, trip amplifiers e t c . . , ) i t 
out of the purpose of our work, so w* will limit our considerations to the shut-
down device itself. Valves V-l through V-6 will bs considered as tlw system'« 
actuator, consisting of a series-parallel arrangement. These valves work in 
a fail-safe manner, i . e . , they are closed when energisod, tor obvious safety 
reasons. 
Finally, auxiliary equipment and circuits, a« solution tank and pea**. 
helium compressor, qu»hi^i *4**r U*w •*«., hav« **> r ^ b#*rta* Oftfs. »?*>*-
trm safety. They werk *# • » ? * » ( • # y » t » r ** s+riorf* mmHtØåf? ********* *• 
and their m*L/aj,«i«k. cannot bjrt tmp*4r, »ft* t&MTttti*. tajwuh9**\ s ^ ti******! » 
Uoos >riU thirefer***- cqrøned t# *** »*J-*4»T*#» ff^iMfcSSK•*•<»f t«i44fc*<* 
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quid aides. These circuits only consist of pipes and valves. The pipes being 
submitted to moderated temperatures and low pressures (the static head 
maximum), they are heavily derated, so that their failure rate can be ne-
glected in comparison to the valves failure rate. For this reason we will 
henceforth only consider failures of valves and their combinations. Note that 
there is always a double barrier (a series of two valves) between the main 
loops and the auxiliaries. 
4. FAIL-TO-DANGER FAULTS 
4.1 Combined Revealed and Unrevealed Faults 
We will begin our considerations on dangerous system faults with those 
. caused by failures of valves at the bottom of the rods, i . e . valves V-9-1, 2, 
. . . N and V-10-1, Z, . . . N coupled with failures of valves in the auxiliary cir-
cuits. Faults in the former set of valves are revealed by means of probes 
placed just beneath each valve, to monitor the presence of liquid in portions 
of pipes which are normally dry. False opening or lack of internal tightness 
of valves V- l l through V-15, on the other hand, cannot be revealed because 
normally there is no liquid present at those valves, so that this kind of fail-
ure is of the unrevealed type. 
Fig. 3 is a simplified diagram, showing the actual situation of the proto-
type system. The total number of rods is eight, six of which are enough to 
perform a correct shut-down, i . e. the entire system i s faulty when at least 
three out of eight rods have lost liquid. Any rod has two valves through which 
solution could leak out, but liquid will not be actually lost unless at least one 
of the auxiliary lines, constituting the unrevealed system, is also open. Rod 
failures due to internal losses toward T-3 are therefore a combination of re-
vealed and unrevealed valve failures. 
From the general formulas of the majority vote schemes, the probability 
of failure of our revealed, three-out-of-eight system can be expressed as 
follows: 
r . 1 - 28 e-12*«* t IB e"1**** - 21 e"16*** (1) 
p 
The unrevealed system, consisting of three parallel lines, each one contain-
ing a given combination of valves, has the following probability of failure: 
Tv . 1 - a e"3*«* t 7 e "'*<•* - 5 e-6*"* t e"7*««* (2) 
, A protective system failure can occur when both the revealed and the 
unrevealed systems are in the failed state at the same moment. If a revealed 
failure occurs first it will be immediately repaired, so that the only probabi-
lity of significants of having a failure of the protective system s i a whole i s 
t t# •c*wr**Me of s revealed fault while at least one unrevealed Us« Is i s the 
frt l f f S*S»». Unrsvaaled type of faults include of course vatr« internal and 
*§&•*•* lusss i . Tattfm; into account the repair actio* which take* place in s 
(3) 
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within T , the probability of a 8ystem failure can be expreaaed by: 
0i(Tc> = f° *'**' fC \ < f )fr<t-f )[i-rr(xc-vt3 dt 
o t * 
being t' the time of occurrence of the unrevealed failure. The probability of 
having two ayetem failurea within the game period T would be: 
P2(TC) = | T c \ t | T c \ v J V \ c t ) f p ( f -t)fr(f'-t'-Tr)[l-Fp(Tc-xp-t»)]dt" 
O t t*+T 
r 
being t" the moment of occurrence of the second revealed fault. It i» easily 
seen that p ( T ) « P . ( T ) «° w « can neglect it and all the successive ones. 
For the assessment of the system fractional dead time, one must con-
sider that, every time the system fails, it remains in the failed state for a 
period T , Hence the mean failed time for all intervals equal to T i s : 
T , = xp w (4) 
The corresponding fractional dead time for the period i ia given by: 
c 
For calculating p ( r ) and D , the real problem i* the value to be as -
aigned to the valve« failure rate«, X and \ . Published data do not mention 
important factor« such a« valve size, operation mode etc. In addition differ-
ent «onrces often do not agree between each other. In these condition« suit-
abl« value« m u t be in some way Inferred. 
The fir«t consideration to be made i* that it i« quite reasonable to a s -
sume X - X . Secondly, the low pressure and temperature at which those 
valve« are submitted, the absence of »hocks, vibration«, fluctuations of en-
vironmental conditions, the fail-safe mode of operation, all suggest the 
choice of the most favourable data among the published ones, i . «. 
* _ " * , " 1 .5/10 6 h (Ref. 2). Assuming i < 1 year, t « 5 h, the results 
ofthe calculations performed by means of the ISPRA 3e6/65 IBM digital 
computer are as follows: 
P 1 ( t c ) « 0.61 a 10"7 (6) »x - 0.35 x 10"W (7) 
*t is perhaps worthwhile noting the importance oi the excess rod* inclttewa 
In tha design. If, lor isstanc«, i* UM sacBeiVroJeet only » t so ess s taaoassad* 
be previdsd, (he srMsm wool* letl whew »we-eot *f w r e n rwoV-wvswaslafejes'« 
tailed state, in this eas* tas »roaastftty «i fslsurs ot«e» s e — I X «»»!•*> :q 




and the overall system failure probability: 
p l , ( x e ) = ° ' 1 5 x 10~5 DJ = 8.5 x 10"10 
4.2 Revealed Fault a of Flange Joint a 
Another sourre of dangerous system failures is the failure of flange 
joints at the rod bottom. This is a revealed type of fault, and the system 
again behaves as a three out of eight majority vote system. The fractional 
dead time for this case is given by: 
{>. 
where V is the failure rate of each rod due to the flange gaskets at its bot-
tom. The failure rate of a single junction i s assumed to be 0. 05/10* h. 
Each rod (Fig. 3) ends in two lines, and the liquid is only present down 
to the upstream side of the motorized valves, which are closed during nor-
mal operation, so that there are in total six wetted joints per rod. A fault 
of any one causes the failure of the rod, which means that X = 6 x 0 .05 / l0°h ' 
= 0. 3/106 h. Assuming again T = 5 h: ' 
4. 3 Dangerous Failures Due to Scram Valves 
Valves V-l through V-6 form the system actuator. They are excited 
and closed during normal operation, and must open when shut-down action is 
required. There are three parallel lines, and a fail-to-daager fault arises 
when all lines ( i . e . at least three valves in three different lines) remain closed 
upon emergency signal. Being these valves closed in normal operation, their 
sticking is an unrevealed type of fault. A sequential, weekly opening test (pe-
riod i = 168 h) is planned for these valv;s. 
The probability of a system failure due to this series-parallel arrange-
ment is given by: 
p(t) r (1 -
 e -
2
* b V (9) 
Tha relevant fractional dead time can be calculated by: 
P<t) dt (10) 
•Htr*= 
o 
»rom the usual sources, the assumed generic failure rata i s : X > 4 .5 / lO'h. 
W e O t l m a f that in our case, where the valves are closed when power is ap-
aU«*v*>4fc« sisctoamsanetic motor and opeasd bv »return taring. Duly 101, M 
jJP)«, »bov« value will contribute ,«p valve blockage, Tb« vaia* to be nasd i«
 s<< 
therefore » = 4 .5/10 h, which leads to the result: b 
D 3 = 8.6 x 10"1 0 
5. PROBABILITY OF HAZARD 
5. 1 Shut-Down Valves 
We will start the evaluation of the probability of hazard that arises where 
a shut- down is required while the system i s in the failed state, by consider-
ing valves V-1 through V-6, The demand for emergency shut-down is supposed 
to be random and the corresponding demand rate B very low, in such a way 
that, for the valve test period x , it can be said that BT « 1. 
In this case, assuming 6 = 4 demands/year, the probability of hasard, at 
the end of the test period, i s : 
«WV =Btt D3 = 6-6 x 10~" < " ' 
At the end of a period x comprising n weeks, the probability of hasard will be: 
Ph3(Tc) = 1 - ( 1 - Ph3<Tt))n - » ph 3(r t) (12) 
with good approximation. At the end of one year we will then have: 
Ph 3( lyr) = 3 . 4 x l 0 " 9 (13) 
5. 2 Block Valves at the Bottom of the Rods 
A hazard can arise only when a demand occurs during the repair time of 
a dangerous fault. Hence, from (3): 
»hi » fc \x<|V\(f )f„(t-f )[i - rp(Wt)]dt prfa«t» (14) 
o f t 
where f i s the probability density of emergency shut-down demand« which 
can be expressed as f. = B e~ ', and substituting in (14) 
a 
P M . (1 - e-Btr> j ^ ' d f j t c " \ < t * r ( t - t ' ) . - * [ l - F r ( V T r t ) | d t (1J) 
Again assuming 6 » 4 demands/year and i « S V » result« #r *< I Md 
1 - e* , T r • 6t . Calculating (15) by digital computer we get a probfMUty 
a« the end of one year of: %rfr>;-;?&t4<(»S 
» M - 0.0062 x 10 ' ' -- r- , , 
ff. 
6. SPURIOUS TRIPS 
o. 1 Shut-Down Valves 
The reactor will undergo a spurious trip when at least one of the three 
lines connecting T-l and T-2 (Fig. 2) is opened by spurious trip of the rele-
vant valves. 
The accumulated time to repair N faults i s T « NT . The average num-
ber of faults occurring in a period T being N • X T , it will be 
T = AT T f s r 
which is also the mean tripped time for one valve over a long period T. 
A spurious trip of a valve during the tripped time of the other valve of the 
same line will cause a spurious shut-down of the plant. Hence, the average 
number of plant shut-downs caused by each line during the period T i s : 
M__ : n = X2 T T SD f s s r 
The mean total spurious trip rate due to the three parallel lines i s : 
Substituting the numerical valuea T - 5 h and » = 4/10 h, which is the 9/10 
of the assumed generic failure rate for solenoid valves (Ref. Chap.4. 3) it 
will result: 
«j = 0.21 x 10' 3 trips/year. 
6.2 Spurious Trins through T-2 Overflow Line 
T-2 overflow line i j closed by valve V-16. This valve is normally closed, 
and its spurious opening while V-14 or Y-IS have also opened by failure, will 
cause a plant spurious shut-down. The total failure rate of the system V-14, 
V- IS is 2 x , hence the average number of trips over a long period T i s 
N » 2 XT. The accumulated time to repair N faults i s T « N t • 2 i l l r > 
Since t ie rate at which V-16 produces spurious openings fs a l s o ' , the aver-
age number of spurious plant shut-downs i s : 
The mean total shut-down rate results in: 
SD 9 
rr. »j »,f*f «,2 \' T . . . (W) 
-»»Snj fo '^a ; . , . , , . , - „ •_. . . . . ". , , • "i 
Substituting the values already used to compute r ^ w s i ^ (J6) M e J*W 
*_ • j ' O . U a l O ^ t t i p a / y e a r . t: < -« • ' ' - '" ,,,"» •-
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6. 3 Spurious Trips Due to Level Control System 
If T-5 and the pipes connecting it to T-l get empty, a spurious plant 
shut-down would occur, because T-l and T-2 would communicate directly. 
This can happen by V-7 spurious opening (**ig. 1) while at least one of the 
three auxiliary lines (the same set called "unrevealed system" in Fig. 3) 
has failed open. 
The mean failed time over a period T for the auxiliary lines is 




Pu(t) = <KJpt)2(l - 1.25XPt) (19) 
Substituting in (18) and solving: 
Tf • ! *rTc ( 1 " » • * V c ' <M> 
When valve V-7 opens with the same failure rate X during a failed period of 
the auxiliary system, a plant shut-down will occur, and the total number of 
trips per period x will be N » T X . 
The trip rate is 9, - NA and substituting N: 
Being; T . 8750 h and X * 4 / l u \ : 
c r 
6 • 3. 8 x 10" trips/year 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis performed in the preceding chapter* confirms what could 
be guessed through a qualitative inspection ef :'-e system, its properties, U§ 
behaviour under different circumstances (Ref. Chap, 3), The total fractional 
plant dead time, for all causes considered iss 
D « D j + D 2 + D 3 » (0.35 • ...OCBS • 8.6)10"1 0 « 9 * 10*' 
From this it i s apparent that the major contribution to the system deed 
tims i« given by the scram valve system, while the contribution t>t «t U e 
-10-
losses through flange joints :.iay be neglected. 
The hasard probability a is c ertainly negligible, so that it has not 
been calculated, p. and p , representing independent events, maybe 
added to give the overall hazard probability over a period of one year: 
Pv " P,_, +Pv» = (0.0062 + 3.4) x 10"' = 3.4 x 10"9 h h i b } 
The dominant part is , again, the scram valves assembly. It i s perhaps 
useful to point o, t that the p calculated by us is only a part of the true 
plant hasard probability, (which should be, for instance, better than 10 , 
Kef. 5), because the consideration of the reactor safety instrumentation 
is beyond our scope. Nevertheless, a sound safety assessment should not 
be attempted without considering the influence of the safety chains, which 
may well play a major role. 
Similar considerations apply to spurious trip rates. Of the various 
Tates calculated, only one dominates by far.the loss of liquid fTom the level 
control system, which gives 
-2 , 
- 3.8 x 10 trip/year 
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me reliability of a containment isolation system Is analysed and the 
results are compared to a reliability- standard. 
A short description Is given of the analysed containment Isolation system 
and related systems. K B fune ion of the systems i s explained. Ihe procedure 
of the reliability analysis Is explained Including failure effect analysis, 
development of the fault tree, selection of appropriate input data and 
the calculation of the overall system rel iabil i ty. 
The fault tree i s calculated using a fonte Carlo method computer programmej 
uhlch Is explained to some extent. Ihe results obtained from the computer 
are given and Interpreted. 
Ihe overall reliability of the system i s compared to a rel iabil i ty standard. 
Ihe derivation of that standard Is explained and discussed. 
Ti 
The Reliability of a Containment Isolation System 
1« Introduction 
In the paper A / presented at the 2nd CflESF meeting In Ispra an attempt was 
made to assess the reliabil ity of an emergency power supply system. Several 
limitations of the problem were given due to our limited knowledge. 
This paper shows the progress made in the assessment technique during the last 
year. A system snalysls technique as well as a reliability analysis technique 
has been developed. Further, reliability computer programmes are now in use. 
In addition we have developed some idea of a reliabil ity standard /2/ which 
also i s included In this paper. 
To demonstrate the recent developments the analysis of the containment isolation 
system of Kemkraftwerk WUrgassen (XMW) has been ehoosen as an example. 
2 . Procedure of System Analysis 
First of a l l , a reliability engineer has to translate the real design of a 
complex system into a rel iabil i ty model of the system which can be subject 
to a reliabil ity oaloulatlon. 
In order to make suoh a translation a ttorough knowledge of the design of the 
system and i t s functions i s necessary. Therefor«, a system analysis must be 
perfomed in order to obtain this knowledge. 
He lave developed a system analysis technique which proceeds along Wfo l lowing 




a) Analyse the design and the function of the system« 
b) Define an und' sired event and Its criteria (fault criteria). 
c) Define mission time, maintenance and test intervalls. 
d) Perform fcilurc node and effect analysis. 
We will now discuss in some detail the items defined above. Die analysis 
of design and the function of system includes the following details. B e 
location, the Environment and the condlt; n of operation are investigated 
and oompared to the rated and design parameters. The system is also investigated 
for the possibility to bypass a failed component, for standby components 
and redundant components. 
Certainly it requires thorough discussion of the system to produoe a well-defined 
picture of that system. 
UBIDQ the knowledge of the system obtained from item 1, one is able to define 
the undFCired event of interest for which ttie probability is to be oaloula' i* 
Now wo will consider the example of XUW-contalnment isolation system, the 
un&elred event is defined as: 
Uncontrolled activity release in case of a reactor acoldent. 
7m activity might be released from the stack, to the air ventilation system 
or by direct leakage trough the containment shells. 
The next step is to define the criteria of a failure of the system In order 
to define In occurences which Uad to the undeslred event. The arlterla only 
may distinguish between the two states "operation'' and "failure" of the 
system. 
Applied to the XWW-syetem we obtain the following criteria i 
a) System failure ooours, if the underatnospherle pressure in the gap between 
'bo two shall« d-snpoars. 
b) System failure occurs. If activity reloasa to the air ventilation system 
ocour; and thus activity is released fros the vtaok. 




These criteria are the basis of the reliability analysis. 
Ihe next step i s coneemad with mission length, maintenance and test Interrail«. 
Coming bask to the example, the following pu-lods are considered! 
a) Ihe possibility of unrepealed faults in the system in a test period. These 
faults might cause system failure at the next demand. Also the ocourence 
of revealed faults Is taken Into aooount as the plant wi l l probably not 
shut dom) after the event of a revcalf! failure. 
b) Failure of switching over procedure fron normal to accident operation, 
o) Failure of System during accident operation. 
Tho time intervals defined are test period of one year and 100 days of accident 
operation. The final step in toe system analysis procedure i s to perform 
the fai" :ara rode and effect anal-Tils. 
The failure mode and effect analysis deals Kith toe failure modes of components 
ami the consecutive reaction of Bystes and subsystem following a failure of 
toe component considered. 
In oase of the KHtf-examplelheprocedure used Is as follows. Ihe forms used 
are shown In f ig . 1* For each component Its DBEC as well as Its 
subsystem and Its system must be entered. In addition the component function 
i s required. 
For some components the f a l l safe state should be defined. The columns of the 
form are entered with failure modes and i t s causes as well as the oonsaqutlve 
reactions of subsystem and system, 1. e. whether the system has failed 
or not, whether i t has lost redundancy or not, etc . 
Wing the informations worked out during tte failure mode and effect analysis one can 
prooeed to the Important cte$, the ralS»feiU.tj eomlycu. 
3 . Procedure of Reliability Analjjls 
After one has obtained d detailed knowledge on tte system snd i t s ft«**ie» 
tbetranslatlon into » vcliobiUvyaed«! has to b» emi**rf ou»V » • # • # " § 
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variety of methods has been developed, for example the fault tree method 
or the blook dlagramme methr . Also some sort of switch dlagramme as well 
as reliability tapping methods are In use. 
Ve found the fault tree method more convenient Chan the other methods. So the 
KWW example Is worked using that method* 
Due to some limitations cf our computer programme, we are forced to separate 
the problem into three parts which are given hy the three time periods defined 
In chapter 2* Always having In mind the indesired event the three cases we 
have are: 
a) System is unavailable when demanded, 
b) Failure of switching over procedure, 
c) System failure during accident operation. 
The fault tree method we use is already described in /!/* 
Additional gates are defined to take into account a variety of data. In the 
following the signs and lbs functions allocated are explaned. 
System input This input simulates an external system which already has 
been analysed or its failure probability is known from 







Compo nt Input 
St gate 
I«. 
This Input only Is allowed with the secondary fault gate. 
A name, a probability and a repair time Is assigned to 
this Input. 
To this input a component is assigned, defined by a name, 
a failure rate and repair time. 
This gate is defined by only three Inputs. E, simulate. 
the component in operation while Eg Is assigned to the 
standby component, 
over equlpnent E- to actuate E,, 
B, falls or Eg fall« during or after actuation. 
A failure of E, will cause the swltoh 
A failure oocurs If either 
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Secondary If a failure of component EU occurs a certain probability 
fallun£gate of a secondary failure of E, exists. So the output A 
'i ' i' slmulatoa the secondary failure at component Ej. 
In addition the wellknoMn gates s N "HOT", "AND" and "CR" ai 
^ O O 
NOT 
The number of Inputs of AND and OR-gatcs are limited by tile eomputor programme. 
The f i r s t faul t t ree according to item 1 Includes unreveald faul ts during 
t es t period as well as revcald faul ts which wi l l be repaired during reactor 
operation. 
The second fault tree treats the switching over procedure from normal to 
accident operation. I.e. the possibility of failure at the time of switching 
ovor. 
The third fault tree takes into account the possibi l i ty of repair a t certain 
components as well as secondary faults of the oontalnment shells due tuc 
fai lure of control e t c . 
This i s the translation of the system into faul t t ree . The worked fault 
trees are not shown in this paper beoaose they would blow up the paper 
to much. 
Thcs^step that follow the faul t tree proparatlon Is the selection of appropriate 
failure* rates and repair times. These data are also entered in the fault 
effect fcftsa. See ohapter 3 , The data situation has not much ohangodsinoe 
l a s t year, so I ean drop on extensive discussion on that subjeot and refer 
to A A 
The following four kinds of Input data are used. 
a ) Probability of fai lure of an e t e r n a l system (far esaaple power rm&r) 
b) Secondary fault probabilities 
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e) Failure rates of components 
d) Repair times 
After one has selected carefully the failure and repair data« the Input data 
for a computer run are prepared. fi» computer program©- Is described In 
chapter 4 and the Interpretation of the results obtained Is given In -chapter 5-
4. The Ability of the Computer Programme 
The Programme FESIVAR uses the MOOTS CARLO Method and an importance aempllng 
technique to reduce computer time. Its purpose Is the calculation of an 
overall failure probability of the fault tree. In addition the critical, fal'ure 
comblnniiions are given as ?. result. 
Several asumptlons are made In this versicn 
a) Failure and repair are independent events* 
b) The time of failure of components Is random« 
e) The time to failure is exponentially distributed. 
d) The repair time is constant. 
The qualitative limitations of this version are as follows. 
a) Other than exponential failure distributeen are not accepted« 
b) Tine response of components are not taken Into account« 
c) The system considered only may consist of components which might be "in 
operation" or "failed". 
d) Exept the "undeslred event model'1 no other reliability models may be treated. 
e) All components must be allocated *.*-• same mission length« 
The programme Is able to handle the following Inputs and gates 
a) Components assigned with failure rate and repair time 
b) Secondary failures 





f ) CR-gate 
g) Secondary failure gate 
h) Cold standby Including the probability of switching over 
The programme le also able to deal with loops in fault trees. 
FESIVKR i s written for a CDC I6c4 computer and uses completely the available 
storage. 
5. Interpretation of Results obtained 
After the Input data have seen prepared a computer run i s performed for eaeh 
of the three fault trees. In the following the results of the oonputer runs 
are discussed. 
5tl System Failure at Normal Operation 
Two types of failure might occur at normal operation 
a) System failure due to a revealed fault of one or more components occur« 
and repair taedlately takes place. During repair a reactor accident 
occurs, e.g. the system Is not available, 
b) System failure ooours I f the system i s called upon due to a reactor accident. 
This system failure i s due to <p unrevealed fault of one or more components. 
The undesired event only occurs i f one of the above stated items holds. So 
the failure combinations obtained by the computer run neocessarlly haw at 
least tiro failure events, the reactor aooident and one or •ore faulty components. 
The most probable failure combination i s the failure of the t wtrol-vslve 0 * ) . 
During i t s repair a reactor accident occurs. The portion of this eoablnettlon 
of the overall probability Is about 60 0. 
The occurence of the combined events failure of controller (12) and reastor 
aooident ami also of the oosMned events failure of the sensor 0 5 ) and rssotor 
aooident i s less probable. 
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Tb»ir percentage of the overall probability i s about 10 $S and 27 £ rsspectivly. 
Ihe results obtained are Elven in Table 1. 
5.2 Pailura of Switching Over 
m ease of an accident the system switehes over from aørsal to aeoldent 
operation, e.g, a reactor accident has already occurd and some signal has 
actuated the systems automatic. In this case no probability of successful 
operation per "tire but the probability of suooessf ul operation per demand 
i s required. No repair i s possible. The outcome of the calculation i s as 
follow«, Dearly e l l of the overall failure probability i s given by two failure 
csmblxationsj namely 
the staok-valvM (2ft) and (29) fa i l to close and 
Isekage-valves (44) and (45) do not open. 
I t s percentage of the overall failure probability i s about 22 % and 78 $ res-
peetivty. The results obtained are given in Table 2« 
5.3 Failure of Accident-Operation 
In this case also the accident already has ocoured. In addition the system 
successful is switched over to accident operation. The occurrence of the 
undeslred event i s due to the failure of one or more of the components which 
result in system failure. The most probable failure combination i s the failure 
of the control valve (34) and the motor-valve (20).e.g. the control of the 
system has failed. Its percentage of the overall failure probability la 
about 80 %. 
Less probable combinations are failure of the sensor (35) and motor valve (20), 
and failure of the safety valves respectivly. 
The possibility of a secondary failure of the containment i s not reglectible. 
Tile results are given in Table 3* 
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5.* Overall Failure probability 
The results of the three Calculations are 
a) Nornal Operation Px - 8,5 x Hf 7 
b) Snitching over r0 - 4,1 x 10"* 
e) Accident operation F- - 5,2 x 10 
As a l l three events are virtually exclusive, the overal probability of the 
problem Is obtained by sunmtion of the three single probabilities. Sc the 
probability of an uncontrolled activity release due to a failure of the eon-
talwent Isolation system 1B 
P - 5,6 x 10"? 
on the basis of an one years test Intervall and 100 days aoeldent operation. 
6. Application of a Relative Reliability Standard 
To derive renjilriuent • for the system reliability the overall risk of the pV_- ' 
Is used. This Is elven by 
Rj - Wj x DLj £l) 
where la 
Rt - Risk of MBA 
»j - Probability of MCA 
H*, - Damage level of MCA 
The risk of NBA, Rj requires the aueeesaful operation of the eentalnewb isolation 
systea. At the event of the system failure the damage level w i l l Increase 
ant thus, i f the risk has to remain constant, the probability of Has event 
RCA and f a i l u r e e f i s o l a t i o n s y s t e a aust decrease by the factor tke 
r i sk Increases . 
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If we have 
where i s 
R^  - Risk of MCA and failure of oontainment isolation system 
W - Probability of MCA and failure of containm. i so l . syst . 
DL. • Sange level HJA and failure of contains, iaol. syst . 
and i t i s required 
wc obtain 
(3) 
where we Have Wg - W, x w00in; • *™> this the unreliability requirement of 
the containment Isolation system W derives 
W = DL1 (») 
The unknown in this type of reliability standard i s the probability of the 
reference event and also the risk of that event. 
Coming baøk to our example of KHW containment isolation system* both the damage 
levels in equation (4) have to be dctermlnded. Therefore the accident of In-
terest - l ø 8 s *>f coolant - has to be analysed. Tn the following a brief 
description of the accident i s given. In the ccuse of a loss of coolant 
accident the pressure in the drywell of the pressure suppression containment 
Increases and decay s to the suppression chamber pressure at the end of the 
blowdown. The pressure will actuate the pressure supresslon system at a certain 
level. Tøs system pressure i s down at 0,1 atmospheric overpressure after a time 
of about J hours. During the courss of the accident a portion of tho actual 
fission products content of the con* i s released to the containment. With 
a certain leakage rats the fission products leak Into the gap between the 
two containment shells, where the pumping system takes suction. If tho 
pumping system operates successful the fission produots are pumped back to 
tot oontainment. otherwise the f lsiion products wi l l be released Into the 
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surroundings. In this case the following leakage modes are possible, 
a) Leakage aeross tbe two eontainraect shells 
b) Release to the stack 
c) Release to the ventilation system 
d) leakage of the large airlocks 
Certainly a number of the modes wi l l take place at the same time. 
In oase of successful operation of the jumping system leakage into the gap 
between the two shells i s pumped bask to the containment over a period of 
tine of about 100 days. Then the remainder of activity i s released carefully 
by the stack. A very rough calculation showed the damage level due to the 
failure of pumping system a factor 10 to 1<D higher than the damage level due 
to careful release after the 100 days period. So the reliabil ity requirement 
to the containment pumping system comes * out to be about 10 . As already 
described in chapter 5 the actual probability of system failure i s 5,6" x 10 , 
e.g. the probability meets the above stated requirement. 
7. Discussion 
Zh our experience the greatest difficulty is tø translate the real system Into 
an appropriate rel. ability model which can be calculated« n i l s effort tales 
most of the time of the whole analysis. The analyst must reveal a l l funotlonel 
Interconnections, redundancies, standby functions as well es the possibilities 
of secondary failures and the Influence of other systems and save them in a 
systematic way. suoh that a complete picture of the system Is designed. This 
picture should be checked by a second person to find out and discuss improper 
interpretations. In most of the cases this check has proved to be most 
effeotlve. 
From this system picture the rel iabil i ty model may be derived. Again a cheek 
of an Independent analyst i s necessary In order to discover mistakes In the 
rel iabil i ty diagrams«. If the analysis i s not performed with utmost care 
the probability of Introducing mistakes might be higher than the probability 
of system failure. 
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The application of reliability standards requires in addition a good 
knowledge of the behaviour of the system and the reactor Itself when 
an accident occurs. The course of accident might be different from that 
of the MCA. The reliability requirements must rely on the actual course 
of the accident. 
Now, some remarks, on the pumping system should be added. In this analysis 
a failure of the inactive »opponents of the system such as piping is not 
Incorporated. This is due to the fact that the failure rate of these 
components is very low« Also human error is not taken into account, e.g. 
operator error and poor repair. The reliability standard derived far the 
pumping system Is obtained from a very rough calculation. Thus its 
accuracy is not known. But for demonstration of the method it will be 
good enough. 





Description of the Containment Isolation System 
Operation at normal Conditions 
The containment system consists of a double shell wall. The inner shell has 
to withstand the containment pressure. The gap between the two shells la 
held at an unteratmoscberic. pressure. 
A system i s provided to pump gas (which might be radioactive) from the gap 
either to the stack or to the inner containment. In the following we are 
ooncerned with that system. See Fig. 2. 
One out of two installed compressors takes suction from the containment gsp.and 
yunps tiie air across a f i l t e r . One f i l t er and one oonprejssor are standby 
respeotivly. Zhe operating' compressor i s controlled by a bypass eonta-ol 
system. The control system includes a sensor for differential pressure 
(containment gap-atmosphere) (35), a control unit (12) and a control valve, &*)• 
A motordriven valve i s provided to close the bypass. That valve i s actuated 
at the control room. 
An aircooler i s installed to cool down the bypassed pressurized air (12). The 
air cooler is controlled by the air temperature. 
A measuring equipment for leak rate i s provided at the pressure side of the 
compressors. The normal way of the compressed air i s along the valves (24, 25) 
and (28, 29) to the stack. The valves (24) and (25) are closed and valve 
£5/1* opened. So the air i s collected in tank (59) due to the closed valves 
(26, 27), Pressure and Temperature arc measured ir. the tank. Valves (52, 5Ba> 
5?« 55a) and also valves 0&, 38a) are closed. So no connection i s made 
to the inner containment during normal operation. Further, leackpipes are 
provided to compensate the leckage of the valves and airlocks connected to 
the Inner containment. 
At normal operation the penetrations of the ventilation system øf the Inner 
containment ere looked by two air locks In series. An inspection of the 
containment during operation i s not planed. 
Operation at Accident-Conditions 
The systems purpose i s aglan to hold the underpressure against atmosphere In 
the containment gap. But the air sucked from the containment gap Is pumped 
back to the containment. 
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The following act iv i t ies have to be carried out to eonplete the switch over 
fron nomel conditions to eocldent conditions. 
1. Both the etaok-valres (28) and (29) nuet close 
2. One of the two valves (30) and (3D have to be closed 
3 . The valves (32, 32a) or (33, 33a) have to be open 
*• Valve (13) has to be open. 
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Unavailability of the Containment Isolation System in Case of an Accident 
Set of Components failed Percentage of Overall Failure Probability 
Accident and Failure of the Control Valve (3*) 60 5S 
Accident and Failure of the Pressure Sensor (35) 27 # 
Accident and Failure of the Controller (IS) 10 £ 
Accident and Failure of the Stackvalve (28) 0,5 % 
Overali Probability of Failure p - 2.5 • 10"7 
Table 2 
Failure of Switching Aver from Normal to Accident Operation 
Set of Components failed Percentage of Overall Failure Probability 
Valve (28) and (29) fail to close about 22 <f, 
Valve (44) and (45) to open about 78 $ 
Overall Probability of Failure p - 4,1 • 10 
Table 3 
Failure of Containment Isolation System at Accident Operation 
Set of Components failed Percentage of Overall Failure Probability 
Control Valve (34) falls open 80 ;S 
and Motor Valve (20) fails to close 
Pressure Sensor (35) fails and 7 % 
Motor Valve (20) falls to close 
Vasuunbreakvalve (2) or (11) leaks 10 % 
extenslvly 
Controller (12) falls to operate and 1,5 % 
Motor Valve (20) falls to close 
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S U M M A R Y 
iTwo emergency cora cooling systems inatallad 
in Geraan light watar powar plants ars de-
scribed comparatively. 
•The functions of the different subsystems ars 
dlscusssd vltb rsspset to two examples of loss-
of-coolant aooidsnts on the baaia of detailed 
flow sohemes and reliability diagrams. The re-
liability of these system* is analysed and eon-
pared. 




This study is the first step of a reliability in-
vestigation for Emergency Core Cooling Systems of 
Light Vater Cooled Reactors. In the final stage, 
it Is intended, to combine extensive th.exnodyne.nic 
calculations regarding the cooling efficiency and 
the mechanism of accidents with the systems themselves 
which are designed to cope with these accidents. 
This is the only way believed to offer a chance for 
finally coming out with figures being really of 
some help in estimating the propability of a certain 
system to handle the aocident in question. 
Under this aspect, the main idea of tbe study pre-
sented here is not to give final results, but to 
show the difficulties which are involved when calcu-
lating the reliability of complex systems, and to. 
bring into disouaaion tbe metboda by which we tried 
to overcome these difficulties* 
Emergency oore cooling ayatema are installed in 
commercial power reactors to aaaure heat removal 
from the reactor core in case of a losa-of-coolant 
accident* The large range of possible rupture sizee 
up to the rupture of tbe main steam line in a BWR, 
or the rupture of a primary ooolant pipeline in a 
PVR, reaulta in different aubsyateme for eaob 
reaotOT, »uon ma o ore spray ayatema, oore flooding 
ayatema and depresauriaation ayatema. 
This report presents two different emergency core cooling systems including 
their subsystems of 600 HVe light-water cooled power reactors currently 
designed to analyse ths mechanioal components of these systems and their 
eooperability from the point of Tiew of reliability. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF EMJHGESCT CORK COOLING SYSTEMS 
2>la Emergency core cooling systems installed in a Cernan 600 ;.r?e 
pressurized water reaotor 
The emergency oore oooling systems are designed to prevent fuel 
melting and to limit the metal-water reaction to a negligible 
amount in the event of a leak in the primary system. The entire 
spectrum of possible leaks includes ooolant piping ruptures up 
to the double-ended rupture of the largest pipe oonnected to 
til« reaotor pressure vessel. ' 
For the analysed Pressurised watsr reaotor, emergency core ocAling 
syatems,designed to cop« with all possible loss-ef- ooolant 
aooidents, ooneist ofi 
- the high-pressure water injection system, 
- the recirculation aystsm for residual heat remove1, and 
- a set of four accumulator tanks« 
The primary purpose of the high-preaaure water injeotion system 
is to supply boronatad water to the reactor oooling syatem in case 
of a medium size pipe break (IS 12$ i m 250). In this case, 
th« system is designed to keep the whole oore oovered. Four 
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high-pressure pumps are Installed in the circuit, but 
the capacity of two pumps is sufficient to cope with 
this accident. The four pumps are working on two parallel 
pipelines so that, in case of a rupture of one of these 
lines, an automatic switch over to tbe other line is 
possible without endangering the core. Tbe system will 
be activated by a coincident low-level and low-pressure 
indication in tbe pressurizer. If the pressure in the 
primary cooling system decreases to tbe operational 
pressure of the accumulator tanks (2o at overpressure) 
the tanks will work in addition. 
In the case of a double-ended rupture of tbe primary 
coolant pipe (ND 700), tbe reactor would loose its 
coolant in about 10 sec. Tbe melting: of fuel cannings 
and fuel elements can. in this case, only be avoided 
if the core is reflooded after about 200 sec. This 
means that about 60 m water are to be fed into tbe 
pressure vessel by the four accumulators. Each accuau-
lator haa a capacity of 2o «r so that one unit can be oon« 
sidered as stand-by unit. At tbe same time, together 
with the accumulators, two of the four pumps of tbe 
resudual heat removal system work witb a capacity of 
about 500 »J/h each. To remove tbe decay heat from 
the core, a water capacity of about 500 m^/h is necessary. 
If the whole capacity of tbe four boronated-water 
•1 
storage tank« of 560 m is fed into tbe reactor pressure 
vessel the pumps of the residual-beat removal system will 
take suction from tbe containment sump and operate via 
the heat-exchangers in a closed circle with tbe primary 
system. 
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Summary description 
Hlrti-prsssure water injection system 
number of loops 
pressure range of operation 
number < f pumps 
flow rate per pump 
method of activation 
emergency coolant source 
• 2 (1)** 
• 110 r 20 atm 
• 4 (2) 
t 250 m'/h (at 30 atm) 
I low-level and low-pressure in-
dication in the pressuriser 
• 4 (3) boronated water storage 
tanks.with a capacity of 
ZOO m3 each 
Pressurized accumulators! 
number of loops 
type of water storage tank 
pressure range of operation 
capacity of the accumulators 
method of activation 
i 4 (3) 
• gas pressurised, on line 
• up^to 20 ata 
I 4 x 20 m3 
* check valve opens when accumu-
lator pressure exceeds systea 
pressure 
Recirculation system for residual hsat removal i 
(system injsoting water at low pressure) 
nnaber of loops 
pressure rangs of operation 
nuaber of pumps 
flow rats per pump 
method of activation 
nuaber of heat exchangers 
i 2 (1) 
t 8 atm overpressur« to atmos-
phere proioure 
« 4 (2) 
• 300 a'/h 
i low-level and/or low-pressure 
• 2 (1) 
(# the number* in brackets indicate the nuaber of circuit ooaponeats 
neoesury for full capaoity operation« lb* numbers without brackets 
give the number of component* installed. 
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•Emergency core cooling systema Installed in a German 600 
HVe Boiling water reactor. 
The emergency core cooling systems of tbe analysed Boiling 
water reactor include an automatic depressurization system, 
a high-pressure water injection loop, and a core flooding 
system as well as a core spray system. Tbe automatic 
depresaurization system consists mainly of six primary 
system relief valves (of which three are necessary for 
full capacity) which open to tbe wetwe11 at reactor over-
pressure and after closing of the pressure emergency pene-
tration valves, enabling thus core cooling by the low 
pressurs emergency cooling systems* They start operating 
automatically at 78 atm overpressure below the designed 
pressure of tbe primary system valves. The valves also 
remain open below the closing pressure, when signalled to 
do so, after a loss-of-coolant accident. This signal is 
based on simultaneous signals from 
- high drywell pressure, 
- reactor scram because of low primary water level, 
- non-operation of the feedwater system, 
- non-operation of tbe emergency core cooling system. 
The higb-pressurs water injection loop is designed to feed 
water into the reactor vessel under loss-of-coolant con-
ditions within a reactor pressure range of 69*5 to 12 atm. 
absolute at a rate of 900 t/b. Tbe system consists of one 
steam turbine driven pump« arranged outside tbe pressure 
suppression system in tbe reactor building« The cooling 
water is supplied from tbe wetwell and is pumped Into the 
feedwater line. 
A low water level in the reactor will start automatically 
loop operation when the primary pressure is above f% atm 
absolute, and a high reactor water level will stop it. 
If tbe pressure in tbe primary eyete« drapa ta about 17 
raaptctivaly 15 *tm tbe eere apray system er the core , 
flooding ayste« respectively is m$rtMm*±*ml%r*******^ ^.; 
,t a certain water Javat. &* ^ ^ f ^ T T ^ - C 
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system consists of two independent loops. Sach of the two pumps is 
designed for a capacity of 600 t/h at 17 »ta. The core spray loops 
will spray water onto the top of the core so that the water will 
flow down the fuel channels and oool the fuel by radiation and staam 
convection« The core flooding system is designed to reflood the 
core up to the top of the jet pump diffusere which means 2/3 of core 
heights This will be possible because the core shroud is sealed 
circumferentially around the vessel wall. The maximum capacity of 
the core flooding system at pressure equalization of the primary 
circuit and the pressure suppression system will be 4.200 t/b. 
Pour pumps are installed in the system but only three of them are 
necessary to reach full capacity. If the water level of 2/3 of 
core height ie reached only one pump is required for long-term 
maintenance of level and cooling. 
Another residual pump is necessary to fill the suppression pool 
with water from the sump.' 
The normal feed water pumps are not considered in the reliability 
calculation« 
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Suxnary description 
Automatic depressuriaation syateat 
number of relief Talves 
operating pressure 
t 6 (3) C 
t 78 atm, overpressure 
Pftah-pre&sure water injection loopi 
number of loops 
nunber of pumps 
pump flow rate 
pressure range of operation 
aetbod of activation 
i 1 (steam turbise driven) 
I 900 t/h (pressure not known) 
I 89,5 to 12 atn, overpressure 
• low rsaetor water level 
Core g pray system 
number of loops 
nuaber of pumps 
flow rate per pump 
pressure range of operation 
aetbod of activation 
•urgency ooolant souroe 
« 2 (1) 
. 2 (iy 
i 800 a /h (at 17 atm overpressure) 
i froa 17 atm overpressure to 
prossure equalization of the 
primary circuit and the pressure 
suppression system 
i low reactor water level and 
low reactor pressure 
i wetwell or sump of drywell 
Core flooding system! 
nuassr of loops 
number of pomps 
flow rate per pump 
prsesurs rang* of operation 
(5) 
I 1 400 t/h at 6 ata and 
800 t/h at 19 atm 
• from 15 ata ovorprossurs to 
pressure equalisation of the 
primary circuit as« »as prsssurs 
suppression system 
maximum flow rata of the whole system 
at pressure equalisation i 4 300 t/b 
emergency ooolant sours« 
method of activation . • „ . - : 
f.£t*~ 
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3. RELIABILITY DIAGRAMS 
The reliability of the two Emergency core cooling systems (ECS), 
*) 
as described above, is calculated by a digital computer programme ' 
with respect to two cases of accidental 
a) rupture of a minor line* e.g. the connection to the preasurizer 
or smaller leakages in the main lines of the primary coolant 
systomf 
b) rupture of a main line of the reactor primary coolant system. 
Depending on which of these two cases happens, different parts of'-the 
ECS are involved. As a consequence of large ruptures, a quick de-
pressurization occurs and a large amount of coolant is lost« In that 
case, the low-pressure system, layed out to restore the lost water 
within a short period of time, has to handle this accident* 
For smaller ruptures, however, the problem is to feed water into 
the reactor vessel against high pressure« Here, the high-pressure 
injection system has to operate properly or one has to take care 
for an artificial depreasurization of the reactor vessel so that low-
pressure feeding systems can be used- • 
As regards reliability calculations, the systems under consideration 
involve the following problemet 
a) they consist of different subsystems which are operating subsequently 
b) the subsystems are overlapping, e.g. they use partly the same lines 
for equipments. 
To overcome these difficulties, the lin« .as shown below was followed in 
our.calculations. 
- if subsequent actions are necessary to cover the accident under con-
sideration they are supposed to appear simultaneously* 
- if the same equipment is used by different subsystems they are intro-
duced only J2QOJ to the reliability diagram, although they have to 
work in fact subsequently aooording to the operoticn modes; 
W^F^SgSA used is »eliag. written 1ft KJBKU* tV 
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if special valves have to be operated during one operating 
stage (active), whereas they have to remain only in a certain 
position during the other stage (passive), they appear in the 
diagram twice, togettier with the corresponding failure rates. 
1. Pressurized water reactor 
3.1.1. Rupture of injection line 
To calculate the reliability of the ECS, 3 rupture 
of one injection line is postulated (Fig. l ) . In 
comparison to the rupture of the pressurizer line, 
in this case too one of the two feeding branches 
for the ECS is lost. 
According to the lay-out, two subsystems of the 
ECS are necessary to handle this accident: 
- the high-pressure water injection system (IIS); 
- the low-pressure water injection system (LS). 
Therefore, in order to calculate the total relia-
bility for sufficient cooling when a break of one 
injection line does occur, the HS and the LS are 
combined with and "AND"-gate (Fig. 12). 
3*1*1*1* High-pressure water injection system (lis) 
The redundancy of the storage tanks for 
the boronated water (3 out of h) and the 
high-pressure pumps (2 out of k) is veri-
fied in the diagram (Fig. 5 ) * Assuming 
a rupture of one Injection line, the 
corresponding valve TJ 31 will close auto-
matically so that feeding into the rupturod 
line is prevented. Therefore, starting 
at this point In the diagram, only the 
second feeding branch is available for 
cooling purposes* This Is •Hovn in the 
diagram by legical **»&*•'. 
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3*1.1.2« Low-pressure water" injection aystem 
When the preseure has dacreaaed to 20 kg/cm the 
accumulators atart to feed into the reactor vessel. 
Below 8 kg/oa further cooling is achieved by the LS> 
As the accumulators need not be operated in thia oaae 
they have not been incorporated into the diagram 
On prisoipal, two pumps (for one residual heat ex-
changer each) are started regardless the fact that 
one of them ia feeding into the ruptured line« Two 
pumpe eerve aa stand-by unite, one for each line* 
Conaidering the aooidant aa defined above, only one 
half of the LS is available for further cooling. 
Therefore, a 1 out of 2 redundancy is taken into 
account for the pumpe and only one line aa a con-
nection to the'HS. 
Finally, tha auction lines are switched over from 
the storage tank to the sump. Tha lines and valvaa 
uead for thia operation'are introduoad in the dia-
gram in series. 
5.1.2. Buoture of one main coolant line 
Tor the reliability calculation, a rupture of the hot leg 
of one main ooolant loop is assumed« The following eubayatema 
are involved with thia accident« 
- tha accumulator aystea (iS)| 
- tha low-pressure water injeotlon system (LS). 
Therefore, the reliability of tha AS and tha LS ia ooabinsd 
with and "AID"-gata to taka into consideration tha fact that 
bojh, aystema bare to operate properly la Order to handal the 
break of one main coolant loop (fig. 12). 
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3.1.2.1. Accumulator sy3te« (kS) 
In c««« of the rupture of a main coolant line, 
the pressure of the primary sys ten is decreasing 
so rapidly that the HS need not he used for suf-
ficient oooling. The set point of the AS is reached 
quiokly, and the accumulators start to feed water 
into the reactor Teasel* Because of the rupture, 
one of the four accumulators is feeding into the 
defect line. For the second one, it cannot be ex-
cluded that its oooling efficiency is very Ion beca'iss 
of the short eirouit via the reactor. The renainir 
two accumulators ars both necessary to provide enou*' 
cooling fluid for oovering the first phase of the 
aooident. This faet i« considered by using a 2 out 
of 2 systsB in the reliability diagram (Fig. 7 ) . 
3.1.2.2. low-preasure water in-iection eyBtem (LS) 
AS regards the L8, the consideration« are valid as 
given in chapter 3.1.1. Again, one feeding branch 
is not available due to the rupture. Therefore, 
the sane reliability diagram can be used as 
before (Fig. 6). However, when taking into acoount 
the connection line between AS and LS (incorporated 
into the HB for the previous investigation«), th« 
corresponding tubes and valve« are added in eerie« 
at th« end of the reliability dlagraa for th« ac-
cumulator «y«t«a (Fig. 7 ) . 
3.2. fo^Vrit f * f '"»'"tyT 
3.2.1. Minor matur« in the primary «v«t«m 
. Tbi« accident is onaraoteriwd by a comparatively slow lo««-
of-iwolant so that th« first sttpmW cooling the eoi-s htm to 
V« eobi«v«d whilst til« »motor im am full pr»s«ur». 
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fho following subsystems of liia ECS are designed to handle 
such accidental 
~ the depressurization Byatem (DS); 
<- the high-pressure water injection aysten (HS) I 
- the core spray systea (SS)( 
^ the oore flooding system (FS). 
According to the layout of these subsystems, either one 
of the high-pressure syet ems (DS or AS) and the core spray 
and/or core flooding systems have to operated The aa-
eooiated logic diagram ie given in Fig. 13« 
£•2.1.1« Jepresauriaaticn system (TtS) 
This system consicts of 6 remote controlled pressure 
relief valves ihich have a 3 out of 6 redundancy 
(Fig. 8). 
^.2.1.2. High-pressure »ater injection system (HS) 
The reliability diagrams show two lines; one line 
for the turbine (including pipes and valves) which 
has to drive the injection pump (Fig. 9(1) )i the 
other one for the pump itself and the associated 
injection facilities (Fig. 9(2)). In order to cal-
culate the reliability for the total HS, these two 
lines are to be taken in series. 
J.2.1.3. Core spray system (SS^ 
The system is laid out with a 100 j{ redundancy. One 
pre-eeleoted loop is started automatically in case of 
emergency. This other one is in stand-by condition. 
This is shows in the reliability diagram by combining 
the two branches with an "0B"-gate» switching over 
to loop 2 is taken into aooount by "ACT" (Fig. 10). 
J.2.1.|. Core flooding system frsl 
4 ••• table 2 -~~ In the first [ease, the oore is flooded by three 
JSproveient ° *"•*•» t U fonrth P*"' *• i n »t«*-** condition. 
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This ia verified in the reliability diagram 
(Fig. 11(1)) ay a 3 out of 4 system with an "aCT"-
block in the forth line. 
Starting »ith the point where these 4 systens are 
leading into two parallel lines (which have to 
operate both for auffioient cooling), the diagram 
shows a 2 out of 2 logic oombination. Assuming the 
rupture in one feeding line, soarhere after the 
eheok valve L 451 the total coolant has to pass 
valve L 69 and the damaged line has to be blocked 
by closing the valves L 43 and 1 SI (Fig- 4). This 
ia taken into aooount by incorporating the acting 
valves into the diagram and by considering only one 
connection line to the reactor vissel (Pig. 11(2)). 
During the second phase,only one of the four pumps 
mentioned above is used for flooding, a second pump 
delivers eater from the sump.into the suppression 
pool in order to refill it. Bearing in mind that in 
this stage two different suction lines are in oper-
ation (Pig. 4) i the remaining two pumps are to be 
aeen as reduriant equipments according to a double 
1 out of t system (two 1 out of 2 systems in paralle"'. 
Looking at the reliability requirements for the ayatema 
regarding phase 1 (3 out of 4) and phase 2 (double 
1 out of 2)i there la no doubt, that the former are 
the more stringent ones. Therefore, in calculating 
the total reliability of the two phases of operation, 
a 3 out of 4 syatsa is introduce! in the reliability 
diagram. The double 1 out of 2 •yetem-etage ia omit-
ted. Only the additional pipes and valvaa which are 
neoessary to opkrata phase two ara taken into aeeounti 
the two sump-suction lines as a 1 out of 2 ayataa 
'and la addition the lins for refilling the suppression 
pool (Pig, U(3)>. 
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3*2.2* Rupture of recirculation line 
As a oonsequence of this accident
 f a rapid depressuri-
sation of the primary system does occur. Therefore, the 
high-presBure cooling systems need not operate. In this 
oase, the core spray and/or* the core flooding system 
(phase 1 with associated pipes and valves of phase 2) 
have to operate. The reliability diagram for this case 
la shown in Fig. 13. 
4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The tablsa 1 and 2 show the reliability values of the emergency core 
cooling subsystems and of the two cases of accidents for the German 
600 Xwe Boiling and Pressurised water reactora diaouaaed. The re-
liability as funotion of time was calculated for an inspection time 
of 400 hours, except for the depresauriiation system of the BWR the 
reliability of which waa aaaumed aa an average value over 2 years 
(normal reaotor shut-down period). The failure ratea, ehown in the 
reliability diagrams, were taken from the literature. 
A comparison of the two high-pressure water injection systems (HS) 
shows that the one of the PWH is only for about 0.5 ?C more reliable 
than the system of the BWR. The reason lies in the 2 out of 4 system 
for the HS of the PWS in opposite to. the 1 out of 1 aystem of the 
BWB. On the other hand, a 100 j( redundancy exiata for depressurizing 
the reactor vessel of the BWR because of the depreaauriiation system 
(DS) which is not installed in the PUR. Due to the few components 
and the 3 out of 6 oonoept, the depressurization aystem of the BWR 
has a vary high reliability. 
The core spray and core flooding system for the BWR correspond to the 
low-prssaure water injection and accumulator system for the PVR. 
The reliability values of these subsystems show that the SS of the 
BIB is the most reliable subsystem of the low-pressure ooollng 
systems, due to the 100 f redundancy (90,998 jf). 
However, a distribution effeot of the »pray nozzles and the cooling 
• •*• table 2 - possibility of Improvement 
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mechaniam could not be oousidered in the analysiai only th« 
availability of oooling water above the core haa been taken into 
acoount« 
The core flooding aystem for the BUB. has a lower reliability value 
(99,45 j>) sine« it consists of a 3 out of 4 system. Due to the 
2 out of 4 oonoept, the IS of the PWR has a higher reliability than 
the PS of the JBVR (99,72 # ) . In spite of the 2 out of 2 concept of 
the accumulator system (AS), the reliability amounts to a value of 
99,64 % because it consists of fewer components« 
whilst the reliability values of the subsystems of the ECS for the 
two reactors show some differences, a compariaon of the reliability, 
aaluulated with respect to the two oasee of accidents, shows that 
the probability for sufficient cooling, when both, rupture of a main 
coolant line or rupture of a minor line, do occur, is nearly the 
same* The difference of about o.l »J is very low. 
The' calculation was performed for oonparative reaaona under the 
assumption that for the BWS, in case of a rupture of the injection 
line, aither one of the high-preesur« systems and both core spray 
and core flooding eystea have to operate while, in case of a rupture 
of the main coolant line, both, core spray and core flooding system, 
have to operate to oope with the accident. 
The availability of the emergenoy core oooling systems installed in 
a BWR can, however, essentially be improved when, in oase of a 
rupture of a main coolant line, eaoh of the two subsystems, cor« spray 
ox oore flooding system (S3 or FS), oan handle the accident. For 
thl« 0 M « 
Hg,, (400) was eaUeated to be Rg,, - 99.99994 t . 
k similar arrangement of duplicate cooling facilities ia possible in 
ease of s rupture of the injection line. In this case, one of th« 
two high-pressure cooling subsystem« (DB or H8) and on« of th« two 
low-pressure oooling systems (S3 or 78) must operat« to sop« with 
th« avoidant. 
Bgj w»r l»prov« to "„j. » 99,9998 *J 
10R 
Following this discussion, one can imagine 
already the many confllctlve situations that 
arise when attempting to compare the two ECS's. 
There is no doubt that this kind of investigation 
is useful to find weak points in the design or 
In looking for the best solution regarding safety-
and economical considerations for important sub-
systems. However, to get real reliability figures 
as wanted by the safety engineer or by the evaluator, 
and this brings ua back to the introducing remarks, 
it is necessary to even better define the kinds of 
accidents, to take into consideration the thermo-
dynamic efficency of the ECS's and to include in-
vestigations of the consequences for the development 
of the accident, when assuming the one or the other 
subsystem should fail. 
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Table li Reliability of ECS for FOR 
1. High-Preaaure Vater Injeetion System (HS) 
8^(400 h) - 99.B1 i. 
2 . Lm-Preaaure Vater Injection Syetea (LS) 
1^(400 h) - 99,72 f 
3. Aeoumulator Systea (AS) 
Hig(400 h) - 99.84 J. 
Huoture of Main Coolant Line 
8^(400 h) - i^ .
 BA3 - 99,55 * 
Rupture of Presaurizer Line 
V 4 0 0 h ) ""ES •••«• "'"* 
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Table 2i Rel iabi l i ty of ECS for BTO 
1* Depressurisation Systea (SS) 
BpgCnftan value of 2 years) - 99,999998 jf 
2a High-Pressure Water Injection System (HS) 
»^(400 h) - 99,32 * 
3« Core Spray System (SS) 
RgS(400 h) - 99,998 * 
4« Core Flooding Systen (PS) 
(Phase 1 including sump and suppression pool pipes and 
valves) 
8^(400 h) - 99,45 * 
flupture of Main Coolant ftlne 
1^(400 h) - Hgg . S^ - 99,45 * 
Improvement 
W 4°° ") " "ss + "FS - "ss • "ra " 9».9»9* * 
Bnpture of Injection Line 
V 4 0 0 ") " "ss • "Wbs + ha • ha • ha> " " • « * 
ftmormnt 
^ { 4 0 0 k) - ( ^ + Bgg , gjg . ^ ) (Hg, + B,g - Bgg . ! „ ) 
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for Nuclear Reactor Safety. Organized by the 
Committee on Reactor Safety Technology of the 
European Suclear Energy Agency and held at Ristf, 
Denmark:, September 24 - 26, 1969. 
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SUMMARY 
Ontario Hydro's present nuclear power program 
Involves four nuclear-electric generating stations, two of 
which are nou In operation while the remaining two are 
under construction. 
Several years ago in Canada, nuclear safety 
standards were defined in mathematical terms as guides for 
determining the required re l iab i l i ty of nuclear safety 
systems. Experience from our operating stations has led to 
the development of techniques to measure and compare 
component performance with these safety standards and 
similar techniques are now being developed to define 
e lectric i ty production targets and compare equipment per-
formance with these. 
This paper traces the development of both the 
safety and production re l iab i l i ty standards, reviews 
experience with various equipment at the operating stations 
in terms of these standards and describes how this experience 
i s being applied to the stations now under construction. 
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Ontario Hydro i s c publicly-owned electric 
u t i l i ty with a dependable peak capacity in excess of 
10,000 MW(e) at the end of 1968. The committed nuclear 
program involves four nuclear power stations a l l 
equipped with heavy water moderated and cooled, natural 
uranium (CASUS) reactors. Two of these stations are 
presently in operation while the remaining two are 
under construction. The single unit 22 MW(e) SPD was 
placed in service in 1962 (1) and the single unit 208 
HW(e) Douglas Point Senerating Station was placed in 
service in 1968 (2) . The f i r s t of four 508 MW(e) units 
of the Pickering Generating Station i s scheduled for 
operation in 1971 while the f i r s t of four 750 MW(e) 
units of the Bruce Senerating Station i s scheduled to 
begin operation in 1975. 
Reliability studies for these stations focus 
on two main areas, safety and production. Safety 
re l iabi l i ty studies are directed towards ensuring that 
risks of dangerous equipment failure are acceptably low. 
At the same time production re l iab i l i ty i s of major 
economic concern and studies in th i s area are directed 
towards equipment improvements which wi l l reduce los t 
production. Although the goals are different similar 
techniques are used for both types of study in Ontario 
Hydro to set up information collection systems and to 
develop component standards for judging component 
performance. 
The intent of this paper i s : 
(1) To describe the safety and production 
re l iabi l i ty standards which have been 
adopted and to describe techniques used 
to gather equipment fault data to enable 
equipment performance to be compared to 
these standards. 
(2) To review experience with reactor regu-
lating and protective systems for 
comparison with the standards. 
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(3) To review experience with partloular 
mechanical Bystens at the nuclear 
station? such as emergency cooling 
systems, fuelling machines and standby 
generators and to compare this 
experience to the safety and production 
re l iab i l i ty standards. 
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1. RELIABILITY STANDARDS AHT ASSESSMENT 
There axe two basic reasons for striving for a 
high standard of equipment re l iab i l i ty at nuclear 
stations, the f i r s t i s to ensure that tl-e risks of 
dangerous equipment failure are low enough to provide 
an acceptable safety standard. The second i s to 
ensure that the risks of equipment failure leading to 
a loss of e lectr ic i ty production are economically 
acceptable. 
For these reasons we have developed for 
Ontario Hydro nuclear power stations two separate 
standards to use as targets for equipment performance, 
a nuclear safety re l iab i l i ty target and a production 
re l iabi l i ty target. Performance of a l l equipment at 
our nuclear power stations i s measured against these 
targets. 
1.1 NUCLEAR SAFETY RELIABILITY 
In the early stages of reactor development 
extensive safety measures were often applied without 
much knowledge of their effectiveness or re l i ab i l i t y 
or of the magnitude or probability of the disaster 
they were intended to avoid. These measures added 
considerably to cost and plant compleaity and the 
net increase in safety was obscure. 
In Canada (3) the search for a nuclear safety 
standard led to an in i t i a l philosophy of defining 
as an acceptable public risk from a nuclear 
establishment one which was equivalent to that 
associated with other enterprises of equal economic 
worth. Many safety factors were applied to offset 
unknowns associated with the nuclear stations, 
however, the result was that the maximum acceptable 
nuclear accident risk for stations such as NPD and 
Douglas Point was described as being in the range 
of 10-5 to 10-6 per year. 
This type of standard was used to judge the 
adequacy of the design of these stations, however, 
the number i s so small that i t i s obviously 
impossible to provide any single system or piece of 
equipment with adequate re l iab i l i ty to meet the 
standard. The approach which has been used i s to 
arrange the plant so that no nuclear accident can 
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occur unless there are simultaneous failures of 
several pieces of independent equipment. This 
sharing of the re l i ab i l i t y requirement results in 
equipment failure rate targets Which could he met 
rea l i s t i ca l l y by the designer and Which can be 
demonstrated in a re lat ive ly short tine by 
operating experience. 
This philosophy has been further refined in 
recent years and has led to the preparation of a 
Siting and Design Guide by the Atomic Energy 
Control Board Which i s the federal government 
agency responsible" for l icensing nuclear stations 
in Canada v+). The basic assumption of this Guide 
i s that nuclear plant i s separated into three 
groups for purposes of safety evaluation. These 
groups are: 
1. The process equipment Which includes a l l the 
equipment and systems necessary for the 
normal functioning of the reactor and 
generating unit. 
2. The protective equipment Which includes a l l 
the systems or devices designed to prevent 
damage to the fuel resulting from any failure 
of process equipment. 
3. The containment provisions Which includes any 
structures or other provisions Which are 
intended to res tr i c t or l imit the release of 
any radioactive materials that might escape 
from process equipment. 
A fundamental principle of this approach i s 
that these three groups of equipment are 
structurally and operationally independent to the 
extent that the probability of a cross-linked fault , 
that i s , one affecting equipment in more than one 
group, i s small compared to the coincidence of 
independent faults . Thus, for analysis purposes, 
the probability of simultaneous equipment fai lure 
i s ealoalated ae the product of the individual 
equipment failure probabil it ies . 
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The standards of equipment r e l i a b i l i t y are 
similar to those developed previously for se t t ing 
a permissible accident r i sk of 10-5 to 10-6 per 
year. They are : 
1. Single Failures - fa i lures of process equipment 
which could lead to a dangerous re lease of 
rad ioac t iv i ty , but are safely terminated by. 
operation of protect ive and containment 
equipment, should not exceed 1/3 per year. 
?. Dual Failures - fa i lures of process equipment 
potent ia l ly leading to a dangerous re lease of 
rad ioac t iv i ty , combined with a coincident 
fa i lure of e i the r the protect ive or containment 
equipment, should not exceed an annual r i sk of 
10-3. 
A common charac te r i s t i c of the protect ive 
equipment and containment provisions, or the safety 
systems as they are commonly cal led, i s tha t the 
systems are normally id le and fa i lu res which may 
defeat the system remain hidden u n t i l revealed by a 
t e s t or other c a l l for operation. In Canada, we 
use the term unre l i ab i l i t y to describe the portion 
of t o t a l time that a safety system would be expected 
to f a i l i f called upon to operate. For most equipment, 
fa i lu re ra tes are independent of t e s t frequency so 
that unre l i ab i l i ty can be reduced by increasing t e s t 
frequency. As an example, increasing the t e s t 
frequency by a factor of 2 reduces the unre l i ab i l i ty 
by the same factor for a fixed equipment fa i lu re 
ra te and we use t h i s technique to adjust equipment 
un re l i ab i l i t y . 
The probabili ty of a dual f a i lu re , as considered 
In the Siting Guide, i s calculated as the product of 
the process equipment fa i lure r a t e and the protect ive 
equipment un re l i ab i l i t y . 
At our nuclear s ta t ions we se t a permitted un-
r e l i a b i l i t y standard for each safety system then 
establish a f a i r share of t h i s system t o t a l for the 
various subsystems and components. Table 1 indica tes 
the application of t h i s technique to the Boiler Room 
Area Containment system at BED. This system Is made 
up of three major subsystems, one for providing 
i n i t i a l pressure r e l i e f of the area, one for i so la t ing 
the area and one for l imit ing pressure within the 
isolated area by dousing. 
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I s this example the maximum permitted un-
re l iab i l i ty of the total system i s fixed at 10"z, 
however, the portion assigned to the various sub-
systems and components i s f lexible. Poor performance 
on the part of one group of components can he offset 
by better than expected performance by another group 
and extensive use i s made of the capability of t es t 
frequency increases to reduce component unrel iabi l i ty . 
1.2 HtOBPCTIOK KEUABtUTY 
For our applications we consider production 
re l iab i l i ty to be the abil i ty of a generating unit 
to deliver e lec tr ic i ty when required. This i s a 
general term and we have developed several other terms 
to simplify our calculations of production r e l i a b i l i t y . 
1. Capability refers to the abi l i ty to produce 
e lec tr ic i ty using an energy basis and thus 
provides a comparison between the actual energy 
production and the maximum possible energy 
production. 
Availability refers to the abi l i ty to produce 
e l ec tr i c i ty using a time basis and thus i t i s 
a measure of the time during which the unit i s 
ably to produce power. 
2. For simplicity of calculation we normally use 
the complimentary terms incapability and un-
avai labi l i ty as a measure of the inabil i ty of 
the unit to produce e lec tr ic i ty . 
3. Incapability may result from a unit being 
shut down (outage) or reduced to part load (derating) and these outages and deratlngs in 
turn may have been planned for ahead of time (planned) or they may be the result of un-
expected conditions (forced). 
4. The net output of a unit i s the net energy In 
HWh delivered to the transmission system for a 
specified time. The entire time interval i s 
considered including the period «han the unit 
i s shut down or derated. 
The net capacity factor i s the ratio of the 
actual net output to the net output a unit could 
deliver i f i t operated perfectly at f u l l eapaolty 
for the entire tine Interval. 
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Nuclear generating unitr in the Ontario Hydro 
system wi l l he operated as base load units and an 
average lifetime net capacity factor of 80 percent 
i s assumed for the Pickering units. In our 
analysis we assume that the avai labi l i ty of nuclear 
units w i l l be similar to that of equivalent f o s s i l 
units and that availabil ity wi l l be lower during 
the early l i f e or immaturity period. This i s 
reflected in the predicted capacity factor variation 
shown for Pickering GS in Table 2. 
We also expect that avai labi l i ty w i l l decrease 
with unit size and this i s i l lustrated by comparing 
the Pickering incapability targets with those which 
have been set for HPD and Douglas Point as follows: 
HPD - 1.7Æ (Forced Outage and D e r a t i n g ) , 
3-45« (Tota l ) 
Douglas Point - 2.1% (Forced Outage and D e r a t i n g ) , 
7.2* (Total) 
Pickering - 5.2$ (Forced Outage and Derating), 
10.0* (Total) 
Shutdown preventative maintenance normally i s done 
during planned shutdown periods while emergency 
maintenance i s carried out during forced shutdown or 
derating periods. The total incapability target for a 
nuclear generating unit includes incapability caused 
by both planned and forced outage and derating. 
Since i t i s a demonstration stat ion, NPD i s 
frequently shutdown for experiments, training and 
testa thus providing an additional opportunity for 
planned maintenance. During the winter months no 
shutdowns are planned so that total incapability during 
th i s period i s equal to the forced outage and derating 
incapability and the target net capacity factoi i s 
based on this . Tables 3 and 4 compare the achieved 
net capacity factor to our targets since 1962. 
1
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Just as a system was developed for sharing safety 
system unrel iabil i ty targets among the various sub-
systems and components so we have developed a system 
for sharing unit incapability targets among the -various 
plant systems. To establish the relat ive fair share 
for each system we f e l t i t was necessary to recognize 
two basic parameters. These were; f i r s t , the 
complexity and worth of equipment as indicated by cost 
and second, the likelihood of the equipment failure 
causing unit outage or derating. 
The system we have adopted involves distributing 
the unit incapability target in proportion to the 
total cost of each system modified by a Relative 
Proneness Factor (RPF). The RPF mainly ident i f ies 
whether a system can cause a loss of production or not 
and to date we have restricted our analysis to three 
degrees of RPF. 
RTF = 0 for systems whose probability of 
causing an outage i s zero 
RPF = 0 . 1 for Buildings and Structures 
which could conceivably cause an 
outage 
RPF = 1.0 for a l l mechanical, e lectrical 
and instrument systems which are 
l ike ly to cause or contribute to 
an outage or derating should they 
f a i l . 
The incapability allocation for the various HPD 
systems i s summarized in Table 5. 
Information of th i s type provides a guide for 
the system designer to judge relationships between 
equipment performance and economic requirements and 
i t provides the operator with a tool for measuring 
equipment performance. 
1.3 RELIAgllTY. MBAStmaiENT 
1.3.1 Data Collection 
A single form (Figure 1) i s used at a l l Ontario 
Hydro nuclear power station« for reporting a l l 
component faults . Shis multi-copy form, which 
i s identif ied as a Deficiency Rejort, serve« 
two main purposest 
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1. The form provides a method for reporting 
a l l faults and deficiencies to the 
responsible work unit and thus serves as 
a work order. 
2. Analysis and corrective action taken by 
the work unit are recorded on the form 
which i s placed on the equipment f i l e so 
that the form provides a complete fault 
record. 
Since the single form i s used to record a l l 
types of faults , a review of the Deficiency 
Report f i l e for a particular system or piece 
of equipment wi l l indicate a l l faults which 
affect both the safety and production 
re l iab i l i ty targets for the equipment. 
Two other types of forms are used to provide 
data required for re l iab i l i ty analysis. 
All safety systems are tested at regular 
intervals as calculated from unreliabil ity 
targets. For each type of t es t , forms have 
been prepared specifying such detai l as tes t 
procedure, expected component response, etc. 
These forms are forwarded to the tes ter at 
scheduled dates and completed forms placed in 
the System l e s t f i l e . Since the forms are 
designed for each type of t es t we have not 
developed any standard tes t form sty le . 
Each time a unit outage or derating occurs 
an outage report i s prepared. These forms 
contain such detai l as the outage or derating 
duration, system or equipment causing the 
outage and system or equipment prolonging the 
outage. A sample of the type of form used i s 
shown in Figure 2. 
2 Reliability Analysis 
Several times per year at each nuclear 
station a complete review i s made at the 
performance of a l l process, protective and 
containment equipment which affects the 
nuclear safety standard. This review requires 
an examination of a l l related Deficiency Reports 
and classif icat ion of the various faults . In 
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addition, the t e s t records of the protective 
and containment equipment are reviewed and 
calculations made of system and component 
unreliabil ity for comparison with targets. 
Finally, arrangements axe made for t e s t 
frequency adjustment or component modification 
to bring expected unrel iabi l i t ies in line with 
the targets. 
To date production re l iabi l i ty reviews have 
been carried out l e s s frequently than the 
safety reviews. The production re l iab i l i ty 
review starts with an examination of the 
various outage reports and calculation of the 
total unit incapability and the incapabil it ies 
chargeable to the various systems. When a 
system bas been identified as having exceeded 
the incapability target, the Deficiency Reports 
are examined to pinpoint actual component 
faults . 
At the present time we are actively invest i -
gating the use of computers for fault data 
storage and analyses. One current study, 
associated with the Douglas Point GS reactor 
regulating and protective systems, involves the 
preparation of a computer program which wi l l 
receive information on component behavior, 
recognize and classify faults and calculate 
component and system unrel iabi l i t ies . I f the 
study indicates that this type of computer 
application i s successful we w i l l extend i t to 
cover other station systems and also provide 
production r e l i a b i l i t y information. 
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2. RBOTIATIHS AMD HtOTEOTIVB SYSTB1 KELIABIHTY 
2 . i srs im PEscBigrioir 
The reactor system design of a l l Ontario Hydro 
nuclear generating units follows the same basic 
concept characterized by a horizontal pressure tube 
reactor, heavy water moderator and heat transport (coolant), natural uranium oxide fuel and on power 
refuelling. The basic flow diagram i s shown in 
Figure 3. 
The heat generated in the fuel i s transferred 
by the heat transport f luid to the steam generator. 
The steam generator consists of one or more heat 
exchangers and Bteam drums in which 3team is 
generated from ordinary water. The steam thus 
produced is used to drive the turbine generator. 
The quantity of steam admitted to the turbine i s 
controlled by a set of steam throttle valves. After 
passing through the turbine the low pressure, low 
temperature steam i s condensed by cooling water and 
returned to the steam generator through a conventional 
feedheating system. 
The reactor consists of a tank and tube assembly 
called a calandria which holds the heavy water 
moderator. The fuel and heat transport heavy water 
are contained in zirconium alloy pressure tubes which 
pass through the calandria tubes and are centred 
in them by spacers. Each end of the pressure tube 
i s fixed in an end f i t t ing to which the fuelling 
machines are attached for fuel changes. 
Reactor power regulation i s achieved by 
variation of moderator leve l , insertion of absorber 
or booster rods or addition or removal of dissolved 
poison. The NED reactor normally uses only 
moderator level control while the Douglas Point and 
Pickering reactors employ a l l three methods. 
In the HPE system vacuum pumps reduce the 
pressure over the upper surface of the moderator in 
the calandria below the pressure in the dump tank. 
Tine control of the pressure differential , and hence 
moderator level and reactor power, i s provided by 
varying the opening size of the regulating valves 
which bypass tbe vacuum pumps. 
1*1 
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To tr ip or scram the reactor In the event a 
cr i t i ca l variable exceeds a prescribed l imit , the 
differential pressure i s reduced to zero by the 
rapid opening of dump valves which causes the 
moderator to drop into the dump tank. 
The reactor protective system, which controls 
dump valve position, i s tr ipl icated. The s ix dump 
valves are arranged with two valves in series in 
each of three parallel pipes so that opening of both 
valves in any one pipe destroys the pressure 
differential causing a reactor t r ip . Each of the 
three protective channels controls one valve in each 
of two pipes, thus opening of any two of three 
channels w i l l cause a reactor t r ip . At the same 
time any one of the protective channels can be 
removed from service and i t s dump valves opened 
for tes t while the reactor remains at high power. 
The reactor regulating system i s a similar but 
completely independent system which i s also tr ip-
l icated and which controls reactor power by con-
trol l ing regulating valve position. The s ix reg-
ulating valves are arranged similar to the dump 
valves. 
The regulating and protective systems receive 
independent information from independent detectors 
on important variables, such as neutron power, heat 
transport pressure and temperature, moderator l eve l , 
etc. 
At Douglas Point the main change involves the 
use of control rods for minor adjustment of reactor 
power so that the calandrla normally remains fu l l 
during operation. 
At Pickering, shutdown rods have been provided. 
These are normally dropped on a signal for reactor 
tr ip eo that the dump system remains as a backup and 
wi l l not operate unless a reactivity re<*»otion f a i l s 
to proceed at a predetermined rate. This allows a 
rapid restart following a transient t r ip by avoiding 
delays associated with calandrla pump up. 
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2.2 HBJABUJTT EgEBIHTCE 
Our most complete experience to date with 
regulating and protective systems bas been provided 
by HID, which bas been in operation since 1962, and 
for th i s reason our re l iab i l i ty analyses have 
focuseed on results from tb i s station. 
2 .2.1 Huclear Safety Reliabil i ty 
In our system for deriving nuclear safety 
standards, regulating systems are classed 
as process equipment, which by definition 
bas a permissible annual unsafe failure 
rate of approximately 1/7, while protective 
systems f a l l in the category of protective 
equipment which allows a permissible un-
re l iab i l i ty , or portion of total time in a 
failed condition, of between 10-2 and 10 - ' . 
For the BED systems, which represented our 
in i t i a l efforts to meet these standards, we 
f e l t that additional safety factors were 
desirable, thus we set as our targets a 
maximum annual regulating system unsafe 
failure rate of 10-2 and a maximum protective 
system unreliability of 10-4. 
To meet these high standards a program of 
daily t e s t s of each regulating and protective 
system channel was inst ituted in 1962. Hisse 
t e s t s mainly involve injecting a synthetic 
signal in a single channel and observing that 
instruments and valves respond correctly. 
Detailed reviews are made periodically of a l l 
tes t sheets and fault records xo produce safety 
re l iabi l i ty s t a t i s t i c s . 
In our re l iabi l i ty analyses we review both 
cross-linked faults which affect more than one 
set of instruments or channel and single 
component faults. . We have had very few cross-
linked faults and have never had an unsafe 
failure which resulted in the regulating system 
demanding an unsafe power increase or the 
protective system fa i l ing to shut down the 
reactor when required. Thus, our calculations 
of regulating and protective system re l i ab i l i t y 
mainly involve deriving the probability of 
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unsafe system failure through the application 
of Btandard probability calculations to our 
experienced individual component failure rates. 
Our reviews to date indicate that the unsafe 
failure rate of the regulating system remains 
below our target of 10~2 per year and the un-
re l iab i l i ty of the protective system has con-
s i s tent ly been several orders of magnitude 
below the maximum target unreliability of 10-4. 
Is a result of this experience with the pro-
tect ive system, we have reduced our tes t 
frequency from once per day to twice per week. 
The regulating and protective systems at NPD 
have not been without component faults , as 
indicated in Table 6. Many of these faults 
were associated with mechanical devices, such 
as retransmitting slide-wires, balancing motors, 
etc. , which employ moving parts to transmit 
information. In recent years reliable sol id 
state devices have been perfected and th i s type 
of component i s being used in the Douglas Point 
and Pickering stations. 
2 Production Reliabil i ty 
As a small demonstration stat ion, HFD i s used 
for training and equipment testing as well as 
e lectr ical production, thus the periods of sus-
tained production are usually limited to pre-
determined demonstration runs. I t i s during 
these runs that attempts are made to eliminate 
outages and unit derating and compare actual 
unit and system incapability with the targets. 
The performance of the HPD unit during eleven 
demonstration runs i s shown in Table 4. 
Between 1964 and 1966 there was a total of 119 
outages of the HPT unit, of which 29 were for 
training, 21 were planned or maintenance outages 
and 69 were forced outages. During the seme 
period there were 31 reactor trf ps from high 




During the period between 1964 and 1966 s ix of 
the forced outages were charged against the 
regulating system, while eight of the forced 
outages were charged against the protective 
system. During this period the incapabil it ies 
of both the regulating and protective systems 
were considerably above the maximum targets; 
however, since that time the incapabilit ies of 
both systems have been brought down to 




HBLIABrUCT Of MECHANICAL SYSTEMS 
Some mechanical systems are provided as a safety 
measure and they may have l i t t l e effect on the production 
of e l ec tr i c i ty , other systems play a major part in 
production hut have a minor effect on nuclear safety. All 
mechanical systems in Ontario Hydro nuclear stations are 
measured against both the nuclear safety and production 
re l iab i l i ty standards. As a result one of the standards 
for a particular system may prove to be a diff icult 
target to meet while the other standard can be met very 
simply and only periodic checks are required to ensure 
conditions have not changed. 
Experience with three different systems is 
described in this section. These systems have been 
selected to show the variation in targets chosen for 
different systems and some of the efforts we have made 
to meet these targets. 
1. Fuelling machines - Nuclear generating units 
in the Ontario Hydro system are designed for 
on-power fuel replacement, and these 
machines are frequently in operation while 
the unit i s producing. Fuelling machine 
breakdown may result in unit shutdown or 
derating and so the machines have a s igni-
ficant effect on production re l iab i l i ty . On 
the other hand, the machines are designed for 
f a i l safe operation and they have not 
presented any significant problems in meeting 
nuclear safety standards. 
2. Standby generators - these are protective 
devices which are normally idle when the unit 
i s producing. They have a moderate effect on 
the nuclear safety standard and a minor • 
effect on production re l iab i l i ty . The 
standby generators are sometimes operated to 
provide additional generation during extreme 
system peak conditions, thus introducing a 
further economic consideration towards their 
re l iab i l i ty . 
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3. Emergency cooling systems - these are classed 
as protective equipment, or safety systems, 
and they are normally idle When 'tile unit i s 
producing. These systems have a relatively 
minor effect on the production standard but 
they are of v i ta l importance to the safety 
standard and considerable effort i s required 
to ensure that they meet their share of this 
standard. 
3.1 ETOHHG MACHINE KELIABIIITY 
3.1.1 General Description 
The basic design of the Canadian on power 
fuelling system has been described by 
HcConnell (5) and the major features of this 
concept are i l lustrated in Figures 3,4,5 for 
NED. The major features of the Douglas Point 
and Pickering fuelling machines are similar, 
although there i s some variation in equipment 
orientation. 
To change fuel "on power" two machines each 
clamp onto an end f i t t ing associated with a 
selected fuel channel. Seal plugs are removed 
at each end and one machine pushes a new fuel 
bundle into the channel while the other machine 
receives a spent fuel bundle. The seal plugs 
are then replaced, the fuelling machines 
unclamp from the end f i t t ings and the spent 
fuel i s discharged to a spent fuel bay. All 
operations are directed remotely from the 
control room. 
3.1.2 Reliability Experience 
In the Canadian system of classifying station 
systems for nuclear safety standards, the 
fuelling machines come in the category of 
process equipment, for this type of equipment 
our standard specif ies that the rate of -
dangerous faults should not exceed 1/3 per year 




During commissioning of the HPD fuelling 
machines in 1962 while attemping on power 
fuell ing for the f i r s t time one machine was 
not t ight ly clamped onto the end f i t t ing when 
the seal plug was removed. As a result , a 
gap existed between the end f i t t ing and the 
fuelling machine which allowed some escape of 
heat transport water from the fuel channel 
into the reactor vault. The subsequent drop 
in heat transport pressure caused an immediate 
reactor tr ip while the entry of hot water 
into the reactor vault ini t iated operation of 
a dousing system to limit pressure in the room. 
All protective and containment equipment 
operated as designed to safely terminate the 
incident. 
Changes were made to eliminate th i s type of 
occurrence and the KID fuelling machines have 
been performing on power refuelling routinely 
since January 1, 1964. 
During the three year period between 1964 and 
1966 the average incapability for the HPD 
unit was II.65C compared to an annual target of 
4$. The production re l iab i l i ty review indicated 
that 979* of the lost production was due to 10 
systems and of these the fuelling system con-
tributed the largest share. 
This focus Bed attention on the need to improve 
fuelling machine re l iab i l i ty and the rapid 
improvement in performance of these machines i s 
demonstrated by the following s t a t i s t i c s . 
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This dramatic improvement was not entirely 
a result of better fuelling machine per-
formance singe SPD was shutdown for several 
months in 1968 while the heat transport was 
changed from a pressurized heavy water to a 
boiling heavy water system. 
3.2 STANDBY GBraRATOR JgJLIABHJTY 
3.2.1 general Description 
The arrangement of electrical power supplies 
at Canadian nuclear power stations was 
reported by Bake (6). 
As indicated in Figure 6, station service 
power consists of either three or four "classes" 
of power, each with i t s own set of busses. 
These are l i s ted in ascending order of 
reliability. 
1. The Class IV busses are supplied from the 
generator and transmission l ines through 
the station service transformers. 
2. The Class III busses are normally supplied 
from Class IV but in emergency are supplied 
by standby generator units. 
14'.' 
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?. The Class II busses are supplied from 
Class i l l but in emergency service i s 
sustained through motor generator sets 
operating on the station direct current 
su-røly« 
i. Class I i s the station direct current 
supply, normally fed through rect i f iers 
or the motor generator sets and supplied, 
in emergencies, from the station 
batteries which float on this supply. 
Equipment which i s supplied from the Class III 
tusses i s generally of the type which can 
tolerate an outage of a few minutes without 
affecting the safety of the station. This 
includes such services as the firefighting 
pumps, moderator pumps and heat transport 
Standby cooling pumps. 
At NPD one 175 leva diesel-generator was 
originally supplied; however, a second 175 kva 
iinit was instal led in 1963 during the final 
stages of station commissioning. Both units 
are capable of supplying a l l essential Class 
III loads. 
At Douglas Point two 950 kva diesel-generators 
were originally supplied and a third 1200 kva 
unit was added in 1969. Each diesel i s capable 
Of supplying a l l essential Class III loads. 
At Pickering the Class III loads for each pair 
of 508 HW(e) nuclear generating units wil l be 
supplied from a set of 3 - 5000 leva combustion 
turbine generators. Each combustion turbine 
generator wil l supply a l l essential Class III 
loads for one nuclear generating unit. 
3.2.2 Reliabil ity Experience 
(The main safety requirement for standby 
generating units i s that they, in conjunction 
with other sources of electrical power, main-
ta in sa e lectr ical supply with a low enough 
unreliability that i t does not significantly 
affect failure rates of essential process, 
protective or containment equipment. Our 
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analyses indicate tha t our safety standards 
wil l be met i f diesel s t a r t ing fa i lure r a t e s 
do not exceed 0.25 fa i lures per t e s t s t a r t . 
Kach diesel unit a t NPD and Douglas Point i s 
routinely t e s t s ta r ted once per week. 
NPD experience has been favourable. During 
the four year span from 1965 through 1968 
there was a to ta l of 7 s ta r t ing fa i lures foi 
the two uni ts which represents a fa i lure r a t e 
of less than 0.02 per unit per t e s t . 
Douglas Point experience has been much less 
favourable. l e s t data accumulated to the 
present time indicates a fa i lure ra te of 0.1 per 
unit per t e s t . Although th i s performance meets 
our safety standard, i t i s well below the 
performance that has been experienced at HPD 
and other similar i n s t a l l a t i ons . 
This poor diesel performance does not d i rec t ly 
affect our production r e l i a b i l i t y standards 
since single diesel s t a r t ing f a i lu re s do not 
involve nuclear generating unit outage or 
derating. However, the diesel generating un i t s 
are operated occasionally during extreme system 
peak conditions to provide addit ional generation 
capacity and t h i s i s one reason tha t we are 
attempting to bring the r e l i a b i l i t y of the 
Douglas Point uni ts into the normal range 
experienced elsewhere. 
3.3 BfflRsatmr COOUHG srsim RSIABILICT 
3.3.1 general Description 
The major features of emergency cooling 
systems in Canadian nuclear power plants have 
been described by Brown (7) and the basic 
concept is shown in Figure 7. The common 
charac ter i s t ic of a l l systems i s tha t 
emergency inject ion i s provided by feeding 
an a l te rna te heat renoval supply to the reactor 
using the exist ing heat t ransport i n l e t and 




In the HPD design the light water dousing 
system storage tank i s used as the alternate 
supply and this i s connected by pipes 
directly to the heavy water heat transport 
system. The injection water i s isolated. 
by normally closed check valves and an air 
buffer space separates the heavy and light 
water to prevent downgrading when injection 
i s not required. The system i s designed to 
operate automatically when there i s a sudden 
heat transport pressure drop as in a loss of 
coolant accident. 
In later designs, as employed at Douglas 
Point and Pickering, the heavy water 
moderator is used as a source of injection 
water. This i s normally separated from the 
heat transport system by closed isolating 
valves. Operation is init iated by instrument 
detection of low heat transport pressure 
which signals the motorized valves to open. 
2 Reliabil i ty Experience 
The HPD injection system has never operated 
nor has there been any occasions- when 
operation was required. At various times the 
heat transport system has been depressurized 
for planned maintenance and care i s required 
to ensure that before this i s done the 
injection system i s isolated by operation of 
manual valves. This procedure has not 
presented any problem. 
There i s no provision for testing HPD 
injection system components while the 
reactor i s at high power and a l l components 
are tested semi-annually during a planned 
shutdown. There have been no unsafe failures 
of v i ta l components and It i s necessary that 
component fai lure rates remain very low In 
order that system unreliability targets wi l l 
be met without an increase in tes t s to mors 
than twice per year. Ho test frequency 
reduction i s warranted in the near future, in 
spite of the very favourable t e s t experience. 
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This Is acceptable at a small demonstration 
station but we attempt to l imit this type of 
shutdown test to once per year at the large 
nuclear units. 
for the Douglas Point and Pickering design, 
provision has been made for testing v i ta l 
components with the reactor at high power 
and this has enabled the safety unreliability 
target to be met with only once per year 
complete shutdown tes t s . This on power test 
capability also permits additional t es t s to 
be scheduled to compensate for higher than 
expected component failure rates without 




In developing numerical standards as targets 
for nuclear generating unit safety and production 
r e l i a b i l i t y , we recognize that some lack of re l iabi l i ty 
i s inevitable and acceptable. Our studies show that 
similar techniques can be used to divide this lack of 
both safety and production re l iab i l i ty among the various 
systems and components. These techniques provide the 
designer with a tool for assessing relat ive cost and 
effort which should be employed to ensure the re l iabi l i ty 
of the system he i s designing. At the same time, the 
techniques provide the operator with a tool for comparing 
experience with design goals and focus attention on 
equipment which i s interfering most with unit performance. 
We have been using these techniques for several 
years at NED, and the lessons which we have learned are 
leading to modifications which wi l l be applied at other 
nuclear power stations. 
1. A capability for on-power test ing of major safety 
system components i s important This allows frequent 
t e s t s to be done as dictated by the safety standard 
without unit shutdown or derating and resultant drop 
below the production standard. 
2. Techniques used to share re l iab i l i ty targets among 
different systems and calculate unit targets by 
probability methods assume that the various systems 
and equipment are independent. At the same time 
there i s an economic incentive to reduce capital cost 
by sharing services among various systems, thus, a l l 
common services must be arranged so that the risk of 
cross-linked faults i s l e s s than the risk of simul-
taneous independent faults . 
3. Our methods for recording and correcting component 
faults have been successful at HPD, where the volume 
i s small; however, we are preparing to have computer 
storage of fault data at the larger stations. We 
are also actively investigating the use of computers 
for analysis of fault data and re l iab i l i ty calculations. 
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TABLE 1 
NED Boller Room Area Containment System 
















Sousing lank and 
Lines 
Rel ief Diaphragm 
Ssehaust Samp*r 
Control Circuits 
Relief Duot Gate 
Iso lat ion Damper 
Control Circuits 
Component 
1 x 10"4 
J X 10" 
1 x 10' 
4 x 10 
-3 2 x 10 
6 x 1 0 ' 4 
4 x 10"4 




1.7 x 10" 
3.0 x 1 0 ' 5 




















































Uo-'ing the maturity period production wil l be l o s t because ot 
system conditions on occasions when the unit i s capable of 
producing. The capacity factor i s reduced by 8 percent in 
addition to the unit incapability to allow for this . 
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Oct. 1 - Hov. 11/62 
Feb. 12 - May 25/63 
May 6 - Sept. 5/63 
Dec. 18/63 - Apr. 17/64 
Tear 1964 
Dec. 1/64 - Jan. 31/65 
June 1/65 - June 30/65 
Dec. 1/65 - Peb. 28/66 
Dec. 1/66 - Peb. 28/67 
Dec. 1/67 - Peb. 29/68 







































0 GENERAL Sub Total 
1 SITE AND IMPROVEMENTS Sub Total 
2 BUILDINGS, STRUCTURES 




25 Outdoor & Underground 
Structures 
REACTOR BOILER AND 
AUXILIARIES 
31 Reactor 
32 Moderator System 
33 Beat Iransport SyBtem 
34 Auxiliary Systems 
35 Fuel Handling 
36 Boiler Steam and Water 
37 Fuel 
TURBINE GENERATOR AND 
AUXILIARIES Sub Total 
41 Turbo-generator unit 
42 Main Condensing System 
43 Feedwater 
44 Reject System 
45 Auxiliary Systems 








OUTAGE DEBATING TOTAL 
.150 .020 .170 




















































































Reactor B o i l e r and 
A u x i l i a r i e s 
Turbine Generator and 
A u x i l i a r i e s 
E l e c t r i o Power Systema 
Control Centr« Equipment 
Common Processes and 
Serv ices 






Vater Suppl ies 
Sewage and Drainage 
V e n t i l a t i o n 
Compressed Gas Serv ices 












































TOTAL 3.000 .400 3.400 
IAHLE 6 
KED Regulating and Protectlye SyBtem Faults 
KED protective System 
Minor Faul t s 
Safe Faul t s 
Unsafe Fau l t s 






































JED Regulating SyBtem 







































i a n a b i l i t y Experience 
Regulat ing System 
Actual I n c a p a b i l i t y 
Outage Derating 
0.17 0.27 
0.27 0 .09 
0 .01 0 .05 
0 0.029 
0.076 0 
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Ris^, Uth - 26th Sapt. 1969 
FREQUENCY AM) CAIISES OF FAILURE TO COMPONENTS 
OF LARGE STEAK TBBIHBS 
by 
H. Huppnann 
ALLIAHZ Vereicherunga~AO, Mttnchen 
Germany 
For many dacadaa nov, tin 'Allianz Versicherungs-Aktiengeeell-
ecbaft" baa maintained a central card index for stear turbines 
of Goi wan ovnerahlp insured vith ita Machinery Insurance Depart-
ment. To day, thla card Indax contains approximately 1 700 tur-
bine« of all eapacitiea up to 370 *W - per turbo eat of Straw 
manuf actor era. Entered in tbia index ar* the Moat important 
failurea aa well aa their causes. Ve have ehoeen for tbia con-
ference a repreaentative aalectlon of modern turbo unite ten 
years old at moat, starting with a capacity of 100 Kir. Va consi-
dered 84 etaan turbines, 51 of the reaction type and 33 of the 
.lotion type, vith a total capacity of 11 914 NV and a total of 
3 481 000 hours of operation. The average unit load par etaam 
turbine ia 1*1,8 MV. The average number of hbtira of operation 
of each atsam turbine ia 41 440 hours. 
Va proceeded vith the evaluation aa followai The number of the 
moat important component« vas taken from production documenta 
and from blueprints. The following components have been examined 
la detaili rotor bladea of eaoh stage, atator blades of each 
stage, nasalee and action wheels, journal and thrust bearings, 
caat-steel casings, rotors, labyrinth aaalinge and valves. If 
- 2 -
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ve multiply tba number of hour a of oparation of tha different 
components with the number of component a, we obtain for each 
turbo set and for each component, characteristic figures for 
reaction-type and action-type turbine«. Thus, for example, 
the average reaction-type turbine achieves k • 10 tl—aita 
mhmxaixxh blade-hours of operation, whereas tha action-type 
turbine achieves only 1.4 • 10 blade-hours. Similar figures 
were obtained, for the other components. Theaa values must be 
recalled to mind when conaidering the laat two figures 10 and 
11 in order to avoid too quick coneluaione on the operational 
reliability of the entire system "steam turbine". 
For example! The reaction-type turbine has on average a little 
leas than thr'ee timea as many blade-hours of operation per 
turbine than tha action-type turbine. For thle reaaon tha 
action-tyae turbine can have about three time« the probability 
of failure of the component "rotor blades" aa tha reaction-
type turbine and still achieved the eame reliability. 
Letytts begin to consider the grapha 3f the moet important com-
ponente of a eteam turbine. 
Figure No. ' • we will show basically for all other following 
' grapha what coneluaiona may be drawn from theae evaluations. 
Tha horisontal axis shows tha number of hours of oparation from 
O to »1 WOO. This is tha average number of hours of oparation 
of all considered steam turbines. The vertical axia on tha laft 
shows the number of caaes of fallura, whereas tha vertical axis 
on tha right shows the frequency of failures In psroantages. 
The straight-edged curve from O to 100 % shows the xequency of 
failures in the component "rotor bladea". Immediately evident la 
the fact that $0 % of all failures already occur upto 8 799 
hours of opsration. Tha broken line from 0 to 100 % shows the 
linear distribution of failure. Tha variously croas-hatched. 
bars on tha horisontal axis represent the slmpls addition of 
4^f«i|l»ree In intervals of,hours of operation,^ ___, , , ,,» ,t> 
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Three basic types of failure-causes are clearly shown by 
three different types of cross-hatchings. 
The first category is called "productions! deficiencies". 
This includes material, calculation, design« production and 
installation deficiencies. This category of causes is of 
prime importance during ths first 10 000 hours of operation 
in particular. 
Tha sscond category we call "operational deficiencies1*. 
It includes operational and maintenance deficiencies and 
failure of supervisory, protsctive and control facilities. 
In this category wa have alao included failures due to wear 
andteax under operational conditions, such as erosion and 
corrosion. 
Ths third category was designated "external influences*. 
This Includes failures originating in the boiler, In tha oil 
supply syatsm, in the generator and in the electric grid. 
Attention ie drawn to the maxima at 10 000 and 20 000 hours 
of operation revealed by tha guarantee inapsctions of the 
Manufacturer on the one hand or tha operational inspections 
by tha operator and insurer on the other. Tha importance øf 
tisMly inspection, which should be effected before the and 
of tha first 10 000 hours of operation, ia particularly 
clearly shown in this graph. Only in this way can productional 
deficiencies of a naw atsam turbine be discovered in tim* and 
elialnated. 
figure Ho. 2 shows ths frequency e< failure In the com-
ponent "statDr blades'. Ssre, the stralght-Adf*« "*»»rv» is 
' t * v . :, - **•&! ±) A L 
almost identical with the idsslissd linssrity of failure. 
This if due to greater clarity la r»»«j«»»la» o/ th« typs 
of lead on ths stator blades. The eamplstaly airferem* .4**i*» 
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of tha di&phragu in tha action-type turbinea aoet certainly 
also plays a role. 
Figure No. 3 shows the evaluation for the nozzle cate-
gory and Figure Wo. k that of the rotor bladee of aingle-row 
action wheels. The rotor bladea of the fir at stage in parti-
cular already show the striking figure of 50 % failure fre-
quency upto 3 750 hours of operation. The atator bladaa of 
the nozzle category, on the other hand, show a clear increaae 
in failure frequency, and thus a deviation from linear dletri-
bution, after approximately 20 000 hours of oparation. Deeply 
latent productional deflcienciee, auch as aensitivity to 
theraal stresses, sake their appearance here. Such caeea of 
failure are usually first discovered in the course of inspec-
tions carried out during thia operational period. 
In Figure Ko« 5 particular attention Is drawn to tha 
category of failure causes known aa "operational deficiencies" 
which occur amch awre Cequently during the first period upto 
12 500 houra of operation than in the previously ahown Figurea. 
During the initial pariod of operation, i. a. while tha person-
nel opsratora are being trained and during replacement of the 
eoBHtlasloning opsratora, experience shows that aany errors in 
operation occur which in stoat caaaa lead to bearing failures. 
The sub-category "failure of protective facilities" contributes 
to this to a substantial degree, aa aasential protective faci-
lities are, unfortunately, often insufficiently tested or not 
accurately adjusted dua to lack of tine during tha starting-up 
pariod. 
Figure Bo. 7 shows a slaliar trend. Tha Majority of all 
failures to rotors occurs during tha first 2 500 hours of 
operation solely aa a result of errors aade by the operatora 
an failure of protective facilities, whereby tba relative ax-
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panaion and the vibration readings in particular play an 
important part. The category "production«! deficiencies" 
mainly constitutes failures ensuing as a result of improper 
installation. 
Figure Mo. 6 shows almost complete linearity in the 
failure flsquency for cast-steel casings. "Productional 
deficiencies"v especially material deficiencies, play a 
very important part after a considerable number of hours 
of operation. 
Figure Mo. 8 shows the incidence of failures in re-
spect of labyrinth seals. Conspicuous in this caae again 
is th« great number of errors on the part of the operator 
during the Initial poriod of operation alone. The re-
appearance of this category of failure causa after 25 000 
houra of operation should not give rise to confusion. These 
are mostly cases of failure resulting from wear and tear to 
the alloy-steel-strips of the labyrinth seals. 
Figur« Mo. 9 shows the failure incidence in respect of 
the control and stop valves of the steam turbines. The 
straight-edged curve differs from those previously shown in 
that it lies 100 % below the linear distribution. During 
the period up to 10 00D hours of operation, no ssxbus valve 
failures are shown in our data. It is thus apparent that 
these components, which are of the utmost importance for 
the safe operation of steam turbines, havs achieved •..high 
degree øf reliability. Only after a great number of hours 
of operation do latent design and - mar* »iwitty.-: 
latent material deficiencies in storms and valve •«•*» nak* 
en appearance. _vi, ,. j-.,-. <>.,,. 
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Looking through these graphs > the question automatically 
arises why only a limited period of approximately k\ 000 
hours of operation was evaluated. The reason for this is 
that the steam turbines with capacities of 100 MU and up-
wards selected by us achieve, on average, this particular 
number of hours of operation. Only very few turbo-sets 
manufactured during the initial period around 1937 - 1959 
provide periods of operation exceeding this limit. In the 
period longer than 41 000 hours of operation, "operational 
deficiencies11 and "external influences" are predominant. 
None of these categories of causes permit any true assessment 
of the reliability of component parts in steam turbines. On 
the other hand, evaluation should not be oxtended to older 
turbines of smaller capacity, because as the data gathered 
on these would be of no interest for future nuclear power 
plants. Aside from this the first five years of operation 
of a nev turbo-set are today considered the most critical 
years of operation as regards reliability and availability, 
taking in account the desired base load of operation. 
In conclusion, we should like to summarise the results 
in the last two Figures: 
Figure Wo. 10 shows the probability of failure of the 
components mentioned, depending upon their hours of oper-
ation (a logarithmic scale was chosen for the presentation). 
For reasons of clarity, and in order to appease many erities 
of statistical processes right from the outset, the turbine* 
were divided into those of the action-type and those of the 
reaction-type. Finally, a statistical coupling of both 
design types has been effected, with the result that a third 
column In-the tables shows the values that may perhaps some 
day result for turbines of combined design. The result* are 
a true criterion for the technical reliability of the indi-
vidual components of stsam turbines. 
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The rotor bladea, ttxa moat feared components of atean 
turbines, ravaal the greatest reliability. The reliability 
of the action-type turbine vita heavier loada per blade-
row la not i however« aa good aa that of the reaction-type 
turbine. Otherwise, there are no notable differences in 
the order of components, except for the fact that the cast-
ateal casings of the reaction-typee turbinea are more — » i a 
sxsm prona to damage than thoaa of the action-type turbinea. 
In this case« a apacial deaign amy prove to be disadvantageous, 
or the larger dimensions of the cast-ateel parts of reaotion-
typa turbinaa amy contribute. 
In Figure No. 11 the abatract concept of technical 
reliability of a component ia not based on ita houra of 
operation« but rather upon the period of operation of the 
entire "steaa turbine* unit. Thus, the importance of the 
rotor bladea becomes immediately apparent. The rotor bladea 
of both types of turbine deaign atill represent a bottleneck 
aa regards reliability or availability. The turbine of the 
action-type makea a pretty bad showing aa far aa evaluation 
of the rotor bladea is concerned. This, however, is not 
surprising as hare a daereaae in the number of atagaa waa 
particularly atrongly aaaociated with an increaae In capacity 
from 150 MY to 300 MW per unit. 
It should however, also appreciated that both construct-
ional designs), with vary little deviation, attain aa inoreass 
ia failure probability of the various components after 
100 000 hours of operation. If these results ara to be 
applied to the reliability evaluation of the components 
of the latest prototype turbines, then further parameters 
will have to be latrodacM iato «als atattMtsal *urV»y»J 
T*a toga oX turbine^»^ ,
 X o T exaajrto -„. MtO^M**««*«* 
rotor blades will have to bo considered a» further orltoria, 
since, as oar data prove, lis* exert • najer latrluaaoa as 
the reliability of e**penant». ,*»**<* Tuwn»a . , 
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On tha subject of "cause« of damage" , the following 
auaajary ia alao preaentad: 
The category "production deficlenciea" is by far, the 
•ost important. Within thia category, pure "deaign" and 
"calculation" errors play the nor* significant role. Mate-
rial deficiencies have becosie very rare, and errors in 
inatallation are alao very aeldoai found. This is quite 
apparently the result of improved material input controls 
and the use of qualified personnel for installation work, 
whereby aupervislon of tha installation by tha simultaneous 
employment of several erectlonfittara and periodic inspect-
ions by the erection englneer-in-chaxga sake tha greatest 
contribution. 
In tie category "operational deficiencies*, errors In 
operation are of conaequence only during the initial working-up 
period, 1. e. during the first two years of operation. In con-
trast to earlier data gathered and evaluated, favourable 
changes have been brought about by automation of the ayatea 
and ths alaioat complete protection afforded by auparvisory 
facilities. 
Undisputed first in the category of causes know as "ex-
ternal influences" are tha breakdowns originating frosi live 
•teaa and reheated steaa in conventional systeas. Extremely 
serious failures have alao raaultad from breakdown in slectric 
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La ainiaisation de la sone U conduit a una expression des å*, i , , . , , ff* a 
partir d1 opera tours de lissage SJ, S ,^ . . . , s" défirds pac la relation da 
recurrence S* (X) =«t sJ " 1 (X) + (i -<<) S° _ , (X) ane SJ (x) = Xp. 
La valeur du IITBF sstiaée aprés la panne de rang r est alors dunnée par : 
BTBF (t) = 4J + «J. (t - tr) + . . . «£ (t - t r ) n 
l'origine des temps choisis étant celle de la derniere penne. 
Dans la pratique, use tendance perabolique eet choisie, ce qui conduit å un 
triple lissage. 
Un program de calcul pernettant d'efiectuer les calculs mmåriquee a été 
nis au point. 
La constants de lissage °( est, par definition, un noahre conpris antra Bero 
et un. L'auteur de la réfdresoe 3 signals, qu'en general, ISB melUeure resul-
tats sont obtenus en choisissant la constant« entxe 0,1 et 0,3. 0a ransefgna-
aent n'est qu'indicatif et, dans la pratique, on determine par un etalon-
nage du procéaé de lissage sur la partle de la cbronique qui est connue. 
Forauler une estination prerisiormelle du iOBF n'a de Talsur que s i on peut 
fixer un interrails de confiance a l'estiiaation faite et s i un noyen d'alarta 
aasse sensible pernet de signaler un changement dans le cooporteamt du sys-
taw étudie. 
L'erreur de prevision peut (trs déflnie conas la difference antra la prevision 
et la realisation t 
• r - TBF (tr) - JOTF (tr) 
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Si le modale choisi représsnte bien le processus de croiaaaaoa du KEBF, la. 
•oyenne des arrears est null« et la distribution des ermuxe eet nonale. 
Four fixer la præcision de la prevision, i l faut calculer la variance ou 
l1 écart type de le distribution des erreura S . Bne solution plus aiaple 
consist© a d&finir la dispersion de la distribution des arrears non par son 
écart type aais par aon écart aoyen f (pour tme loi norsale Cai/--*. C * TTB)* 
Use ostisation continue de S
 t J = a (tr) s'obtieot pur un sisple lisaege 
de la serie des erreurs qui doit fttre Btationoaire et de noyexme mille« 
Les liadtes ge confiance se calculent alors a partir de la valeur prévisiøn-
nelle de d. a ( tr ) , l'on a : 
WBP (tr + %) =HEBP (tr + T ) - -g-g 
Si l'on veat an interrails de confiance bilateral i 95 % une table de In 
lo i noraale réduite indique que E est egal a 1,96. 
Se plus, UD signal d'alerte peut consister a verifier, en peraanence, al l a 
some algébrique das ensure fluctae effectiTeasnt olen autour da sexo. Cto 
peut Is verifier, quaUtativeBsnt, en trsgant d'uoa facon continue la s n e s 
des erreura. Four foire use estimation qrantitntive qui ptaet Sauls In prise 
da decision, i l est nécessoiie de calculer l e veriance de le søsat das erreure. 
Le utugraBM) de calcul de lissage étsbU pernet ds ealsulm la variance dee 
arreum ainsi que la variance da la BOBBS Aes em aura at par consequent de 
Juger de la validity das ISS? (t») obtenos. 
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c o a n res IEGHKIQUES BE SCCURIXE BES HEACTEOBS 
Reunion ae apéc ia l i s tes en matiére de f i&bi l i té 
døs cooposants e t des systemes nécanigues 
destines k assurer l a sécurite des réactsuxs 
"FIMIUTE QEEHATICMBELLE B'TJKB MCHUE -
FliBILIfE HIEVISICaiMEUf vnf SYSTIME CMPEEKAIf « røfl"]"« ™ Ptmi.HnJ!" 
par 
p . HKMBUT* 
et 
Å. BESMESGtTl« 
• Soclét« EEHTn . Bolte Postale n° 3 - 78 FUtXSIB, 
•» ELSCTRICITE IS SKAWS.- Bolte Postale n» 26 - 57 KBRS. 
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1 - IHDBQIHCTiai 
1«B constxucteurs de systémes mécanliiuea ont, de tout temps, cberché a con-
férer & leurs fabrications une slSreté de fonctionnenent aatisfaiaante. 
Mais, il n'y a que recensent qu'on a cberché it Quantifier eette surety de 
fonotionnenent. 
OB besoia a donoé naiasancs & la fiabilité mécanique qui eet oaractériaée 
par : 
- la difficulté d'obtenir des resultats statistiques significatifs, lea 
Bysternes étant généralercent construits en nombre restraint, 
- 1" existence d" interactions difficile a précimr entre les composanta d'un 
systems, 
- la possibility d'affectuer des reparations. 
Apres avoir rappalé quelques généralités sur la fiabilité, on expose t 
- les méthodes psrmettant, a partir de resultats d'esaaia, de calcnlar la 
fiabilité opératioimelle d'une machine reparable et la fonction da reparti-
tion dea duress d'arrtft correspondante, 
- use aéthod« de calcul de la fiabilité previsiomelle d'une fonetion asaurée 
par N machines associees en parallele et supposées aane interaction. 
Cetta etude a été effectuée pour le compte de l'Eleotrioité de Prance et 
les méthodes décrites appliquées au calcul de la liability de la fonction 
aoufflage du reaeteur Saint Laurent 1 de la centrale nusléaire de SADT-
LAUBEHT-æS-Eirø. 
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2 - G&HERALITES 
La fiabilité de sftreté de fonctiazmement d'un systene est la probability 
que ce systems fonctioime de facon satisfaisante pendant sne duréa dornes 
et dans des conditions d'utilisation précisées* 
La fiabilité d'un aystene peut Gtrs calculée au stade du projet - fiabilité 
prévisiosnelle - et/eu determines experiment alenent, la realisation une fois 
aohavée - fiabilité opérationnelle -. 
Bans le preller cas, il est fait appel auz regies du calcul de fiabilité 
issues du calcul des probabilités et auz données nunériques relatives sux 
organes conposants. Ces données sont issues de 1' experience industrielle 
antérisure ou d'essais systéaatiques de laboratoire. Ce genre de rensei«ne-
nent de plus en plus fréquement cosBuniqué par les foumisseurs de corpo-
sants électroniques l'est encore bien rarenent, pour ne pas dire javels, 
dans Le A^mfjy^ 49 2a nécaxiique* 
Dans le second cast on fait appel a des techniques statistiqueB utilisées 
aussi en contrSle de quelité (tests séquentiels, tests tronqués, teste aceé-
lérés* etc«**) qui permettent soit de confimar les Valeurs des fiabilités 
adoptées ou calculées au stade du projet* soit de foumix de nouvellM 
valeurs plus réalistss* 
2.1 * - PéftolUops nathéaatinnes 
Mathéaatiquenent, on définit la fonction fiabilité d'un systaae, P (t), ou 
fonetLon de eurvie ooane la distribution cuBUlée des probabilités de ban 
fonctionnenent de ce systeae. 
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La densité de panne d'un ayatsae, f ( t) , eat la probability de pame entre 
les instants t et t.+ dt ; on e évideemnt : 




La taox de paime ou tam d'avarie est egal a. m (A. C'eat la probability 
oonditionnelle d'ararie a l'åge t d'un materiel ayant vécu juaqu'å. eet Age. 
Bans le oas general, le tauz de panne Tarie avec le teaps. 
2.2. • 
L'experience montre qua la Tie d'un couposant ou d'un systime psut (tre decom-
poses en trois periodes : 
- une periode dite d'apnrentisaage ou de .leunesse pendant laauelle apparaia-
sent des pannes aléatoires et dea pannes systéoatisues, les demleres étant 
dues a dea défauts de niss au point, a un certain naabre de composants plus 
faibles que la normale, etc... On pallia ees défauts ds jeunesse, et, pendant 
cette premiere periode, on constate un tauz de penne décroissant ; 
- une periode dite de vie utile ou lea pannes se produisent a. des instants 
aléatoires Bais avec un tauz noyen constant. La Doyenne des temps de bon 
fone«™t..o»KBF. ..JL. „t „ i constate , 
- une periode dite d'usure oil oertaines pennes sont aléatoires et d'autres 
causées par l1 usure. Le tauz d'avarie eet croissant. 
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Ces considerations, sur le taux de panne, sont généralement résuneeB par 
una courbe dite en baignoire qui repcrésente le tauz d'avarie A en ftaction 
du temps (Cf. figure 1). 
- dans la &oué (2) au X est une cons tante, la densite de penne et la loi de 
survie sont dee exponentielles (figures 2, 3). 
F ( t ) = e - X t t ( t ) = . \ e - X t 
- dans la gone (3), la densité de panne est genéralement une lol norule 
øynétrique autour du teiiips M aui correspond & URS møyenne de durée de vie 
(Cf. figures 4 et 5). 
Dans le cas qui nous interesse, le systeoe a étudier est compose de F oscMnea 
reparables fonctionnant en parallels. Pour determiner la fiabilité préviaion-
nelle du systems, il est necessaire de connattre la fonction de fiabilité' 
opératioraelle ou prévisioonelle et la fonction de repartition des duren 
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3 - ilABILIir, OFBHATIOlllEUJS, KHCTIdl IB REPAKTmOR H)S HJREES D'ABBET D'OTE 
MACHDE 
5.'. - "^ ,' 1^ onerationnellB pendant la néjff^ *'ynff 
On nontie (Béf, 1) et, cofime on l'a déja dit, on vérifie eaqperimBntalemsnt 
que, dans le cas d'un system complaxe ou les sources de penne sant nonareuses, 
indépendantes et oil, sxuune de ces sources n'est préponderante, la loi de 
fiabilité est une axponentielle, lo taux de penne est alors constant et egal 
a 1'inverse de la durée noyeime de bon fonotionneaent (KEBT). 
Si cette affirmation est vraie, pour un systems au point, elle eet partiel-
lsment inezacte pour un systems en cours de mise au point, pendant la phase 
ilte d'apnrentissage ou pour un systems qui entre dans la phase d'usura. 
Sans ces deux cas, les taux de penne sont respectiysDsnt déeroissant et eroiB-
sant. Cta peut admettre, dans ces cas, que le taux de panne est constant aeule-
ment pendant des intervalles de temps Unites. 
Sous adDsttons que la politique de maintenance pernet d'éesrter la cas de 
l'usure. 31 il n'ea était pas ainsi, a parttr d'un certain moment, on oons-
taterait effectivement une oroissance du taux de panne puis sa stabilisation 
a un niveau éleve, la loi de fiabilité de la maohine restant de forne ezpo-
nentielle. 
Hals revenens a la phase d'apnrentissage. 
»lite sux oorreotions apportaes aux lacunas initiales du systems, le taux de 
penne décrolt. On adnet que la loi da fiabilité' du systems eet toujoure uos 
exponentielle mais avec un taux de penne (ou un WET) qui n'est constant que 
localement. 
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L'estimation de la Valeur du HTBP, dans la phase i'apprantissage, present* 
alors quelques difficultés. En effet s i , corns a pu le ncntrar KTSIKUI (Hef. 1), 
la aoyenne arithnétique des tamps de bon fonctiormenent est l e æilleur est i -
oateur du KTBF lorsque le tam de panne est constant, c1 eat auasl le plus 
muvais laraque ee paraaetre évolue. 
Pour sumontar cette difficult^, an oonsidere la suite des durées de bon 
fonctiannement - TBF (t) - ooooe une serie chsonologiaue que l'on traite par 
use aethode de lissaga arponentielle de BBOHR (Sét. 3 et 4) . 
Sans le cas 4'une tel le cnronique, on peut fomallement distinguer, pendant 
la phase d'apprentiaaage, deux ternes s un tene de tendance HEBF (t) •> 
TBP (t) et un terne d'aléa dont la presence obacurcit la tendance. 
TBF (t) « TR? (t) + e (t) 
Soit X la sulte des durées de bon fonctionnenent (r rang des pannes). L'oxi-
r 
ginalité de la méthode exponeatlaUa reside en l e fait qu'une fois obolsi 
le model« de la tendance, sous forne poljraadsle par emupie t 
MHF = 33? (t) = a" + a t + . . . + an tn , 
l'esttaation des a , a., a , apras la penne de rang r, 
se fait non pes en itlffilrtmnt la a o s n o ^ (X (p) - X (p)) sal* en ntaian> 
r 2 ( r - p ) * - > , , 
sant U sonos V -~^> (1 -<) (X (p) - X (p)) oeoi m l'objeotif 
p • t 
d'aocorder, pour la pxerlaion, snx eeerta préVlaion-realisetion lea plus réosata 
une Jtaportence plus grande qu'aui plus aooiena. 
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3.2. - Kabillté a la fia a« la periode d'essai 
Le calcul de la fiabilité prérisionnelle d'une fonction assures par un groups 
de machineatsaxis interaction associees en parallele,peut étre conduit a partir 
de la fiabilité opsrationneU.e de cheque mnnhirw en cours d'essai, c'eat-a-dire 
en periode infantile. Hals, il paralt 30uhaitable de pouroir disposer de la 
fiabilité opérationnelle de ohaque machine pendant la periode de Tie utile. 
La netnode présentée par Martin H. SALTZ au 5ene Symposium National sur la 
fiabilité et le controls de qualité, en 1959 å Philadelphia pennet, entre 
autres, le calcul de cette fiabilité a partir des resultats d'essais de aise 
au point (Héf. 5) . 
Qn admet que le qysteoe a une fiabilité exponentlelle et on avance l'hypothese 
que les pannes appartiennent a deux families t 
une famille de pannes dites primaires, peu nombreuses, ayant une forte proba-
bilité d'arriTée et auxguellea il correspond une Doyenne de teops de bon 
fonctioimement MTEF , 
- une famille de ptumes secoiidalre^nombrsuses, ayant une faible probabilité 
d'arriTée et auxquellas correspond une moyenne ae tenps de bon fonctioraement 
HTEFB. 
On suppose que les sources de paanes primaires peurant åtre détectées et cor-
rigéee pendant la periode de miss au point et qu1 elles ne se manifesteront 
plus par la sult«. Cn suppose également que la correction d'une source de 
pennes jcaaaixes ne modifie pas le tam de pannes dfl aux pannes weoadains. 
Ainsl, une fois toutes les oauses d'svarias primaires éliainéeo, le taux de 
penne derient oonstant et egal au taux de penne, HKBF , consequence dee 
araries noondaixes seuleaent, Ce taux de panne est le plus faible que l'on 
puiase eapérer lorsque le systime sera au point. 
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La aatériel doit itre essaye dans les conditiona assea procnes da Sexploi-
tation normale. La fiabilité depend du niveau de contraintes ou sjode de fono-
tionoesnnt. 
Le M B F est tout au lang de la. parioda d'essai use constants aloxe que le 
M B F peut varier par pallers li 
prinaires modifient la maohine. 
oraque les reparations correspondent a n pannes 
La oourbe "noyenne" donnant les durées cusulées dea tenns d» bon fanetiomMMnt 
t en fonctian du rang des pannes est ainsi use auccsBsion de aegaants de 
droits, earreapondant aux pamies prinaires, sno en plus un certain ncnbre 
de points, correspondent auz pennes aeeondaires (WBF « W O T ) . 
La netnode de dépouillement dea resultats experimentaux parmettant de calcu-
ler le WTBF déooule iamédiatement de cette reaeroue. 
1) Cn trace la oourbe donnant les tanps de ban fonotianneaent cunulés en 
fonction du rang dea pennes, 
2) Cn •"<•>"» grossieraiient cheque portion, sans eassura, de ostte oourbe 
a des sagnents de droits correspondent auz périodee^^ ou la machine n'a pas 
eubi de modifications provenant de la reparation de pannes prinalras. 
Pendant les periodes At., le nombre de pannes OBt &?.. 
3) Cn choisit un HTHF. 
4) On oaloule pour cheque plriode At., le ( K U L ) 
At. 
A Pi-!H» 0 • • 
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5) Ob determine lea dates t d'apparition "an wajmm" das pannea an taction 
da leur rang 
(MBf^, 2 (HTBF,),, HOT, (rHTIFp),, r (ffiBPj), 
+ (MBF' ) 2 , r (itfflF^), + p (HtBPpJj 
6) On calcule la a o m s ^ > (tr - pour touts la period« d'observation 
disponible. 
la bonne valsur du MTBF eat celle qui minimise la soanelECt - tr) , oe qui 
peat se determiner gr&phiquemsnt. 
3.3. - Benartition daa duress d'arrtt 
li'étendue des valeura das duress d'arrst étant généralement falble par rapport 
au tenps de bon fonctionnement, on adopte par souci da sijoplicité una loi 
exponentielle pour la fonction de repartition dea duries d'arret d'une aacbine. 
Le parametre définisant catte loi eat obtenu par ajuatenent grapbiqua a par-
tir das resultats d'eaeais. Aucune diacrénination n'aat effectuee antra 1 M 
pannes priaaixes et I n pannes seooadairw. 
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4 - FIABIUTE PRLVISICKNELLB D'USE KHCTICM 
4.1. - Plusieurs machines peuvent Åtra réparéee gdjnultetnénant 
Dens ce qui suit, on admet qu'une fonction assure« pax un ensemble de machines 
supposées sane interaction, associéea en parallele, eet renplie loraqu'une en 
Doins des machines est en etat de marche. 
A partir de la fiabilité opératioxmelle de cheque machine et de la loi de 
repartition des durées de panne correspondante obtenues en cours d'essai. 
on pent calculer la fiabilité préVisionrvalle de la fonction coasidérée i 
- soit analytiqueoent, on obtient alors directement la fonction fiabilité, 
- soit par une méthode de simulation représentant le fonctionnenent reel, 
pendant une periode T, de 1 
tions échantillons encore en vie auz instants t.. 
Bans ce dernier cas, il est : 
- soit possible de determiner la fonction fiabilité cherchee par ajustamont 
grapfaique a partir du graphe (-w-, t.) ; la fiabilité déterminée est dite 
parametrlque, 
- soit nécessaire d'utiliser pour determiner la fiabilité les resultats rela-
n* 
tifs auz tests tranqués, ne disposant pas d'aases de pointe (*-*-• t.) ; la 
fiabilité déterminée est dite non parssetrique. 
Nous avone choisi use méthode de simulation du type "Monte-Carlo" øt nous 
avons du calouler une fiabilité non parametria^*). 
Pour simuler le fonctionnenent reel. 11 e'aglt de determiner, au hasard, pour 
cheque machine échantillon, des duxes* de aarche et d'arxtt qui* U c a qu*alé*-
toirw. doivent respecter les lois de survie et d'lndisponibUité ohoisiee. 
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Cta donsntre que l'on attaint es resultat an tirant au hasard des sonores a. 
eonprie antra 0 «t 1, puis en faisant corxespondre, par l'internediaire dss 
lois de fiabilité da repartition des duress ds repartition a chaqua nombre a. 
des duress de Tie ou de reparation t*, et t . (figurs 6), En alternant lss 
periodes de narche et d'arre't pour ehacuns dea nacbines st en poursuivant 
l'opéretion jusqu'au tesps voulu, on obtient l1histoire de la fonetløn souf-
flage que l'on peut illustrer par la figur* 7. Sur cette dandere, il est 
facile de oonptabiliser la frequence dss éVeneaents qui présentsnt ds l'inté-
rdt pour le problene pose* 
Deux programmes ds calcul existent qui psraettest de faire eatte elnulation« 
Le prexder programe, assss simple, a été écrit dans Is but d'obtenir rapide-
ment dss resultats. 
Il permet de fsire fonctiømier H fois quatre nacbines identiquss (V fbnctions) 
pendant un tamps f quelconqus, cheque aaoMTW étant réparée des qu'elle tombs 
en pæne. La loi de fiebilité et la fonction ds repartition das duress da 
repartition de la aachine type sont dss exponentialles. Lss dates d1 appari-
tion du premier arrtt simultane des quatre machinas sont snsuits donnéee, 
Le deuxleas programme est d'utilisation plus general* s 
- le nombre de mwMiws constituent la fonction globale et le nombre ds simu-
lations peuvent ttre libremsnt choisis (sous reserve dss limitations dans 
la dimension dss tableaux st l'eneombrenent en memoirs centrale de l'ordi-
nataur utilise), 
- lss nacbines sont indisridualiaées (cbaque • * < « a aes lois propres et un 
åge independent de oelui des autres), 
17-



















- les différents etats successifs de la function globale, leur date d1 appari-
tion et leur durée sont maintenus en memoir«. 
Cette derniére option pennet en perticulier de connaftre t 
- les dates d* apparition des premieres "pannes*1 (plus exactement les dates 
des premieres sequences comportant 0, 1f 2 machines en pstrnc). d'ou 
1*estimation de la fiabilité, 
- la repartition de ces sequences en classes successives de durées (duress 
probables de fonctioimeoent ou d'arret), d'ou. connaiøsance de la disponibilité. 
Le noobre d' éveneoents possible étant tres grand, les resultats ne fournissent 
pas toutes les durées oozxespondantes individualisées mels groupéee en 
classes. Le nombre de ces classes a été choisi egal s 12. Les durées des éve-
nements (penne ou bon fonctionnament) pouvant varier a l'intérieur de limites 
tres vastes (quelques minutes a des oentaines de millier d'heures)* les inter-
valles de classes n'ont pas été pris équidistants male espacés, suivant une 
progression geooétrique. Cette loi de repartition est modifiable a- volonté 
au niveau des données* 
Cumaissant a un instant t le nombre de fonotions écbantillons tombées en 
penne : N - n, on estime (Réf. 6, 7) une liaite inférieure de la fiabilité 
au bout du temps t correspondent a un interrail« de confiance unilateral a 
100 (1 -«0 & Vaide de la relation 
F(t) ! 
, + ( * i ^ ) 5 ^ . 2 ( K - n ) + 2 ; 2 n 
(Ay^ | 2 (B - n) + 2 j 2 n correspond a la valour au aeuil 4 de la distri-
bution iajfavec les degree da llborté indiijuéB. Cette estimation da la f ia-
bilité pemet done d1 affinner gu'U. 7 a use probabilite t - •* d'aroir une 
fiabilité pour t bsures supérieure ou egale a la Valeur ? ( t ) . Come deje 
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signalé', il s'agit la d'une estlaation non paraBetrique valable que le eompar-
tesent de la fonction étudiée soit du type exponentiel ou non. 
4.2. - One aeuU machine neut Stre en reparation a chaque instant 
Outre la fiabilité d'une fonction précédeaaent définie et calculée, il eat 
interessant de pouvoir déterainer la finMlité* de la fonction lorsgua t, 2, 
p machines sur les P machines, associées en parallels pour assurer la fonc-
tion, sont en penne et ne peuvent étre reparées. Ce cas se presents lorsqu'on 
ns pent reparer qu'une machina a la fois, la fonction étant alors assure« 
par les I - 1 machines rest antes. 
Si l*on suppose les oachines identiqueSi de fiahilité P (t)t la fiabilité 
d'une tell« fonction est alors donnée (Be*. 6) par la some des ternes du 
developpement du binone 
(F (t) + D {t)f " 1 = P (t) + Op _ , , F(t) D (t) . . . . 
avec D (t) = 1 - F (t) 
et oil i 
pT - O 




- C , F (t) D (t) la probability de voir surrivre Q| - 2) machines, 
eto... 
3i la fiabilité' de la fonction est toujoure définie conne 1'existence d'une 
esuls oaohine en service, el le est alors egale s o' _ F (t) B ( t ) . Dans le 
cas oti les tiaoMiws aseurent la fonction se sont pas ioentiiuec, la fUMliM 
de la fonotion s'obtiect a partir du deVeloppenent de 1'expression i 
. 20 . 
^T?1 ^ W + V*» 
F. (t) ftfflt U fltf llltd optntloaitU* 1» 1» ;!•*»;! W 
B ^ | • • • ' - ' * ' « . • - • - - - • . •U^aaMUdlMÉUildi 
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A M Vrngaai IB± fetcMt da» riBMn pmnttwit di galcnlar k jartlr da 
xiiBltata 4>Hnd. darant U pfeLofe Intuitu*, la flaWUt« OftfattimaXI* 
da w t f a i aoMddfe*n o w da* taWae netxaa m i 4M dfrrtnaaaaii. 
ttO> u aatfcola da atMOatiiB parartttot d* caladar t æ fianUiM ia4*ialan-
n*U* f i m taction aaagxaa far i-'mnoclatlffl as parallala 4* jf l"-*— ••> 
tidnaa •uau»ti» m tntaneUw • ftf in&tsjiaaa 
L'liinmiJtilit da aatta afarts aat BH<»13» a n t t i m i l w i t da tr^-^t- so* 
ffabUlW MC jarantaAlua. 
I l aantt intnraaamt «a iiiaaaro u r laa a m l n tjattta laa ilaaHatii sbta-
nua ana (Mux qua l o m n U ana aftbada g* oaloal analytiqpa feéf. 0 at 9) . 
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AUSLf GUNS UNO ANORDWNG 
itNSt KEAICrOII-KSCHICItUNQBANIAOE 
AUFGWND V O N ZWERLfeSIGKEITSMTHACHTUNQEN 
U . H s n n i n g i 
trownlsvar^Kiuap laakterbau GabH 
08 Monohdn 
Z u * B » m * n f g n u n Q 
Eln KtoJthxlojni von 300 MWa Ubhmg, dar rund 700.000 bawafltt itugalfeflalgt 
haniiakMiant* anlhalr, bnuchr * I M btMndtr*. tMcMebungMnlaa*. DtH* bl 
balm Kueallmifanmolttor ouaarhuti da» Kam angaordnar und Solidt In latriab. 
SI* auB autor dar Kugahawaoyig und Zuordnung iu Con-Xonan oueh dta Jamili 
Yghuiidami phytikiiliKliait und nachoniichan EiganuhufMn dar Kugahdamnt* 
bal Hubaiam DurchlouF, bai alner KugaKpla* van en. 7 Saaundan, hxliKllan. 
Vhmn audi <kr ftagktar bal wUUrsehandam Stillttond der SwchfekvngMnkiBi 
valk Utøung pnduilaran kam, hr bai dar Autbaung dtaatr Elnrichlufla. nit 
Ihnn oVnMbch bwraBiudrian Bauatllan dia ZuvariBjaigfcsIr bnondtn » baeshM. 
Oh Anahnt ztlgr, daB, ouch utiMr dar paatlmliilKhari Armolim* alnealnar imt-
Boraelar SchUan, Varfuaborin Itin von W , 4 % - intatttM u . M Tag* Aidfali, 
wbivarlangt, irralentwardan. Mitwltargthtrritr bdundwxanordnung wflmn 
A u f a l l n t t m m 1rod*rgarO,B1agM«inikhbDr. HlarflfrwOnn htdoeh 03* 
MahrbDrtM (Or Anlog* und Warning grafer ab dir Gtwlnn durch Varfttoboriqirt. 
I » n h r « l b i i n g dar An lag« 
«• Gtaamix w bahianm «ir JtaUbnnifan Bwimtlaininkn irfcroart dar Kugtl-
hwamMdrUr balaarlal MawhipM fer dk InrMtoflbaiehtokuna, -uaMtamg edar 
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w!rd dit SdwaikiuTl ai&ttittt. unuwtlicha Emigla wind Mr dtt Aufwam-
bawanuna und droit Zugab* odir dot IhmriJtM von SnxwwlHatnttn wanmndkt. 
Di* a l u l a « Bwtondhitla dir Baachkkunonnlagi am C M * tind nahia, dt* an 
anftpnrehtMhn PunkMn n»r Com'ffcitøhtri* onaaonnat ilnd. SojntltEha V v -
rfchtungan, i n dla gawOnBhfe KugalbaHaaungt * • Kugiltnipaktiai und di* 
Zqeob* odtt dm At/rug ran Brninaltitnttn auauMllaM, tind untaitafc dM Kwro 
und J I I I I B Dnichbatielttr ongMidn*!. 
E ina t t ldWAnlg iga lSr f im lS t^ - l tMktM AVR In JOllih, mil w*lelwr U i 
htuti eo. 10.000 Kugaln » g t g i i a n , 100.000 uagawalxt und eo. 10.000 
•ntnomman wardin ilnd. Dloi* Anlagt nut, abguahtn von AnbnsiHhHtcrtgktnwi 
und (btiaan l*lcht bah*U>onn Fahlam, fan Letttungibatriab nch gul innnlirt. 
Abb. 1 zalgt linen Schnitl duren d*n THTR-Prlpartatl, In Kalahari di* abatalmn 
Anlogalalii d«r l a s h [cfaunojnnkiga Hh das 30ft MWa-Kwnknfanrk w anUHinan 
•inch 
DarJtttiktortani UnoehunlHt durehaln BOO <an {/tohr 
virlBnaiit (uV din Kuaahanip. Am Amaona dlaaM Ionia* 
in laKhtdujnaaquni baflndan ilen » a i Vwatratlmr und 
Schrottab«h*idaT. 
Von Zufldbnouin (Ifnb) aifetpf dia Nochftllunn fttøhar. 
Elamaiue. Dfau* mtrdin em than Tnmpart>wnd Leott-
konbavn In dla Zupobaaffnunaan alnoiatbui und butan 
nadt l i lzttr Slehriaxtnall* In VonoMnckan, d , h. 
Relaa in JtBuaan d*r lauktorholla. In Loan Bt 60 SlOck 
waidan ila in din KugallaaklauF *tnguahl*uir. 
DlaUawdjuneundMawiiB baflndrt ii«h Im Utchfk-
kunganuia. 
Die fthdwunn, bariakt aw aWt Auftpollung d*t alnan 
UnnrtlonanoH In 15 fttdtnohni, d« abtasui em 
Kiim In 3 Mtttol- und 12 lendporiitanan awaftn. 
Oat FenhrgBatyihiiii und alia kawagltdan Elamnla 
dar Kvgafftttbfuag itnd taaidathi I * la»li>«kmgn«ua> 
Van daff a»»)*n dl* dial ja*>(V*» ftiftUB* dw & = ! " * • » 
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obgebionntar Element« ubereinen Zwischenkanal zum 
Entnahmeschleusenniuai. Nach Gaadruekabsenkung warden 
im Entrahmeraum Elemente in verschlieuDara Kannen 
abgefUllt. 
Abb. 2 stellt das FlieBschema dar. Zugabe und Abzug munden in die Umwalzstrecke, 
die sich nach der Drucksperre in Entnahme und Fbrderung aufspaltet. Zur Forderung 
gehtsrt ein eigener Forder- und Bremsgaskreislauf. Man bekommt durch diese Dar-
stellung ein Bild von der Vielzahl einzelner Elemente. Diese warden Funkrionsteile 
genannt und haben fbfgenae Aufgaben: 
Vereinzelner bringt Kugeln aus einem Vorrat einzeln und 
nacheinander in ein Rohr, dient bei Stillstand 
der Scheibe als Kugelsperre; 
Schrotlobscheider sorrierr Bruchslttclce, obgepløttete oder 
obgeriebene Kugeln aus; 
Zohlspule registrierteinzelne vorbeilaufende Kugeln, 
gifat Signal bei aavorslahenaar Kucal: • 
FOI Istandsanzeige; 
haitaklinke gibt bei Betatigung die vor ihr srehende 
Kugelsoule frei; 
Dosierer gibt bei Berarioung jewelii eine Kuoel fi»i; 
Sammier Est eine Zusammenfllhrung zweier Strange, 
wegen Verklemmgefahr (tretz iteuer-
lechnischer Verriegefung) autbaubar, 
im Betrieb unbeweglich; 
SchnelischluBventil schlieBt automatisch bal Druckabfoll im 
DBSchiekungssvfttm; 
Reporaturarmatur - schlleØt ntrngasfeuert von Hand, vm das 
Reakrordrucksyslem abzusp anen, warn der 
Ausbau eines Funktiomfalls ertolgen soli; 
Oruekspana vertiindert FordergasttrBmungirn (n Riehtung 




Hohenforderer 1st die Zusamtnenfuhrung eines Kugel-
ynd eines Go$rohn», in dem geringer 
Oberdruck hemcht. Bil hier rollt die 
Kugel, ab hier wird sie pneumatisch 
gefSrdert; 
Vfeiche lenWt die Kugel in eine vorgewahlte Bonn; 
Trimmarmatur dient zum Einsteilen des Fordergas- bzw. 
Bremsgasdruckes; 
Durchfluftmessung signaiisiert, wenn eine Kugel im Fbrder-
rohr ist; 
Verzogerung ist die Zusammenfuhiung eines Fdtder-
und eines Gasansaugrohres. Hier wird die 
Austrittsgeschwindigkeitcier Kugel 
verringsrt; 
Abbrandmessung stellr den Gehalt an spaltbarem Uran fest; 




K o n s t r u k t i o n s p r i n z i p i e n 
Das Gas in der Beschickungsanlage ist Helium von 40 ata und 240 C, dos radioaktive 
Edelgasisotope enthtilt; Reaktor - Primorgas. Brennelemente, die einmal den Reaktor 
durchlaufen hoben - im Durchschnitt werden sie sechjmal umgewalzt - strahlen. Dal 
System ist daher nicht zugilnglich, obwohl es weit vom Reaktorkern entfemt 1st. Di« 
zum Teil in 7-Sekunden-Foige bewegten Funktionsteile mUssen entsprechend haufig 
und daher leicht gewortet bzw. repariert oder ausgetouscht werden kunnen. Diese 
Forderung erfttllt mon ahnlich wie be i Amuturen in aktiven Anlogen und Kreisloufem 
man setzt den Antriebsteil nech au Ben vor eine Abschlrmung. In unserem rail wird im 
Wartungsrall der Funktionsteilkopf und der Absehirmstopfen mit in e lm Blei-Ausbou-
glocke gezogen. Antrieb, Steuerung und DIebtung befinden (ich vor oV Abschirmaecke 
und sind dintkt zugOnglich. Mon hat ouf diese We ise einen Betchickunoiraum, der 
fur normal« Wartungen und Slorungen rrlcht ct*ret»n m» weneen sjraueht. Ver den 
Abschirmwonaen befinden »ich dia Stoiieumtritt Abbie«BJ»oArM»-go/eo<|sti Hllfs-
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kreisloufé und alle MeflversKlriwr, auch dia der Zdhljpulen. Dia Antriebsenergie ist 
elektromotorisch filr Schrottobscheider, Vereinzelner und Fsrdergeblttse, pneumoHsch 
fur olie anderen beweglichen Funktionsteile und tederkraftschlieBend fUr die Schnell-
schiufivenrile. 
Das zweite wesentliche Konstruktionsprinzip ist die weitgehende Vereinheitlichung 
der Elemente, wie in Abb. 3 im Prinzip dargestellt. Hier sieht man links beginnend: 
Dosierer, Weicne, Drucksperre, Sammier, Ztihler, Høhenforderer, SchnellschluB-
ventil, Repaiatuiventil und AnpreSvorrichtung fUr die Sitzdichtung. Das Baukasten-
prinzip ist mit dem Erfolg verwirklicht warden, dafl in einem Block von 2 x l x 0,8 m 
in 4 parallelen Reihen 30 Funktionsteile untergebracht sind. Da auch der Antrieb mit 
2 Endstellungen vereinheitlicht wurde, sind statt einiger Mehrwegeverleiler mehrere 
hintereinandergeschaltete Zweiwegweichen vorhanden. Trotzdem ist letzferes sicherer, 
billiger und durch die Blockanordnung mit der engen Teilung nicht platzraubender. 
Z u g a n g l i c h k e i t 
Envohnt wurde schon die Zuganglichkeit zu Funktiorateilen, MeSgebern und 
Steueiungen als den wartungsbedUrftigen Bestandteilen der Anlage. Die Zugobestrecke 
bis zur Schleuse bereitet filr die Zuganglichkeit keine Prohleme, auch nicht ftfr die 
Rohre selbst. An die Rohm und Bloclce in Umwalz-, Abzugs-, Forder- oder Entnahnw 
strecke kommt man heran, nachdem die Antagen von Kugeln und Primargos befreit 
und gespUit sind* Da das Kugeiabzugsrohr und die Bn/chkannen extra obgeschirmf 
sind, ist der Zugang in den Beschickungsraum nach Vorbereitungszeit moglich. LflOt 
sich das System nicht vollstandig von Kugeln befreien, so yerlBngert sich die Wartezeit 
und es sind spezielle Brtiicne AbschinoungsmaBnahmen zu treffen. Rohre in der 
Spannbetonbehalterwand und im Innern des Behaliers sind nicht zugtinglich. FUr 
Funktionsteile der Entnahmestrecka gilt dasselbe wie ftlr die UmwBlzung. FOr den 
Entnahmeraum sind bei Storfallen, die das Enttemen von Kugeln bzw. AbfUllkannen 
vor Betreten verhindern, SondermaBnahmen erforderlich; allerdina« nicht fUr 
verschlelooedingte Størungen. Fardergeblose und Graphitstaubfilwr sind nach unwn 
ousbaubar. 
S torpnoior ten und Behebung 




Hilfskreislttufe, Vorsteuerungen, Anrriebsenergieversorgung, 
MeOwertUbertrogung und -verarbeitung, Programmsteuerung 
»Ind firet von direkten Etnfluuen von strahlenden Kugeln oder 
Primttrgos, letcht und schnell behebbar. 
Funktionsteilantriebe sind getrsnnr demontierbar, daher leicht 
und schnell behebbar. 
Dichtstellen an Flonschen sind nur in Ausbaurauinen vorhanden 
(im Beschickungs- und Entnahmeraum sind alle Verbindungen 
geschweiBt). Bel gr&flerer Leclcage muS rur Reparatur die Be* 
schickungsonloge drue klos gemacht werden. 
Wellendichtungen der Funktionsteile kttnnen betrieblich durch 
Fettdnjckaufgabe nachgebessert werden, unterltegen jedoch 
dem natUrlichen VerschleiS, die Meta Ufo I tenbalge før den 
Schrortabscheiderantrieb der Alterung. 
Die von Kugeln und Gas bertihrten Ktipfs der Funktionsteile 
sind robust, hoben groGes Spiel und sind weitestgehend ausfallsicher. 
Ein komplettes Funktionsteil karm an einem Tag ausgetauscht 
werden, ausgsnommen Reparalurventrie, Schrottabscheider, Ver-
einzelnerund die Schrottkonne. 
Reparahjrventile, SchroTtabscheider und Vereinzelner liegen an 
bzw. vor der Absperrgrenze. Zur Reparatur mufi der Reaktor 
druckentlastet werden. 
Fbrdergasgebtøse mit Motor und Staubfilter sind leicht ausbaubar 
konstrulert, sie IctSnnen mit den obgeschirmten Ausbaugertiten ft)r 
die Schrottkanne gehandhabt werden. 
- Abbrand- und UnterscheidungsmeGanlage sind so aufgebaut, da6 
alle »Kirunas- und vonchleiflbedingten Wartungen von den Ausbau-
rtkimen aus vorgenommen werden konnen. 
- Undichtigkeiten belm Aroetxen von Schroftbehtilter ©der Entnahme-
kannen werden betm cvokulWren sofort bemtrkt. f&reh «*WLW» 
Indirekte und e)ne direkte Pollttandimenung wtirf Qbertollyyi wenlg 
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wahrscheinlich. Der Antrieb des Transportwagens filr Entnahimkannen 
ist mit wenigen Kandgrifren auswechsettar. 
Kugelverklemmungen in Funktionsleilkopfen sind durch konstruktiv« 
Ausbildung und die hone ZerdrUckfestigkeit umrahrseheinlich. Sol Ire 
mehrfaches Bewegen des Funkrionsreilkopfes ergebnislos bleiben, kann 
die Kugel mit ausgebaut werden. Eine entsprechend abgeschirmle 
Glocke istvorhanden. GrtsBere Staubmengen, die die Kugelrolibahn 
zusetzen kbnnlen, sind erfahrungsgeroa'u' nicht zu erwarten. 
Kugelverklemmungen im Rohr odV Block sind nur denkbar durch 
fSlbtzliche Spaltung einer Kugel in zwei elwa gleich grofie SrUcke 
oder durch KugelbruchsKlcke, die nach Passieren des Schrottabscheiders 
entstanden sind. In der Praxis sind solche Rille noch nicht beobachtet 
worden. Kommt es dazu, muB der Beschickungsraum begangen und 
das RohrsrUck herausgenommen und ersetzt werden (wenn nicht tiuQerliche 
MaBnahmen helren). 
Kugelverklemmungen in etnem Ftirderrohr innerhalb der Betonbehalter-
wand oder im Behtilterinneren ktinnen zum Verlust des Rohres fuhren. 
RohrbrUche sind im Beschickungsraum mit Aufwand behebbar, eventuel! 
streckenweiser Ersatz. Reifien von Blticken, das nicht reparierbar ist, 
wird nicht betrachtet. 
Oie Scheibe des Vereinzelners stelft die Abtpenvng zum KugeJhoufen-
kern dar und ist nicht ausbaubar, da kein AnlaB (Ur ein schnelles 
Entleeren des Cores besteht. Sie ist ein Massivteil, dessen Lager 
ausgebaut werden kann. Bei entsprechend starkem Antrieb wtire sie in 
der Lage, Kugeln zu zerdrOcken. Metalliser* Teil«, die in den 
Kugelhaufen fallen kbnnten, gibt ei nicht. Es sind zwei Vereinzelner 
fur 100 % Le iltung vorgesehen, so oaS einer SuSerstenfalls aufgegeben 
werden kann. 
RohrbrUche in der Behalterwand und Im inntnraum sind wegen des Ein-
betonlereni bzw. der Druckgleichheit schwer vorstelibar. Ein Rift 
wOrde wahrscheinlich nicht støren. Scbllmmsfenfolls h-lfr der Verlust 
dei Rohreseln. 




Z u v e r l t t s s i g k e i t - Auslegung 
Der 300 MW-Reaktor ist tør eine Lebensdauer von 30 Jahren ausgelegt. 
Um den Brennstoff optimal zu nutzen, ist zu fedem Zeitpunkt die Zugabemenge 
und -sorte von Elementen und die Verteilung der die Me flan lage passierenden 
Kugeln auf die einzelnen Core-Positionen nach einem Programm vorzunehmen. 
Da der Zusiand des Kugelhaufens stiJndlg verfolgt wird und die tiigliche Nach-
fli l l- und Entnahmemenge klein im Vergleich zu der im Kern vorhandenen Menge 
an Elementen ist, ca. 1 : 1000, karm im Storfall Ober Itingere Zeitauf den 
Betrieb der Beschickungsanlage verzichtet werden. Der Reaktor kann etwa 
40 Tage lang mit Vol last betrieben werden, wobei die eingebaute Uberschufl-
reaktivitfit zum Uberfahien der Xenonvergiftung nach Lastwechsel teilweise 
aufgebraucht wird. 
Die integrierte Ausfallzeit der Beschickungsanlage innerhalb von 30 Jahren soli 
daner in der GreGenordnurtg von 40 Tagen Megen, voiausgesetzt, daQ Einzel-
ereignisse wesentlich darunter I tegen-
FUr einen optima len Betrieb »I l te die Beschickungsanlage stttndig laufen, so 
lange der Reaktor in Betrieb ist. Die Leistungsauslegung alier Strange der Anlags 
sieht vor, die fUr einen Reaktorbetriebstag notwendigen Operationen in elner 
8-Sfunden-Schieht ausfuhran zu konnen. Diese Diskonrinuitttt ftJilt nicht ins 
Gewicht. Somit hat dia An lage eine Leistungsreservø von 200 %. Die taglich 
16 berriebsfreien Stunden werden zum Teil fUr die Wartung benutzt. Ferner sind 
in den planmaBigen Abschaltpausen im 4-Jahres-Zyklus Wartungsaibeiten auszu-
fUhren. 
FUr die Funkrionsteile sind bestimmte stOrungsfrele Betrføbszeiten vargeschrlebeni 
Gesam ton lage 30 Jahre 
ausgønommen: VerschleiBtaHe, 1 Jahr 
die routlnemdfllg auswechsefbar sind 
Der Belastungsøred wird wie folgt bertJcksichtlgtt 
Funktionsteiie Kugtln 
SchUuwnarmatvr 




Reparaturomtaturen 2-10 Betarigungen 
Logerund Balgdichtung von Vereinzelner 8 ' 10 Kugeln 
und Schrottabscheider 
R e d u n d a n z b e t r o c h t u n g 
Die Mehrfachanordnung einzelner Strange nach Abb. 2 be de u fe f nicht in allen Fallen 
echte Redundonzi 
Der zweite Sining in der Zugabe vor der Welche wird watirend der 
Anfangsphase vornebmlich Borkuge In zur schnellen Korrektur von 
Berechnungsunsicherheiten bei dertfrtlichen LeJstungsverteilung 
en thai ten. Nach genauerer Kenntnis des Core-Vernal te ns und Be-
endigung der Einlaufphase ist der zweite Strang eine echte Ver -
doppelung. 
Die drei parat le len Strange hinter der Zugabeschleuse werden nach 
dem Rechnerprogramm fUr die Neubeschickung des kommenden 
Tages gefullt, in den ersten drei Jahren mit max. 865 und danach 
mit 711 Elementen. Jeder Strang kann 300 Kugeln aufnehmen. 
(Auch die Puffenrrecken vor der Zugabeschleuse hoben dieses 
Fatsungsvermbgen.) Fttllt hiervon ein Strang aus, so kann die 
resrliche Tagesftlllung nicht auf Vorrat eingeschleust werden. Dies 
bedeutet keine Einbufe an Verrugbarkeit der Zugabe&trecke, sondem 
betriebliche MaQnahmen. Eine Reparatur wUrde manerstbei 
Gelegenheit vornehmen. Auch bei zwei ausgefallenen Strecken ist. 
wenn auch miterhtihtem Aufwand, z . B. Mehrschichtbetrieb, die 
Zugabestrecke nach vol I verfUgbar. Die Schleusenzeit fur 60 Kugeln 
ist ca. 20 min. In der nachfølgenden Analyse wird die Zugabeitrecke 
in ihren d n i Zonen als l-von-2, 1-von-l und l-von-3 Schaltung 
betnchtet. 
Echt- doppelt vorhanden sind die zwei Schrottabscheider/ Vereinzelner-
• Inht l t in der Abzugstrecke. 
FUr e lm zweckmttQIpe Auftellung aei Cores in zwei Zontn sind wegen 
der Sehvrltegelfrerwen 3 ftehre Innen und 15 om Rend anpeordnet. 




Der Verlust einei Rohres verschiebt ortlich diese Grenze und ergibt 
• in * ungleiche Rlllhoht. Dieser Umstand konn in der Programmrechnung 
berucktichtlgt werden und beeinfluSt nleht dtn Reakrorbefrieb. Fol It 
•in weiteres Rohr an einer nicht benachbarten Stelle aus, gilt dastelbe • 
Bei 15 Rahren ist di« Wahncheinlichkeit, daB zwel Rohm neben-
einonder Megen, noch genUgend klain. Erst bei eiiwn dritlen Rohrousfall 
ist dcmit zu rachnen. Es wurde donn eine gerings Beeinflussung des 
Reoklotbetriebes hinsichtlich der Whischoftlichkeit ouftreten. Es IdSmen 
somit zwei Rohm als redundant angesehen werden. Obwohl ein weitemr 
Retrieb mit drei und mehr ousgefallenen Rohmn gmndsotzlich mttglich 
ist, wira in der nochfblgenden Analyse bemits "Austell"-angesetzt. 
FUr das Ausbringen von abgebrannmn Elementen aus dem Beschickungt-
kmislauf und das gleichzeitrge Abftlllen solcher Kugeln in Entnahme* 
karmen braucht man zwei Strange, da die Fuflentmcke die Schleuse 
»l ist ist. Der dritm Strang in der Entnahme erleichtert dureh zyklisches 
Vertauechen den Betrieb. Fdllt er aus, Iconn die AbfDIIung einer Tages-
menge in die Entnahmekanne unier Umsfonden nieht mehr in einer Schicht 
erfolgen. Die Reparatur erfolgt bei Gelegenhelt. Ein Strang gilt ah 
redundant. FBlIt ein weilemr aus, so muB der Beschickungjbetrieb Wr 
die Oauer der KannenabfDIIung, d. h. ca. 50 min. tflgllch unfesbroehen 
warden. In der nadrfblgenden Analyse wird doher die Entnahmestnicke 
pessimtstiseh als 2-von-3 - Selnlhjiig angesehen. 
* * 
mit dem Zie l , dos Geret in einen solenen Zustand zu Venetian, doB « ain nochstes 
Interrail mit gleicher Zuverlossigkeit Obenteht wie dos vorhergahende. bis max. 
30Johre. 
Di* Zuverlossigkeit 1st also on die Warnings- oder Inspektionsinterralle gebunden. 
(Im folgenden wird nur noeh von "Intervallen* gesprochen.) 
Di* Konstruktion der Teile und das dazugehorige Wartungskonzept wurde so gewahlt, doB 
bei Einhalten der gefbrderten Lebemdauer - storungsfreie Zeiten die Ausfaltrote der 
Beschickungsanlage null ist, weii die Wartungsarbeiten entweder bei lautendem Be-
trieb oder in plonmbBigen Stillsrandszeiten durchgefuhrt werden kernen. Die 
Verfogbarkeit der Baschickungsanlage ware dann gleich 1,0. 
Neben den GrttBen Interrail J und Reparaturzelt R wird fur die Ausfal Irate eints Teils 
die Haufigkeir H gebrauchr: 
A = H j 
H wird deflniert als Wahncheinlichkeit des Eintretens eines Størereignisses im Inter-
voll J . H und J missen obo immer zusommen gesehen werden. R schlieBt die Zeit 
vom Eintraten des Eieignisses bis zur Wiederinbelriebrnhme nach Ausbesserung und 
PrOJvngein. 
Di* A-Werte venehiedener Teile, auch bei untenchiedliehen Intervallen, sind 
vergleicnbar. 
Bei irraparablen Starungen wird R • 15 Jahre, denn das Aurrmten innerhalb des 
30-Jahr*-Interrails finder im Mittel nach Ablauf der halben Zeit statt. 
Åuigo ngswe rto 
In Tobelle 6 sind die benutzten Werte fUr die Autfollrute im dozugebtSrigon lnt*rvall 
genonnt. In der Urerarur sind •rwortyngsgemaB statittische ZuverUjssigkeitwngoben 
fur neuartige Konstruktionen nlcht enrholten. Es werden daher, toweit moglich, 
Ertohrungen abnllcher Elemente •u f der AVft-fieichiclajngfanloge verwendet. Die 
neuortlgen Funktlontteil* werden einzeln und in Zuwmmenvchaltuno alt Prototypen 
*» teeter, Dl* Tell* der teakler-leichlckunoionkige werdnn elnem etahrmorutiaen 




Fur die Analyse wird im Grundsatz davon ausgegangen, doB bei auslegungsgemVBer 
Beampruchung von 10 Teilen eines im Interrail ausffiilt: l a , 4a, 5a, 7a. Bei 
geringerer Beantpruchung (Belastungsfalctor) wird anleilig bis auf 20 % dieses Werles 
zuriickgegangen. Geblase und Staubfilter kbnnen in der Funktion versagen durdh 
Motor- oder Lagerechoden bzw. Belegung mit FiemdkBrpern (aufler Grøphitstaut) 
und Feuchte in SrSrfallen: 12a, 13a. Uber diese Arien vi n mechanischem Versagen 
= Storungsart a hinaus wird angenommen, daB unzuldssige Gasleckagen an Flansch 
oder Welle auftreten, deren Behebung einen Ausbau erfordert: Ib - 7b, 12b, 13b, 
14b; und daB im Funktionsteilkopf Kugeln verklemmen: le - 8c. Pessimistischer-
weise wird dies rrotz gegenteiliger Erfahrungen mit guter Statistik auch fUr Rohre, 
Blocke und als UberfUIIung von Kannen betrachtet. Steuer- und Vorsteuerungen 
werden mit Ausnahme tør die MeBanlage in der Auswirkung als zenrral beeinflussend 
angenommen und StSrungen, die bis zu zwei Tage Reparaturzeit erfordem, fUr 
denkbar gehaltens Id - 12d. Bei Armaturen IsGt bekanntlich die Sitzdichtigkeit 
nach. Dies soli rrotz Wartung beriicksichtigt werden: 3e - 5 e . MeBgeber sind leicht 
austauschbar angeordnet und werden nicht betrachtet, da ihre Reparaturzeit unter 
einem Tag liegt. Storungen an den Venturi-DOsen des FSrdergassystenu sind kaum 
vorstellbar. Desholb ist kein Routineausbau goplant: 3f. In der Analyse werden 
Komplikationen beim Austousch der MeBgeber der KugelmeBanlagen berUcksichtigt: 
lOf. Hilfskreislaufe liegen mit ihren wartungsbedBrftigen Elemenlen giundstltzlich 
ouBerhalb des Beschickungsraumes, sind leicht zugBnglich und in Stunden zu repa-
rieren. Auch hier warden Komplikationen bei der Ausbessenmg betrachtet! 4g, lOg, 
12«, 13g. 
Grundsarzlich sind nur StSrungen in der Tcbelle aufgenommen, deren Behebung 
mindestens einen Tag douert, da tomt dl« VerfUgbarkeit der Beschlokungsonlage 
nicht beeinfluBt wird. 
Die Werte von H und J der Stttrunjsorten b bil f werden In Relation zu denen yon g 
gebiacht. Doneben werden Relationen der "storanfalllgen" Tell* 1 bi* 16 bernjetøff. 
Durch dieses KmuxKlwiMbUlbtnJrdwEraessenelniilner^rMlohmertweSliB, £ j 
Spielroum. Man kann altø dovon auigehen, 4gS die E l i^ lc^ l lMk i f fgkeMi i ' i 
wertmoBig gesichertsind, sotemdielosiss |eee« z e ^ " furtøfoasiilf i l t t e ^ M « ) ""' : 
pn> Interrail out, anenWnBt wird. ~ ~ " T . 




Diese erfblgt obschnittweise ftlr dia fttnf Abschnitte der An loge •= Zugabe, Abzug, 
Umwalzung, FBrderung, Entnahme (siede Abb. 4 und 5 , Tabellen 7 bis U ) . 
Zunachstwird das Flieatchema des Abschnitts und somtliche hierzu enthaltenen 
steningsvarursachenden Teile betrachlet. Bei bestimmlen Teilen wird der Belasfungs-
grod festgestellt. Far die Reparaturzeit istdie Zuganglichkeitenrscheidend. Her 













Enfnahmeschleuse - Ausbauraum 
Entnahmeroum 
Entnahme - Schleusenraum 





Die Reparaturzeit umfaBt definitionsgemoBauch Warte-und Vorbereitungszeiten. 
Es wird ein Ersatz- Schallbild des Absehnitts gezeichnet = Abb. 4 und 5. Hiemaeh 
karm - bei BerUcksichtigung der echten Redundanzen, siehe aben - die Zuverlassig-






1 Luftstrang defekt 
1 Gantrarg defekt 
2 Oontrange defekt 
Zugobe auigafollen 
kbxjg 






2 Strange defekt 
/ 
Fflfderung ousgefollen 
: . tr 
, V&iviiB Afekt 
CnMeJm* omgefallen 
Rechnerische VerknUpfung der 
Elnzel-Auifaltraten 
tleheAbb. 5 
3-(© + © + © ) 
3 ( © + © + © ) 2 + © + @ 
Z(@- © ) + © + © + © + 2 " © 
•lehe Abb. 4 
2-<® + © + ® + © ) 
!(®-®)2 + Z(®-©) \ 
ileheAbb.4 X 
tieheAbb. 4 
•S-((D + @ + ® + © + © + © ) + 2 ® 
105-(®,+ © + ® + © + © + © ) 2 + 2 © 
& ® - ® > + I < © -©)+<!" ; +12.® 
•ler* Abb. 5 
3-2«3>-©)+@+ © 
3-Q©-®)+ ©)* + © + ©+£(© - ©) 

















EiwartungsgemaG ist die Ausfallrote eines Stranges gleich oder groBer der des Ab-
schnitls. Bei der Zugabe dagegen ist es wahrscheinlicher, daB sie im ganzen austallt, 
als daS ein Strang unbiauchbar wird. Das zeigt, daO hier die Mehrfdchanordnung der 
parollelen Strenge primår aus GrUnden der Betriebsvereinfachung und nicht wegen 
erhohter ZuverlBssigkeit yorgesehen ist. 












so sieht man, daS eine anndhemd gleichmaGipe ZuverlBssigkeit erreicht warden ist. 
Die Annahme irreparabler Schoaen bei FtSraerung und Abzug wirkt sich im Ergebnis 
kaum aus. Die relativ hobe Rate bei der Forderung ist bedingt durch die hohe Zahl 
(22) zenhal beeinflussenderStdiquellen. Die Ausfallrote der UmwSlzung ist bedingt 
durch den hohen Belastungsgrad weniger Funktionsleile, durch die aber jede einzelne 
Kugelleuft. 
In 30 Johren beaeutet die Gesamtausfallrate von 6,258-10 
0,19 Jahm «• 68 Tage Ausfall derBeschickungsanlage. 
Das Einxelteil mit bochster Rate ftlr die Gesamtønlago ist di* Abbrandnwfianlage mit 
•3 "3 
0,512-lu , gefolgt von Schleusenventilen der Zugabe mit 0,378' 10 und 
Daiemrn dor Umwfllzung mit 0,353-lu"3 . 
Da ewrohnt wurde, del d l * BessWekungtar.log« ca. 40 Tag* •HtieScrmricann, ahn* gros-
» i » ElnbuS* an VerfUgborkeif fbr den Reaktor zu verunachen, und da di* Wahrschtln-
llehkelt genUgend gering 1st, doB di* Awsfsllzeiten der Anlog* unmittofear aufelnonder 
- le -
t ^ a a & y - i X 
229 
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folgen, sondem sich auslegungsgemllB etwa gleichmdBig Uber 30 Jahm verteileTi 
warden, ist die ermirelre Ausfallrate klain genug. 
Die VerRlgbarkeit der Beschickungsanlage betragt domit 99,37 % . 
A l t e r n a t i v e n 
Zwei Altemarivanordnungen wurden untersucht: 
a) Echte Verdoppeiung der Abschnitte Abzug, Umwalzung und FtSrderung. 












Gesamtausfallzeir in 30 Jahren: 19 Tage 
VerfUobarkeit: 99,80 % 
Hier ?eigt sieh, daS e i unzweckmitBig wBre, Entnahme und Zugabe unver-
Bndert zu lassen. Es bieret sich daher die LSsung einer vollsttJndigen 
Anordnung zweier gstrennter, je fur 100 % Løistung ausgelegter Antagen, 
wie es die ursprllngliche Konzeprlon war, an. 
b) Echte Verdoppeiung der gesomten BesehlekungMnlage, »InschlleBlich 
Steuerungen, Hilfskreltleufe, gemelnsame Enrnahmeitarlon. 
Ole Ausfallraten sind in dieiem Fall: 
Zugabe 1'10"* 
Abzug • • j | « t ø -
Umwolzung M O " * ,-;. aj$ H 
En*rahe» tø-ty"*. 
g*., "'f 




Gesamtausfalizeit in 30 Jahren: 0,9 Tag* 
Verfügbarkeit-. >99,99 % 
AusgafOhrt wild für den 300 MW« - Reaktor die in den Anlagen gezeigte Anordnung, 
da ein Übergang zur Alternative b einen unverhältnismäßig großen Kostenaufwand, 
vor allem wegen des Raumbedarfes zweier völlig unabhängiger Anlagen, verursachen 
wurde. 
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Tabelle 7 Z P C A B B 
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p a r t 
2 Weichen 
2 s w i t c h e 
3 Zabler 
3 c o u n t e r 
3 D o s i e r e r 
3 t i m i n g d e v i 
c e s 
3 S a m l e r 
3 c o l l e c t o r 
2 Hohre 5"> 
2 Rohre 20 m 
2 t u b e s 5u 
2 t u b e s 20 m 
1 Rohr 2 n 
1 Rohr 1 m 
1 tube 2 a 
1 tube 1 n 
3 Robre 1 6 m 
3 t u b e s 18 s 
Vore teuerung 
p a r t d r i v e 
c o n t r o l 
S c h l e u s e n k r e i 
l a u f 
a i r / g a s l o o k 
c i r c u i t 
<j»ishe 6 » i t « 
" • J N * 
u 
o ft 









































0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 ,01 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 ,01 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 0 $ 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 0 2 
0 ,001 
0 , 0 1 8 
0 , 0 5 
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vent i l 
repair valve 
SohnellBOhluB-
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* siehe s e i t e 
see page 16 
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label le 9 P H V l L Z T T K G 
































Bohr 3 • 
(Rest 4 o) 
tube 3 s 
(rest 4 e) 
Torsteuerung 
PI, part dri' 
control 
• • iehe Seite 
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Tabelle 10 F 6 R E E R P N G 




























vent i l s 
15 quick ac-
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pa r t 
Geblaee 
gas c i r cu la -
to r 
S taubf i l t e r 




5 gas valves 
5 Sohnell-
BohluSventile 
5 quick ac -
t i ng valves 
5 Beparatur-
ven t l l e 
5 r epa i r 
valves 
1 Rohr + 
2 BlScke 3m 
1 tube + 
2 blocks 3D 
15 Rohre j» 5i 
in BR it 20m 
l a BSD* 
15 tubes 5a 
each' in BR, 
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15 gas tubas 
7 » 
1 Gasrohr 0 • 
1 gas tube 8B 
5 Gasrobre 8B 
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0,004 jo 30 21 
0,004 50 JO 24 
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Tabelle 11 E K T K A H M E 










- v . 
10 
T e i l 
p a r t 
Veiche 
s w i t c h 
Weiche 
s v i t c h 
Veiche 
s w i t c h 
3 Zahler 
3 counter 
3 S c h l e u s e n -
v e n t i l e 
3 a i r / g a s look 
v a l v e s 
3 Zahler 
3 counter 
3 D o s l e r e r 
3 t i m i n g d e -
v i c e s 
3 Sch leueen-
v e n t l l e 
3 a i r / g a a lock 









0 , 5 
0 , 2 
0 ,1 














0 , 0 5 
0 , 0 5 
0 , 0 2 5 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 . 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 ,01 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 ,01 
0 , 0 2 
0 ,01 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 , 0 2 
0 ,01 
0 , 0 2 
0 ,01 
0 , 0 2 
0 ,01 
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DEMONSTRATION OF THE PERFORMANCE AND 
RELIABILITY OF THE GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 
BOILING HATER REACTOR MAIN STEAMLINE 
ISOLATION VALVES 
by I. M. Jacobs 
INTRODUCTION 
The General Electric Company has used re l iabi l i ty analysis and assessment 
techniques to evaluate cri t ical designs since the beginning of I t s commer-
cial power venture. The eaphasis has been on performing trade-off studies 
during the early stages of design to select a system configuration with 
adequate re l iab i l i ty potential, f i r s t on instrumentation and logic1 2 3 ; 
later expanded to include complete systems for emergency cooling1*. Other 
valuable studies have assesed the effect of test frequency and repair time5 s 
on the availabil i ty and re l iab i l i ty of engineered safeguards. 
In any re l iab i l i ty analysis, there is always concern that the meager failure 
rate data available actually represents the fai lure rate of a particular 
component in a particular environment. A case in point is the main steam 
Isolation valve which was originally designed for closinq against a flow 
of saturated or superheated steam. This type of valve has a good perfor-
mance record and wide acceptance in industry. The question to be resolved 
Is th is: Does the valve perform equally well for the expected conditions 
followinq a postulated break of a main steam line? 
A few facts wi l l place the problem in perspective. In the General Electric 
direct cycle Boiling Hater Reactor (GEBHR), the steam lines couple the reac-
tor directly to the turbine. In the event of a postulated steam line break 
outside the primary containment, an escape path is present for loss of reac-
tor steam and water and any dissolved radioactive materials carried with 
them. For sufficiently large breaks, this loss of reactor coolant, i f un-
checked, would result in the release of a large fraction of the vessel f lu id . 
Two isolation valves are provided 1n each main steam line for the express 
purpose of providing a redundant means for terminating such a coolant loss 
without uncovering the reactor core. 
To meet the safety needs as well as the requirements for low pressure drop 
during normal plant operation, a Y-type design was selected which uses an 
a i r cylinder operator and closing spring as separate Independent closure 
devices. Individual design features of this design Include a basic stop-
check configuration, pi lot valves, closing springs, a i r operator, and o i l 
dash pot. All of these Individual features have wide acceptance In Indus-
t ry . The total combination of these features, however, had not been tested 
under the combination of conditions postulated for the steam l ine break 
accident. This combination of conditions may Include very high steam flow 
rates, high velocity steam-water mixtures, and dynamic loadings in addition 
to the stat ic pressure differentials. Proper and rapid closure of the iso-
lation valves under these conditions is a safety function In the plant, and 
• I . M. Jacobs 1s « Reliabil ity Engineer In the Atomic Power Equipment Dipt, 
of the General Electric Co., San Jose, California. 
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the concern was simply that valves of t h i s type and large size had not 
demonstrated t h e i r performance and r e l i a b i l i t y under accident condit ions. 
However, analysis of the conditions and examination of the valve design, 
together wi th a number of spec i f ica t ion tests possible under shop condi-
t i o n s , provided s ign i f i can t assurrance that the valve performance would 
be sa t is fac to ry . Never-the-less, a large-scale demonstration was consider-
ed desirable to establ ish greater confidence in the a b i l i t y of the valve 
to perform r e l i a b l y . 
THE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM 
The approach taken was to tes t a typ ica l f u l l - s i z e valve under conditions 
which approximate as c losely as possible the most severe conditions the 
valve is predicted to experience in the event of a steam l i n e break out-
side the d rywe l l . The primary object ive was to demonstrate proper closure 
of the valve under such condit ions. In add i t i on , some tests were made at 
conditions more severe than expected to demonstrate ample safety margin. 
A two-phase f low analysis o f the postulated accident was performed to pro-
vide the expected conditions of pressure, flow r a t e , and qua l i t y at the 
va lve. This information was u t i l i z e d to plan the experiment and to design 
the tes t f a c i l i t y to provide the wide range of conditions needed. The tes t 
f a c i l i t y was b u i l t i n the Commonwealth Edison Company's State Line Stat ion 
Unit 1 and u t i l i z e d the f u l l steaming capacity of a l l boi lers wi th a t o ta l 
thermal ra t ing o f approximately 700,000 KU at a nominal pressure of 650 ps ig . 
A specia l ly fabr icated set of headers and valves allowed fo r mixing steam 
and water from one or more of the s ix bo i lers p r io r to admission to the 
valve under t e s t . The steam headers ranged In size from 14 Inches to 20 
Inches wi th ventur l sections b u i l t i n t o measure steam f lows. 
The main steam Iso la t ion valve tested was an a1r-and-spr1ng operated Y-
pattern globe valve f o r use i n a 20 Inch pipel ine (Figure 1) . The valve 
tested was taken o f f the production l i n e and Is typ ica l of the valves used 
In GE-BWR's. 
Each tes t was i n i t i a t e d by quickly venting a balancing pressure from between 
a pa i r of rupture discs which simulated the Instantaneous rupture of the 
steam l i n e . The tes t valve was closed on a var ie ty of f low condit ions cover-
ing the fo l lowing ranges: 
Steam only tes ts : 50 to 1080 lb/sec 
Water only tes ts : 240 to 3490 lb/sec 
Mixture t es t s : 1530 to 3860 lb/sec (qua l i ty range 0.17 to 0.4S 
Surge t e s t s : 520 t o 2970 lb/sec (qua l i t y range 0.01 to 0.33 
RESULTS 
The main steam Iso la t ion valve under tes t was opened and closed without f a l l 
more than 400 times (200 cycles) during the two-month tes t program. I t shut 
o f f more than 40 f low tests which simulated accident conditions Including t he 
more severe than postulated f o r the deslqn basis accident I n the nuclear power 
plant . Each t i n t I t opened and closed when signaled and shut o f f the f l a n com-
pletely and reliably. 
•2-
2?0 
Figure 2 shows the differential pressure when a saturated steam/water mix-
ture flows through the valve part way through I ts closing stroke, as may 
occur In the event of a steam line break. A qradual rise in differential 
pressure Is observed as the valve closes on steam flow. When mixture enters 
the steam line a decrease In pressure occurs at the valve followed by a 
slight overshoot at the time of transition from steam flow to mixture flow 
at the valve. Eighteen of these surge pressure runs were included in the 
test program. Contrary to original concerns and conservative predictions 
that very large pressures might accompany the surge of f luid (rapid transi-
tion from steam to steam-water mixture) through the valve, the tests demon-
strated that the surge pressures were minor and entirely witMn the rated 
boiler pressure. 
The test demonstrated that steam and mixture flows assisted valve closure. 
Closing speeds during the flow tests were generally 20* faster than the 
closing speed under cold, atmospheric pressure conditions. 
Analysis of closing performance on this wide variety of conditions demon-
strated that valve closure is not c r i t i ca l ly sensitive to temperature, 
pressure, f luid in the valve, or f lu id flow.7 
CONCLUSIONS 
The pressure and flow transient response in the steam line durinq the postu-
lated external steam line break accident condition can be analytically pre-
dicted and the type of commercially available main steam Isolation valves 
used 1n boiling water reactor nuclear power plants designed by the Gerieral 
Electric Company wi l l close as required under the steam and two-phase mix-
ture flow conditions that could occur for the design basis accident. To 
the re l i ab i l i t y analyst, 1t 1s significant that this standard valve did not 
f a l l during more than 200 cycles of operation, over 40 of them In simulated 
accident conditions. Even more significant, this valve was drawn from a 
larger population of valves which over the years have demonstrated rel iable 
performance in normal steam service conditions. These tests have demonstrated 
that the valve 1s not overstressed and Is capable of operation with mixed 
steam and saturated water flow conditions. Thus I t seems reasonable to use 
?iner1c fai lure rate data In a re l i ab i l i t y analysis of the main steam line solatlon valve function. 
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One of the main factors which affect the lifetime of Zirconium 
components In nuclear reactors is the embrittlement by radiation 
and hydrogen pick-up. 
The quantitative evaluation of this factor and its Implications 
in the assessment of safety are still matters of discussion. 
The development of the science of fracture mechanics has pro-
duced methods and criteria for a quantitative evaluation of the 
brlttleness cf the basic material. 
But great difficulties arise when we want to estimate the me-
chanical stability of the whole structure, given certain pro-
perties of the basic material. 
In fact the risk of a catastrophic failure due to the brlttleness 
supposes the presence of flaws or cracks. The distribution of 
the cracks and the dimensions of the largest one, depends on 
the dimensions and the complexity of the Item considered, on the 
age, on the controls, etc.. This means that the risk of a catas-
trophic failure is connected to several factors which are of a 
statistical nature. 
Usually the factor "embrittlement" Is considered alone and over-
emphasized, while Inadequate attention is given to the Inter-
connection of all the factors. The reason is that other factors 
can be estimated only with reference to single engineering com-
ponents and a statistical treatment is needed. 
This paper gives an example of how different factors can be 
statistically considered together In order to estimate the ca-
tastrophic failure probability of a structure like a pressure 
tube In Zirconium alloy. 
Also given are the heuristic possibilities of the method when 
simplified assumptions about factors and their variability 
are made. 
Basle concepts and formula« 
Given a component and the type of failure let PR(x) be the 
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probability that the resistance to failure of the component is 
less than a certain x and Fc(x) the probability that the load 
which causes the failure is greater than x, these probability 
distributions being a function of time. 
The failure will occur when x„ > xR. 
Therefore the probability of failure or unreliability is ex-
pressed by (Fig. 1) : 
(1) H(t) = I | FR(x,t) — S — I ta 
The reliability will be : 
(2) R(t) - 1 - H(t) 
It is useful to Introduce another xoncept is some way analogous 
to "safety factor" In the conventional calculation methods. 
The "safety factor" is the ratio of the resistance to the load. 
We Introduce a "load factor" : 
x 
(3) y - 3r 
where x~ and Xg are quantities statistically distributed. Therefore 
y will also be statistically distributed. 
Given PR(x) and Pc(x), the distribution of y Is expressed by s 
For y • 1 the value of P(y> corresponds to the probability of 
failure. I.e. the probability of failure corresponds to the pro-
bability of a load factor » 1. " ' r' '""•'s 
Formulas (1) and (4) summarize the whole of structural reliability 
theory. 
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The use of these formulas supposes the knowledge of the distri-
bution function F R W and F C U ) . 
Horeover, the solution of (1) and (4) In a finite form is not 
possible except for very few distribution functions. 
For this reason the literature usually gives a simplified 
approach £~1, 2_7 based on the error propagation theory. 
According to this approach instead of the distribution function, 
only the variances are considered. 
Let Z(m,n) be a function of the statistically distributed va-
riables a and n. 
A Taylor's series expression of Z can be written : 
(5) a(-.n)-«(V V+Sili'-'o'+g (a - nQ) + 
If the higher order terms are neglected : 
(6) Z(m,n) a + b m + c n 
Regard lees of the type of distribution of m and n, the variance 
will be given by > 
(7) var2 (Z) - b 2 var2 (m) + c2 var2 (n) 
This formula implies that a change in Z oan be estimated as a 
linear function of the changes In the individual variables. 
For Instance, given the variances of load and resistance the 
variance of the load factor can be easily estimated. 
However to have numerical values of probability we need the dis-
tribution law. When m and n follow a normal distribution, Z also 
follows a normal distribution. But when m and n follow another 
typa of distribution, the aorrect distribution for Z can only be 
obtained by formulas like (4). Hence, the simplified approach oan 
give In this oaae only a qualitative indication. 
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Outline of the model adopted for the reliability calculation 
Starting from the basic concepts referred to previously, the 
following reliability midel for our structure is assumed. 
The failure considered is the catastrophic failure due to the 
brittle propagation of a crack. 
For our tube a certain distribution of defect size is assumed. 
The relationship between the critical defect size and the 
corresponding applied stress allows the derivation of the re-
sistance distribution. Then the load or applied stress distri-
bution is assumed. By the superposition of the applied load 
distribution to tee resistance distribution in (1) the relia-
bility is calculated. 
The distributions PR and F„ are considered variable with time, 
i.e. their parameters are function of time. 
The effect of the Inspections aiming at limiting the maximum 
crack size and the maximum load value can be expressed by a va-
riation of the extremes of the Integral (1) i.e. by a truncation of 
the distributions F„ and F„. 
Main characteristics of the actual structure. 
The specific considerations that follow refer to pressure tubes 
of Zr 2,5 % Nb alloy to be installed In the experimental zone 
of the Essor reactor (fig. 2). 
Tensile properties of the material are given in tab. 1. 
From the coolant which is planned to be used In the loops (water 
or organic coolant) we expect slgnificatant hydrogen pick-up 
at the operating conditions (up to 300°C for water and 36o°C for 
organic coolant). The embrittling effect of the hydrogen on the 
unirradiated material has been evaluated by C.O.D. test on a 
SEN specimen (fig. 3). 
To clarify the meaning and the reason for this teet we recall' 
the general relationship between the critical length "a" of a 
crack line defect and the applied stress J ., 
(8) „ , an • 8 
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where B Is a constant which characterizes the material from the 
point of view of the brlttleness and n is an exponent which can 
vary from 1/2 to 1. 
In the case of a plane sheet loaded In a direction perpendicular 
to the defect length, B Is proportional to the "Fracture Toughness" 
or "Crack Extension Force" G , i.e. to the energy needed to pro-
pagate the fracture of a surface unit. 
In the case of tubes loaded by Internal pressure and containing 
axial defects, B is still a quantity characteristic for the ma-
terial, but is not related only to the "Fracture Toughness" because 
we are far away from the conditions of validity of "linear elastic 
fracture mechanics". 
In general the relationship (8) can be experimentally determined 
by a burst test on artificially flawed tubes. As this type of test 
Is very expensive, a great effort has been made to attempt to 
discover snail tests from which a reliable extrapolation to tubes 
would be possible. 
A technique, based on the assessment of the crack opening dis-
placement A In the region near the tip of a defect, gives within 
certain limits satisfactory results C^J' 
The relationship between C.O.D., the hoop stress In the tube and 
the length of the corresponding orltical defect is given by : 
(9) 6-S£a 
where 
o » yielding stress y 
E « Young's modulus 
The formula (9) corresponds to (8) with n » 1/2. 
C.O.Di, 6 • can be measured on small specimens. 
Fro* the values of C.O.D., for eaoh material condition, the constant 





The values of a , measured on our material, versus the hydrogen 
concentration, at room temperature, is given in fig. 4. 
The values of
 0 depend on the crack orientation due to the tex-
ture of the tube material. 
We have considered the C.O.D. corresponding to the longitudinal 
defect, the most dangerous and the most probable in our situation. 
The values of C.O.D. increase very rapidly with the temperature, 
so that the most dangerous condition for our material is low 
temperature. 
This is why we assume room temperature for our calculations. 
An embrlttlement effect should be expected also from the neutron 
irradiation. The fast flux (> 1 Hev) on our tube is of the order 
of 5 •*• 10.101-3 n/cn2 see. 
In one year we have already a dose of the order of 10 -1 n/cm . 
Like the hydrogen, irradiation has no detrimontal effect on the 
tensile and yield strength, of Zirconium alloys, while significant 
effect has been observed on Impact properties and fracture toughness. 
However this effect tends to a saturation at a dose of 10 n/em . 
It could be equivalent to a hydrogen concentration of 100 - 150 ppm. 
The superposition of the radiation effect on the hydridlng effect 
is not additive. 
The impact properties and the fracture toughness tends to have a 
limiting absolute value Z"4_7. 
Specific tests are underway at HER (Petten). 
In the absence of definitive experimental data various hypotheses 
have been made (fig. 5). The curve (2) Is considered the most 
prpbable. It corresponds to a rate of embrlttleoent equivalent to 
an hydrogen pick-up of 300 - 400 ppm after 20 years. The linear 
variation with time has been assumed for simplicity aa a first 
approximation. 
5. Determination,,of \ , fo.f? 
5.1. Pjaw dAetrlbifttffl 
Let P(a) be the probability that the largest longitudinal 
defect in the tube is longer than "a". 
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He choose for F(a) a Weibull distribution. 
At present experimental data on defect size and on their 
statistical distribution are very poor, and the choice of 
a Weibull distribution Is arbitrary. However it can be 
justified on the one hand by the formal advantages of this 
two parameter distribution and on the other by the fact 
that this type of distribution has been successfully 
adopted In similar cases : 
.i3 (11) F(a) - e^a"' 
a and a are respectively the form and the scale parameters 
of the distribution. 
5.2. Resistance distribution 




la> »U =e-^ ) 
F(o) expresses the probability that the resistance is lower 
than o» i.e. the probability that the largest defect present 
Is lohger than the defect a for which o is critical. 
The constant B of the material is Included in the parameter 
T . 
Consider now that the basic material is embrittled keeping 
oonstant the cracj distribution i.e. the parameter o0-
The basic material will be characterized by a new B'< B. 
If we indicate a »4- the new parame 
in (12) according to (8) will be : 
•£ ter oJ,to be Introduced 
(w) <é - » • h • °e «n 
She new resistance distribution is i 
(M) røi - .-<*•"•» - [».« J 
2«5 
If we plot on loglog paper In F_(o) versus „ vre have a 
a o0 
straight line : 
(15) login F„(0) = - | log -f-
K n o0 
A variation of the properties of the material keeping 
constant the crack distribution corresponds to a vertical 
translation of a quantity log : 
(16) login — - = login — S log a 
F£(o> FR(o) 
To Introduce the variable time we write (12) and (14) In the 
form : 
(17) PR(x,t) = e ' \ x""r(t) 
(18) Eg (x,t) = e - \
 e(t>»'"r(t)x - " r ^ 
As we have supposed that the parameter (t) expressing the 
embrittlement of the basic material is linear with time 
(fig. 5). we can write : 
(i9) v t ) - K^a - (t-D c±)a V t } 
where 
(20) C. - x ~ "tt) 
1 4- T 
If we suppose also that the parameter m_(t) expressing the 
form of the distribution and therefor« Interpreting the 
phenomena connected with the modification of the crack 
distribution (wear, local corrosion etc..) is linear t 
(21) ra^t) - a,,! + (t-1) C d r , i ^ , 
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5.3. numerical expression of Fn(x.t) 
We assume on the basis of fabrication experience some points 
are fixed and on them the Weibull distribution is drawn : 
-9-50 a 1*075 (22) F(a) = e " °  
From this distribution we derive the parameters K . and n^, 
(25) K^ - 990 
(24) m^ = 2,15 
As a variable w we talce 
(25) x - -0-
where is the actual hoop stress and ctø the nominal allowable 
stress calculated In accordance with the ASHE code for 
pressure vessel : 
^ 2 
(26) o H _ -4(300<>C) - 16 kg/mnT 
From the fig. 4 which gives the C.O.D. at the initial time 
and from (9) the resistance distribution at the initialtime 
time is derived : 
(27) FR(x) - *-**> *"2'15 
In fig. 6 are plotted such distributions. 
To fix (21) the following hypotheses are made about the 
avolution of the probability distribution. 
We suppose tost In time the probability of the' almost 
incredible defect remains constant and the probability of 
shorter oraoks Increases (fig. 7). 
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As several phenomena can contribute to the growing of the 
defects (wear, pressure cycling, thermal fatigue) various 
values are also assumed for the parameter C. . 
Vie have plotted in fig. 6 the crack distributions after 
20 years of operation for various C. . 
To give the physical meaning of these values we can see 
that they correspond to a probability for a crack larger 
-7 -4 -l 
than 6 mm after 20 years of 10 ', 10 and 10 respec-
tively. 
Determination of Fc(xrt) 
As we have already said Fc(x,t) is the probability that the 
maximum applied stress attained In the time t is higher than x. 
The variable x os still o% (25). 
We assume also for this distribution a Weibull type : 
(28) Pc(x,t) = e-Kc(t) x I°° 
This distribution will change in time in the sense that the pro-
bability of having m load higher than a certain x 1B increasing 
with the tine. 
We assume that the time affects mainly the probability of having 
accidental overload, i.e. the distribution on the side where the 
probability values are very low, so that no change can be con-
sidered of the distribution around the value x » 1. 
With this hypothesis we can write Xe(t) - K0(l) - oonstant. 
To take into account the tlmewise increasing probability of 
values of x higher than 1, m0(t) is expressed as a linear function 
pf the time t • - , . . . . • • -.-?- ., 
, , - • " ' - , - • • - ; . - . - ; - '•" "*• ",S,>! ."-<? 
(29) Me(t) «^j,;f jtøX,P«» i3',:i~,'.,:t. -f;~- ;jtei**<J 
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Numerical values for the constants K and m - can be obtained 
on the basis of an analysis of all the possible plant operation 
conditions. C. is a parameter which expresses the reliability 
of the safety devices foreseen to keep the loading conditions 
below certain levels. 




cdc = °*155 and °'07 
This corresponds to the following probabilities 
t - 1 year 
P (x-1) - 10"1 
P (x-1.5) - 3.10"7 
p (x-2) - io"25 
t - 20 years 
P (x-1) - 10"1 
P (x-2) - 10"8 and 6.10*4 
Reliability calculation 
The formula (1) has been solved by a digital computer programme 
for the distributions indicated above. 
She most interesting comments on the results are in connection 
with the mutual effects of the four factors considered i em-
brlttlement, flaw distribution, load distribution, control 
limiting the maximum defect size. 
In fig. 8 to 15 are given different cases considered. 
In table 2 are given the values of the reliability for different 
value« of the parameter expressing embrittlement, flaw distri-
bution, load distribution and truncation. 
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The following remarks can be made on the results : 
a) The embrlttleoent can modify the reliability of a structure 
more or less according to the kind of crack and load dis-
tribution we can expect in the structure. 
The degradation phenomena are not additive in a simple way. 
A structure with a high standard regarding the probability 
of cracks has a reliability much more sensitive to a basic 
material degradation than a structure for which a great 
dispersion of the possible defects is supposed. 
The same remark applies to the load distribution : a stringent 
specification on overload probabilities, which means a high 
reliability of the safety devices, emphasizes the effect of 
embrittlement. 
b) When we fix certain values of reliability for pressure tubes 
(see for example C^.J w e must pay attention to the fact that, 
for given operating condition and Inspection rigour, a very 
small variation of the fracture properties of the basic ma-
terial can result In a variation of an Important factor in 
the reliability. For instance In tab. 2 we sae that a variation 
of a factor 2 In C.O.D. which corresponds to a variation of 
fracture toughness of 1,4, can change the reliability from 
H T 6 to lo"10. 
c) The slope of the probability of failure or unreliability as a 
function of time tends to change. 
This also can be considered a combined effect of the "evolution" 
of the statistical distributions determining the reliability 
value. 
d) The positive effect of Inspections In limiting the value ot 
the maximum crack is important for the smaller times but 
deorease rapidly as the time increases. If what we wast Is 
a oertaln mission reliability for the time t, the type ami 
the rigour of the Inspections must be optimized with regard 
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to the particular situation and time to avoid performing 
ineffectual Inspections and thereby wasting money. 
8. Comparison with conventional methods of resistance evaluation 
The conventional methods of calculation based on pressure vessel 
codes cannot take into account the factor "embrlttlement" if 
no corresponding variation of tensile properties exists. 
The factor "statistical distribution" of defects and of applied 
stress are considered in the "safety coefficients". 
More recently calculation methods in which the brittle fracture 
alone is considered have been introduced ^~6_7. They are based 
on fracture mechanics and go under the name of "leak before 
break criterion". 
From experience in fracture testing of thin wall pressure vessels, 
it was reasoned that a through-the-thiekness crack, normal to 
the maximum membrane stress, of a total length equal to twice 
the wall thickness would deform sufficiently under pressure to 
permit leakage of the pressurization medium, provided that this 
length was less than the critical defect size. As the leakage 
can be detected a critical defect of twice the thickness is 
considered the safe limit and the basis for the stability cal-
culation. 
According to this criterion the safety factor against brittle 
fracture is 
e critical defect size of the operating condition 
2 x wall thickness 




We can see that the quantity "safety factor against fracture" 
Is ambiguous for values less than 2. That is to say that when 
the risk of brittle rupture becomes really significative only 
a probabilistic evaluation based on the knowledge of all factors 
could give a quantitative evaluation of the stability of the 
structure. In fact for a safety coefficient equal to one we 
-3 -7 
can have an unreliability ranging from 10 to 10 according 
to the various cases considered. 
9. Conclusions 
- The reliability of a structure depends on several factors : 
if we take into account the statlstioal nature of these 
factors, we find that their effect on the reliability is 
not purely additive. 
This means that practically the same attention must be given 
to all the factors to avoid an error In interpreting the 
advantages or disadvantages In modifing one of these factors. 
- The factor "embrittlement" can be estimated on the basis of 
fracture mechanics. But Its impact on reliability has a quan-
titative meaning only if we refer to a determinate situation. 
We can say that "fracture toughness" specifications should be 
accompanied by a specification, on a statistical basis, of 
the load conditions and on the crack probability. 
- The Inspections must be chosen carefully, paying attention 
again to all the factors, including the mission time we expect 
from our structure. 
270 
REFERENCES 
f \ J "Reactor Primary Coolant System Rupture Study" Section III 
"Reliability Engineering" 
GEAP 4964 
£~2j E.B. Hangon 
"Statistical Methods for Structural Reliability Analysis" 
Proceedings of Tenth National Symposium on Reliability 
and Quality Control, Washington 1964 
PiJ G.D. Fearnehough, B. Watklns, R.O. Mills 
"Application of the Crack Opening Displacement Approach 
to the Prediction of Pressurized Tube Failure" 
TRO Report 1J48 (o) 
/"4_7 D«s- Uooå, J. Winton and B. Watklns 
"The Effect of Irradiation on the Impact Properties of 
Zirconium Alloys" 
The Electrochemical Society, Fall Meeting, Buffalo, 
Oct. 10-14, 1965 
£~$J L. Cave, T.F. Williams 
"Safety Assessment of Pressure Tube Heavy Water Reactors 
by Probability Methods" 
IAEA Slmposlum on Heavy Water Power Reactors, September 
1967 
/"6_7 H.E. Johnson 
"Fracture Mechanics t a Basis for Brittle Fracture Pre-
vention" 
WAPD - TM - 505. 
?71 
TA3LE 1 
Mechanical propertles of Zirconium 2,5# Hioblum heat-treated 
pressure tubes fabricated by Cefllac according to Euraton 
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A REVIEW pr THE SATETT ASPECTS OF THE DESIGN OF PRESTRESSED COHCRBTE 
PRESSURE VESSELS WITH. REFERENCE TO LIMIT STATE DESIGH 
C.W. Ku S. Gill 
Existing Design Philosophy 
The aain safety consideration in th« design of nuclear reactors 
has always been that of restricting the release of harmful fission 
products into the atmosphere. For this purpose, the primary containment 
of the fuel can and the secondary containment of the concrete pressure 
vessel Itsalf• continue to represent the main precautions against disaster. 
For the gas-cooled reactor, housed in a prestressed concrete pressure 
vessel, safety requirements in addition, have always demanded a restriction 
on th« escape of gas fron the *t;el-lined interior of the vessel, at least 
onder test loadings. 
The vessel loadings consist of the gas pressure, which is limited by 
relief valves, and the temperature load, which is limited by a secondary 
cooling system and insulation, and which can rise only slowly in the concrete 
due to the letter's thermal inertia. 
It has been stated (1) that before gas leakage can be significant, the 
steel lining to the vessel must suiter widespread breaching, and that 
consequently structural failure of the main sections of the vessel only need 
to be considered where leakage is concerned. 
Moreover a further assumption is usually made that all closures and 
penetrations of the concrete vessel maintain complete integrity. 
Based upon these aims and assumptions, three design criteria have come 
to be adopted: 
(1) that the elastic response of the structure should be such that 
under design load and test pressure, the stresses in the main 
sections of the vessel shall lie below permissible code values. 
This is ths main classical design requirement for serviceability; 
the design of the steel lining is also, to a degree, dependent 
on a knowledge of the elaetic response of the concrete. 
(2) that there should be a mod« of failure under overload conditions, 
such that deformations in the whole vessel are recognisably gradual 
and large before ultimate structural collapse. 
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(3) that there should be an adequate aargin against ultimate failure; 
at the present tine in Great Britain, it is required that the 
vessel barrel is the case of cylindere, should fail at a presaura 
not less that 2.5 tinea the deaign pressure, and that the end alaba 
should fail at a pressure not less that 3 tines the design pressure. 
In addition to these criteria for design, proof testing ia normally 
carried out on completed veasels at a presaura 1.15 tinea the deaign pressure. 
The main purpose of this teat remains that of indicating clearly that the 
veasel ia adequately safe at design pressure, i.e. that it is not about to 
fail, and for this purpose, 1.15 seems a reasonable factor. 
By the proviaion of *inatrunentation in the veaael, confirmation can be 
obtained during the test loading of the structure, that the design 
calculations forecast the actual behaviour reasonably accurately under 
eervice loadings. Such inatromentation can also confirm satiafactory 
behaviour during construction, commissioning and operation. 
Other aspects which may be listed under the beading of aviating aafety 
philosophy ara such items aa inspectioniduring construction and quality control 
of materiale. 
Results of model teating of prototypes alao ensure that apecial 
arrangements of vassal geometry cither of Che vhole structure or of parts 
of the structure, can he satisfactorily analyaed. 
Shortconlnte of gxistinx Criteria 
Although the three assign criteria listed, may all be apparently 
aatisfisd by applications of acceptable analytical methods and arrangements 
of aaitabla vassal configurations, it should be realised that to a 
considerable extant, the overall safety of a prsstrassed concrete pressure 
vessel still depends am cms integrity of many secondary layout details. 
for example all inserts amt closures, and the insolation and cooling systems 
represent safety problems. Thes« probles« ara not necessarily resolved by 
•eatias the msin criteria Vat by good planning sad detailing, by controlled 
mMaf^1wM^,mi *» —^m*.Pv*&i'r -** #.**•.*#!-*• v 
It shsmld also be tnUmt m*t*tmm»mB*lm*;m*'*iutUtttåttttki 
BUeh k m ta be made ia calculations any vary for different methods of 
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Ae for load factors or safety factors for any particular design 
condition, these should be specifically suitable for each configuration of 
veeeel, although in the past einilar factors have been used for very 
different layouts. 
Moreover no realistic process yet exists for integrating into designs, 
proper allowances for tine-dependent and tenperature-dependent strains. In 
particular for themal creep and for other secondary effects. MOr i s i t yet 
custoatary to allow in analysis for the involved stress histories of a l l 
concrete sections. 
As the setting concrete generates heat of hydration, i t expands 
and the stresses set up are relieved to a considerable extent by creep. 
Later the concrete having hardened, cools and contracts. The contraction 
stresses are tensile and increase the shrinkage stresses which begin to occur. 
Dead load stresses v i l l load the concrete further and the extent to which 
a l l these stresses are dissipated and redistributed depends on the degree 
to which creep la s t i l l acting. 
Undoubtedly there i s an indeterainate condition of locked-in 
stress which represents a datuat upon which are later imposed LU—lissloning 
and operational stresses. 
In addition the nature of the. aechanical loading imposed on the 
pressure vessel concrete i s cyclical, and in a realistic design, the effects 
of this repetitive loading on subsequent stress redistribution should be 
allowed for fully. I t i s in this sense that the concrete's stress history 
i s of iaportance. 
At first sight the three win design criteria, nay appear reasonably 
satisfactory. However, an erawimtion reveals a certain ineonaistency and 
arbitrariness. 
For exanple, on the one band the designer la assured that relief 
valves » i l l prevent the internal preaaure fro* rising above a certain value., 
wbilat on to* otter, ho i* raqoind to pond * lot of tuU tjm arortoiPt • . 
•oaoo of ruptur, a t e vn*lo*i må oamrioc that, t#»„ s b f a l * ^ gjnfrojl^,
 t 
nor io I t e U « to noot omt*«t th» fjgoet •£ t « L > i ^ a f e . - j i * ^ p K « i É i i > 
•' I . WJrtf« «fc» . 
im,„i?-*ttti**>rMm*t>it*n'-mtt _ 
oceorriof in tb« cnttrttt *f o^»r«tio« 
29? 
When i t COMI to the choice of overall load factor for the vessel, 
the values of 2.5 and 3 appear to have no real scientific basis; nor can 
i t be established that by using these figures safety i s fully guaranteed. 
Furthermore i t cannot be claimed that the figures are the result of 
experience because none of the vessels built has yet had a service l i fe 
long enough to permit any realistic statistical analysis, although the 
Foulness model tests (2) of the U.K.A.E.A. go sow vay towards rewdying the 
situation. 
The elastic analysis carried out has also been subjected to criticism 
in soae quarters on the grounds that i t i s only the average working stresses 
that can be kept below permissible levels.. It is frequently pointed out that 
the state of stress in certain parts of the structure does not neccessarily 
give a true picture of the overall serviceability. 
It i s evident that in order to be assured of a satisfactory design, 
the pressure vessel designer not only needs to know how safe the vessel is 
under overload conditions, but he also needs to know this at a l l stages 
and under al l combinations of loading. Using the existing design criteria, 
he cannot certainly achieve these objectives. 
However, i f the limit state design concept is adopted, the safety 
of the structure can be systematically and logically assessed, provided 
the necessary data become available. 
I t should be pointed out that the ultimate load method of design, 
which i s utilised for pressure vessels at the present time, in addition to 
the elastic analysis, i s in i tself one aspect of limit state design. 
when the failure mechanism or mschanisme are known, the ultimate load 
method vei l represents the behaviour mode of the structure near collapse 
end consequently, satisfactory strength can be inferred, with confidence, 
at service lead level. However, this aspect is only one of many that need 
consideration i f the full limit state design method is adopted. 
: LWt etate design is new a well-established »wwedure wifely 
• » U s d to niWiwUiMsl structures, and which considers variations in 
tta»V>ele**»t to the * « • « * fch^i«. . , ^ .. ^ ^ ^ ^ . . ^ ._, ^ , I I ( , , 1 ( . 
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The governing equations for characteristic loads and strengths 
•ay be stated thus: 
Characteristic load - anan load • (K, x standard deviation) 
and 
Characteristic strength - nan strength - (K, x standard deviation) 
where K, and KB are factora with values vhich ensure respectively that the 
probabilities of the characteristic loads being exceeded and of the 
characteriatic atrengtha not being achieved* are of a known, acceptable order. 
Furthermore, the atrength of the Material in the finished structure 
•ay be weaker than that found froa tests on saaplea. For example in the 
caae of concrete this could be due to the. inherent variability of the 
material as a reault of .its netted of manufacture; the degree of compaction 
•ay not be the sane on s i te as in laboratory eaaples; impurities nay be 
preeent in aite concrete and conaequently ita atrengtb nay be reduced. To 
allow for these factors which tend to weaken the atrength of the material 
in the completed structure, a further partial safety factor la applied. 
Thua, for the materials 
Design strength - »l»r«teri . t ic f . tr»» i th 
' • 
Similarly, the load applied to the l true ture or to part of i t , may be 
greater than anticipated due to errors in design esaumptions or errors in 
conatruction etc. Hence, for the loading; 
Design load • Yt * characteristic load. 
The choice of the magnitudes of Ym *•* Ts, depends on how acceptable 
i t is for these edverse affects to occur. Obviously the chosen values of 
Ya and Y, will determine the probability of these adverse affects happening. 
For example, let ue consider the strength ef * section, wklak Is 
govened by the coavruaiou strength of concrete. a*samJLUg that, e l l . 
neceasary daU a n available, tte d^iwe* can *nl»et ft* a » p t « ^ ^ velaea 
• ' » t . *W Y, end Y , , »hid. introduce^*. p x « * # i . l ^ ^ • 
emmmni&sTofi ImtftVal tolfl " h r I n * a***-*-«-«**, tkt Éanmmt M^rewrnW• mJÉJJMgJMT "jfiBanMm*^ '^ lM;r~artHa^"^amlamWl7i^ ~" 
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In general* a structure under service conditions, should not 
only carry the load safely, but i t should also not deflect excessively 
and thus cause damage to interior finishings or installations. Partial 
safety factors and probabilities against the structure reaching an 
excessively deflected condition can also be estimated. 
Finally, structural nenbers should not be damaged locally by 
cracking and spalling of the concrete thus exposing the reinforcement 
to corrosion. In this case also, the probability of the structure reaching 
such a limit state can be assessed. 
Thus for a structure to be satisfactory i t has to be designed for 
several limit states. 
A structure can be said to be veil designed if i t can be shown 
that the probabilities of each of the limit states being reached sre 
constant and acceptable, provided of course that the resulting cost of 
the structure i s realistic. 
Theoretically, this is possible if all the statistical data are 
obtainable for assessing the probabilities p . , Pg, P*and PB. 
It should be accepted that Identical probabilities cannot be 
arranged for all limit states applied to structures and particularly to 
the prestressad concrete pressure vessel because of the non-availability 
of certain data. 
This problem may be overcome by accepting* in certain cases, a 
lower probability. For example, for those limit states, the attainment 
of which would result in serious loss of l i fe or irreparable damage, or 
i f the behaviour of the material and the variable nature of the loading 
were difficult to determine, then lower likelihoods of reaching such 
limit s t a t u may be designed into a schema. 
Such a step may be achieved by varying tbn partial load factors 
Ym and T t f or ths different limit states. For example y, can be 
evtsidatsa' to be the product of y u and y w in which r £ l caters for 
thi våriaeio&s of the loading in the structure aS compared with i t s 
émiim ie*4, *nd y ^ depend* on the severity of conseauence when the *' 
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used as « measure r f th* factor of sa fe ty against a l imi t s t a t « being 
reached, thus giving a physical Meaning to the s n s l y s i s . 
appl i ca t ion of Limit Stat« Design to Pretitressed Concrete Vesse l s 
I f i t can be accepted that there i s a need for reappraisal of the 
design philosophy of pressure v e s s e l s , i t say be i n t e r e s t i n g t o examine 
to What extent the l i m i t s t a t e method can be a l o g i c a l development. 
For ordinary structures i t i s the pract ice t o group l i m i t s t a t e s under 
the following headings: c o l l a p s e , deformation and l o c a l damage, as explained 
above. In f a c t , i t i s poss ib le to group a l l the pos s ib l e serv ice and f a i l u r e 
l i m i t s t a t e s appropriate to a comprehensive concrete pressure v e s s e l des ign . 
under one of these three ca tegor i e s . This can be done from a knowledge of 
the operating and functional requirements of the v e s s e l . 
Table 1 g ives i n general t e n s the operational procedure* and 
funct ional requirements o f a pressure v e s s e l i n t h e i r l o g i c a l order. 
Constructional , Commissioning 
and Operational Procedure« Functional Acquirement 
Concrete Plac ing . 
Sat i s factory Compressive Strength. 
Sat i s fac tory Dens i ty . 
Heat of hydration temperature recorded. 
Shrinkage j o i n t s and good curing to 
prevent shrinkage cracking. 
Check foundation t i l t . 
Level of foundation checked to ensure 
core and v e s s e l v e r t i c a l i t y to prevent 
i n t e r a l i a , f u e l l i n g nmclianism jamming. 
Pres tress ing of Cables. 
Sat i s fac tory S t e e l and Concrete s t r e s s e s 
before and a f t e r losses* 
( Security of anchorages. 
( L i f t - o f f t e s t - check t o ensure ode j u s t e 
( res idual tendon force^ 
Sat i s fac tory Strains-recorded. 
Sat i s factory Overall vessej . deformation 
par t i cu lar ly top cap. 
Lining Castigfat. 
Proof Testing v irk a i r . 
Hot run up to design 
temperatures and c r o s s f a t l . 
5 J r-"">kuig. 
Mafcrfp intended to check Jawulatioa. 
U a f t s m j M i j l ! . * . * . ^ / ^ c 
S tee l mod coocrata s t r u s t a acceptable . 
Pnf lact iwos a«ee*to*4*. 
Bo cr 
Ca» Preafurc Applied. 
Qrecfc cable »Cress« 
CfeMfc tbat dcrips 
f a l l 
<w.sm». •vM.iwtm"-'- ^JffCSSsSi'-St&'&LilMi, 
™
mv"?t"'Mitl ffit /.*> K» Weakens-' - - , - • »J - • * * T — 
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In general, by examining Table 1 the mode of behaviour of the vessel 
can be assessed under service conditionn by poatulating various limit states 
governed by factors arrived at from the statistical-probabilistic analysis. 
For example, the serviceability, the design load, and the test load limit 
states are characterised by mechanical loadings which are well-defined in their 
range, magnitude and frequency. In addition, various failure modes may be 
examined as limit stitea. 
By this means, a preferred sequence of failure modes may be facilitated 
to promote the greatest aafety. Hot only would each failure mode be gradual 
where this vae possible, but the preferred sequence would ensure that the 
least serious failure would be likely to occur earliest, 
Tbeae safet« considerations assume paramount importance when new 
nuclear reactora are located adjacent to large conurbations with the 
objective of economising in transmission costs. 
For example, for a cylindrical veaeel the euggested sequence of limit 
states might be 
1) Limit state corresponding to working load for temperature and pressure. 
Z) Unit state corresponding to design load for temperature and pressure. 
3) limit etats corresponding to test loading for temperature and pressure. 
4) temperature limit stats corresponding to breakdown of cooling system 
and/or insulation. 
5) limit state corresponding to relief valve control pressure. 
6) local first cracking of concrete. 
7) loss of stiffness due to extensive cracking in the barrel, 
a) Steel lining rupture. 
•) kadial cracking in end cap. 
10) Berrel, hoop tension failure. 
11) Shear failure in end cap. 
12) sanding tailors at sad cap/wall connection. 
13) rreetressing cable rupture. 
The critical stress or strain criteria controlling each of these 
I M t Stat« can thee be investigated ia the manner illustrated by laker (3). 
If tat ssauias« »I limit states l isted i s accepted as a basis far the 
- Wttmjtt* STSstsasssd eanarate pressvra vessel, values far partial sad. . 
ewer*^ aaJstT tacsara t ^ tba/«sr4e«a statss, caa alae « • aaaigasd ia s 
smnajn; aJaiUK ta that sneasatsd by |sk«t i« table I of Ma pep«. ''• 
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The partial factors suggested in Baker's example are such that 
for later undesirable limit states, a low probability of their occurring 
i s arranged. Where stress and strain at a limit state are difficult to 
assess precisely, .1 low probability of these states being reached is again 
arranged. 
It is evident that with the existing design philosophy, for all of the 
listed states to be catered for, i t would involve the vessel being over-designed 
in sone sections. 
Difficulties in Applying Limit State Desiyi to Prestressed Concrete Vessels 
As indicated by Baker, the partial factors suggested in his example 
are for illustrative purposes only, because in many cases, data distribution 
frequency and characteristic loads (particularly those resulting from 
temperature) are lacking at present. Because of this lack of data some of 
the partial safety factors may appear excessively high. HoweveT his table 
does indicate the principles involved and the logic of the approach. When 
•ore nuclear power Btations have been built and mor« extensive instrumentation 
has been installed, more of the necessary data should become available. 
In the case of pressure vessel limit states affected by thermal creep, in 
addition to the lack of data already discussed, there are other diff iculties. 
Consider the limit state of local cracking due to shear. Since in this 
case stress is the criterion, either the characteristic compressive or 
characteristic tensile strength may be used. However the probability and 
global safety calculated in the usual manner are not likely to he the 
appropriate values, because shear cracking strength is not directly 
proportional to either the compressive or tensile strength of concrete, but 
depends on many other factors. Therefore i t will be necessary either to 
introduce a third partial safety factor to cater for this , similar to the 
Russian practice in ultimate strength design (4) or the partial factor selected 
for the load must allow for the shear affect. In either case, appropriate 
statistical data wil l be necessary. 
When a limit state involving stress Affected by creep and shrinkage 
at elevated temperature is being considered, the creep data to be used in 
the analysis may be obtained from control specimens. Again i f the.g^Dbel
 r 
safety factor and probability are calculated in the usual meaner^fh^gmiy 
not be the true values. This i s because "characteristic jegtts* ttJMfø 
directly proportionel to concrete compressive strengt«. Furthermore, ***" 
method of creep analysis would influence the stress vsluss obtained in Cki« 
CAM. It m i l tfcsrefoc* be necessary to introduce s third »*rti*$ i 
smUes on sllovaws could be e«d« in this resfee* in 1 
- 4**i* ««*» *»*»* « *** J 
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Take a further example and consider the experimental work 
carried out at Imperial College and The City University, London, on the 
behaviour of the perforated end slab of a pressure vessel subjected to 
radial pressure and temperature load. Fig. 1 shows the stress history at 
the periphery of the perforated region (5). TA. indicates the stage at which 
the pressure load was reduced after 100 days. The calculated locked-in 
field stress was 2.2 ^/m 2 causing a tensile hoop stress of 3.2 M/K2 
thus cracking the slab radially. If this particular cracking limit state 
is under consideration, then it is evident from the process of analysis 
that the relationship between the resultant tensile stress and the creep 
rate is complex. Calculations for this limit state based on the concrete's 
compressive strength in any way would be misleading. 
The above three examples are intended to indicate the difficulty of 
applying the limit state design concept in certain instances due to lack 
of data, nevertheless the principle can be seen to be a logical one if the 
aim is to achieve the greatest safety in pressure vessel design without 
using unnecessarily high safety factors. 
Conclusions; 
1. Prestressed concrete pressurt vessel designers should seriously 
consider the limit state design concept since it enables every 
critical part of the vessel, under all loading conditions to be 
logically considered. The probability of failure can be assessed 
and a preferred sequence of limit states arranged, in order to give 
the greatest safety for a given pressure vessel. 
2. However, in order to apply this principle to design in practice. 
sere data will be necessary. The data required, such as the 
pressure distribution, the temperature distribution, the frequency, 
likelihood and effects of pressure and temperatures surges and the way 
in which construction, cosmissioning and operating procedures affect 
design parameters, should be collected from existing vessels and 
from instrumentation on future vessels. 
3. A critical study of the appropriate parameters to be used at the 
various limit states must be carried out to enable correct global 
factors to be assessed. 
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Ina preaaure vessel statistics ara aet out by the Vereinlgung der Teehnlsehen 
tfoermcfcunfta-Ver«lj!» CwMOV) and ar« eratariVnrUd hy a l l Teebnlacnea Uber-
mahungs-'Verelne (Tt)V). A description of the eharaoteriaties of the stat ist ics 
ia given and the VdlVV failure reports are explained. Furthermore* the analysis 
of the primary data and the determination of failure rates la ahoNn. 
the boiler drum stat ist ics cover most of the boiler drums operated in the 
Federal Republic of Oermsny. Once more a description of the charectmrlatlea 
of the statistlea la given. In addition, the observed failure nodes are 
reviewed, furthermore the analysis of the primary data and the deuewimtten 
of failure rates i s discussed. 
lba failure rate figures obtained from the VtfrtJV atetlstløm have provided 
ua with an Idea of the order of the failure rate connected with reactor 
presaura vessels, anile the failure rate data derived from the boiler drums 
stat ist les la suggested to be more reallstlo in oonneotion with nuclear 
pressure vessels. The relevance of the data to iwnlssr Treasure vessels 
Is discussed. 
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Analysis of a Oernan Pressure Vessel and Boiler Drum statistles 
I. Introduction 
Huob effort has been spend In the development of the reliability analysis 
technique. But the absence of appropriate Input data became obvious* 
especially of pressure vessel data. So we decided to analyse the material 
already collected In Germany. A study of the reliability of conventional 
pressure vessels has been Initiated. Our objective has been to obtain more 
accurate and reallstlo data on thlclwalled pressure vessels which would enable 
us to extrapolate to nuolear pressure vessels failure behaviour. ?The first 
step of that study is concerned with conventional pressure vessels and has 
given us a knowledge of the order of magnitude of the failure rate data. Tblm 
step has been completed. A / 
An analysis of the results obtained and an analysis of the material left for 
investigation, lead to a second step which is concerned with boiler drums. 
Rie boiler drums Investigated are comparable with reactor pressure vessels 
in overall dimension, wallvthlckness, design pressure and temperature. So 
the results of this step will be more representative for nuolear pressure vessels 
than those of the first step. 
Tb&M paper reports on the technique used in the analysis as well as on the 
results and its consequences. 
2.0 Pressure Vessel Statistics 
2.1 Design of Statistics 
The data analysed are taken from the VdlUv statistlee / l / . This statistlos 
Includes all failures from vessels which must be Inspected In oompliehoe with 
official regulation«. Deficiencies are not »ported. By definition s falturé" 
la defined to have oceuwd, when tes'vessel'^'lo-fes f^**—- -- —>«-l—>*' e 
Vessel failures arm reported by authorised i 
Ins number of vessels In operation as well as tte ( 
are tjom f ro» anamual statistic« of to. ' 
( *v f /? / . * eTie.lric.tion »f the v»tt,is ; _ 
«*iéaWiS*»ot U t f £ ' ' * :" " ''"*• "*"* ********** 
1 f»4 to b.
 ret«lr«l or MfitQ&> ,  
'•• binMrtSQfmf oil ~m fon i-tøn In -Hf^ r i» 
_ -J»4-A?* /CSfttf .& W*' 'SEEK**.« '** l Wm~t 
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2.2 Analysis of Primary Data 
Die notarial shortly described In the preceding para.," -iih has been analysed 
and the following data are obtained. 
Ttm total nuabar ef vessels, which are In operation per year, have been taken 
from / ? / . 1st corresponding data from 1953 and 195* have been estimated 
from the graph of the data. 
Also the number of vessels operational have been taken from / a / according to 
Its year ef manufacture. The error due to new eoudsslonlns of old vessels 
i s below ljfc Again the numbers S-cn 1953 and 195* are estimated from a graph 
of the data. 
Bie number of pressure vessels which have failed par Tear alaaalflad aseordlng 
to their year of manufacture are taken directly from the form described 
in the proceeding paragraph. All data described are available for the years 
1952 until 1967 reapactlvly. 
2.3 Determination of Failure Rates 
Iba failure rate of the pressure vessels i s calculated in accordance with the 
German standard DIM 400*1 /}/. See also / * / . 
B ( V A t i 
q C&V t±) - i i - t - i - ( i ) 
Where 1st 
q Utt1. 
B ( t t ) 




stat ist ical estimate of the failure rate 
number of components operational at the time, t . 
number of components operational at the time t . 
- Uaw Internal (t^ t ( j ) . 
Hi a l l , 15 samples"W.taken, namely the pressure vessels, xhleh have been, . 
manufacture« per year beginning 1952 up to i960. A time interval} At . 1 0 hours 
mam beam used. . . ^ 
U » estimate« are shown In Ms . 2 
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The failure rate Is then estimated from the data obtained from «Q, (1). 
We have tried the data In several Probability papers. Die best f i t appears 
to be the WelbuU-distrlbutlon. Two methods have been .applied. 
1. The failure rate Is estimated using the data of eq. (1), see Pig. 2 
S. The rel iabil i ty tmrtion Tt (t) i s estJuated using the oumulative-rrequsney.--
Fron the rel iabil i ty function then the failure rate Is obtained. See Fig. 3 . 
We have used both procedures and compared the- results-obtained. 
The equations used are as follows. 
R (t) . e -^l3 (2) 
where R(t) is the reliability function and t the probles tine. Pro" this 
the failure rate Is derived! 
Z (t) = a/St 0-1 (3) 
the values of the parameters a and fl obtained from the data analysed are 
a * 1.49 • 10"5 
0 - 0.43 
As wi l l be empastøed in the following discussion, the reference data contain 
sone Inaccuracy, the magnitude and eonsequmee of which i s hard to estimate. 
Taking this Into account, the results are to be considered with some reservation. 
Quick and generalising conclusions, especially concerning reactor pressure 
vessels, should be avoided. 
2.4 Discussion 
- - , - **y 
All pressure vessel* having s pressure voluse product J % t> UW S«<.* »fift y 
require Inspection, lndspendint fro" ttaete design en* epsmtlB« shslWjtferølma, 
but having a pressure at > 0,5 at«. Toss* |»<s>u>« vessels •*» s W t a r t M f ø « 
frem various materials, e,«k eojper, «e#t fem, e^eel, Vw*t*m:MTitm*'t ma 
dissnsions from 0,5 up- to.several esfrss mi »«faM»i# •tam.iiUlimm* fJWpjpStst 
e.g. for storage of ohHdoals, sueh a* Stan, nested rol ls 
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In paper a l l la , or as eondenser vessels, heat exchangers, spray ooolera In a 
power plant etc . They are operated aver a.wide-rwngn of JtaMWiretliran end 
pressures (0,5 to »ore than 1000 atli) due to their various applications. 
lbs following senses for failure of the vessels have been fovndt 
design and nanufaeturlng deflatencies, 
poor construction, 
operating and environmental Influence, 
wrong operation (to a large extent huaan error), 
corrosion and aging and 
pressure testing. 
The failure modes are as follows: 
Sudden total destruction during operation, the original 
function of the vessel being disturbed and Internal and 
external testing by the inspecting organisations. 
The authorised inspeators have to decide whether I t Is a failure or a def latency,, 
an exaot definition of both i s not given. So the decision of the Inspector, 
who has to f i l l In the form (Pig. 1), as to wether i t la a failure or deficiency 
la also influenced by the aaount of work he baa to carry out. According to 
our lnfdrastlon the tendency to report a l l failures has Increased over the last 
year, nevertheless the nuaber of reported failures per year remained alnost 
eonatant, although the msober of vessels increased six-fold since 1958. 
One of the reasons nay be Improved quality of the new vessels. Manufacturing 
•stnoda, materials, welding prooeduree and the construction have undergone 
a very favourable development during the last decade. Hut there la some doubt 
Hart this influence la solely »sponsible for the depressing failure frequency. 
I t la aaaused that failures, which have oooured, had not bean reported, 
• r putting la fosse t to new regulations / 5 / In 1958, »Man had already been 
applied In 1956 and 1957, aa they ware already available in fera of a draft • 
the failsse saaavdour of the pressure vessels was distorted due to the mgbsr 
fri*"*! ftaassmi eaused by Wis pressure vast according to / V . 
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Sua to the lack of data, with regards to the nuaber of vessels In service, 
to entrlaa aid deductions In 1953 and 1954. these were extrapolated tram the 
data gained In the other rears. The failure rate has teen calculated using 
the entrlas of 1952 - 1957 as the aaanle elze. respectlvly. Bf this sethod 
an error was lntroduesd due to the faet that sow old pressure vessels had 
been taken back Into service. This error should be below IK. 
Tbe widely scattered eatlaates of failure rate q, aa shown In Fig« 2 , la 
caused by an lnoreaae of pressure Teasel entries at appradsately constant 
failure frequency. Tbe resulting failure rates of the various saaplea arc 
decreasing with -Hie advancing years of aanufacture. This effect la responsible 
for the exagerated value of the calstfuitsfl deviations. 
The estlsatea of the failure rate are larger than previously for the tla» 
Interrail between 8 end 9 JC 10 service hours« but the assuaptlon of an 
Increasing failure rate (failure by aging) Is adslaadlag. He don't believe, 
that the failure rat« la actually Increasing at this stage. This effect 
i s probably due to Insufficient data. 
Tbe Tallies of the euaulatlve frequencies la r ig . 3 are also scattered as a result 
of en Increasing ouster of pressure vessels at apprsdlsmtely oonstant failure 
frequency. In addition one observes an accuaulation of failures at rounded-aff 
hours of service, especially at service tines eaeedlng 1000 hours. Our 
conclusion Is that usually romded-off hours of service tlwe are given« or 
are eettaated according to the type of service. 
The function Z(t) In Fig. 2 has been ssotWy drawn trough the sodes of 
tbe estlaate of the failure rate In the respective tine periods. The straight 
11ns In H g . 3 la also drawn trough the sodea. The andes ware eatlsated. 
A calculation of the sodes would not give sore enact results, due to the laek 
of suffuolant data for each t i e s period. Theoretically a illsulsussswrt of ths 
point« should be possible* But this deplacesant would only sl ightly i b s n s i . 
the paraaster a, the slops of the straight 14ns would isenln apaetant snd, 
thus the psraaeter | 3 . > - v ^ - . . ' ^ » : « , w 
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3 . Boller STUB Statlatlos 
9.1 Eeeln ar Statistlea 
ju 1961 a study ma Initiated whleh «•—i.-«— »71 «.«gt. piaaniro stesa druns 
operated In the Federal Republic of Oeraany and which ara supervised by the 
Juv" and the organisations which operate the boilers. All. essential data of 
the lntaet drues as wall aa druas with faults are entered In a special 
fora. 241 drues« Including 33 druas villi faults are Investigated, 
the druna are-operated at a preaaure ranging froa 60 to 110 atO and teaparaturas 
ef 290 - 350 °C and are Bade frsa hlgb»teBVemture--strwtwal_stoeljgf_dlttsxejnt 
ooapoeltlone. lhe operating tlsea of the drums are of very different length 
as the ysara of 1 iwilaIniiliaj vary froa 19e9 to 1958. The faults -ouaonea ware 
eomslon aavrka and crooks of different s ize . 
y& Determination of Failure nates 
Again the failure ratea any be calQuieten using the tao eathoda described 
In chanter 8 .3 . But some nodlf leatlona are necessary due to the kind of data 
enelyaed. 
1. The actual tine at aUsh the faults are developed la not known as-al l the 
faults »are discovered during Internal Inspections to be peifumcd at a 
three years Interrail. So a negative deviation of the tin« at which Hie 
faults ara developed of three years la Introduced. 
2 . The operating tines of the boiler druse are morale« equally distributed 
along a period of tlae up to 1,5 • 1<T hours. So eq. (1) must be mortified 
taking Into aeeount the different operating tines. IMS also applies 
to the calculation of the mandative frequency distribution. 
A s aslnulat.lofi of the protabUlty distribution and i t s parese-ters proceeds 
slang UM> following ltaasi lbs ouaulatlve frequency distribution Is oaleulated 
sal a deviation ef sinus three years Is assigned to the t i e s of Internal In-
vestigation antsh revealed a fault . These data are tried in several 
PFObaWlltr papers to f lat out the type <** dletriSirtlon. Then the best f itt ing 




The cumulative frequency Is calculated by 
where m designates tbe number of faulta ,B(t) the number of vessels Intact 
at t ins t - t . n, the number of vessels which have to be taken out of the 
o J 
rtatlstloa In Interrail of tine t due to the end of operating tlojand A(t,» to) 
Is the emulative frequency of faults a t operating time t , . 
The best f i t of the data polnts nas again found to Be the Welbull-dlstrlbutlon. 
The analysis Is made f i r s t for a l l boiler drums, then for the CuKL-drues 
only and finally for the drugs whithout the CuNl-druna. This »as suggested 
by the discovery of faults a t SO drums out of a sample of 46 CuW-dnms. For 
more details see / 6 / and /7A 
The sample of a l l boiler drum contained 241 Items of which JJ showed faults« 
A catastrophic failure has not been observed. The parameters of the Helbull-
dlstrlbutlon, eq. (3), are calculated to be 
0 - 1.73 
a - 6,07 • 10"10 
The sample of the Cuffi-alloy made boiler drums contained 46 Items of which 
SO showed faults. The Weibull-parametera obtained are 
0-2.7 
a - 7,36 • lo"1*. 
The sample of holler drums without the CuU-alloy made ones contained 195 
Items of which 13 »homed faults . The WelbuU-panmeter calculated from these 
data are 
£-8.7 
« - 8,84 • 10"17 
The result« are given In Pig. 4 to Fig. 7. : v " 
Altbonjh the data analysed are mer* Mounts end m e s o m p l s t . ' * • Umi' - <•« 
s tat i s t ica l point of vlsw ttsn those of topt~ma*<*Mli.*tå*U*ummm 
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the relevance of the data obtained to reactor vessel* Is restrlsted. therefore 
the data should be handled with care when applied to reactor pressure Tassel«. 
This will be —pi"••»« la the followlng chapter. 
3.3 Discussion 
The statistical data analysed are In our opinion a complete set of inf orsntlon 
on the boiler drums operated In ma. The limited accuracy of these data, 
however, should be borne In mind. 
The data on operating times are very often estimated. Due to this fact 
an error i s Introduced In the failure rate parameters. Additionally, 
the faults always are discovered at internal investigations which have a three 
years intervall. So the aotual tine of failure can be off by as much as three 
years of calender time. This additionally, introduces an error. The failure 
rate of the boiler drums developing faults as corrosion holes and cracks 
thus ahsuld be used with care. However, the starting point of the failure 
rats« e.g. at time t - 0 can be obtained by considering the failure mechanic«. 
The cracks as well the corrosion marks develop as the time goes on. So the 
; possibility that d drum with faults Is found Immediately after tte f i r s t start-
up does not exist. This suggests a failure rate at time t - O of Z(0) - 0. 
Z(t) Inoreased as the tine goes on. The slope of the ourve, however, strongly 
depends on the material emplold. So we decided to distinguish between the 
druns made of the CuKUalloys and the rest of the drums. The analysis showed 
a Barked difference in failure rates of the two groups of material oonsidered. 
Our oonoluslon on this Is that only the curves of the CuNl-alloy made drums, 
see Pig. 5« and the rest of the druns, see PI«. 6, give fairly accurate data 
respeotlvly, while the overall curve, see Tig. 4 , does not apply to the data 
analysed. 
JkttBf the boiler drums no serious, eatastrophlo failure has been observed, 
•rrertnelass an estimate of a failure rata for this type of failure would be 
•eat interesting, 9 « following set of assueptlone, however, slant present 
SB sjajmv vsunmMn/ SBSSOMII to ttnct ttosbev* 
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1. a l l of the 241 boiler drums nave accumulated the samt operating 
tine which la supposed to be an average of the aatual 
operating tines. This gives an operating time of 8 . 10 hours. 
2 . An exponential failure distribution i s aaaueed. 
3« One catastrophic failure i s anmwefl to occur at a, operating 
tine of 8 . 10 hours. 
From those assunptlone wo obtain a failure rate of 
z = 5 • 10"8 • h"1 
This estimate of course gives an upper Uni t of the actual failure rate. 
4. Conclusions 
As already emphasized In chapter 8.4 the failure rate of the pressure vessels 
analysed has been calculated from 15 samples with various raenlng times 
and represents an average of a l l samples. The samples drawn contain pressure 
vessels of a l l types and varying conditions of operation and environment. 
The failure nodes were« catastrophic failure of the vessel« e.g. either 
circumferential or longitudinal crack, leakage by smaller Bracks, corrosion, 
failure of closures and failure of the vessel due to pressure t e s t . So the 
failure rate obtained Is not representative for reactor pressure vessels. 
However, the result certainly gives a knowledge of the upper limit of the 
failure rate of reactor pressure vessels. 
Here representative results are obtained from the boiler drums s tat i s t i cs . But 
nevertheless. I t Is hard to extrapolate from the behaviour of the boiler dVums 
to the fault behaviour of reactor pressure vessels. The following differences 





Heaotor pressure vessels and boiler drum are designed according to different 
rules, for example the different ASK eodes. Additionally, the reactor pressure 
vessels are penetrated by a few big nozzles •*"» the boiler drums have a large 
number of snail holes for the boiler tubing. 
Material 
Reactor pressure vessels must not be built using ordinary bailer steel. 
Compositions Including elements which will be activated to radioisotopes 
having a long half-live period are not used for reactor pressure vessels. 
Additionally, reactor pressure vessels are plated by an auetenltlc material. 
So corrosion as observed In the boiler drums will probably not occur In 
reactor pressure vessels. 
Manufacture 
Again the boiler drum and nuclear pressure vessels are manufactured and tested 
according to different rules. As recurring Internal Inspections of nuclear 
pressure vessels are very difficult, often Impossible, the manufacture and 
testing of these vessels is performed more careful than the manufacture of 
bolle, drums. 
Operating condition 
A s temperature and pressure conditions are almost the same for both the 
nuolsor pressure vessels and the boiler drums. However, the number of start 
np and shut down procedures for boiler drums usually Is much higher than for 
nuelssr pressure vessels. On the other hand the neutron enbrlttlement of 
the reaotor vessel material Is unfavourable for the reaotcr pressure vessel. 
All tout differences may Influence the failure behaviour of nuclear pressure 
vessels to a large but unknown extent. 
Due to the fact that all dsflelenoles of the boiler drums ware discovered 
at Internal Inspections sad so catastrophic failures wars prevented, the Importance 
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of Internal and external Inspections of reactor pressure vessels Is supported. 
Tbls Is emttazlsed by the fact that cracks of a length up to S in and depth 
up to 15 na could develop In a time period of at most three years In boiler 
druns, While current reactor pressure vessels are.desisned._for a lifetime up tc 
*K) years without inspection. Proposals already are made / 8 / . Consequent 
external and Internal Inspections as well as pressure tests night Improve 
the rel iabi l i ty of reactor pressure vessels some orders of magnitude. 
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A scum or BOSSES* VESSELS BUILT TO -, iq«ff <"tsw» or cetsancaffp 
By 
C.A.G. Phillips. B.Sc.(Eng.),C.Eag.,a.I.s.S., united I'ingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority, Health A Safety Brinch, u d S. 6 . Varnlck, BU. . 
C.B«.. K.I.«och.E.. Appelated Office« xmTtV~|7 frTTlttir 
In view of the limited experience with nuclear pressure vessels, the 
united Ungdom Atomic Energy Authority, Health a Safety Branch, approaches 
the Associated Offices Technical Coeadttoe »hen i t was desired to arrive at 
the figure« for the probability of failure of nuclear vessel« vith a Tie« to 
establishing failure ratea over a large ssmnla of conventional pressure 
Teasels built to similar standard*. In the united Ungdom a l l steem boilers 
and a proportion of pressure Teasels sust be thoroughly inspected at intervals 
of about 1 year or 2 years to coaply with the regulations laid down in the 
Factories* Act* These inspections normally conslet of a visual OTaminaflnn 
of the boiler or Teasel both externally and internally and are supplemented 
by more detailed examinations such aa ultrasonic testing, radiography, naenetle 
or dye penetrant flaw detection, tube sampling, hydraulic tests, e tc . , as may 
be considered neceesary by the competent person carrying* out the exominatioma. 
I t i s the normal practice for these inspections to be carried out by specialist 
Engineering Insurance end Inspection Companies. Five of the major qflmpanlv*)1 
carrying out this type of work form the A.O.T.C. end i t i s from their records 
that this study i s made and the ini t ia l phase fully reported elsewhere. ( l ) 
In addition to carrying out inspections of boilers and pressure Teasels during 
service, the A.O.T.C. Members carry out inspections of boilers sod pressors 
vessels during construction and a separate study was carried out relating to 
this sspect. 
In attempting to compare the various stat ist ics of conventional and nuclear 
pressure vessels, two aspects where differences can occur must be given serious 
consideration : -
(a) Vith a conventional pressure vessel a thorough examination i s carried 
out annually or biennially and any defeets which are found, such so 
cracks e tc . , l l l l be repaired, whereas major parts of • nuclear pressure 
vessel may be inaccessible for Inspection after the reactor has gone 
crit ical , or may only be accessible for inspection at infrequent intervals 
and only after major dismantling work has been carried out. I t I s , 
therefore, necessary to consider serious defects shier a n found during 
inspection of conventional pressure vessels as well ss the catastrophic 
failures of these vessels . 
(b) In view of the potential hasards involved, a l l nuclear pressure vammel* 
are subjected to extensive inspection during eonstrootion wherea* the 
inspection carried out on conventional piSHuie Taesels may vary from • 
serric« similar to that carried out on noclemr vessels, to very U%*U 
inspection at a l l . 
Vith these tvo points in mind the scops of the surrer v&s defined as follow :-
(a) Tassels should he of either raided or forged construction. Many riTstad 
conventional pressure vessels and hollers are still in use and experience 
vith these would not be relevsnt to nuclear pressure vessels* 
(h) The vessels were constructed during manufacture to the current Claaa I 
requirements of B.S.1500, 1515, 3915, 1113, 2790, i.O.T.C. or other 
comparable stsndards at the tiJne of construction« Tabls 1. illustrates 
the typical inspection stages for these codes from which it will he noted 
that to« standards used are comparable vith those required for nuclear 
vssssls and in all cases include physical tests on plate material, 
procedure or production veld test plates and extensive non dsstruetive 
testing; of principle i 
(c) A minimum vail thickness of 3/8" vas specif isd aa it was considered that 
this would be the minimum likely to be encountered in the nuclear pressure 
vesssl fields* 
(d) a minimus stipulated working prsssurs of 105 lh per square inch was 
specified as this would certainly eliminate any boilers built to standard« 
lover than Claas I and would also tend to eliminate any vessels which 
even though they vsre built to Class I standards were notv in fact, 
involved in onerous duties. 
(e) Vessels older than 30 years were excluded aa the present concept of a 
Class I standard with wsld testing and non-deatruetive testing has only 
been in use in the United Kingdom for this period. 
(f) Cstaatrophic failures vsre defined as those in vhich disruption of a 
vessel or of a component of a vessel necessitated major repairs or 
scrapping. 
(g) Potentially dangsrous failures were defined aa defects requiring roaediwl 
action »here the working conditions might result in a dangerous extension 
of a know defect. If a single reported occurrence involved several 
defeets in asperate components, thess were all counted as failures. 
(h) failures of pipework built to comparable stsndards have been reported 
but this cannot he related to the total pipevork involved. 
Dae to the way is which the Members of i.O.T.C. keep their records, it was 
initially necessary to rely on recollection of their stsff to quote failures 
but since the reported recollections covering a 5 year period, comprehensive 
failure reports hive been prepared at the tims of the incident« 
A standard fora was used to report defeets which gav* details of the pressure 
vessel, its material« of construction, the working condition* to whioh it vas 
subject, details of ths defect, the method by which the defect vas found mad 
indications of the cause. 
An eetiaated population of vessels within the scope of the survey was obtained 




A detailed sumnary of the surrey of failures for the f i n year* up to 
30th June, 1967, has been reported elsewhere (1) and Table II givea a 
numerical nummary o* these failures broken dovn by Method of discovery and 
cause. The total population to which thest defects relate, i s about 100,300 
Teasel years. 
I t wi l l be seen fro« Table I I that the majority of failure« (Cgjt) vers due 
to crack* and moat of thesa were at branch connections and f i l l e t wolda. A 
•ore detailed suapary of these failures i s contained in Table III , fro« which 
i t wil l be seen Wat fatigue accounts f or 40jf of the crack« with the next 
•ost numerous clans at 'not ascertained' at 30*1. 
Is the more detailed study of the results tanied out elsewhere ( l ) i t ia 
found that about 51% of a l l the failures raported were found by visual 
examination as coopered with 9£ found by ••n-daetraotiv« or hydraulic 
testing. 
A study of the age of the vessels which failed indicates that the aore probable 
time for these incidents i s in the early etage« of service l i f e which confirae the 
conclusion »ported elsewhere) (2). 
Heine the previously assigned definitions It can be concluded that the 
probability of a potentially dangerous defect occurring in a pressure vessel 
during service ia 1.3 x 10"' per vessel year and that of a oataetropbio 
failure 0.7 x 10-* per vessel year. It vnild appear that then ia a factor 
of at least 10 between the probability of potential and catastrophic failure 
during service. 
As the ultimate aim of the survey carried eut i s to obtain guldaaM for the 
service failure probability of nuolear reactor priaary oireuit envelopes, 
the reports of failure were studied with a view to ellainating defeoto which 
It ass considered wore irrelevant to the sptoif ie conditions experienced ia 
nuclear pressure vessel envelopes. nuclear primary' circuits ara unlikely to 
experience serious wastage, gross deformation or creep, because of deeign 
limitations. Hal-operation In reactor« oa« be eliminated by rigid controls, 
however, undetected oracks aay be present and pre existing defeote from 
Manufacture cause* through too employment of incorrect Materials are not 
unknown in nuclear circuits. I t was, therefore, eonaidarad that only defee-ta 
due to crack« and pro-existing defect« could be considered aa relevant but 
the crack« ware ctfnaidered in aore detail and approximately half of the eraoka 
wars eliminated m* being ligament cracks, tracks ia boiler furnaces, boiler 
fumaee-to-end plate welds etc . , e t c . . 
Taking into account thane further factors i t i s considered that the failure 
probability of defect« ia conventional veaiels whioh ara potentially flangeioas 
and are relevant to nuclear primary circuits i s approximately 6 z t(T* par 
year and that the annual probability ol oataetropsio lailurea l a uuK'—WilliV 
prsssure vessels which a n relevant to nuclear primary circuits i f approxlaatolv 
2 a 10-5 pec year. 
In tbl* connection i t la noted that Xellamaw (3) owotea th« probability of 
serious prsssun »easol failures or«? • 7 l«*» period as 9 x W>-
l ar lous failures' a n aoant to daaeriba a failure whlob would have r—"* 
a rupture of the pressure vessel dorlag ouiaotutrt opoxttiffe O * g 
quotoe the probability of pressure vessel failure over tb* lim pari. 
2.1 S 10-« 
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In addition to the study of defects is pressure vessels during service, a 
study was made of vessels during construction and a record vas kept of cases 
»here defects »ere found during construct i on which required remedial action 
which ware not detected or repaired during the normal inspection procedures 
''excluding the pressure test). These are cases where the Class I Pressurs 
Vessel Inspection Service did not locate a potentially dangerous defect at 
the expected stage. Out of a total of 12,700 vessels involved, 10 incidents 
Occurred. Two of the incidents are considered irrelevant to nuclear primary 
Circuits as one involved a gas burner control failure and the other occurred 
during the purging of a vessel with liquid nitrogen. This gives a probability 
of 6.3 x 1Cr* where significant defects have not been picked up during an 
Inspection to Class I requirements. 
In order to assess the relevance of this data to nuclear plant, an attempt has 
been made to survey the incidents occurring to reactor pressure circuit 
envelopes during normal operation. The information concerned has been based 
only on information published in the technical press and includes experimental 
reactors as veil as power reactors. The study is limited to British and 
American reactors and covers 1,352 reactor years. It is agreed that in many 
cases tiis reactor primary circuit envelope is not subject to pressure but it 
is probable that in all cases the envelope has been built to a standard of 
construction comparable with Class I standards for conventional pressure plants* 
The actual incidents are reported in detail elsewhere (0 but it is noted that 
17 defects, none of tfaes catastrophic, have been reported which necessitated 
remedial action. This corresponds to an «T""'»1 potentially dangerous failure 
probability figure of I x 10"' which must be compared with a similar figure 
6 x 10""* from the results of ths Class I pressure vssssl survey so far* 
However, all figures relating to potentially dangerous defects are dependent 
on engineering judgement of the effect of any defect which is found and to 
whether remedial action is immediately necessary or not. The analytical 
study of ths effect of different sises and types of defects is as yet in its 
^infancy. In addition to this, with reactor primary circuit envelopes not 
only is a determined effort made to locate any flaws which may appear during 
operation but also ths detection of minute leakage may be facilitated by ths 
pressnos of a slightly radioactive primary coolant* When a flaw is. In 
fact, located. It ia more likely that a much more critical attitude will be 
taken to its pressnes than may be the cans with the conventional plant* 
Tables J£, J, 7T and Til show the distribution of reports of failures during 
servioe, from ths 18 months following the initial study of ths A.O.T.C. surrsy, 
divided into 2 periods. Ths information relates to a vessel population of 
7,800 vessel years for ths last 6 months of 1967, and of 18,100 vessel year« 
for 1968. In general the conclusions drawn from His earlier 5 year survey 
ars confirmed and ths deviation' in 1968 of Uw number of failures found by 
I»D.T. and ths 'Hot ascertained' cause of cracks ars due to a aeries of 
similar failures being reported in identiaal circumstances following a failure 
being; found by visual inspection and an extensive programme of Y.D.V. being 
started on all similar items. 
If similar criteria, to those used in the original surrey are used, 3 failures 
asm bs eliminated from tbs last half of 1967 results, as not being relevant 
to Knslaar Primary circuit envelopes and 10 failures from 1968 results. Ion« 
of the Cataetronki« failure from 1968 sen be slimioated. 





Sins« June 1967, only ana failure hae COM to light prior to commissioning. 
Thia relates to nossle aside i s ehromiua aolyodanua nmadiua atael hollar 
drue which waa deliTored to alta out due to difficulties found elsewhere, an 
ultrasonic QTMM nation of tha noatlaa m ecrrled out before hydraulic teat 
and showed up aerloue cracking. During thia period the ultrasonic, exaaisntioa 
of alailar nosilee aaa commenced on a routine basis and but for thia additlanal 
tooting four other incldaata which eould bore been classed aa failure prior 
to commissioning would hare bean reported. 
Arguments have baas put forward that dua to the inspection oarriad out during 
construction and the leakage which takes place before a cataatxophie failure 
that i t i e iapoeeible to enTiaaga a sudden failure of thia nature but oaa 
incident reported ia of nota in thia oonnectijn. i 12J" diameter 
ehroalua molybdenum Tanadiua pipe to r a i n outing weld, failed completely 
learlng two open-ended pipee. The pipe waa under ateaa preaeure at » teaperature 
of about 550°C. at tha tlae of tha failure and there n a no eridanoe of leakage 
before the incident. Detailed exaaination of the failure indlaatad that the 
cracks initiating tha falluree were typical of streae relieving erackB and had 
been preaent ainoe oonstructien. Thaaa eonoluaiona ware eoufiraed wbea 
examination of a nuaber of aiallar aelda reraaled eerioue aiailar cracking. 
The raeorda ahowed tha'' radiography, ualng the double-wall technique, had bean 
oarriad out after atraaa relief and tha walla paaaed aa elaar of defeeta. After 
the failure, tha actual radiograph waa re-examined and did not indicate the 
crack. Ihie technique waa in line with the Claaa I etandarda of inspection a t 
tha tiaa of conatruetion in 1964 and would bare been -<-<ifi- to the laapeotloa 
technique uaed ia nuclear prlaary olrcuita. 
A creek In tha primary eirouit ef the Dounraay Feat Keaetor (4) illuatratea a 
aiallar eaae where a high degree of inspection did sot lndieata a defeat which 
later eauaed a failure though fortunately only causing alight leakage la tala 
eaae. the origin was finally found to be a crack in tha weld of a 4* dimeter 
pipe to a thermocouple block. 
Detailed exeaiwtlon of the failed weld shored that there were aoae Aefeete ia 
tha Ticinlty of the crack. Pirat, tha alignment of the pips to the spigot of 
the block waa badly out, there being a 0.049 in. misalignment between tha tan 
where the wall thinkaeaa waa 0.080 In., giring a considerable atep change la 
eontonr at thia point. Also tha weld tended to ran off the line of the Jolat, 
and there was a lack af penetration giring riae to a atraas raiser where the 
•aid bad a double start, fhe theraal street was calculated to be wltala 
normal l la i ta , bat i t la probably that without the atraaa failure would act 
hare bees caused by these defects alone. The radiograph of the said concerned 
was found and re examined. 
•atthews nee thia to say about the ease i -
"In accepting radiographs of these hand walla a curtain amount of judgement 
usually had to be aiereieed, aa by present day standards seas of thea ara 
rather rough la appearance and marten la eontsur, and therefore do net giws 
perfectly clear radiograpba. Thia la a l l right prorlded there i s adequate 
thlnrntsf of the weld. The aajor oontributloa to the failure waa the 
misalignment of the two seotloes of the ply*. The radiograph doaa act enow that) 
tha astaal thlekness of aetsl ia there, bat the sections ars misaligned and 
the radlegraph does net pick this ay. Oa looking at thia pertieuUr tVaUaasaafe 
sal seafaring I t with redlegraphs of a slailar type, I think as weald s t i l l asaa) 
I t , takleg lata aeeeaat that aks weld was produced with tat tashalaa— anl laW« 
fecrwsaa yean es s . 
- S -
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The quality of welding h w ieproved considerably elme thoee tlaee, end tha 
radiographs which one would accept now ara subject te aora etaaagea* 
liaitationa than those which were expected for tha MB.* 
at thia etage it ia considered that tha inforaation available en tha failurea 
of conTentionel and nuclear pressure Tssools ia limited. One of tha aajor 
problems with thia »ork ahieh haa nat yet been fully recalled, ia that with 
both conTentionel and, te a lasear extant with nuclear pressure reoselo, 
defects are found by inspectiea before the* b a n caused a eataatrephie 
failure of tha Tesael itself and it ia necessary to aake an engineering 
deoiaien baaed on a United knowledge of the theories of failure to deelde -
whether tha defect concerned could have caused a catastrophic failure if the 
period between inspections had been greater. 
Za rise of tha sxtiona haaarda involvodB nuclear preseure primary circuit 
amalapee axe usually constructed with a high, decree of inspection during 
aanufaoiure. Hoverer, frea tta limited aora: oarried out as far« there ia 
nothing to eufgeet that the Incidence of potentially dangerous failures is 
likely to be significantly batter than with relevant conventional preaaura 
ressela. 
(1) Phillips and Yaraiek, A Surrey of Defects in Pressure Teaaela built 
to High Standards of Construction and its relevance to luoleer 
Primary Circuit Eurelopee. A.B.S.B.(s) (.162. H.H.S.O. Leaden. 
(2) FhiUlpa and Smith, in inalyeie of Reported Boiler bploaiena 
and ita laplicatlona for Safety of Pressure Teaaela. A.1.3.8. (s) 
8.161. HJI.S.O. London. 
(3) lalleraan. Present Views an Hecurriig Inspection of Beactor Preeeure 
Taaaala in tha federal Kepsbllc of Seraany. I.A.I.A. taahnieal leperta 
Seriee ao.SI. 
(4) Matthews and Henry, Location and lapair of a Seek in the Dounreey 
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1* Erosion in a nuclear power 31*. ti or steam generating unit following 
the break up of a fabricated steel support structure. The debris 
in contact with a superheater tube eroded a hole* 
3« Xal-operution causes were nainly shortage of water (4)* oil 
contamination (2). 
* 10 IT. diameter, 3/8 in. thick »tea* pipwent burst fox about 10 ft. 
longitudinally, due to laainations. Afte.- the first failure further 
Laninated pipes were found by ultrasonic oethoda« 
4- Superheater header suffered serious cracking and was replaced in a 
different saterial. 
TMffTimTT"* Iff? MIOTnTTOW 
V. - Unflred conponent 
f. e ?ired ooaiponent 
CAT - failure found by a catastrophic occurrence 
IV - failure found by leakage 
E - failure found by hydraulifi testing 
T - failure found by visual eiawisatioa 
I.D.f .•> failure found by aon-destruetive testing eethods* 
TABLE I I I 
irøaaiCAL smjim og CBACXS OCCUTOHO „ama SEBYICB 
posrpioB 
( i ) Beller furnaee or furnace to end 
atate weld. Shell boller back 
tuba alata craokini. 
\$S$ Oreeks la mlded branchea and 
f U l e t velda 
i i i > Cneka alenr th'.> length of a 
.'...: „ i d 
^iw) Creoke lu parent plate material 
4*> Mfce to tuea plate ligament 
(i^l1'Craoka redi*ting fro« openinge 
%U}_ Onwka la plpeeork (a l l unfired) 



















































































* ^ 1 . . Ih» t*o aiaMllaaaoua failurea vara due to tbe failure of the refractory lining at oil burning equipment on fumaoea. 
2. tao-feiluree oa -"*""• vessels rotated on truniona. yvo failures of pipevork vith defective supports. 
3><- Tea * fatigue and corrosion auistad fatigue failure« are related to steam receivere at power stations la the 
4«»«aa>iMMM of header inspection cape, oaa was blown out under working conditional the boilers concerned were similar. 
! « jsac eC'-**aae failures relate to cracks in fillet »elds of baffles nr fixings. One of these involves B3 1501 -6209 
— material* vhere a oreok pauaUated a 3/4 la. thi ok header in 6 months. 
6. Riaa failures of jaekete of vessels subject to a steam-cooling vater o;cle. 
7. Failure of vary high pressure pips originating fro« Internal surface defeots. 
«. Crack in a oorrusavlon extending 60$ round the oirouafara ce but not detected by leakage. 
TABU £ 









Corrosion Kel-oporation Pro-ttiatinc dafeota fro« Manufacture. 





l . ' l iamiaatad p l a t « In a h a l l b o l l e r fumaoa - part of p lata burnt away. 
TABLET 
NUMERICAL SÆBABT 0? CltACKS QQCURHDIB flJRmC SERVICE - LA3T g MONTHS 0? 1967 
P o a i t i « 
Crack 
i ) Boller Ml—u« ar 
f n n ta eoa plat« 
n U , Shall boil«* back 
lltøftOka l a «*U«< branche« 
l i t ) MMka alooc t in 
**' Csaefea la parts* 





























L For elaaalfioatioa and abbrerlationa I M TABLI II 
afaf/%' 
xuia TI 
NTMBtieAI SUNKART OF CRACKS 0CCUKEHO DUEHO SIHTICI - 1968 
Feeitien. 
' l ) Betler famaee or 
' faiaaee t e and plate 
Ml* . Shell b o l t e 
bask tabe plate 
ereeklag. 
( i l ) Creoke ia •aided 
eraaehee and 
ttUatwM«. 
<ltt) Cxaoke along tha 
leafltb. af a *eld. 
4*») Creeke la parent 
•atari*! 
i W tabe te tabe plate 
11«iaait eaaeklac 
(e l ) Orwka radiating 
i v ru tam epaii1n«e 
b t t ) Craoke in pipework 


















Pre ei ietlng defeeta 
from amraf aetuxe 
1 0(3) 
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: WflEl 1 . Failure of a ahell boiler funtMe aaaa originating froa underout at toa of f i l l e t »eld. Thar« la record ef jwerieue 
ael-operetioa of bai ler . 
2 . 13 oaeee relate to eraoks in tha noiale aelda of boilar druaw. The exaet oaiue ie a t i l l under lnreetlgatieB. 
1, Other inatanoea hate bean found vhiea b a n not pat neseaaltatad repaira. 
- i . M M n l to la text . 
4 4»7'*rth aeaea OB bailer feed pipework - one aajor eireuafereatlal failure from root of trlfora JvnetloB relnfereeaaat. 
^^Qjggsss^^så^sL 












C o m a ion 
TåSSJt T i l 
HUORICåL SUtSliRT OT FAILURE IH SBLTIQE -
M å l - o p e r a t i o n 
2*0) 
2 P ( 1 ) 
Fre-adljtiiig defeeta 
from aamifaotuxo 








1* Four oaaaa of shell boller furnace deformationa or falluraa due to shortage of water« 
2> Fart of fumaea tuba burnt a m y due to area of serious laminations ir> r""*4-«. 
3« All twelve eaaaa relate to slallar inoidenta where cracking was f oi., å, -in jn.r.-li* attachments. They i 
raault of an extensive programme of testing of similar items. 
t found aa the 
TABLE Till 
COUP 
Class of fai lure 
All potential fa i lures 
All oatastrophie failure« 
Potential failure« oonoidered roloTant 
to nuolMT olroulta. 
Cataatropkle falluraa eonaldered 
relevant to nuclear e i n u i t a . 
tRISOM OP FAILURE KATES TCIO ffRII.'C 3t,37ICE 
5 year« : 1962-1967 
1.3 x 10"' 
7 i 10-* 
6 T 10~* 
2 x 10-5(D 
Last 6 montha 1967 
1.5 i 10"' 
None reported 
12 I \<T* 
Hone reported 
1968 
1.6 z 10"' 
3.3 r 10-* 
10. fx 10-* 
1.1 x 10-«<2> 
MOfBSt 1* Tba oataatrophie falluraa inoluda one oaae of pipework (5Gg( of total) 
2. theme oataatrophlo falluraa all relate to pipework (2 failures) 
Jor claaaifioation and abbreviationa aee TABLE II 
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Haatiag of apaeialista on taa xellaMUty at 
•eehanleal oomponanta aal aystsaa fer 
nuclear reaotor aafaty 
24th-2éth Septasbar 19*T» 
ASPECTS or i—«» «[BT.Tamn or msaon 
TDBB3 tO" KMT* »IBB BflgBaMP HifllOBa 




The core of e pressure tube heavy-water moderated reactor i s stade up of a 
l ight vessel throughout which arc passing parallel channels, each consisting 
of a cold calandria tube and a hot pressure tube. 
The design of the pressure tube mu3t be based on the strength of the Ma-
ter ia l , on neutron -.^sorption and en economical considerations. 
The allowable probability of aa accident (a channel burst or a pressure 
tube burst) and the corresponding economical daoa^e oust be connected 
mutually. 
For a heavy water moderated and organic liquid cooled reactor, i t i s pro-
posed to uoe SAP (Sintered Aluminium Powder) to fabrioate the pressure tubes. 
A test program was performed to study the consequences of a pressure tube 
burst, i . e . strains introduced in the neighbouring channels, in the vessel 
and in the safety systems. 
The long term mechanical resistance of SAP i s determined by i t s creep 
behaviour. A stat is t ical analysis of er i^e rimen tal creep rupture test 
results allows to determine the thickness of the pressure tubes for a 
certain rupture probability under normal operating conditions. 
Using the results of both studies a re l iabi l i ty concept can be introduced 
to determine design criteria for thd pressure tubes. 
•16/73*/«$ • • 
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1. Introduction 
A Ligh-pover heavy-^vater moderated reactor with pressure tubes i s 
characterised by a bundle of between 5C0 and 10C0 parallel channels 
(vertical or horizontal). Each channel consists of a hot pressure 
tube containing the fuel elenenta which axe cooled, by gas, vater or 
organic liquids and a cold calandria tube which isolates the pressure 
tube froQ the moderator. 
In contrast to the relatively sturdy construction of the channels, 
whose pressure tubes must be able to withstand, the pressure of the 
coolant, the vessel i t s e l f i s large and particularly l ight . This i s 
because under normal operatine conditions i t only needs to withstand 
a low pressure* Under accident conditions, however (a pressure tube 
burst, which would lead to the bursting of the calandria tube) the 
vessel and vessel-internals are strained by pressure waves which, in 
certain cases, can cause considerable damage £~lj. 
Arguing in statistical-economical terms the probability of a channel 
(pressure tube + calandria tubcj-burst, which has serious consequences, 
i . e . causes considerable economic damage, must be kept particularly 
low. On the other hand, one can admit a ouch higher probability for 
the burst cf a pressure tube only, for which the consequences are much,' 
l e ss severe• because they are confined within the calandria tube. 
There i s , however, another fac tor , i . e . the neutron economy, that l imits 
the indefinite increase cf the pressure tube thif&neas, especially 
for natural uranium reactors. Thus, one can not reduce indefinitely 
the rupture probability of the pre a sure tube. 
The thickness of the pressure tube i s therefore defined by the optise-
l ization of the reactor as a whole, and finally i t i s the overall 
economy balance which i s decisive. Wiie paper does not deal with the 
whole problem of optimal!zation, but only discusses come design and 
economical aspects.which may contribute to the solution of the problem. 
EUS/C-I^t f /^ • • 
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2. The consequences of a pressure tube rupture 
Ihere are various cases to be considered) depending upon whether the 
coolant employed i s gas, water or organic liquid. Where gas or vater 
i s employed as coclant, the high pressure permits only the pressure 
tube (because of the neutron absorption) to he designed to withstand 
the coolant pressure. Biexefcre, i f the pressure tube should burs'*;, 
the cal&ndria tube (normally a Zirconium alloy tube with a thioknes? 
of l e ss than t mm), which has not been dimensioned to withstand high 
pressure, wil l consequently also burst. 3his must be considered to be 
a severe accident; the coolant ningles with the moderator, and fuel 
element fragosnts may be hurled against the neighbouring channels and 
dacage them. I t has nevertheless been prove! by the experiments per-
force d for the CIHEUE reactor (Holtbecker and Leoni, unpublisad) that 
the bureting of one channel d*es not lead to a chain of bursts-in the 
other channels. The consequences of this acoident therefore consist of: 
a) the need +•" replace the entire channel, i . e . pressure tube and i 
calandria tube, / 
b) the recovery of parts of the fuel elements / 
c) possibly, some of the neighbouring channels which have been, damaged 
but not destroyed need to be replaced, / 
d) the exchange of polluted heavy water in the case where the coolant 
employed i s l ight vater. 
In order to carry out such an operation, the reactor would have *o be 
shut down for several months. 
An estimation of the relative cost should take into account both repair 
costs and the greater oo3ts for the supply of the energy from other 
sources. 
On tho basis of these elements one oan estimate the oost of the accident 
to about 7-tø of tha capital, i . e . about 100-150 dollars par kVe ins ta l -
led C2J' 3*6 probability of such an accident should therefor« be kept 
very lou. How low these probability oust be wil l be determined, as told 
beforehand, by the optimal!Kation of the reactor as a whole« 
Referring to what ether authors /~3_7 adcit for the chance of failure 
for presoure vecoels, i t i s estimated that the probability of 1 in 10^ 
during the tosign l i f e for the accident described before sea be consi-
dered conservative, thus the pressure Tabes in Ziresloy, that normally 
ere used in the water or gas cooled reactors, must satisfy these spe-
c i f i c s t i cas . 
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Shan an organic l iquid cooled reactor i« oonaiderad, the situation la 
different ta^ausc of the low pressure of the ooolsnt. In faet in tola 
type of reactor the oalandria tube, with the aaae thiakneas aa that 
fcieseen for a vater or gas oooled reaetor, oan withstand the pnsatire 
of the coolant circuit (pressure l ess than 30 At«), la oaae the pres-
sure tulie ruptures. 
I t i s therefore possible to coobiue the rupture probability of the 
pressure tube and of the calandria tube. 
Taking into consideration also the bellows and the other coaponenta 
of the prinary c ircui t , one can, by a good design, eas i ly U n i t the 
rupture probability to a value l e s s than 1 in IOC. 
ftuia in order to have for the -whole channel, pressure tube and oalandrla 
tube, the SSBB conditions aa for a channel of a water or gas cooled 
reactor (rupturs probability 1 in 10*) the thickness of the pressure 
tube sust be such that the rupture probability wi l l be 1 in 100. 
The following chapter wi l l show what thickness for a hot pressure tube 
of SAP has to be used to satisfy the aborre specifications. 
Creep rupture of a hot pressure tube 
3 .1 . Creep test program 
I t has been established that the best criterion for calculating 
the allowable stress in SIP i s i t s creep-rapture behaviour. 
TSi:: peni'Scible stress i s then defined as the stress causing 
rupture altar a cortai.i time with a certain probability, a creep 
test proyrn« was therefore init iated on tube section« at two 
temperatures, 420»C and 3CC°C respectively. 
The test sections consist of a 850 an long SAP tuba, 3 •*> thlok 
and with an internal dionetcr of 92 aa, olooad at both ends by 
stainless steol nlags allowing a leak t ight closure to be realised. 
An internal SAP f i l l e r connect« tho two plug«, thereby both e l i -
.tinaticc x i a l streau'es or.-the tube and reducing the voluoe of 
the pressurised sas . 
•a» onop testa on tube aootions were dm* la »«smiA»ls tress 
condition!« (el iui$a«j*j asjlajL *»?»«•»») ,$M» <mKdm Hfr—m*/^ 
these .»«ulta with «»»o of »..mVMjrt,-*^* mtjmmtm «MMO* 
3pecincns^'4_7. , / 
^0-13/730/«?«. "*- . " - ; 4 ^ ^ 8 
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3.2. jatatistipal Analysis 
To obtain reliable results from creep-rupture tes t s i t i s neces-
sary to nnalyse the experimental data by s ta t i s t i ca l methods £$J» 
One has to establish a relation between stress and. time-to-rupture 
and to determine vhat dsstribution lav i s verified for the expe-
rimental data. 
The empirical oreep law proposed in the literature relates the 
stress r and the time-to-rupture t in the form t 
log t - A + Be. 
This relation i s verified for ductile materials, and wil l bo 
assuaed valid also for SAP, because actually there are too few 
experimental results available to show who the r another empirical 
lair would f i t the creep data better« 
A Xclcogorov test showed that the normal distribution law did f i t 
best the observed results , oonfidenoe level 0,91 £&J* Bow the 
confidence intervals for the creep-rupture data wil l be determined. 
A f i r s t oonfidenoe interval must be calculated for the domain in 
which experimental results oro available. In that domain the 
magnitude of the confidence intervals depends not only on the 
scatter of tho data but also on iheir number. The fewer data are 
available the wider the confidence interval, for a constant con-
fidence level , wi l l be. 
A second confidence interval i s calculated for the extrapolated 
domain, in which a confidence level for the regression line has 
to be considered« The greater the ratio of the extrapolated i n -
terval to the experimental interval i s , the wider the oonfidenoe 
interval wil l be. 
Tho size effect , i . e . the increase of rupture probability with 
increase in s ice , i s a factor that may be crit ical for the design 
with brittle materials, and has boon calculated for SAP that 
bohsvus in a britt le way in creep conditions £^\J* 
3.3« He suit a 
Tiro » r i e s of tes ts were dona at 420*C and 330*0 respectively. 
Tha allowable stress i s calculated ao the stress causing rupture 




EM numerical results for the allowable stresses for the SAP 
pressure t-obos ( ful l loncth i . e . 5 ») ia eiven in table 3 .3 .1 . 
regression line 
standard deviation 











- 12,6 - 2,09 <r 
0,79« 
1,5*g/*» 2 
Because creep tests are very tine oonauming oxperioents, results 
are only obtained at two temperatures. A linear interpolation 
i s f e l t to be a peasimiatio approximation, and could be used to 
estinate an allowable stress for the SAP pressure tubas at an 
intomediate temperature. 
The v . lues of the allowable stresses oan be converted in- tame of 
preasuro tube thickness i f the operating conditions ara defined. 
An organic cooled reactor can have for inatanoe a priajaxy cooling 
circuit operating with in le t conditions 20 atB and 300*0 and outlet 
conditions S atat and 400*0. The thioiaieee of the pressura tuba* ia 
SAP oust than be about 4 am; not taking into consideration other 
Unit ing factors as e.g. wear. 





the re l iabi l i ty approach, as applied to the safety of the vesse l -
internals of a reactor, allows the thickness of the pressure tubs 
to bo deterained by rules which are independent of the normal c a l -
culation codes. The problem i s thus transferred from the traditional 
basis to a more real i s t ic approach, inasmuch as i t i s now based on 
economic oonoepts. 
Irhis oonoept nay be generalised for the design of any stxuoture of 
a reactor (e.g. prossure tubes in Zircaloy, pressure vesse l , vessel 
internals) and not only i f the no structures are subjected to creep 
but also under conditions of s tat io stresses, of fatigue e t o . . . 
Die example discussed (Sip proscure tube) i s only an example demonstra-
ting the method. Tbe choice of the pressure tube should be made, in 
this particular case, in comparison with other solutions £""ij an the 
basis of the optlnclisation of• the reactor as a whole. 
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LA HABILITE DES PROHTLSEUHS A REACTION DIRECTE 
par 
A. MIHAÏL * "BlLl&SftU. V££lT/}S 
te transport aérien a connu depuis la dernière guerre et 
notamment durant cette dernière décade, un développement 
prodigieux. La mise en ligne des avions de transport à réaction 
n'a fait que confirmer cette tendance. 
Le progrès technique s'est traduit par un accroissement 
notable du confort, de la capacité, de la vitesse (cel le-c i est 
passée de 140 km/h en 1925 à 320 tanA en 1940 pour atteindre plus 
de 900 km/h aujourd'hui). 
Toutefois, i l faut le reconnaître, l'avion inspire encore 
a l ien des usagers et surtout à la masse de ceux qui n'ont pas 
été touchés par ce nouveau moyen de transport, un sentiment 
d'inquiétude en raison du caractère de gravité que représente 
l'accident aérien, aussi rare soit-11. (A noter toutefois que 
d'après l'IATA, 1« coefficient de sécurité, fonction du taux 
d'accident mortel par km/paBsager parcouru, a plus que doublé 
en dix ans). 
En effet , i l est bien connu que le grand ennemi de 
l'avien c'est le risque et sa conséquence directe : l'accident. 
Celui-ci, outre la perte d'un matériel coûteux (un Boeing 
B. 707 ou un Douglas SC. S valent de trente à cinquante millions 
de francs), peut entraîner des pertes de vies humaines e t susciter 
une réaction immédiate chez le passager qui peut conduire, dans 
certains cas, jusqu'à une désaffection pure et simple pour un 
matériel donné en particulier (par exemple, la première version 
,,./... 
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de l'avion ae transport Lockheed KLectra) et pour le traneport 
aérien en général. 
Les retards enregistrés au départ sur des horaires 
préétablis, tien que ne mettant pas toujours en cause 
directement la sécurité, ont eux aussi une influence indis-
cutable sur les usagers en laissant planer une vague atmos-
phere d'insécurité, surtout lorsque la cause (cas assez 
fréquente) n'est pas indiquée clairement. 
Tout ceci conduit à rechercher dans le transport 
aérien un haut degré de sécurité. 
Les facteurs qui conditionnent la sécurité du transport 
aérien peuvent être classés en trois catégories : 
a) - Facteurs extérieurs au matériel lui-même (navigation 
aérienne, environnement etc..) 
o) - facteurs d'utilisation du matériel (conditions 
d'exploitation, équipages etc..) 
o) - Sûreté de bon fonctionnement du matériel. 
Far ailleurs, les acquéreurs d'un avion de transport 
(qui sont aussi souvent les utilisateurs) ne considèrent 
plus le matériel comme un bien consommable, mais désirent 
avoir la garantie de la possibilité de son exploitation 
régulière pendant un minimum de 30 à 40.000 heures de vol 
(à raison d'une moyenne de 10 heures par jour), soit durant 
10 & 12 ans (le matériel étant ensuite rebuté car déclassé 
techniquement). 
Lorsque l'on regarde l'entrée d'air des groupes 
générateurs de puissance d'un B. 707 ou d'un DC.8, la marque 
de l'un des plus grands constructeur» d« moteurs d'avions, 
apparaît entouré» de sa devis» »aependaW.» engin»»", au*N«»nt 
dit "moteurs sur lesquels ou peut dompter'. . 
347 
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Les intéressés font là plus qu'une profession de 
foi, ils mettent en évidence une condition essentielle pour 
un propulseur aéronautique, à savoir sa sûreté de fonction-
nement. 
En effet, le groupe générateur de puissance a pour 
mission principale d'arracher à la pesanteur l'aéronef et sa 
charge (constituée en général de passagers) et de permettre 
de véhiculer cet ensemble dans des délais de plus en plus 
réduits sur des parcours de plus en plue importants; il ne 
peut donc Ctre question d'appliquer à cette partie essentielle 
de l'aéronef, la boutade du marchand de parachutes qui dit s 
* Il n'y a pas de problèmes, tous les parachutes qui ne 
s'ouvrent pas, je les remplace gratuitement ". 
1.- DBHHITIOW PB IA flABILIIE 
Ccet justement la nécessité de l'étude scientifique 
approfondie des conditions requises par une sécurité de bon 
fonctionnement qui a donné lieu à cette nouvelle discipline 
que les angloa-saxona ont baptisée du nom de " K E L I A B I U T T * 
et qui a été traduit en France par le néologisme "PIABItITB* 
ou "sûreté de fonctionnement*. 
Il n'a, malheureusement, pas été établi à l'heure 
actuelle une terminologie internationale concernant cette 
nouvelle discipline, aussi, lea définitions en présence 
sont-elles multiples. 
Nous avons retenu, pour notre part, celle proposée 
par la HÄMO ELECTROIŒS TELEVISION KAHUrACTtnUBS ASaOCIAIIOI 
à savoir t 
* la fiabilité est la probabilité pour qu'un » 
" équipement, appareillage ou oompoemnt assure * - "' 
• sans défaillance lee operative pour lesquelles : *r'*"* 
• ' il s été prévu, durant une péri«**'«»' teapTi ft'"'"* * "*> 
• •- dans des «enditivàk «e feneticnftiwefti é s é U w i 1 •*M m 
La fiabilité apparaît dono coma IBM probabilité 
fonction du temps. Aussi est-il coutuaiar da l'exprimer an 
probabilité ds bon fonctionnement en jC par période d'emploi 
(celle-ci étant fonction dea caractéristiques d'utilisation 
at pouvant être exprimée en cycles, nombre de tours, temns), 
soit mur nlus de commodité en 4 de orobabil i té de défaut 
par période d'em»»loi. 
2.- IMPOCTAHCE 1« LA WABILICT 
La fleurs 1 (qui ns se réfère ni à un matériel 
déterminé ni h un utilisateur donné mala représents uns 
moyenne) nermet d'anoréeier l'importance des anomalies (et 
donc de la fiabilité) sur les différents éléments consti-
tutifs d'un aéronef (en fonction de la nhaae oit ces anomalies 
»ont survenues!. 
tin propulseur s réaction directs, »lus connu, 
sous le vocable de réacteur ou ".let" eet un ensemble compose 
ds plusieurs milliers de ntecee imnortantss (3100 dans ls 
cas du Pratt et Whitney 31 4, 3&00 dans le cas du Rolls 
Royce Avon). 
L« fiabilité a Aig&lenent une Influença sur 
l'aanect économique de la réalisation et de l'exploitation 
du material aérospatial. Ainsi, 11 a été calculé sue la 
mauvaise tenue en ssrvine du matériel coûte à la ROYAL AU) 
FORCE environ 3 milliards de francs annuellement (auxquels 
11 faut ajouter 45 millions nar suite d'accident« materiale). 
La ROYAL AIS 70R0B est conduite à remplacer annuellement 
50 6 de sas 50.000 microswitchee et ds see 10.000 pompes 
auxiliaires à carburant par exemple. Aux U.S.A., la maintien 
en état de fonctionnement du matériel électronique ds la 
Marina represents durant la premiere année de livraison, le 
doubla du tirix d'achat. C'est-à-dire qu'au bon* se 10 ans 
on a dépensé 20 fols la pris d'achat pour l'entretien. Enfin, 
en rrarce, la part dea crédita consacrés a l'aehett da pieeea 
da rechange avoieinait 25 J* du total (sa crédits alloué« a 
l'électronique par la Ministère de« Arméss. 
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L'étude de lu fiabilité permettra d'acquérir des 
aliments sur : l'amélioration de la suret* de fonctionnement, 
le choix d'un matériel le mieux adapté aux besoins, les 
conditions d'entretien, l'organisation rationnelle des stocks. 
i.- FIABILITE DES COMPOSANTS KLEBENTâIRBS 
ET DES BISEKBLES 
Que ce soit pour les composants élémentaires ou 
pour les ensembles complexes, les définitions applicables 
en ce qui concerne la fiabilité seront sensiblement les mêmes. 
Il est toutefois bien évident que si la panne d'un 
composant élémentaire met pratinuement fin à son existence, 
tel ne sera pas le cas de l'ensemble complexe où la défail-
lance d'un des composants peut n'entraîner que son changement 
et donc la remise en service de l'ensemble (à condition, bien 
entendu, que l'ensemble soit réparable ou récupérable). Ceci 
supposa l'application de mesures de maintenance préventives 
afin de réduire au maximum le risque de panne. 
Quoi qu'il en soit, il convient de distinguer, 
pour un composant ou un ensemble, les conditions de fonction-
nement propres (limites, critères de défaillance, critères 
de fonctionnement, contraintes) et les conditions dues & 
l'exploitation (dont certaines sont connues et définies -
tel l'entretien -, alors que d'autres - telles les conditions 
réelles de fonctionnement dans des contraintes d'environnement 
facteur humain - ne le sont ou ne peuvent l'être qu'avec une 
assez grande approximation). 
Dans le cas des conditions de fonctionnement 
propres (conditions plus rapprochées de celles d» laboratoire), 
la fiabilité du composant ou de l'ensemble est plut comunéswnt 
appelés "fiabilité intrineeque", alors que dans 1« cas .fea 
conditions dus« il l'exploitation, la fiabilité est r}>f Oonnue 
sous l'appellation 4* "fiabilité d'exploitation". 1*/produit^ 
de ces Anw fiabilités constitua 1» füfciUtf«;** -•_ Z'^ty-jX- ' 
»opérationnells« qui correspond, en fait» aux «é«a%**» ' ' 
•«««»iwaent^^^tsiisx^o^tteft^Ui^ ^ ^ ^ 
• rt #/•« * 
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L B fiabilité das enaeablea aa caloula plutôt qu'alla 
na aa aasura en raison de la tailla at du prix das unités at 
das difficultés à réaliser das essais compléta. 
Un propulseur à réaction directe aat un ensemble 
de plus en plus complexe où se trouvant rassemblés eimulta-
néaent des phénomènes tharmo-aércdynamiquea, chimiques, 
physiqusB, électriques, etc.. (qui sux-aSmes ne sont pas 
•oins coaplexeB). Il apparaît donc qu'il aat difficile 
d'affirmer qu'il puisse Itra obtenu une probabilité absolue 
de parfait fonctionnement (ou que la probabilité de panne 
soit nulla). 
L'examen deB figures 2, 3 et 4 montra la variation 
de la fiabilité des pieces constitutives. 
La figure 2 montre la variation de la fiabilité 
d'un système lorsque le nombre de aes éléments varia, chaque 
élément ayant uns fiabilité propra de 99 £. Si l'ensemble est 
composé ds 10 éléments sa fiabilité aat encore élevée (90 Jf); 
•i l'ensemble est composé de 100 éléments, la fiabilité du 
système diminue à 36 4. Enfin, elle ne sera plus que de 3 £ 
pour 400 éléments. Ce dernier chiffre est cité car il repré-
sente, ainsi que nous le verrons par la suite, le nombre 
approximatif de "pieces sérialisées* dans un réacteur. 
La figurs 3 indlnue justement la variation de la 
fiabilité d'un ensemble eomno»é de 400 éléments, en fonction 
do t.-» »in>iit it<* d» chaîne *lém»nt. Si chsoue élément a •xri 
fiabilité propre de 99,S *, la fiabilité de l'ensemble n'est 
que de 14 i alors qu'elle sera de 70 £ si la fiabilité de 
chaque élément eat de 99,9 4. 
La figura 4 donna la roseau 4« courbe« permettant 
de déduire en fonction du nombre d'éléments constituants et 
i de la fiabilité nropre île chacun, la fiabilité d'un enaeabla 
complexe. T1 convient de noter «ua si l'on considéra Isa 
3 100 ni»«>es nrineinales d'un tt 4, par exemnle pour arriver 
• uns fiabilité da cat ensemble île 70 *, la fiabilité ds 
i chaque élément devra (tre tttnérieura a 99,085 4. 
Y .../••• 
k; 
WÈÊÈIàmàrtumàirtw^as.^MiMâ,*^^, .,„ , ._ 
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1'w.amen da cea différentes figures permet 4« 
formuler deux rrar^iui : 
a) I* fiabilité d'un ensemble est, d'après 1« théorie akt 
da la probabilité composée, la résultat da la velsur 
flabia da chaque éléænt constitutif. Ce» éléments doivent 
Itre considérés com» dea éléments indépendants qui 
eoneourrent à un objectif commun, par ezeaiple l'obtention 
dan* des conditions précisas de certainea performances 
(qui seront assurées par la eoabinaison d'un certain 
nombre de fonctions éléaantairta). Ceci suppose qua la 
prédétermination dea conditions ds fonctionnanent dans le 
diapoaitif étudié eat bien acquise et qu'il n'y a pas de 
réaction 'parasit«" dea élênenta, 1»B una sur lea antra*. 
b) Il apparaît qua la fiabilité d'un system» n'est Jamale 
que celle de son éléasnt critiqua le plus faible nais la 
fiabilité de cet élément peut Itre changée, soit en y 
modifiant laa conditions de son utilisation, »oit an lui 
apportant daa »édifications technologique« (exemple t an 
début de l'utilisation daa réacteurs Avon sur la Caravelle, 
certaines anomaliss ont été enregistrées sur le roulement 
central; une modification technologique consistant à 
diminuer sa charge par augmentation du chemin de roulement, 
a permis d'améliorer aa fiabilité propre). 
4.- ASPBCf QUALITATIF Mg IA FIABILITE 
la sélection systématique, la misa au point et 1s 
vérification du bon fonctionnement d'un propulseur avant aa 
mis» an sarvioa, nécessitent des mois (voira daa année*)« ~0e*l 
provient du feit que la fiabilité dea. composants élémentaire* 
et dea enaaaU.es devra Itre un* oaxre de création contian* k 
tous pointa de vue et à tous las stadee, aussi, e U * deyjr* 
Itre «pensée' des ls etade de l'sarmt-proiet (pra>imiaa 4» X« 
fiabilité) Jusqu'il pis* aa exploitât!«» effectiv» |aa4af1#a , . 
at saélioratipn A* 1« fiebUlté)* a» effet-, ma* fsjia, la- m*M*l 
" conçu et réalisé, sa M peut plus faire grant •**•» # M B T 
améliorer la fiabilité. 
» • #/• • • 
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Bu règle général», Isa facteurs fondamentaux qui 
déterminant la probabilité da survie d'un élément ou ensemble 
aont lea aléas du proeeaaua da fabrication et lea caractéris-
tiques aléatoires das efforts que l'élément doit supporter an 
fonctionnement (contraintea dues à l'environnement ou suk 
oonditiona de fonctionnement). 
la conception, l'expérimentation et la fabrication 
devront tenir compta de ces exigences et ceci non paa uniquement 
pour l'élément prototype mais surtout pour la séria (qui an 
fait seule intéresse l'utilisateur). Il conviendra & eet affat, 
de prendra toutes dispositions (notamment sur le plan du 
contrôle de la qualité) afin que la fiabilité des aériea succes-
sives ne aa trouve paa abaissée pour quelque raison que ce soit. 
tatrement dit, dee le début, la facilité d'entretien 
obtenue par l'application des principes de déaontabilité, 
accessibilité et interchangeabilité, devra retenir l'attention. 
Il est nécessaire par exemple que lea principaux composants ou 
divers ensembles puissent ttre démontés comme des ensembles 
indépendante et sans que l'opération influe de façon notable 
sur les autres sous-ensembles; ceci aussi bien en cas 
d'inspection que ds réparation. 
•.t.- La fiabilité au stade de 1'avant-projet et de 
l'étude 
au etade avant-projet et étude, il conviendra de 
définir m oertain nombre de parametres ayant une influence 
directe sur la fiabilité. Les plus importants de oes parametres 
apparaissent eomne étant i 
- les performances demandés» à l'ensemble et 
notamment les limite« à 1'Interieur desquelles, l'ensemble 
ssra considéré comme •bon" (a titre d'exemple, dan» le oas 
d'an aéronef, une vitesse de eroliicre intérieur» de 10 fea/n 
à oeil» antonoée, peut représenter pour un exploitant, «ne 
part» te l'ertre se 90 000 fr par appareil et par an). 
**•/«•• 
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- LOB conditions prévues d'obtention d* OBS 
performance* s conditions d'emploi, conditions d'environnement, 
•te. (par exemple, l'Avon équipant la Caravelle, effectue un 
cycl» de décollage - donc de conditions Unîtes - environ 
toutes las 90 minutes, alors que le JT 4, équipant le Boeing, 
accomplit ce cycle dans las conditions actuslles d'exploitation 
prévues, toutes les 3 heures 1/2 environtøf]) 
- La. duré« d'utiliaaUaa envisagée. 
Il convient de remarquer que les solution* WOÏIOS*** 
ou retenues *ux différents proMJmee aérodvnar^Tues, thermiques, 
métal lurjini»»", ttermett^ rt rt^l». iimMelt»iient de ne f«1re 'me 
Idée du dem'* de firtilité d'une ni ire «'i d'un ensemble (par 
exemple, le choix d'un système A« refroidissement des aubes de 
turbine constitue une amélioration certaine du degré de 
fiabilité, »on seulement des aubes ellee-me'mes nais également 
de l'ensemble. Il convient de noter que dans le bilan général, 
la solution du refroidissement des aubes est assess enduisante, 
car peu coûteuse. En effet, pour le refroidissement des premier 
et deuxième étages dss aubes de guidage de turbine et du 
premier étage des aubes mobiles, du Rolls Royce Spey, la 
consommation spécifique de oe moteur ne ae trouve majorée que 
de 0,5 * ) . 
L'étude des aonditioae d'emploi peut, par ailleurs 
également permettre de détecter, dans certains cas, les 
composantes les moins fiables. Par exemple, si l'on Mit que 
le réacteur est destiné à (tre utilisé en zone sablonneuee, 
le compresseur pouvant subir un phénomène d'érosion, on peut 
l'éviter, en partie, soit t 
- en utilleant un matériau adéquat, 
- en utilisant dss grilles sur l'entrée d'air (avec toutèfole 
les inconvénients que cela peut entraîner). 
Il en va de alms d'une analysé ^ a ï e « * de* panaee. 
L'étude, par exemple, oe le diw.tion A« Je* a 1. eoHi. de 
l'inverseur ou du détiateur, pereet de «t r«J4r» 00*^*^11 




Nous constatons done que dis es stads, il sat 
pratiquement indispensable da faire l'option entra un matériel 
destiné à l'usage civil ou militaire. Il est, en effet, 
ooutuaier ds dira que les militaires recherchent la performance, 
alors que pour les civils, la durée d'utilisation ou si vous 
préféras l'endurance, en raison da eon influence sur l'aspect 
économique du problems, est un facteur primordial. Il apparaît 
donc vain de vouloir "adapter", après coup, un propulseur à una 
tâche différente de celle prévue, à moins bien entendu, 
d'accepter d'y mettre le prix (cela a été la cas des Rolls Royce 
Avon ds la série militaire 300, devenue 500 pour la version 
civils, des Pratt J 57, devenus JT 3 et J 75 transformés en JT 4, 
encore que cette dernière transformation n'a pu être achevée 
complètement, notamment en ce qui concerne l'accessibilité et 
la démontabilité; en effet, le carter compresseur ast d'une 
seule pièce, ce qui entraîne un empilage des disques et 
entretoiaes, avec obligation d'enlever tous les disques qui 
précèdent relui ayant una aruriabfalb) 
Compte tenu de ce qui précède, certains peuvent 
penser qu'il peut y avoir difficultés de cohabitation antre la 
notion de performance et la fiabilité. C'est perdre de vue la 
paramètre "temps* entrant dans la définition de la fiabilité 
(exemple : le satellite et son lanceur : si les deux ensembles 
doivent avoir des fiabilités élevées pour assurer des perfor-
mances particulières - performances, il est vrai de nature 
différente s du domaine da la propulsion pour la lanceur, du 
domaine ds l'électronique et des transmissions pour la 
satellite - le temps pendant lequel ces performances sont 
demandées, s'exprime an ssoondes ou minutes pour le lanceur 
alors que pour le satellite, il s'exprima en mois, voira an 
armées). 
Knfin, pour le matériel civil, il ast également 
essentiel de considérer à ce stad«, l'endurance comme une 
s^rtsrmance qu'il conviendra, de rechercher et d'obtenir au 
•las titra qu'un» bass« conaonsaUon spécifique, par exemple. 
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4.2.- La fisbilité sa «tad» ft«« état»» et to 1* 
•im au peint 
Il conviant te distinguer, parai I n principaux 
éléments constitutif« d'un propulseur, trois groupe« d'éléments < 
Sans un praaiar group« t 
- Le« élémenta structuraux dont la défaillancs 
paut affecter directement la sécurité (cas das enseablas 
tournants, etc...). Autrefois, las pike«« da cette catégorie 
avaient des coefficients de sécurité tre« importants (on 
n'utilisait certaines pièces qu'au dixième de la charge de 
rupture). Aujourd'hui, la prise en considération du principe 
du 'self containment", d'une part, eVl'application lu 
•rates« de construction dit du "fail safe", d'autre part, 
permettent une diminution du poids des pieces et done una 
amélioration des performances. 
Pour lea pieces vitales, les risques de 
défaillances acceptables généralement admis «ont de l'ordre 
d« 10-8 par heure de fonctionnement. Ces pieces «ont doue 
surabondantes ou ont une redondance élevée pour employer 1« 
langage des électronicien«. 
A ce sujet, il est nécessaire d'ouvrir usa 
parenthèse : 
Il est bien évident qu'un pareil chiffra «An« 
à la négation de l'interprétation statistique (car c'est la 
fin ds la loi des grands nombre!) et conduit, an tait, a 
suivra las pièces une à une, en établissant un facteur liait« 
de «éeurité. C'eet là, l'origine dss piece« dite« "serialise««" 
qui «ont repérées et suivie« individuellement du point d« vue 
durée d«- fonctionnement, modification, «te... par le« construc-
teur« ou réparateur« a l'aide de véritable« fichier«. 
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que ces eBsais sont coûteux, tant pour ca qui aat de 1'appa-
reillage, que du tempe nécessaire, ou 4» l'outilla«? à mettra 
an oeuvre, et oe, d'autant plus que la fiabilité recherchée 
eet plua grande. Ces essaie ont surtout pour objet d'étudier 
las lois d'accélération des phénomènes en fonction des 
contraintes. Les ai snues de turbine et nompreBseur, par exemple 
sont soumis, si on né.»ll«;e les phénomènes de corrosion, a des 
sollicitations à haute fréquence d'origine aérodynamique a leur 
périnhérie, mais la f«tiçue, surtout pour les disques de 
turbine est due éira]enn>nt a des sollicitations a basse fréquenc 
d'oriffine thermique. Las essais de simulation concernant ce 
type de ml licitations neuvent être faits sur moteur au banc 
ou a l'aid« 4« machiner fméRialea en laboratoire. Pour 
certains des réacteurs en service, un nombre de 6 000 à 10 000 
cycles environ, a été estimé, aprfen ps-sais, comme admissible. 
Ceci peut conduire, compte tenu de la durée du parcours moyen 
pour un utilisateur donné, à des durées de ri« moyennes ' 
différentes pour une mime pièce (de l'ordre de 12 000 h 16 000 
heures de fonctionnement pour les disques de counreaseur ou 
turbine). 
11 est permis également de se poser la question 
concernant la corrélation ertre les résultats des essais 
accélérés et les conditions d'exrloitatton réelles. 
Dans certains cas, cette corrélation pourra Stre 
établie à l'aide d'un ou nlusieurs narametre« définis dans 
las spécifications d'essais. 
En fait, les essais accélérés permettent > 
a) de faire connaître a 1'utillaateur si la qualité livrée 
par le constructeur a évolué( autrement dit, ils donnent 
un rsnaelentement tres rapide sur un woblerne particulier, 
b) d'anprécier la valeur d'un résultat par comparaison 
(dans la cas de l'anollcation d'un« •edification par 
exemple 1. 
Il est toutefois évident que les essais accélérés 
ne eeuvent Itre que ùes reneres et doivent Jtre confirmés par 
des résultat« obtenue en exploitation. En effet, dan« l'étude 
•. •/ ». • 
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de l'influence de la température, par exemple, l e s l o i 8 de 
vieillissement accéléré sont assez malaisées à définir et 
donc & vérif ier. 
Voioi pour le premier groupe de pièces.( 
Dans un deuxieue groupe, i l convient de distinguer 
l e s élément» pouvant causer des dommages secondaires important. 
(roulements principaux, aubes motiles, réducteurs). 
Outre l e s essais particuliers suxqualB i l» ont 
donné l i eu au stade de l a mise au point, c 'est surtout 1* 
taux da parat* élevé relevé en service qui constitue 1« princip 
critère de f iab i l i t é . Four certains roulements, par exemple, 
Holls-Boyee admet comme limite 0,01 incidents par 1 000 heures 
de fonctionnement, soit un« f iabi l i té de 0,99 par 1 000 heures 
A ca sujet, i l est à noter que d'après une étude fait« par 
TAIÆIAN, 10 •> du total des anomalies des roulements s* 
produisent dans la tranche des premiers 4 £ du tempe total de 
fonctionnement admis pour ces pièces. 
L'ensemble dee pieces de ce deuxième groupe 
constitua uite autre catégorie de pièces dites "sérialisées" 
(ou nécessitant un suivi particulier). 
Enfin, dans un troisième groupe d* pièces sont 
classés tous autres éléments susceotibles d'avoir une limite 
de vie (carter compresseur, entrée d'air, chambre, e t c . . ) . 
Un résumé, a ce Stadt, l'étude du spectre des 
contraintes devra permettra, compte tenu de l'expérience déjà 
acquise par ai l leurs, des conditions d'emploi et des processus 
entraînant l e s défaillances ou l'usure, de déterminer ce l l e s 
des contraints* qui sont les plu» sensibles et done atti 
influent directement sur 1* f iabi l i té ' -El sera alors possible 
te prévoir <*» tompowaïl» ou «HAMAIM ayant te» eo*ffieisKv» 
de sécurité surabondants (ou redondante)sJg|gi|Mg|p||||||t '^  
»•MssBBBTaTflBBsmVB ou de "dévaluer" l s s oomposant» en l è s 
souasttant » <M fonctioimement s*ue contrainte» réduite». 
C'est également à ce stade qu'il convient d'apport« 
toute l'attention à la facilité d'entretien en tenant oompta 
des exigences de démontabilité (démontage d'une piece sans 
détérioration de la pièce voisine), interchangeabilité 
(possibilité de substitution d'une piece à une pièce semblable! 
aoceesibilité (possibilité d'accès facile aux différents 
organes et pièces). 
L'adoption pour les réalisations pratiquas des 
systèmes dits "des blocs fonctionnais" assurant des fonctions 
bien précises et susceptibles d'etre démontés, entretenus et 
remontés séparément, sont des éléments importants dans 
l'amélioration de la fiabilité. 
4.3.- la fiabilité au stade de la fabrication de série 
A ce «tade, en vue de garantir une bonne fiabilité, 
il convient : 
- de faire apoel, pour la mise en oeuvre, à des procédés 
de fabrication éprouvés (matière, main-d'oeuvre, outil-
lage, e t c . ) . 
- d'assurer un contrôle poussé de la qualité (à noter à eet 
effet que la fiabilité ajoute une dimension nouvelle au 
service contrôle de qualité en lui donnant la possibilité 
de prolonger ses investigations dans le temps). 
4.4.- ta fiabilité au stade des sssais 
A ce stade qui constitue un dss éléments les plus 
importants de la fiabilité car il eet aussi celui de la sélset: 
finale, il convient de remarquer qu'il ne s'agit pas uniquement 
de savoir quel eat le matériel bon ou mauvais au départ ainsi 
qu'éventuellement, la dispersion de ses caractérietlquea,mais 
il importa de dire combien de temps le matériel pourra conservi 
saa caractéristiques initiales et les dispersions de celles-ci 
an fonction du tampe. 
En rèsjle générale, il convient d'admettre qua plus 
la fiabilité recherchée sera, élevés, plus lea eseaie devront 
H r e nombreux, longs et coûteux. In effet, on ne connaît pas di 
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lo is riTOureusea nui r^i^isient len Turiatinns d» la f i n M M t ' 
suivant l*w keimen n> fnnrtirtwripTnïint «t rtnnc le rnv°"»'i Ar* 
fliffé^en^eR dntr**intçp. 
J.pp B ? e l l p ( | t o i f l ' i T « T » t a ' -n» i 1 n " v » n t S t » V 
vérif icat ion dp nçrfor"iance<* »t d'anttinn'*'*) s'av^r^nt nur 
a i l l e u r s mdisne^sabl*!«! nour EiAt»rrrriner 1* ni"Htioue d'^nt'-Ptipr* 
wévent i f à suivre (pour l e s ^vfc^riels a longue durée de vie) 
ou pour »arantir que les nhénomànes d'>»<îure ou "de dérive" 
des différents composants n 'affectent nas le fonctionnement 
de l 'ensenBle durant l 'exécution de sa mission. 
Ceci oeut être recherché également ^ l ' a ide 
d ' essa i s dans des conditions d'ambiance (rayonnement, en 
température, vibrat ions, e t c . . . } . 
En raison des conditions érigées dans certaine cas 
(vérif icat ion de risnues de défaillance de l 'o rdre de 10-8, 
e t c . ) , des moyens a mettre en oeuvre, du coût e t du tenos 
nécessaire , l es essa is r ée l s s'avèrent Quelquefois d i f f i c i l e s , 
voira inconcevables. Aussi fait-on appel de plus en plus aux 
tes ts séquentiels e t , en oar t icu l ie r , aux essais accélérés. 
Ceux-ci neuvent être envisagés au banc ou en 
labora to i re . I l s ont surtout pour objet d 'é tudier l e s l o t s 
d 'accélération des phénomènes en fonction des contraintes e t 
permettent d'aoprécier le niveau de f i a b i l i t é par comparaison 
à uns l imite préétablie. 
4 . 5 . - La f i a b i l i t é au stade de l ' u t i l i s a t i o n 
A ce stade, l a f i a b i l i t é sera garantie par un* 
série ds contrôles i nd i ca t i f s précis e t rigoureux da certains 
paramètres «t ds l ' é t a t des pieces. 
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L'ensemble da ces ooérations set pius connu sous 
la noa d'entretien (autrement dit opérations ayant pour but 
da maintenir les performances d'un équipement au niveau spécifié 
k l'aide d'une série de mesures prédéterminées). 
Ce stade représente, en aéronautique, un 
pourcentage assez élevé des dépenses d'ensemble (voir figure 8 -
frais horaires d'utilisation d'un quadriréacteur). 
Actuellement, il existe deu. :/pes de contrôle 
indicatif : 
- Le premier type est représenté par les visitée 
périodiques, destinées surtout à "prévoir" at non "à guérir" 
appelées communément "inspections". Le but principal de ces 
visitas est de permettre de détecter toute anomalie et 
d'apprécier la possibilité de survie d'une piece ou d'un 
ensemble, compte tenu des critères préétablis. Css inspections 
peuvent Stre permanentes ou occasionnelles et des changements 
de pièces peuvent y Stre programmée systématiquement. 
Il convient de mentionner ioi, la place de plus 
en plue importante prise par les enregistreurs ds parametres 
techniques et les détecteurs de pannes. Ces dispositifs na 
font, en fait, que maintenir un état d'inspection continu. 
- Le second type de contrSle indicatif est 
représenté par les révisions destinées k permettre de porter 
sur chaque piece, après démontage complet de l'ensemble, un 
jugement sur son état, en vue d'apprécier la possibilité de 
remise en service pour une période de temps déterminée (ceci 
anrfcs simple contrSle ou reeonditionne-nent, voire modification 
de la pièce). 
Dans les deux cas, il s'agit ds prévenir les 
.pannes causées par la variation lente d'un ou plusieurs 
paramétras (dont l'usure mécanique ou la "dérive* des oerfor-
manees constituent des aspects particuliers). 
Toutefois (la ou les) lois da denudation sont 
an oreaiar lieu fonction de l'usage que l'on demanda à la' 
pièoe eu k l'ensemble et des mesures prises an vue de son 
entretien. 
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Ceci implique, sur la plan pratique, l'assurance 
que lea travaux programmés sont rigoureusement suivis par les 
intéressés, aussi bien au stade de l'entretien (inspections), 
que de l'utilisation (Unites et procédures o-irrationnelle»). 
Ce qui précède ne veut oas dire que le rîle du 
facteur humain se trouve diminué ou limité, bien au contraire, 
nais qu'il faut également tenir comote d'un certain pourcentage 
d'anomalies dues a la défaillance humaine, pourcentage qui 
doit intervenir directement dans l'apnréciation du niveau de 
fiabilité. 
Enfin, à l'aide de la théorie des nrooessus 
stochastique» et en utilisant 1B simulation "»ur calculateur 
électronique, l'utilisateur pourra, par exemnle, définir les 
conditions d'un entretien préventif efficace, les prévisions 
concernant les matériels à réparer, les pieces de rechange à 
réapprovisionner, les stocks complémentaires à constituer.. 
4.6.- ta fiabilité au stade^ l^e_J-^ après-vente 
One place nrimorrtiale doit être accordée à 
l'analyse des rønnes nroduitss en exnloitation nui constitue 
«our l'amélioration de la tenue du matériel, un imnortsnt 
élément de «uidaœ. 
C'est 1A un noint annuel, i>alheureu8ei>ient, les 
«roducteurs ne semblent pas annorter l'ettention nu'il mérite. 
Bt nourtant, l'intérêt nue cela représente, aussi bien pour 
l'amélioration de la tenue en service d'un matériel donné, que 
pour la renommée d'un fabricant, n'est »lus a démontrer. 
Qu'il suffise de se rapneler que oertain* matériels ont et< 
éliminés du marché faute d'un suivi efficace, le Servies 
Après-Vente ne devrait pas es limitera traiter les problèmes 
économiques mais proooser également aux utilisateurs de* 
•ovations proffr** H «s*l«falv» W *»v«eV» -IvshrAtru»» 4» \«WM» 
problèmes. • 
l'impression prévaut actuellement que, dsn» ... 
oertaine secteurs, le« constructeur« n'oai ^ ^ r t f u ifi^, , 
du comportement de leurs pweuatW «f fß^ifJ^W^^^-.i -
oeeMionnCs par le maintien dû •atériel.^i» s^ lTttieeV*«^ -'-'^ *''''J ' 
' " 18 -
a mblent norter au contraire tnute leur attention (ce qui 
p orrait être considéré comme normal) sur l'importance des 
v ntes des pièces de rechange. 
5.- ASPflCT BCOBOMiyiB PB IA TIABTIJTB 
Le problème de la fiabilité, outre son aspect 
t clinique qui vient d'être développé, a également un aspect 
é oncaiaue d'importance primordiale pour las utilisateurs. 
En effet, en vue d'assurer une exploitation 
ure et rentable, les utilisateurs devront, en premier lieu, 
p «céder à un bilan économique global. 
Sans ce conte*, la fiabilité n'est qu'un des 
é éments d'appréciation du problème économique d'ensemble 
q .i devra tenir compte : 
• du prix d'achat (sur lequel la plupart du temps, l'utili-
sateur n'a qu'une possibilité d'action relativement réduite), 
• du prix d'entretien (ou l'influence exercée par l'utili-
sateur peut être très importante), 
• et du prix des pièces de rechange. 
Autrement dit, pour l'utilisateur qui ne pourra, 
b en entendu, méconnaître les aspectB techniques du problème, 
lt fiabilité, c'est l'art d'obtenir une exploitation correcte 
d > son matériel, au moindre prix. Hais cela ne veut pas dira 
q te la meilleure fiabilité représente toujours l'optimum 
é onomique et le role déterminant des responsablea das compagnies 
a Tiennes consiste justement à trouver le meilleur compromis 
e itre le codt de "détection" et le coût "d'élimination de 
1 anomalie1'. 
Un exemple : il a été dit précédemment qu'au 
a :ade d'utilisation, la fiabilité sera assurés par uns séria 
d i contrôles indicatifs. Cependant, il convient d e na pas 
p Tire de.vue que si, a l'origine, c'est le constructeur qui 
t -évolt ces contrôles, c'est en fait, l'utilisateur qui les 
a -Jouta (directement ou indirectement) et qui en subit Isa 
e nséquences économiques. 
• • •>/• * • 
Autrement dit, en règle générale, une inspection 
néoeaaite : 
- un certain temps d'immobilisation (l'heure d'immobilisation 
d'un Boeing colite 4 000 * ) , 
- des frais de main-d'oeuvre (la révision d'un réacteur 
néoessite environ 1 500 heures), 
- certaines dépenses inhérentes (le banc d'essai, par 
exemple, dont les frais peuvent représenter 3 a 4 1 du 
prix total d'une révision), 
- le prix des pièces de rechange (ce prix peut atteindre 
dans certains cas environ 45 f du prix total de la révision). 
Sans ces conditions et en respectant les 
impératifs de sécurité, il peut y avoir un choix économique 
à faire entre les possibilités offertes par le remplacement 
à. des périodes déterminées d'un plus grand nombre de pieces 
pour réduire l'importance de certaines inspections et inverse-
ment. 
la figure 9 montre la relation existant entre le 
prix de revient et la fiabilité. 
6.- ASEBCT PSYCHOLOGIQUE I« IA HABHJIB 
Ainsi que précisa au début de cette communication, 
la fiabilité doit Stre "pensée" dès le commencement d'une 
étude et doit être considérée comme une création continue. 
Aussi, à l'intérieur-d'une entreprise (de production 
ou d'exploitation))'Il sera bon-de prévoir une organisation 
fonctionnelle qui puisse constituer un système d'information 
et de contrOle intéressant (au point de vue de la fiabilité), 
l'ensemble des activités. 
Cette organisation devra s 
- définir les aspects quantitatifs de la »abUité. 
- diffuser les données quant aux aspects qualitatifs de im fiabi-
lité. (Il conviendra de ne pas confondre contrôlede qualité 
et fiabilité qui sont en fait complémentaires), 
— - •• ' — y -~L"A^frtiir-^*^1^ 
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- définir l e s caractéristiques des éléments et ensembles 
(ainsi que l e s tolérances) à partir des spécifications 
finales relatives au produit cosplet, 
- fermer l e s boucles du contrôle afin que tout incident 
signalé fasse l 'objet d'une analyse e t de mesures correc-
tr ices . 
- renseigner l 'u t i l i sa teur (ou l e fabricant) pour lu i 
permettre d'apporter, en ce qui l e concerne, l e s mesures 
correctives, 
À cet e f fe t , i l convient de noter qu' i l serait souhaitable 
que l e degré de f i ab i l i t é so i t spécifié à l 'u t i l i sa teur , 
au même t i tre que l e s autres caractéristiques. 
- "aire l e s recommandations et indiquer l e choix pour l a 
réalisation d'éléments l e s mieux adaptés du point de vue 
f i ab i l i t é . 
I l e s t toutefois bien évident que cette 
organisation sera fonction de l'importance et de l a 
nature de l 'entreprise. 
7 . - C0HCIÜSI0SS 
Quelles sont l e s perspectives d'avenir e t notamment 
pour l'avion supersonique ? 
Xes progrès techniques dont bénéficieront l e s 
réacteurs auront une répercussion certaine sur l 'amélio-
ration de leur f i a b i l i t é . Toutefois, cette évolution est 
prévisible et circonscrite. A t i tre d'exemple, on espère 
peu d'améliorations sur l e rendement adiabatique de l a 
turbine qui est actuellement de l'ordre de 93 f ou du 
rendement pelytropique du compresseur (de l'ordre de 90 f ) . 
I l an va de mtme pour l e s matériaux ou l e s améliorations 




Bar contre, il eat certain qu'une amélioration 
notable de là fiabilité peut être obtenue par l'exploita-
tion scientifique, grâce aux ordinateurs électroniques, 
des analyses préalables de pannes : que ce soit lesjannes 
simples, doubles, triples ou les pannes dormantes. Il y 
a là un champ d'activité notable offrant des perspectives 
particulièrement prometteuses, aussi bien du point de vue 
de la sécurité que de la fiabilité et ceci d'autant que le 
point faible du réacteur actuellement ne semble plus être 
constitué par le moteur lui-même, mais plutôt par ses 
accessoires et les circuits. 
La notion de potentiel, telle qu'elle est conçue 
aujourd'hui, est également appelée à évoluer. En effet, il 
convient de remarquer que le eecteur entretien dont noue 
avons montré l'importance et l'influence sur la fiabilité, 
est loin d'avoir suivi, aussi bien dans la conception que' 
dans la réalisation, le progrès technique matérialisé par 
la mise en ligne des avions & réaction ; les faibles 
réductions des frais d'entretien rapportées à l'heure de vol 
obtenues avec ces avions, ne sont en effet réalisées que 
grace aux améliorations propres des oaractérietiquee du 
matériel (vitesse, matériaux e t c . ) . I 
1 
Actuellement, les exploitants sont en train da J 
prendre conscience du fait que les travaux d'entretien 
ne doivent plus être exécutés à des périodicités fixes, 
mais seulement s ' i ls s'avèrent indispensables. Cette 
façon d'envisager le problème est susceptible de repré-
senter non seulement une amélioration de la sécurité, mais 
également une augmentation,de rentabilité du matériel 
par diminution des durées d'immobilisation et augmentation 
des durées de vie. •_,„., ,, 
Toutefois, o» qui précède, n'»»t au «Mbettrènt 
valable que si ,-ta «ppïiquântuiie métho4eTd!«att»*i*«t J»X 
nouvelle, l'on parvient s surveiller l 'état de fonetion-
fljfe - w - k • ~v ^ i t f L & Ä i 
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nement du matériel, d'une façon permanents. Cette 
surveillance doit permettre de déceler les premiers 
indices de défaillance at de localiser les pannes. les 
phénomènes à développement lent (par exemple : caisse 
de puissance graduelle) et les défaillances subites 
devront être détectées et il sera nécessaire d'obtenir 
une indication précise sur l'endroit, l'étendue de la 
panne et sur les causes possibles. A titre d'exemple, 
des détecteurs de vibration ont permis, en 22 mois 
d'exploitation, de détecter 34 ^  du total des anomalies 
survenues sur les réacteurs Conway. 
Far ailleurs, il convient que ces rei seigneiwnts 
soient utilisables à des fins de comparaison dans des 
délais réduits. Autrement dit que l'exploitation de 
parametres enregistrés durant un vol de plusieurs heures 
puisse Stre faite pendant les quelques dizaines de 
minutes nécessaires & une escale. 
une anomalie détectée suffisamment a temps est 
incomparablement moindre que si elle avait pu produire 
tous ses effete. Sur le lyne, par exemple, l'utilisation 
de bouchons magnétiques sur le circuit d'huile, a permis 
de tripler les cas de détection d'avaries de roulements. 
Or, lorsque l'on sait que les gros réacteurs tournent à 
8000 - 10 000 tr/mn alors que les petits, atteignent plus 
de 40 000 tr/nn, on mesure l'étendue des anomalies 
pouvant Stre oauséeB par un incident de roulement. 
En appliquant cette nouvelle méthode, la durée de 
vie ne ae trouvera plus ainsi être limitée a une périodi-
cité fixe, mais sera en fait, fonction des résultats de 
détection. 
X titr» d'exemple, il conviant de signaler que 




plus important transporteur mondial et qui constitue en 
même temps un excellent banc d'essai, étudie ce problème 
à grande échelle, aussi bien pour les propulseurs que 
pour les cellules. Ces études sont faites à l'aide 
d'appareils enregistreurs d'un poids et d'un encombrement 
réduits (grace aux progrès de la microminiaturisation). 
Certains de ces appreils pouvant enregistrer simultanément 
plus de 1500 paramètres différents. 
Il y aura évidemment, le moment venu, un problème 
de fiabilité propre aux différents systèmes de détections, 
mais cela constitue un autre aspect de la question. 
Tel est, Messieurs, le problème dont je m'étais 
proposé de vous entretenir. Comme vous avez pu le 
constater, le sujet étant très vaste, non seulement, je 
ne l'ai pas épuisé, mais sur certains points, faute de 
temps, je regrette de n'avoir pu essayer de vous éclairer 
davantage. 
J'espère toutefois, vous avoir donné un aperçu des 
questions qui sont en réalité, si intimement liées à 
celle de la sécurité. 
Je serais très heureux, si pour certains d'entre 
vous, ces quelques réflexions ont pu être de quelque utilité. 
Je vous remercie de votre attention. 
Iffctn&t* 
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Complément à la conférence 
COLLECTE ET UTILISATION 
DES INFORMATIONS CONCERNANT 
LE COMPORTEMENT DES MATERIELS 
(Mme ARNAUD - SNECMA) 
La brochure qui vous a été remise, a été écrite en vue de 
présenter un exemple précis de réseau d'information. 
Vous pouvez y trouver : 
- d'une part des généralités sur les objectifs qui ont conduit à le c r é e r 
et les résultats qui peuvent être obtenus 
- d'autre part des détails surl 'étendue du réseau, lea secteurs étudiés, 
les paramètres relevés, les codes utilisés, e t c . . . 
Au cours des minutes qui me sont accordées, je voudrais, 
non pas m'a t ta rdersur ces détails, mais au contraire ajouter quelques 
remarques qui se rapportent à l 'état d'esprit qui doit imprégner chaque 
maillon du réseau, état d'esprit qui, tout autant que les techniques de 
l'informatique, contribue à la réussite du système. 
C'est ainsi que la qualité de l'information recueillie est 
primordiale. La collecte doit donc se faire avec une certaine rigueur 
et cela contrarie bien sQr de vieilles habitudes ou oblige certains à 
préciser leur pensée. 
En outre le traitement de ces informations sur ordinateur 
peut mettre facilement en évidence des e r reu r s ou anomalies non seule -
ment à l'échelon du technicien qui a fourni l'information, mais encore 
à l'échelon des structures des services. 
Malgré tout il faut que cette collecte soit considérée comme 
un outil efficace pour la connaissance des matériels et non comme 
un maillon d'un réseau de surveillance. 
De même il ne faut pas que le Client à. qui il est demandé 
des informations précises sur l 'utilisation. L'entretien et les pannes de 
ces matériels, considère cee demandes comme une ingérence dans 
son exploitation. 
Ensuite il faut sans cesse affirmer, bien que cela paraisse 
une évidence qu'un fichier même s'il porte le nom pompeux de banque 
da données ne peut produire que ce qui a été prévu de produire lors de 
sa conception. 
Il peut cependant ê t re extensible, quant au type de matér iel 
a suivre. 
Enfin il faut p réc i se ra ,« le système décrit, s'il fait large-
ment appel aux moyens des ordinateurs et des mathématiques statis-
tique«, n'exclut pas la présence d'une équipe d'ingénieurs et de tech-
niciens. Cette équipe doit, en effet, ajouter le bon sens et la réflexion 
Mto ensa b l e pour augmenter l'efficacité des résultats et transmettre 
c*«x-cl » f a ç o n sélective et adaptés aux besoin, de ctacùit; ' ' '-
375 
De nombreuses publications ont déjà largement ! 
traité des avantages qui peuvent être retirés du suivi de 
matériels, surtout lorsque ceux-ci sont des machines à 
hautes performances dont la fiabilité doit sans cesse être 
améliorée et pour lesquels un coût d'exploitation mini-
mum est recherché à travers une définition adéquate de 
la maintenance et du volume des rechanges à mettre en 
place. 
Dans celle lutte difficile où la sécurité et l'économie 
doivent trouver leur compte, il devient nécessaire de 
conjuguer les efforts des constructeurs, des utilisateurs 
et également des organismes officiels oo normalisation 
ou de contrôle. 
Cette brochure n'a donc pas la prétention de démon-
trer à nouveau la nécessité de poursuivre de tels objec-
tifs dont chacun est d'ailleurs convaincu du bien fondé, 
m ai s de faire part de quelques particularités d'un système 
fonctionnant actuellement à la SNE CM A pour des moteurs 
militaires et, lorsque cela est possible, des idées direc-
trices du projet de suivi des moteurs Olympus qui équi-
peront l'avion Concorde. 
Historique : 
Depuis dix ans, la SNE C MA se préoccupe d'orga-
iiiser les renseignements relatifs à l'utilisation de ses 
matériels. 
1ère phase. La première étape a été la mise en forme méca-
nographique des informations provenant des Utilisateurs, 
communiquées par ses représentants détachés sur les 
Bases. 
Cela a permis de connaître, non seulement les 
défaillances observées avec leurs circonstances, l'âge 
des matériels en cause, mais également le parc des 
matériels contrôlés et maintenus en service. Des lors, 
i l était possible d'établir : 
- des statistiques à but technique (pour orienter 
par exemple des études de modification) 
.*,^.^K/J.'&^!m^^MI&&Mi.é 
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- des courbes de fiabilité (selon la méthode actua-
rielle) pour définir des familles de pièces selon les 
phénomènes d'usure et de défaillance, pour situer une 
limite de potentiel 
- des courbes de prévision de déposes et leur appli-
cation à un plan d'utilisation donné. 
Motifs d'une nouvelle Bientôt, il s'est avéré que les renseignements ainsi 
orientation. traités ne reflétaient plus qu'une fraction trop petite de 
la vie des matériels. 
a) En effet, ceux-ci avaient vieilli, avaient été réparés 
plusieurs fois, mais une partie seulement avait été rem-
placée ou rénovée. Il importait donc de connaître lors du 
nouvel incident si la partie détériorée était ou non d'ori-
gine et quels en étaient alors les âges depuis 1ère mise 
en service, et depuis dernière réparation. 
b) Les standards avaient également évolué de nombreuses 
fois et il n'était plus possible de distinguer aisément 
(sans étudier un nouveau réseau d'information) des popu-
lations homogènes. 
c) La périodicité des contrôles devenant progressivement de 
plus en plus grande (actuellement dans le rapport de 1 à4 
depuis la mise en service), il se faisait que pour des 
pièces dont les détériorations ne se manifestent pas 
immédiatement par un mauvais fonctionnement, il n'était 
plus que rarement constaté des anomalies en utilisation 
alors que des détériorations nombreuses étaient sans 
doute constatées en usine au démontage. 
En conséquence, il devenait difficile, voire même impos-
sible, de pouvoir répondre aux questions de plus en plus 
nombreuses posées par les différentes directions. 
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Définition d'un nouveau système : 
Recensement Pour l'ensemble des moteurs civils et militaires 
des objectifs. diverses catégories d'objectifs ont été définies ainsi que 
les travaux standards correspondants. (Voir annexe 1). 
Ktude d'un système Pour répondre aux principaux objectifs retenus en 
"Fichier Central". liaison avec les directions intéressées de la Société, il 
a été créé un groupe de travail groupant des représen-
tants de ces Directions. 
Au cours des réunions il a été examiné qu'elles 
étaient : 
a) - l es informations existantes à transformer automa-
tiquement 
b) - les informations existantes à réécrire sous forme 
adaptée au traitement sur ordinateur 
c) - les informations existantes ou non, pouvant être rele-
vées lorsque le système serait mis en application 
d) - les informations existantes qui ne pourraient pas 
être introduites "en rattrapage". 
Il a été adopté comme principe que : 
- chaque secteur ne transmettrait que les informations 
dont il serait "producteur" 
- les paramètres ou caractéristiques ne feraient l'objet 
d'Inscriptions multiples que pour des motifs impératifs 
d'enchaînement d'informations et de traitement. 
Etendue du réseau 
d'Information. 
Dans la rie d'un matériel, trois grandes phases 
sont à considérer. -
Construction. • Fabrication : fiche d'identification du matériel, N* de 
coulée ou de forge, standard... 
- Montage : fiche donnant la composition d'un ensem-
ble, ex : arbres et pignon« d'un renvoi 
décommande. 
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- Essais : fiche précisant les conditions et temps 
d'essai. 
- Documents de livraison. 
(Toutefois, parmi ces documents, ceux relatifs aux pièces 
détachées appartiennent à un autre fichier géré par le 
Département Rechanges). 
Les informations sont inscrites sur des supports 
envoyés directement en perforation. 
Utilisation. Pour tout événement relatif à un matériel désigné 
pour être suivi, il est établi un rapport, 
. soit sur un support quelconque, transformé par 
le bureau central des statistiques, 
. soit sur un support pré-codé, 
. soit sur un support directement perforable. 
On considère qu'un événement se produit lorsqu'il 
y a: 
- opération de maintenance ou d'inspection (programmée 
ou non) 
- application de modification 
[ - variation même momentanée de performances, de 
ii valeur de paramètres 
i! - mouvement de pièce (d'un moteur à un autre, mise pro-
visoire en volant. . . ). 
Pour tout matériel entrant en réparation, des fiches 
sont établies systématiquement au niveau de l'ensemble 
suivi ; en outre, les composants détériorés font l'objet 
de fiches complémentaires. 
Principales catégories Pour une pièce faisant l'objet d'un suivi, il est 
de paramètres. relevé notamment, pour chaque événement la concernant : 
- son identification : 
- désignation 
- n* de plan 
- n* de série Individuel 
- n* du support sur lequel elle est montée 
Réparation. 
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son état au moment de l'événement : 
- neuf, réparé, RG 
- nombre d'unités de vieillissement 
- nombre d'heures total depuis fabrication 
- position 
- les circonstances au moment de l'événement : 
- en vol, au sol, au point fixe, 
- contrôle sur avion, au banc. . . 
- leB manifestations ou effets ressentis 
• l es constatations faites : 
- nature des défauts 
- emplacement des défauts 
- importance des défauts 
- narration complémentaire avec mots c lés 
Codes. 
• les décisions ( mise en réparation, expertise 
prises ou ( rebut 
envisagées ( maintien en service 
( application de modification 
( application de consigne 
( application de solution de réparation 
( e t c . 
Pour les moteurs civils, l es codes utilisés •ont le 
plus souvent des codes ATA complétés par des codes 
Société. 
•«a. ^ t j m . ,,.*i!". 5u^<3~«. -Mi&Stäjä*. 










Supports de collecte 
de l'information 
annexe 3. 
Quelques exemples de supports pour le recueil de 
l'information : 
3-A - Recueildes informations "Utilisation" surOlympus 
pré-série. 
3-B - Recueil des informations "Réparation" pour 
ATAR 9 K. 
3-C - Recueil des informations pour l'évolution du stan-
dard des pièces. 
Code 
annexe 4. 
Un exemple de code particulier "ATAR" pour le 
relevé des défauts. 
Cette annexe regroupe pour le redresseur de 
turbine : 
a) Les catégories de défauts définies parle Contrôle 
et mentionnées dans la documentation officielle (utilisa-
teurs et réparateurs). 
b) Les localisations d'autres défauts pouvant être 
décelés. 
il est donné, en outre, un schéma de localisation 
pour l'anneau de turbine 1er étage afin de faire remar-
quer que des zones situées sur un même axe ont des 
codes rattachés entre eux. 
Exemple : 3 W (redresseur de turbine) 
1 W (anneau de turbine) 
ceci est utile pourl'établissement de statistiques, corré-
lation de défauts par rapport à un fonctionnement donné, 
influence de la configuration géométrique en amont de la 
pièce défectueuse. 
Traitement. La description des traitements n'est pas l'objet de 
cette réunion. Il est seulement signalé que ceux-ci sont 
réalisés sur IBM 360/40. 
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Suivi de la composition et du vieillissement d'un parc : 
Il a été mentionné précédemment les circonstances 
pour lesquelles était établi un rapport ou document. 
Ces circonstances sont le plus souvent, soit une 
constatation d'avarie, soit un contrôle de fonctionnement 
ou d'aspect. Or, il se peut que ces circonstances ae 
produisent peu fréquemment et il faut donc compléter le 
système précédent par une mise à jour de la composition 
et du vieillissement du parc d'un type de matériel donné. 
En ce qui concerne les matériels civils, il a été 
imaginé le système automatique suivant. 
Etant donné que : 
a) La composition d'un moteur est connue à sa livraison, 
b) Lorsqu'il y a changement de pièce un rapport est 
établi, 
c) La pièce montée en remplacement est connue soit 
parce qu'elle a appartenu à un autre moteur, 
parce qu'elle a été livrée au t i t re de pièce détachée, 
i l est notamment connu son temps de fonctionnement 
(nul ou non) au moment de son dernier montage, 
ce parc des pièces peut ê t re connu en tant qu'iden-
tité d'individus. 
Ilfaut, en outre, en coimaftrelee ages & un moment 
donné. 
Pour un matériel aéronautique, la fréquence de 
mise à jour idéale serait "le vol". 
Après chacun d'eux (la composition du moteur 
n'ayant pu var ier entre le début et la fin) 
. ou bien il y a un rapport d'incident 
. ou bien l 'ensemble de* pièces a vieilli en fonc-
tion de l 'activité moteur, 
H suffit alors d'introduire en ordinateur l e s carac-
téristiques du vol écoulé et d'affecter les mêmes A u aux 
pièces constitutives du moteur au départ Ai vol. - -
a semble un era utopiqu* d'espérsg 4 t tøUrma 
UonsausfifrétBMBtes. Moyennantimjqiin tmmttømøtm 
cations inurmédlalr«« de* composition« de n»»f »i»i. 
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Unités de vieillissement : 
Il apparaît de plus en plus que si l'évaluation du 
vieillissement en heures est commode, elle masque par 
contre un certain nombre de phénomènes importants 
quant à la connaissance de la fiabilité du matériel. 
En aéronautique notamment, où les séries sont 
relativement faibles, i l est fréquent d'obtenir des résul-
tats en fonction des heures avec ure dispersion telle qu'il 
serait tentant de conclure à une apparition aléatoire des 
incidents, alors que si l'on raisonne selon une autre 
échelle de vieillissement, il est possible de dégager une 
loi d'usure. 
Le fichier actuel ATAR ne comporte que peu de 
paramètres relatifs aux conditions d'utilisation propres 
à chaque vol, mais pour d'autres matériels, il est prévu 
de décomposer les temps de vol selon les différentes 
phases d'utilisation (montée, subsonique, supersonique, 
post-combustion, e t c . . . ) ou de les compléter par un 
nombre de manoeuvres. 
C'est ainsi que le taux de pannes d'un démarreur 
ne peut être ramené uniquement au nombre d'heures 
d'activité mais au nombre de missions effectuées et 
annulées, la fatigue du système résultant & la fois du 
nombre de manoeuvres faites et du temps de présence 
sur avion. 
De même, une pièce peut avoir plusieurs espéran-
ces de durées de vie "en heures" selon qu'elle est utilisée 
surun type d'avion faisant des vols longs à haute altitude 




Pa rmi les travaux standards donnés en annexe, 
certains se rapportent plus particulièrement à l'objet de 
cette réunion "la Sécurité". 
C'est ainsi qu'il est possible notamment, connais-
sant : 
- leparc tota l d'un type de pièce, c 'es t -à-di re pour 
chaque pièce produite, son affectation et ses antécédents 
Retrait des pièces de r e t i r e r du service toutes celles qui présentent un 
dangereuses. caractère quelconque affectant la sécurité (temps de 
fonctionnement, date de fabrication, condition d'utili-
sation, e t c . . . ). 
Ex : aubes de turbine du N°de coulée 2 512' âgées de plus 
de x h depuis fabrication. 
En plus de la Sécurité, il est possible d'étudier : 
. Les répercussions industrielles : cadencement de 
livraison des pièces de remplacement. 
. Les répercussions opérationnelles : nombre d ' inter-
ventions à faire par le Client - nombre de moteurs 
indisponibles. 
Caractéristiques de Connaissant à la fois en fonction du vieillissement, 
- les matér iels en cours de service ou reconnus bons 
après examen, 
- les matériels re t i rés du service pour avarie ou mau-
vais fonctionnement, soit pour les rebuter, soit pour 
les répare r , 
i l est possible de calculer le taux d'avarie correspondant 
nombre de matér iels avariés 
. — , d'en étudier les variations. 
nombre de matér iels exposés 
Ensuite, i l est calculé et t racé, selon la méthode 
actuarielle, une courbe de survie dont il est déduit une 
courbed'endurancemoyennequidonnel 'espéranceroathé-
matique du nombre d'unités de vieilli»s»m«E* qui seront 
accomplies en morerne par un matériel, compte tenu de 
son vieillissement et des déposes prématurées. 
.,./... 
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Influence des conditions d'entretien : 
Pour l'étude du taux d'avarie, il est important de 
distinguer les pièces dont le mauvais fonctionnement ou 
l'avarie se manifeste immédiatement, de celles dont tout 
défaut ne peut être détecté qu'à l'occasion d'un contrôle 
périodique. 
Pour les matériels entretenus selon la méthode 
dite de Maintenance préventive, le point "exact" de la 
détérioration ou de la baisse de performance n'est pas 
connu puisque la dépose d'un matériel se situe souvent, 
soit en avance par rapport à ce point de détérioration 
critique, soit après dépassement des critères admis-
sibles depuis un laps de temps inconnu. 
Ceci pourrait donc être un point de départ pour 
déterminer parmi les pièces ne mettant pas directement 
la sécurité en jeu : 
- celles qui doivent être suivies de façon continue pour 
éviter un nombre de déposes abusif 
et, 
- celles qui sont toujours justiciables de l'entretien pré-
ventif, cette distinction étant fonction de la dispersion 
de la durée de vie de la pièce. 
Maintenance continue. Pour une connaissance plus rapide et plus précise 
de la fiabilité des matériels, les nouvelles techniques de 
Maintenance envisagées semblent offrir de nombreux 
avantages. 
Par exemple, il serait idéal de fixer des seuils 
d'alarme permettant d'assurer une fiabilité suffisante 
pour une unité de fonctionnement qui serait alors la durée 
d'un vol au lieu de la durée séparant deux visites pério-
diques. 
Mais ceci pourrait conduire à immobiliser fré-
quemment le moteur et à des déposes non groupées des 
ensembles ce qui irait partiellement à l'encontre du but 
recherché : améliorer la sécurité, certes, mais réduire 
par ailleurs le coût d'entretien. 
.../... 
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L'analyse de l'évolution des défauts et de divers 
paramètres permettra alors de fixer de nouvelle s valeurs 
de seuils d'alarme et de nouvelles lois de Maintenance. 
Par exemple ; 
. définir certaines limites de potentiel au-delà 
desquelles les risques d'avarie s'accroissent 
anormalement sans être compensés par un gain 
substantiel d'endurance moyenne, 
. élargir la périodicité d'examen en adaptant les 
critères d'admissibilité des défauts. 
Par ailleurs, l'étude des interactions entre cer-
tains paramètres pourra limiter ultérieurement la détec-
tion à leur résultante ou au paramètre prédominant. 
L'enregistrement en vol de la valeur de certains 
paramètres pourra également renseigner de façon plus 
rapide et plus précise, non seulement sur la constatation 
de la défaillance elle-même, mais aussi sur l'origine 
des défaillances. 
C'est ainsi qu'au lieu de constater une détérioration 
de roulement et d'attendre les résultats d'une expertise 
plus ou moins longue et difficile, cette détérioration 
pourra être analysée en liaison avec d'autres dépouille-
ments définissant les conditions d'emploi : température, 
pression, niveau vibratoire, etc . . . 
Les travaux statistiques pourront faire apprécier: 
- si la défaillance est la conséquence des conditions 
anormales d'emploi (dans ce cas une modification n'est 
pas à envisager pour la pièce endommagée mais pour 
un circuit de graissage, par exemple), 
ou, 
- si cette défaillance est imputable à la conception de 1« 
pièce et risque de se reproduire, alors l'étude d'une 
modification doit être entrepris«. 
Cette modification peut avoir pour objectif, so.t 
une augmentation de la dure» d* vie, soit l'amélioration 
du iattt de défaillance. Toutefois, ces deux actions M 
peuvent être totalement indépendantes car le recul de la 
période d'usure est complètement inutile si la t a m da 
défaillance reste médiocre. 
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Là encore, ce sont les courbes de survie qui ren-
seigneront sur le sens des modifications à entreprendre. 
Il sera donc possible, avec des informations nom-
breuses, progressives et les moyens correspondants de 
dépouillement et de calcul : 
- de constituer des classes de pièces pouvant être exa-
minées ou déposées simultanément sans perdre un 
nombre d'heures important d'utilisation, 
- d'élaborer des modifications de telle sorte qu'elles 
assimilent une pièce à une classe telle qu'il ne lui soit 
pas attribué des avantages superflus et inutilisés 
compte tenu des fiabilités amont et aval. 
Il va de soi que tous ces résultats permettront en 
outre de construire un système logistique rationnel, dont 
l'évaluation du coût pourra tendre vers un optimum en 
fonction des services demandés. 
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BUTS TRAVAUX PRINCIPAUX 
A - Technique 1*) - Relevé des incidents exploitation et réparation 
- par catégorie 
- par importance 
en fonction de : 
- standard des pièces 
- circonstances et conditions d'utilisation 
- cycles/temps de fonctionnement 
2") - Taux/1000 heures par Cie ) pour une période de 
global ) temps ou en cumul 
3°) - Répercussion des modifications. 
B - Opérationnel 1°) - Calculs et tracés des fréquences et répartitions des 
contrôles et interventions de dépannage 
- programmés 
- non programmés 
2*) - Etudes des pourcentages des déposes 
- justifiées 
- injustifiées 
3°) - Analyse des durées des interventions 
des immobilisations ou retard 
par catégorie de pièces 
" d'incident 
C - Economique 1") - Taux de mise en réparation 
en révision générale (programmée 
( non programmé« 
en rebut 
2*) ' Taux d'interventions et réparations 
sous-garantie 
hors-garantie 
• j ^ i i i J l ø / g 
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Annexe 1 - 2 / 2 
Statistiques Création pour un certain nombre de pièces importantes 
d'un état de service mécanographique permettant de 
connaître intégralement périodiquement 
- l 'état 
- la position 
- le standard 
- le vieillissement 
de chacune des pièces fabriquées. 
Fiabilité Compte-tenu des travaux réal isés pour A, B, C et des 
informations contenues en D, 
établissement des caractéristiques de fiabilité 





Logistique Simulation et prévision du nombre d'interventions et des 
volants nécessaires correspondant à un type d'exploitation 
défini (type de vol, nombre d'heures d'exploitation, temps 
de rotation journalier, cycle de réparation, e t c . . . ). 
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MODIFICATION • REPARATION 
RECUPERATION C. M.S 
DEROGATION 
3c SJtfcXJULS" **CJ. 1 
DATE: . § 
FICHIER C E N T R A L - C R E A T I O N 
CARTE D A REMPLIR DANS LES CAS SUIVANTS : 
MODIFICATION, AMENDEMENT 
REPARATION (REP. INSTRUCTION) 
REOPERATION 
T. V S. (CONSIGNE DE MISE AU STANDARD) 
DFROGATION 
Pour tous les aimais suints mfiàtitr cenirmt 
CODE DE CARTE -
EMETTEUR 
DESIGNATION EN CLAIR ABREGEE 
PLUS LE LOT POUR LES AUBFS 
D» 
| 1 1 1 1 1 ! ! 1» 
JLSfGNATtON CODhfc. 
V PLAN, ETAT, INDICE : , 
K« INDIVIDUEL 
SOUS-LOT PLUS ORDRE POUR Lt.S AUBfcS 
H 1 1 1 1 1 1 L« 
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Exemples : 
Modifiretior, r e v u e , paragraphe, alinea i 
Répertoire de Modgf., annex«, parafraphe 
R E P , Indice 
Inatractton de revlaion provisoire, 
parafraphe, alinéa 
Instruction} groope, aoua-groop«, pièce, opération ( 
de revlaion) paragraphe (ou figure) 1 
Demande de récapération, catégorie 
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A DESCRIPTION OF THE 
AIR CANADA 
UNIT QUALITY RECORD 
A. I. R. SYSTEM II 
Supplied by K.E. Chapman, 
Director, Maintenance Engineering 
Air Canada Jase 
Montreal, Canada 
for Meeting of Specialists on the Reliability of 
Mechanical Systems and Components for Nuclear Reactor 
Safety, 
RISØ, Denmark 
24 - 26 September, 1969 
(Mr. Chapaan would like to point out that this paper should 
bs considered as an outline only). 
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OBJECTIVES OF UNIT RECORD SYSTEM 
REAL TIME - LIFE CONTROL OF UNITS 
PERMANENT LEGAL RECORD - D.O.T. REQUIREMENTS 
OFF LINE - INVESTIGATION, PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
CONTROL OF WORK DONE ON UNITS 
ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIVES AFFECTED BY 
GROWTH IN NUMBER OF UNITS CONTROLLED 
CONSTANT STAFF LEVEL 
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DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT SYSTEM FLOW CHART 
A U/S tag is already attached to the unserviceable(U/S) 
unit when it is received in the shop for repair, check 
or overhaul. 
The bottom portion of this tag which contains unit number, 
description, reason for removal, etc. is sent to QUA1ITY 
RECORDS DEPT. (Q/R). 
Information on the U/S tag is checked against the unit 
record card (KARDEX) which is a permanent record of the 
unit life cycle, A/C on, A/C off, dates, times, etc 
Unit times are computed and written on the tag which is sent 
back to the shop. 
On the back of this tag the Shop Mechanics enter repair info-
rmation, modification done, components replaced, etc. This 
tag is then sent to Q/R for final posting on KARDEX. 
A serviceable tag is prepared (unit number, description, etc.) 
and attached to the unit to identify it as a serviceable unit. 
When a unit is installed on A/C the installation information 
of this unit and removal information of the corresponding unit 
is written on the serviceable tag and sent to Q/R. 
When it is received in Q/R this tag is used for posting on 
corresponding unit KARDBX. 
A U/S tag is prepared for the unit which is removed and 
attached on unit removed. 
The unit is sent to U/S Stores and then to the shop, where 




QUAUTV RECOUDS | ""Vi UWT 
EXCHANGE* 
PRESENT UWT RECALL SYSTEM 
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DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT OMIT RBCALL SYSTEM (FLOW-CHART) 
A "CHECK SCHEDULE A/C LIST" is issued once a week by PLANNING 
t ROUTING) giving the A/C No. and the date of its next visit 
(HOC, AV, O'haul). The list covers all Aircraft visits for 
the following four weeks. 
On receiving this list Q/R check every unit KARDEX for each 
scheduled A/C for: time expired units, planned sampling units, 
etc 
For each A/C visit a list of units to be exchanged is prepared 
and sent to PLANNING * QUALITY INSPECTION. 
From this list QUALITY INSPECTION collect job tickets for this 
A/C visit. 
PRESEQUISITIONS are typed from this list and sent to Stores. 
The units are then grouped in Stores and sent to the hangar 




CAPTURING BASIC DATA AS CLOSE TO SOURCE AS POSSIBLE 
MINIMIZE PAPER FLOH 
AUTOMATE ALL ROUTINE OPERATIONS 
HUMAN AUDIT BY EXCEPTION 
ENLARGED INFORMATION RETRIEVAL SERVICE 
'»*Y,"ç_'3L " r* i^' 
'S-'vJFOSiît* » y g T L M *iÔ¥# C-HIÇftT—„ 
V 
8 
NEW SOURCE DOCUMENTS - THREE PAKT TAG 
Shop Report 
- USED TO REPORT WORK DONE ON UNIT 
- 35% OF ENTRIES PREPRINTED (COMPUTER) 
- WRITTEN IN SHOPS ONLY 
- CONTAINS PLANNED SAMPLING INFORMATION 
(WHEN APPLICABLE) 
Serviceable 
USED TO IDENTIFY SERVICEABLE UNITS 
30% OF ENTRIES PREPRINTED (FROM ABOVE TAG) 
WRITTEN IN HANGAR k STATION ONLY 
CONTAINS INSTALLATION & REMOVAL INFORMATION 
Unserviceable 
USED TO IDENTIFY UNSERVICEABLE UNITS 
NO WRITING REQUIRED ON THIS TAG 
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DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED SYSTEM FLOW CHART 
1. - A U/S tag is already attached to the unserviceable (U/S) 
unit when received in the shop for repair or check and 
contains all removal information. 
- Prior to that, a new three part tag has been prepared on 
computer and received in the shop (see new source document). 
2. - Shop report (first copy of the new tag) is filled in by 
the Mechanic, detached and sent to update the computer 
files. The shop enters information on only this portion 
of the tag. The old U/S tag is then filed. 
- The new trq (two parts left) is attached to the unit. The 
serviceable tag (top part of new tag) identifies the 
serviceable unit. 
3. - When this serviceable unit is installed on the aircraft 
and the corresponding one removed, both removal and 
installation information is written on this tag. 
- When completed, the top part of this tag is detached and 
sent to update computer files. This will generate a new 
three part tag for the unit removed. 
- The last part of the tag (carbon copy of the second one) 
is attached to the U/S unit (no writing required on this 
portion). 
- The unit is sent to Stores and then to the shop (the cycle 
continues as in (1) ). 
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DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED UNIT RECALL SYSTEM 
A predetermined number of days prior to a scheduled 
aircraft visit, a card is prepared for this A/C, 
giving the type and expected date of visit. 
The program will calculate unit times and prepare a 
list of the unit exchanges required. 
Por each unit exchange called, a prerequisition will 
be prepared and sent to Stores. 







DESCRIPTION OF COMPOTE» FILES 
A/C STATUS FILE 
- One record for each A/C 
- A.c.T.l.O.N. generated info, on A/C hrs, 
cycles• landing .... 
OMIT MASTER FILE 
- One record for U.N.I. 
- Contains identification, description, control, 
limits. 
Â/C UNIT FILE 
- One record for each O.N.I, on A/c 
- Grouped by A/C Ho. 
- Installation info. 
UNIT STATUS FILE 
- One record for each unit serialized. 
- Grouped by U.N.I. 
- Current status. 
- Installation/reaoval/ehop info. 
UNIT HISTORY FILE 
- Records for each unit serialized. 
- Grouped by O.N.I, t Serial Ho. . 
- All previous status records for unit. 
- Info, entered when unit is installed/removed. 
411 
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BENEFITS OF A.I.R. SYSTEM II 
T0> SHOP - A/C t UNE MECHANICS 
REVISED DATA COLLECTION 
. REDUCE WRITING BY 501 - 60% (ENTRY) 
- ONE TAG (NO DUPLICATION) 
- NUMBER OF ENTRIES (PREPRINTED INFO.) 
. SPEED OP PAPER FLOH 
- TAG RECEIVED BEFORE UNIT 
- UNIT TIMES (PREPRINTED) 
- FULL TAG STAYS WITH THE UNIT 
• 12 
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BENEFITS OF A.I.R. SYSTEM II (cont'd) 
TOI QUALITY RECORDS - A/C PLANNING t WAREHOUSE 
UNIT RECALL 
. ELIMINATE MANUAL CHECK FOR UNIT RECALLS 
- PRODUCED BY COMPUTER 
. ELIMINATE TYPING OF PRBRSQUISITIONS 
- PRODUCED BY COMPUTER 
. REDUCE FALSE UNIT RECALLS 
(BY COMPRESSING INTERVAL BETWEEN RECALL t 
A/C ARRIVAL) 
- MOVEMENT OF UNIT FROM WAREHOUSE TO HANGAR 
- PREPARATION OF JOB TICKETS 
- CHECK FOR PRESENCE OF UNIT ON A/C (MECHANIC) 




BENEFITS OF A.I.E. SYSTEM II (cont'd) 
TO: QUALITY RECORDS 
AUTOMATION OF RECOUPS 
AUTOMATED RECORDING AND AUDITING 
TIME AVAILABLE FOR: 
- AUDIT OF SYSTEM, CHECKING OF EXCEPTION, 
PROVIDING INFORMATION 
INCREASE SPEED OF INFORMATION FLOW 
RECORDS MORE UP-TO-DATE 
EFFICIENT t TIMELY REPORTING 
- ROUTINE REPORTS 
- INDIVIDUAL INQUIRIES 





DATA PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS 
CONVERSION OF EXISTING RECORDS; 
MOHAWK DATA RECORDER - OPERATED BY nnftDEX CLERK 
- 1 RECORDER/1 CLERK - $600/MONTH 
TOTAL : $10,000 
ROUTINE OPERATING SYSTEM 1 
INPUT PREPARATION - KEYPUNCHING OR DATA RECORDER 
- 500 DOCUMENTS/DAY - $400/MONTH 
BATCH PROCESSING - RANDOM ACCESS UPDATING 
- OUTPUT REPORTS 
- .50 HOUR/DAY - $2,600/MONTH 
TOTAL - 53,000/MONTH 
ON-LINE INQUIRIES (IMMEDIATE RESPONSE) 
DAY SHIFT ONLY 
- ONE DISC DRIVE - $800/MONTH 
- INQUIRY TERMINAL - $400/MONTH 
































- A/C Maintenance 












A K E V I N AID DISCUSSION « METHODS M D TECBKQJDBS 
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by 
Stanley I. Follock 
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Analysis A Evaluation Group» 
Corona, Cal i fornia 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides information on how to enhance the disciplines 
of reliability» safety, maintainability, and systeas effectiveness by 
utilizing data pertaining to parts /components, which are acquired, 
disseminated, and exchanged through the media of two nationally known 
and recognized fcata exchange programs: 
Interagency Data Exchange Program (IDEP), 
Failure Rate Data (PARADA) Program. 
4T9 
INTRODUCTION 
The Naval Fleet Missile Systems Analysis and Evaluation Group 
(FMSAEG) located at Corona, California, has been assigned the task of 
conducting program management on behalf of the Navy for the Interagency 
Data Exchange Program (IDEP) and on behalf of all the Services and NASA 
for the Failure Rate Data (FARADA) Program. 
To have some appreciation of the need for the data being «xchanged 
in these programs, one must consider the requirements of a contractor 
engaged in the design, development, and production of a missile or an 
aerospace subsystem or equipment. It is during the design and develop-
ment phase of a project that the engineers (at a contractor's plant) 
who are responsible for the reliability, safety, maintainability, and 
effectiveness of these subsystems and equipments have an urgent need 
for considerable amounts of technical data including information on 
parts/components (electrical, electronic, mechanical, hydraulic, pneu-
matic) intended for use in the equipment they are designing. This 
information covers a vide spectrum—for example, who manufactures the 
part/component; who purchases them; why they were purchased, i.e., for 
what program and for what intended use; who tests them; what were the 
results of tests (such as qualification tests, evaluation test** engin-
eering and environmental tests.), and what was the "use-history" of these 
parts/components when placed in operation and subjected to actual opera-
ting environments. And last, but not least, is the need for information 
on failure rates of these parts/components, which entails knowledge of 
quantity used, quantity failed, operating time or cycles to failure, and 
for other data including causes of failure, modes of failure, and operating 
stresses at time of failure. 
The objective is, specifically, how to make all this information 
readily available and useful to the engineers who have need of this infor-
mation; this objective has been achieved by these two data exchange programs* 
ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF DATA EXCHANGE PROGRAMS 
Both IDEF and FARADA originated—or were created—to fill the 
specific needs of the design engineers. However, they were not created 
instantaneously nor by edict. They had their origin many year* ago 
(1957-1958) as a small task assignment to FMSAEG. The substance øf ras 
assignment was to provide the design engineers who wet« engaged in the 
POLARIS (missile) program with all the available essential Information 
on parts/components. The schedule that was established fa? the VffXARII 
program simply did not afford the tint for the lengthy—-asd cioetly-*e**ort 
normally expended in purchasing parts/component» aad, subjMtla* the« 4« 
the various quallfIcatlor. environmental, and engineering teats* lästernd. 
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the experience that had been gained or learned In previous missile and 
aerospace programs was to be imparted to the POLARIS engineers through 
the acquisition of all sorts of data on the parts/components that had been 
tentatively selected for use in the POLARIS missile. The objective was to 
obtain and utilize the most reliable "off the shelf" parts/components 
available within the constraints of time, funding, and state-of-the-art. 
The results of this new approach revealed that many tests could be 
truncated or eliminated; that a great quantity of hardware lor testing 
need not be purchased: and, finally, that many of the designs on the 
drawing boards need not be scrapped later in the program due to some 
deficiency in reliability, safety, maintainability because of the fact 
that timely and useful information had been provided to the design 
engineers as soon as it became available. For example, tests conducted . 
on a particular hydraulic device by another contractor for use on another 
program indicated there were serious problems associated with that device. 
This information was immediately imparted to the POLARIS design engineers, 
and as a result they altered an initial design which had incorporated 
that same hydraulic device. 
This early program, conducted by FMSAEG, vas identified as the 
Component Reliability History Survey (CRHS). Between the years 1958-
1963, it provided engineers of the prime contractors engaged in the 
POLARIS effort with much useful information mainly obtained from con-
tractors' test reports generated because of the need for data on other 
Navy, Army, Air Force projects. This program saved the Navy much time, 
effort, and money, and the concept and techniques developed to acquire 
and disseminate data automatically became the basis for the exchange of 
similar data throughout the entire Navy, as well as the Army, and the 
Air Force. In fact, the commanders of the ballistic missile agencies of 
the three Services approved the Interservice Data Exchange Program in 
1960. Subsequently, arrangements were made to exchange data with the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Canadian 
Military Standards Agency (CAHESA). Thus in 1966, the name of the 
program was expanded to the Interagency Data Exchange Program (IDEP) 
and was approved at the level of Assistant Secretary for Research and 
Development in the three Services and by the Assistant Administrator 
for Industry Affairs of NASA. 
The PARADA Program was a logical outgrowth of IDEP and came into 
existence In 1961-1962. The specialty of this program is the dissémina* 
tlon of timely data on failure rates and failure modes of parts/components 
to user participants. 
In the beginning, approximately 60 contractors and Government 
Agencies participated in the data exchange programs. Today, IDEP has 
210 participants, and the PARADA Program has 279 participants. 
2 
PROGRAM DIRECTION AMD SUPPORT 
Both program receive direction froa a Policy Board composed of 
one representative fro« each of the military services and froa NASA. 
The Board develops and approves Program policies and management pro-
cedures for administration. 
A Technical Coordinating Cornaitire assists the Policy Board on 
matters pertaining to FARADA; a Contractors' Advisory Board composed of 
«embers selected froa the various participants provides information and 
guidance to the Policy Board relative to the desires of industry for IDEP. 
Funds to support these Programs are obtained froa the various 
elements of the three Services and NASA. 
MECHANICS OF OPERATION 
Both IDEP and FARADA are voluntary in nature , and no fees or assess-
ments are charged to the participant«. Ho classified information Is 
exchanged; neither is company proprietary intonation divulged. 
IDEP 
Participants in IDEP submit copies of their purchase specifica-
tions, test specifications, and the results of controlled, "laboratory type" 
tests on electrical, electronic, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic parts/ 
components, as «e l l aa technical Inforaation on materials, production 
processes, and other data pertaining to the reliability of par^/coaaonents, 
to a designated IDEP office. There are three IBS* offices, one tør «ach of 
the Services. The Army IDEP office at Himtsville, Alabama, also asipaa 
NASA. The Air Force IDEP office i s located at El Segundb, California, and 
the Navy IDEP office is located at FMSAEG, Corona, Californie. Figuras 1 
and 2 show the flow of the data. 
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Fig. 1 Interagency Data Flow 
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Flg. 2 IDEF Data Flow 
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A typical IDEP report is Illustrated by Figure 3. This report 
format has been adopted as the standard in IDEP, and the use of this fora 
is required in MIL-STD-831, "Preparation of Test Reports." 
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After processing, the IDEP office provides this information, 
arranged generically, to all other participants In the fora of microfilm 
in cassettes. Certain data are also placed on visual coincidence cards, 
to assist those searching for and desirous of retrieving information 
relative to the effects of various environments upon the part/components. 
Each card is coded in terms of hardware identification and test parameters. 
The placement of data onto microfilm and into cassettes and onto 
visual coincidence cards is shown by Figure 4. 
N I M WCftOFIUi CMTftMM M W l COMBNMI CM» K M 




Figure 5 shows a display of visual coincidence cards. A computer 
listing of IDEP reports (Index of Reports) arranged generically (i.e., a 
unique nine-digit numbering system) Is furnished to all participants on a 
periodic basis. An extract from such a listing is illustrated by Figure 6. 
The listing is structured to indicate the cassette containing the microfilmed 
data desired in order that the cassette may be placed in a microfilm viewer 
for viewing. 
Fig. 5 Display of Visual Coincidence Cards 
^wra 
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Fig. 6 Extract fron IDEP Index of Reports 
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Figure 7 illustrates how data is stored and retrieved at an 
IDEP office. The IDEP information storage and retrieval system is de-
signed for rapid, error-free use without elaborate equipment. It enables 
an engineer to have easy access to the information desired within a few 
minutes. The microfilmed reports may be viewed or reproduced In easily 
readable size. 
Currently there are over 30,000 reports on file, estimated to 
have cost at least $50 million to create. Each month approximately 250 
new reports are added to the data bank. 
Fig. 7 Portion of an IDEf Office Storage and Retrieval Center 
FARADA 
In contrast to IDEP which has three offices, there is only 
one FARADA Information Center, and that is located at FMSAEG, Corona, 
California. Participants in the FARADA Program submit information on 
field/fleet performance data on parts/components to the FARADA Informa-
tion Center, where it is screened, analyzed, summarized, computerised, 
compiled, and disseminated, on a periodic basis, to all participants. 
The information is stored in loose leaf binder notebooks or handbooks, 
rather than on microfilm. The FARADA handbooks contain failure rates, 
generally expressed in terms of number of failures per million operating 
hours. Also contained therein is information pertaining to where the 
equipment was operated, what environmental conditions were experienced, 
modes of failure, and stress curves (for electrical and electronic parts/ 
components). 
The flow of data in the FARADA Program is shown in Figure 8. 
PRIMARY SOURCES AND TYPES OF FAtvURC HATE OAT* 
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Fig. 8 FARADA Data Flow 
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Figures 9, 20, 11, 12, and 13 illustrate the handbooks and 
examples of the types of information pertaining to mechanical parts/ 
components (contained in the handbooks) which are distributed to program 
participants. These handbooks presently contain approximately 45,000 
line entries of tabulated failure rate data. 
FAKADA also provides an updating and expansion to the failure 
rate data appearing in MIL-HDBK-217, "Military Standardization Handbook," 
which is presently being revised to include failure rates for mechanical 
parts/components, as well as electrical/electronic parts/components. 
Both FABADA and MIL-HDBK-217 provide a basis for reliability prediction 
as outlined in MIL-STD-756A, "Reliability Prediction Procedures." 
Fig. 9 Failure Rate Data Handbooks 
11 
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Fig. 10 Extract from FABADA Handbook Showing Failur« 
Rates on Partial Listing of Valves 
12 
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Fig. 11 Extract from FAJUDA Handbook Showing Mode« of 
Failure for Partial Llatlng of Valvaa 
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Fig. 12 Extract from FARADA Handbook Shoving Converged Failure Bate Data 
(with 90X confidence intervals) on Partial Listing of Valves 
PARTICIPATION REQUIREMBOTS 
Eligibility for participation in these data exchange progress is 
limited to Government agencies and contractors vho are users of parte/ 
components procured for Incorporation into the design, development, or 
production of equipment for military and aerospace programs. Both IDEP 
and FARADA were established on a voluntary basis, and both continue to 
be voluntary programs, with no fees or assessments levied against the 
participants. 
An important requirement stipulated to by IDEP participants is that 
a part/component manufacturer must be supplied a copy of any test report 
or results of a test performed on bis product by the participant who per-
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SUMMARY 
Through the media of these data exchange programs, IDEP and FARADA, 
the design engineer and the reliability/maintainability/safety engineer 
have two powerful tools at their disposal. The proper utilisation of 
data—aa a commodity—haa a tremendous Impact on the reliability/maintain-
ability, safety, and performance of a missile or an aerospace system. A 
basic precept of the programs Is that the Information Is waiting for the 
engineer rather than vice versa. 
These data exchange programs have benefitted Government, Industry, 
and Taxpayers through a reduction in hardware development costs exceeding 
many millions of dollars each year. A recent IDEP survey documented over 
$S million in savings attributed to the reduction of testing and the 
consequent elimination of test hardware purchases. The time, money, and 
effort saved was directed Instead toward improving the reliability/ 
maintainability of the product. 
The requirement that IDEP participants provide a part/component manu-
facturer with results of tests performed on his product before the report 
is circularized within the program has, in no small measure, helped to 
create more reliable parts/components. 
Other benefits and objectives of these data exchange programs are 
- Realistic bid proposals through access to current parts 
information. 
- Reliable parts selection in designs to avoid possible systems 
failures. 
- Advance parts information to promote Improved performance. 
- Shortened delivery schedules. 
- Improved test reporting with resultant higher output per test 
dollar. 
- Accelerated parts specification writing and test planning— 
expediting Introduction of standard Improved parts. 
- Provision for direct intercontractor inquiries in urgent cases. 
- Suggested alternate vendor sources. 
- Source of general advice, confirmation, and general education 
lr early stages of program development. 
The IDEP and FARADA data exchange programs represent an outstanding 
example of cooperation and team work between Government and Industry; 
without these ingredients, achievement of program objectives could not 
have been successful. 
Further Information may be obtained by writing to 
Commanding Officer 
Naval Fleet Miasil« Systems 
Analysis and Evaluation Group 
Corona, California 91720. 
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Introduction 
The pursuit of an ever increasing efficiency and of improved con-
struction and operation economy has In the past been very success-
ful as demonstrated by the decreased power plant heat-rates and re-
ductions in specific oosts and in operating expenses. 
These Improvements have been obtained partly due to higher tempera-
tures, pressures, reheat-cycles, etc. and partly due to Increased 
unit sizes. Inevitably the plant has become more complicated - and 
thus more vulnerable to disturbances. Improvements In economy and 
installation costs have to some extent been paid by a reduction of 
the operational reliability, especially during the first few years 
of operation of not yet matured types. ><.-.- s 
This bas caused considerable concern in powtr eompantet all tjmsgtø 
the world and has turned »e. attention toward^ mor«sdftai^«d «*urs M 




experiences and discussions as well as exchange of Information na-
tionally and Internationally with colleagues having similar experi-
ences. It has now been realized that the decisions to be made can 
be supported by objective statistical information collected on a 
nation-wide basis in a uniform way and treated Identically so that 
the results can be exchanged and reliable comparisons be made. 
The statistical information should cover a reasonable number of 
years and the greatest number of units possible with a minimum of 
time between the recordings of performance and the analysis of the 
information. Bearing in mind that the emphasis placed upon the re-
storing of equipment to normal operational status after a failure 
largely affects the reliability figures - expressed as outage rates -
some means of characterizing this emphasis should be devised. 
The results should not only allow an evaluation of past and present 
operating experiences, thereby determining the principal causes of 
unavailability, but should also allow a projection for future In-
stallations by the provision of a sound basis for engineering stu-
dies leading to corrections of the weak points. 
Statistical information about the behaviour of overhead lines and 
electrical apparatus has been collected over a very long period of 
years, and results are regularly published. A comparison between 
different systems and a recognition of defects have been possible 
through these statistics. It is generally accepted that such stati-
stical information is valuable for system planning and operation with 
a view to the optimal economic result. 
Similar view-points ought to be applied more widely on power plant 
components, where the objective of design and operation engineers 
is the samt to aim at the highest possible reliability compatible 
with sound economics. 
Availability statistics are collected in every power company - but 
in many various ways. Much effort Is laid down In attempts to uni-
form the methods of collection and of treatment of the data, and as 
• firm step an agreement about the fundamental definitions must be 
obtained. The work oarrlsd out In the United States of the Edison 
tWotrlft Institute, Prims Hovers Committee (its Equipment Avallabi-
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11ty Task Force) and the IEEE Joint Subcommittee on Application of 
Probability Methods has been fundamental in this respect. In Europe 
the definitions adopted by UNIPEDE have been limited, mainly with a 
view to the application in determining necessary installed power. 
Analysis of and comparisons between various definitions and meas-
ures of availability have been presented in a number of publica-
tions, and recently the Economic Commission of Europe has compared 
the definitions in the papers EP/WP.6/Worklng Paper No. tø and 
EP/WP.4/Worklng Paper No. 19. 
Whichever method is used to gather Information about availability, 
it is normal practice to Indicate the availabilities for different 
categories of power plant: low pressure; high pressure without re-
heat; high pressure with reheat and various unit sizes; etc. Fur-
thermore the main components: boiler; turbine; condenser; genera-
tor; etc. are treated separately, and In some cases a limited num-
ber of auxiliary equipment as: cyclones; pulverizers; induced draft 
fans; forced draft fans; condensate pumps; condenser circulating wa-
ter pumps; exciters; boiler feed pumps; etc. are studied In detail 
in order to permit a separate analysis of their operational perfor-
mance. 
The evaluation of the reliability of various components, as it can 
be deduced as by-products of availability studies, suffers general-
ly from one important drawback: only such incidents that affect the 
capability of the unit" are recorded. 
Repairs, which are carried out without affecting the capability -
e.g. repair of a reserve feed-water pump, while the other suffice 
to secure full load - or repairs carried out during a breakdown of 
another component are not normally reported, as they do not influ-
ence the availability of the unit as such. 
Some notes are, however, normally made In the power stations in con-
nection with repairs of equipment, but very often these notes are 
made in a more of less casual way and without any systematic orga-' 
nlzatlon. This makes special studie« of particular components vtmti-
tlcally Impossible. - — • - •-'-%, -




capability or not, has been introduced in Germany by RC; '. A 
similar procedure is on trial in France and is also under discussion 
in Great Britain and in the NORDEL-countries. The problem is to 
find the golden mean between the easy simplification and the per-
fection that might impose too much extra work on the power station 
operators. 
Collection of Statistical Information 
In the United States the main source of information about outages 
has been the data collected by the Edison Electric Institute, Prime 
Hovers Committee, since 1958. Results covering a number of years 
are regularly published. - The latest publication (EET No. 68-24) 
issued August 1968 covers the eight-year period 1960-67. 
In cooperation with the IEEE Joint Subcommittee on Application of 
Probability Methods a Manual for Reporting the Performance of Gene-
rating Equipment has been made effective from 1st January, 1968. 
The reporting form is filled In by the operator on duty who uses 
special code tables to indicate operating data, outage causes, in-
formation about manufacture, etc. Data giving information about 
changes taking place In the operation (outages or deratlngs) are 
filled in simultaneously with the events. 
The alms of the reporting have been to make only one recording, de-
manding onljt a minimum of time - and In a form suitable for digital 
computer treatment. The recorded data should be sufficiently detailed 
to allow for other applications than Just outage rates for the main 
components in different categories of plant. 
In Europe the member-countries of UNIPEDE (International Union of 
Producers and Distributors of Electricity) have formed a working 
group under the Statistics Study Committee to deal with the problem 
of availability of thermal power plant. 
It has been agreed to collect and exchange information about avail-
able power giving monthly figures that are based upon the power 
»| ' 
' VerfUgbarkelts- und Schadensstatistlk als Entaeheidungahilfe ftlr 
Bau und Betrieb von Kraftwerlcen. 
H. Vetter and K. Heuroth. Mitt, der VGB, 48 Heft 2, April 1968. 
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available each day at eight a.m. (not including Saturdays, Sun-
days, and holidays). Unavailability is divided between planned main-
tenance and all other causes. Information is collected separately 
for thermal units 100-199 MW and 200-400 HH. 
Although a considerable amount of data have been collected from 
about 10 countries no figures have so far been published. A number 
of studies have tried to reveal tendencies in the availability with 
age or size of the units. Furthermore some analysis of the availa-
bility of the main components has been carried out and more is in 
progress. 
Within the NORDfil.-countries a systematic reporting procedure for 
thermal power plant availability was started in Denmark - as the 
pure thermal power country in Scandinavia - already in 1957. Prom 
the beginning of the sixties a standardized reporting procedure 
was tested and in January 1964 adopted nationally by all Danish 
power companies. The reporting procedure is very much similar to 
the US practice.' 
Simultaneous efforts in Sweden led to a close cooperation manifested 
within the NOKDEL organization, in which also Finland has later ex-
pressed great interest in thermal power availability. Small working 
groups within each of the three countries conduct the statistical 
work and cooperate within the NORTEL working group. 
The reporting forms used in the Scandinavian countries have only 
minor deviations, and the results are published by NORDEL - together 
with other statistics on the operational performance of equipment 
as lines transformers etc. 
Even if results from all NORDEL-countries are Included, the breadth 
of these is very limited. Consequently it is important to Include 
results from other countries (especially when the operational relia-
bility of future large units Is estimated). Great effort« are made 
by NORDEL to intensify the International cooperation in this fieM 
and to make exchange of information more open-minded. In order tfejM. 
the results are comparable it is naturally necessary that the statisti-
cal data are bases on comparable standards. She WSEt&LakaitlVfit "*-
are therefore made sufflcinetly flexible tc enable cwapartlteh fclW4 
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US results as well as results from the cooperating countries within 
UNIPEDE. 
Definitions of the Factors Characterizing Availability 
Two different approaches with respect to defining numerical figures 
are at present in use. In the US (as well as in NORDEL) time is 
used as the basis for determining availability and forced outage 
rates. 
On this basis the availability factor is defined as the ratio of 
the time in which the plant has been available (it be in operation 
or in reserve) to the total time. The tall, shaded columns in fig. 1 
show the results obtained for all Danish power stations 1964-1968 
and separately given for units, boilers, and turbo-generators. The 
tapes show the accumulated values since 1964. The forced outage rate 
is defined as the ratio of total outage time to the sum of total 
outage time and total operation time. In fig. 1 the results in Den-
mark are shown as the lower (unshaded) columns. Numerical figures 
corresponding to fig. 1 are given in table 1. 
One difficulty in using time as the basis arlsed when outages are 
only partial, in other words when deratlngs from full nominal power 
are to be taken into consideration. Normally such deratings are 
Included as equivalent full forced outages having a reduced outage 
time proportional to the relative amount of the derating. 
While the available time or time on forced outage are normally easy 
to determine, the question is often raised about scheduled outages 
that is such outages which have not been planned at the time when 
the maintenance programm is fixed, but which can be planned some 
time in advance or for which the starting date is controllable beyond 
the week-end of the week In which some component trouble occurred. 
In the UNIPEDE statistics such scheduled outages are considered as 
unavailability due to other causes than planned maintenance. They 
thus contribute to increase the unavailability factor. 
In UHIPEDE power has been ehonen as the basis for determining availa-
bility factors, taking as a measure of available power the morning 
peak during which the load dispatcher has a knowledge of what is 
441 
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actually at his disposal for the day. The availability factor, e.g. 
for a »onth is calculated by dividing the product-sum of available 
power each working day by the total energy producible if all installec 
power were available each working day. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the results thus obtained for Danish units between 
100 and 199 MW. The black columns include planned maintenance, and 
the white sections of the columns Indicate how much the maintenance 
has contributed to reduce the availability. The annual averages are 
indicated in the figure. 
Fig. 3 gives an example of a graph - often used in UNIPEDE - showing 
the relative length of time during which the available power is 
larger than or equal to the percentage indicated on the abscissa. 
Very often such graphs will disclose the fact that the total in-
stalled power has never been available at any time - due to main-
tenance or to outages. 
In fig. 4 is shown a distribution function of forced outage power 
showing the ratio of power forced out to total power plotted in 
decreasing order. The curve is based upon the situation each working 
day at 8.00. The dashed curves have been drawn as the curves result-
ing from probability calculations assuming 7 % or 5 f> forced outage 
rate. By comparison between the theoretical 5 t curve and the em-
pirically determined full curve it seems like a 5 % forced outage 
rate is a reasonable assumption in the particular case. 
Analysis of Results 
Experiences outside Scandinavia have Indicated that especially 
during the first years after commissioning,the new large units have 
significantly higher outage rates and lower availability than smaller 
proven units. This is illustrated by fig. 5 (taken from EEC publ. 
68-24) and is also confirmed by the unpublished figures collected 
in UNIPEDE. Examples of an analysis according to age is given in 
table 2 which seem to indicate a trend towards bad avallaMlity and 
forced outage rates for the oldest plant. There are, however, no. 
significant teething-troUbleB for'the {limited) amount of units——~ 
Included in the table. :' '"*'" '"'' 
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The figures given in table 3 illustrate how an analysis according 
to size can be performed, and in table 4 Is shown an analysis according 
to the number of operational hours per year. This clearly indicates 
a better availability of the plant having a higher operational time. 
An attempt to disclose the maturing of units is made in table 5 
arranging the availability factors for Danish units 100-199 MW accord-
ing to age. The mean values - and especially the cumulated mean values 
at the columns to the right show a rather quick maturing effect. 
Component Failure Analysis 
While availability and forced outage statistics are of main concern 
for system planning engineers who have to determine the future amount 
of installed capacity - including necessary reserves - an analysis 
of component failures is of concern to the design and operation en-
gineers. 
An analysis of this kind is of the utmost importance in order to find 
the potential sources of failure leading to technical improvements 
or to a better understanding of the reserve requirements concerning 
for instance fans, feed pumps, control equipment, etc. 
A number of reasons for establishing component failure statistics 
oan be given: 
1) An objective measure of each major component's responsibility 
for the overall availability should be given. Weak points can 
thus be found and characterized quantitatively. This must be 
basic to all efforts undertaken to improve the overall availa-
bility. 
2) The determination of necessary reserve equipment Is normally a 
matter of judgement. The total reliability of a unit is a func-
tion of the different component reliabilities, and when these 
are reasonably well known, reserves should be Installed to such 
an extent that an optimum of availability Is achieved, Quantita-
tive Information about the average unavailability factors, aver-
age duration of outages or mean time between outages of major 
components such as feed pumps, fans, turbine blades, generator 
rotors, etc. may give valuable guidance in the choice of reserve 
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equipment deemed necessary. 
3) The extent, to which annual overhauls are carried out, varies 
greatly from one company to another. Damage statistics from 
companies having different overhaul practice may by comparison 
between the results lead to changes In policy. 
4) Restricted to a national level - as an international exchange 
of information is entirely impossible within official channels . 
a direct comparison of component behaviour for various types 
or manufactures is> desirable. This is not only true for the 
power companies that order the components, but also for the 
manufacturers, whose aim is to deliver reliable components, 
and whose research and development work must depend upon the 
operational experiences. 
It has been found useful by everyone Involved In this kind of sta-
tistics to develop some kind of outage code - in general a two or 
three digit code characterizing the components. 
When treating the collected data in a computer, printouts of the 
number of faults and their duration for a given main group - first 
digit - (e.g. boiler) or subgroup - second digit - (e.g. economizer) 
can be produced for the total amount of equipment in the country or 
for any specified station. Further analysis with respect to age or 
to manufacturer can be included. An example of a printout for a 
particular unit listing all faults during a 4-year period In descend-
ing order of fault duration is given below: 
- .1 






Furnace room evaporator tubes ' 113 226.2 ' 19 
Vibrations 319 ' 216.3 I 18.9 
Preheater flanges i 402 . 145.5 12.7 
Induced draft fan i 24a • 107.8 ' 9.4 
Condenser tubes ' 362 ! 107.0 i 9.4 
HP wall superheater j 122 • 92.6 I 8.1 
HP radiation superheater ' 121 ! 47.8 \ 4.2 
Feed water and condensate valves i 475 ' 42.4 ' 3.7 
Steam valves or tubes j 470 ' 38.7 3.4 










Preheaters feedwater pumps or tubes 
Feed water valve or tube 
Not spec, part in security system 
Undefined cause in turbine | HP safety governor 
i Cooling water screen | Safety regulator 
MP pick up valve 
Undefined cause in feed pump 
Primary electricity supply system 
Other external causes 
1 
, 240 
! 499 i 
, " 3 : 
! 349 ! 
i 359 i 
, 331 ' | 372 1 
! 347 ' 
i 336 ! 
, 439 1 
i 626 ! 
i 939 ' 






























Graphically a similar analysis of main components causing outages or 
deratings in Danish power stations over a three-year period is sihown 
in fig. 6. 
Within UNIPEDE a simple code list indicating the main components 
has been applied to allow the (confidential) exchange of information 
about the number of outages, their duration, and the energy lost 
expressed in per thousands of the possible energy production. Only 
outages which cause reductions in power are, however, included so 
far. The tendency is to accept some extra burden upon the power 
station operators to obtain complete records of the performance of 
the main components in a power station - independant of their in-
fluence upon power output. 
Further analysis, which yet has to be introduced, concerns a possible 
correlation between preventive maintenance and forced outage rates. 
By carrying out the preventive maintenance, some of the unlt-availa-
bility is sacrificed - at a time when it can best be spared - in the 
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hope that the unit then stands a better chance of being available, 
when it Is needed most. 
As the problem of finding proper periods for preventive maintenance 
is becoming more and more difficult in pure thermal power systems 
having many large, highly efficient units, the repair effort - its 
cost and the labour required - should be carefully analyzed. 
Conclusion 
Exchange of information about availability and forced outage rates 
is undoubtedly of great value in system planning - provided that the 
figures are based upon uniform definitions. A more free publication 
of results obtained should be encouraged. 
Fault analysis may not always be similarly interesting from one 
country to another, because design and manufacture vary greatly. 
Nevertheless information about methods used and general trends dis-
covered should be published regularly, preferably by some inter-
national organization. 
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Beregnet varighedskurve havarital 7% 
Calculated Curve for Forced Outage Rate 7% 
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TL MATURITY TRENDS 
COMPARISON OF OPERATING AVAILABILITY, FORCED OUTAGE RATES AND SCHEDULED OUTAGE RATES 
VS YEAR OF OPERATION FOR DRUM-TYPE, ONCE-THROUGH, AND NUCLEAR UNITS 
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Fault analysis of all Danish 
stations for the 3-years period 
1966-1968. 











Availability Factor Forced Outage Rate 
* , * 
84.22 ! 6.47 
76.75 ; 11.58 
89.40 2.50 
86.44 J 4.05 
84.42 4.41 
' Accumulated Values from 1964 
' Availability Factor ' Forced Outage Rate 
* * 
84.22 ! 6.47 
80.12 9.23 
85.93 ' 6.46 
! 84.80 1 5.64 
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i Units 
1
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i i 1965 i 
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! i 1967 1 
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! i 1965 1 
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84.02 ! 8.20 
81.61 i 9.12 
76.86 [ifl.CO 
86.70 j 5.11 
85.12 j 7-12 
73.34 [ 7.24 
80.46 , 8.67 
78.27 i 14.75 
79.64 8.47 
85.08 i 7.83 
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Availabil i ty Factor and Forced Outage Bate for Danish Power Stations 










'Number 1 b i l l t y
 (Outage 
Faetoi j Bate j 
2 I 82.83 6.1fl 
2 • 56.46 125.01 
3 I 96.38 ! 2.42 
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1965 ! 5 
1966 j 5 
1967 j 7 
196B ) 8 
Availa-
bi l i ty 
Factor t 
85.19 



























































Availability Factor and Forced Outage Rate for Danish Power Stations 
The Plants Are Sorted According to Operational Hours/Year 
TABLE 4 
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| ; Avails- | Forced ' 
; Year i Dumber i bl l i ty ; Outage j 
j Factor i ! Bate * 
Boilers 
0-999 HourB/Yeer 





























































































































































9 laavx 9S» 
HELIABttm ASPECTS OF SAFETT EVAIUATIQN 
OF NUCLEAR FOHER PUNTS 
S. HATTCRI* 
Tokyo University of Mercantile Marine Chubu Electric Power Co. 
J-i lntT04rvH<a 
m 1956, w# had keen discussions en the reason why we did not need a 
container for a graphite moderated gas cooled reactor., for the construction 
project of Totei nuclear power plant. 
Soon later, the MHI in Japan had made public a report on the safety 
•valuation of a nuclear power plant. 
The report had envisaged the iaportence of the reliability analysis on 
the safety aa*eseaent of a nuclear power plant and furtheraore a fault -
tree l ike approach to follow a reactor accident step wis«. 
Ihe CRE3SHES started i t« activity few years ago with the project purpose 
as following. 
(1) To clarify the relation between the reliability of the safety 
sylte* and reliability value of the system coaponent. 
(2) To study the basis of judgement for the safety of nuclear power 
plants. 
Bd* paper presents sone interesting results obtained tgf the 
Managing staff of the CBEEOES 
, Ministry of international Trade and 
• CoaattU* ca Beeecor Safety Bwlmtlon 
of kgiaewwd aafegiau* ergaadsed to 
lUNMavaa. ttéswjgfjfcjaa* 
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2. Consideration of the Evaluation Basis en toe Huclaar Reactor Safetar 
Recently, interest is increasing in discussions on tee reliabilities of 
engineered safety features. But who could pronounce that present designs 
are suitable, not being over or less. 
To obtain a proper target for the safety design of nuclear power plants 
or a reference value for the reliability of engineered safety features, 
the present effort of our committee is the first step of the approach. 
It i s extremely important for liie hunan life In recent scientific 
civilisation to endeavour to establish a proper judgement basis not only 
on nuclear safety but also on Industry safety. 
Our committee has followed ordinary psychological process which general 
people experience when they have to Judge the safety of a certain thing. 
Handy, we compared the risk of nuclear power with the various fisks that 
surround us by using statistical data. "In what sorts of risks do we, 
human being, have daily life?" Survey activities to this question have 
been the first step of our works. 
2- lBiskstudy 
He surveyed the various risks that surround us and fallowings are main 
survey data is Japan. 
m akt.^1 h y * 
-Severe natural hasards expsrionoed in Japan are earthquake, 
typhoon and flood. The statistics over 60 years until 1965 
shows that average death rate by the earthquake is 3 x 10"' 
death/man year. 
WhileT the death rata by typhoon and flood is 1.2 x W"* deathman 
'*} r i n -
He obtained the disease death rate of the Japanese for each afs 
' rank from statistic*! 
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age 
5 - 14 
2 5 - 3 4 
45 ~ 54 
6 5 -
disease death/nan year 
4.3 x Iff* 
9.5 x ltf* 
5.2 x 1D-3 
6.4 x 10"2 
age disease death/man year 
0 ~ 4 4.7 x Hf3 
15 - 2 4 4.4 x 1 0 * 
35 - 4 4 2.0 x 10"3 
5 5 - 6 4 1.4 x KT2 
The risk of disease death changes by age. The disease death rate of 
the young age Is decreasing year by year in Japan. 
Generally, diseases of high death rate in Japan are various cancers, 
heart diseases and vascular lesions affecting central nervous system 
such as apoplectic stroke«. 
These data show that yearly death risk by disease i s about one 
thousandth in the thirties and nearly one hundredth in the f i f t i e s . 
m Industrie,} tmmrin 
la taking stat ist ics of hasards data of industrial act ivit ies , we 
had following standpoint. That i s , "How nany huaan l ives are totally 
los t by the existence of a certain industry ?» Tearly hasards ratas 
(the ratio of total yearly victims to the population) are l i s ted 
below. 
rai l road 
autor ear 
ship 






6.5 » 1 0 * 
'•ft if 5x10"* 
- r, . . . tv ts- >.« urn. -t » «»•»•»»« liS^t'i%^,W^M'm,lt' 
•I «v : '-J.5 • :l »•tan MMLVltUl Of a»V i 
K'urm » # 
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In treating s tat is t ics , we also paid some attention to deride people 
concerned into the following three parties; 
the 1st party i people who are eoployed and at 
work for the industry concerned. 
the 2nd party : people such as passengers of 
traffic fac i l i t ies 
the 3rd party : public in general 
As for the question whether we should treat these parties separately 
or not, the conclusion of our Coaaittee has not been reached as yet . 
(,.\ K.-i.wfa.i rieks of the public 
Death rates of the public by a l l sorts of accidents are l i s ted below. 
aotor car 2 x 10"* (death/een year] 
n i l road 2 z 10"* ( " 
ship wreck 1 x 10"5 ( • 
natural hasards 1 x 10"* ( " 
others 1 x lo"* ( " 
All sorts of 4 x 10"* ( » 
accidents 
thrroid cancer, abnoi—1 birth 
In relation to radiation hazards, special attention should be paid 
to leubaala, thyroid canosr, aelforaation, and st i l lbirth. 
The yearly death rate by natural leukemia la 3 x 10"' ieath/san 
year in Japan. It i s said that the natural risk of thyroid osnoer 
i s 2 x 10"' a n year. 
Sw rate of abnctssl Mrth such as »alfenetion, fe«W—IWnW end 




(6) Irradiation anil <t.ff >"f»rj 
I t i s really difficult prohlem to get a risk value corresponding 
to a IOK level dose because of the lack of the information and of 
the uncertainty »Aether the hasard i s caused by irradiation or not. 
Following the well taown conservative assumption that the dam -
effect curve i s linear even below the irradiation level of 100 rem, 
ane ren dose corresponds to the leukemia risk of 2 x 10"5 death/asm 
year and the thyroid ouicer risk of 1 - 2 x 10*5 patient / sen year. 
As for genetic effect, i t i s said that one rem dose gives the risk 
of 10"* ~ 10 in relation to nutations and st i l lbirth. This 
figure i s almost negligible coaparad with natural abnormal birth 
rata of 5 x 10 . Figure 1 shows our survey data in Japan. 
S-t f ' W ^ a r i r t l a a m l 
Industrial activities most be continued to accomodate mere enhanced 
l iving standards. Thau, in what extant should tin •Mebj" of those activi-
t i e s be pursued ? What i s the target value of the safety design of the 
nuclear poser plants ? 
There magr be following approaches. 
A. Through the broad and profound survey, a l l sorts of risks auiTUuadiug 
our human being such as natural hasards, Unman and auuddmats cam 
be studied sclantlfissUy, historioaUjr, geographically and sociolo-
gically. 
Giving the analysis on the future statue, and investigating the 
difference of those risks batsman otumvjtmtieml, » ilWImvaw » ! » » 
for the basis or safety evaleatlai would bo set by f tsdUgtbe 
value adequately Invar tian those a i l s w t v c t TlBsK -~ •?-• « 
ft, Through the stttdtie af I 
possible t o gat iaøtm i 
imdustay. Of •»•*» ttorium tl mH 
1 
4*2 
C* Ih the case of the nuclear industry, i t i s a way to investigate the 
natural risks of leukemia, thyroid cancer and so on. Additional 
risk by nuclear industry should be adequately smaller than those 
risks of natural surroundings. 
D. Safety and public hazards of a nuclear power plant could be discussed 
and judged in comparison vith a conventional thermal paner plant. 
Let us apply our survey data to those sorts of approaches. 
1. General human risk 
Ths yearly disease deth rate i s the smallest in the ags from ten 
to thirty, and i t is about 5 x 10 death/man year. The accidental 
risk of tbs yjblic i s different by year, by country and by circumstance. 
in average value of the accidental risk of the public i s 4 x 10"* death/ 
amn year. 
B. Comparison with other Industries 
Tbs figure, 2 x ID"* death/man year, of car accidents is by no means 
acceptable. R i s even a big problem to be salved as soon as possible. 
Then He take the figures 2 x 10~' dsath/man year of rai l roads, 2.5 x 10' ' 
death/man year of constructions and-5 x 10 death/man year of electric 
' power as is faiences. 
The natural risk by leukemia i s 3 x 10"* death/man year in Japan. 
Ths natural abnormal birth rats of 5 x 10"2 is too big figure, which 
cam by no •Bins be a reference. 
ft WmWiHw lrtHt.ttmi* wwr gum 
The figure J x JO"* death/saw year by the electric power Industry 
la comparativeljr a n i l . Besides, the contribution of ths eeclaents of 
tnejtml pater plasto Is very l i t t l e to It. Then, le t ue thlak of the 
| » w f « K t e » t the fisjl miiimmn in the pjsnt. 
>. <r/, . . ^ * 
•mmu. 
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The hasards rate of coal mining people in Japan i s one death/105 tons 
of coal product. A 500 MT coal burning power plant needs about 15 x 10* 
tones of coal to operats for one year. So, one year operation of a 500 MM 
coal burning power plant eventually consumes the fuel which is obtained 
by raising vict ims of fifteen deaths and of mors than one thousand 
injuries. This i s too formidable present situation, so it i s by no 
means allowed to take the figure as a reference. As for public hasards 
problems by burning fossil fuel in the ordinary operation of thermal 
power plants, we do not have quantitative conclusion yet . 
He have obtained a status reference figure of 10 ~ 10"' death/11*'1 
year, by means of general survey on natural risks and risks caused by 
industrial activit ies . 
But when one cones to settle an acceptable standard wlue of the 
risk for the nuclear power industries, there are •any important factors 
to be considered. 
Therefore, the standard value might be some orders of magnitude less 
than the figure of 10"*~ 10"5 death/man year. Ms have to inveatigat« 
these factors to be cons ids red in between the standard value and the 
status reference figure. 
We never forget to emphasise that the substantial effort of the 
safety assurance in the industrial activities oust bo continued endlessly 
for the prosperity of human being in the scientific age. 
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3 . Reliability Data of some Mechanic! r.mpm^p^ 
The engineered safety features such as core spray systems and safety 
injection Bystens are not required to operate during the normal operation of 
plants, but are required to surely perform their functions in case of an 
accident, therefore, in calculation of the reliability of their systems, 
i t i s reasonable to divide the duties into three categories, i . e . stand-by, 
start-up and operation. Reliabilities corresponding to the duties of these 
systems are derived from their failure data. 
However, Judging from the field data, we think i t i s impossible to 
separate the stand-by failures from the start up failures, because the 
stand-by failures can be discovered only at the time of next start. 
The data of emergency diesel electric power generating fac i l i t ies »ere 
obtained from the maintenance records and accident reports of japan Broad-
casting Corporation. 
Resulting failure rates of 5aVe and 75KVA units are 6.9 x 10"3/hr, 
4.3 x KT3/hr during operation and 6.7 x 10"Vhr, $.6 x 10"5/hr in stand-by 
condition, respectively. 
? - 1 j»ti»f*r « « . ! . , s c tr ic Power generating f&cllli.le» 
Japan Broadcasting Corporation had a failure survey of stand-by disss! 
electric power generating faci l i t ies to settle consistent maintenance system. 
Capacities and numbers of these diesel mite are 5K»--750aVA and 271 malts, 
respectively, and 205 of those are 5WI-75Wa units. 
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overhauled or inspected once or twice a year. Moreover, automatic start-up 
testing had been done remotely from the looal station once a month. These 
inspections were made following a check l i s t in maintenance records, and 
this check l i s t was composed of U4 components parts column* with five 
failure modes and three repairing treatments. 
Operating hours, start-up times, repairing and miscellaneous were recorded 
on another sheet in maintenance records. In the case of a starting miss or 
a unpland stop, the details of the affair were mentioned on an accident 
report. 
table 1 and 2 show numbers of the failures of 5KVA and 75KVA units. In 
these Tables, "A" means a minor trouble, and "B" a serious failure. 
"B" failures are 10 - 20SE of a l l troubles. There was no difference on the 
failure modes due to the lapse of t ine. 
Failure rates during operation and in stand-by condition for 5KVA and 
75KVA units are calculated from "B" failures, and they are shown in liable 3 . 
Tile stand-by hours In Table 3 were obtained by substracting the operation 
hours from the calender hours. The judgement whether the failure had been 
occured during operation or in stand-by condition was made by checking up 
the maintenance records and the accident reports. 
In general, a reliability of a stand-by facil ity i s reasonably divided 
into three categories, namely reliability of stand-by duty, start-up duty 
and continuous operation duty. However, since the failures in stand-by period 
are discovered only at the time of next start, i t i s impossible to separate 
the stand-by failures and the start-up failures. Then we could not get the 
atart-up failure rates, no matter hew total start-up trials during two and 
a half years cn 5KVA units and tVSHk units were 8389 tines and 13*6 tines, 
svsjpsstlMfty* • • -
. is.. -. m> ia reajonaa-l« to thin« that tt» »tsaiav*r failure rates e»«a<M*«4 
i.C '£&¥ DUE WieJfcis/^ lPjMBej^ ttlal #&*JaTO31ll$*-*nd fåø ejrtaoit o£ VB&lBØn&BBBtto&K* 
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It Mas shown that numbers of the failures per one unit-year regarding 
a l l troubles (A * B) of the JKVA unit increased linealy with years. 
However, we could not get exact data to clarify the effects of stand-by 
hours and the other factors on failure rates. If the operator watched 
the fac i l i t i es adequately, most of the deteriorating failures could be 
removed. However, most of these faci l i t ies had been urmaned, and a few 
deteriorating failures are included in lable 3 . table 4 shows the failure 
rates excluding deteriorating failures, so these failure rates depend only 
on chance failures. These failure rates in Table 4 are almost constant 
through the period surveyed. 
Operation failure rate of 5 - 7 x 10"3/hr and 1-2 .5 X ltf^/hr in Table 3 
and 4 are rather large compared with operation failure rate of about 
3 x 10 /hr which was obtained from our another survey on merchant marine 
dynamo engines. It can be said that the difference of these failure ratal 
depends on the different maintenance system. 
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Table 1 . f a i l u r e of 5KSA u n i t s 
Inspection year 




Bigine Bain parts 
Fuel oi l system 
Lub. oil system 
Cooling water system 
Starting cell motor gear sys. 
Safety device sensor 
Safety device relay ft meter 
Bigine bed & foundation 
Blgine stop mech. 4 FO, LO, CW 
supply system 
Gas ejdiaust system 
Auto switching system 
Miscellaneous 
T o t a l 
failure« per unit 
F1963 L1963 P1964 LI964 F1965 Total 
9 12 29 U 19 80 
A B A B A B A B A B A B 
26 5 22 2 53 9 15 1 67 19 183 36 
13 2 4 1 3 4 2 5 0 2 1 1 77 6 
6 0 0 0 2 3 0 4 0 1 4 0 47 0 
1 1 1 1 4 1 0 0 7 0 13 3 
1 0 0 0 2 1 6 1 1 0 1 4 0 41 3 
0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 
4 1 0 0 7 0 2 2 2 3 15 6 
4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 
9 6 1 1 6 6 2 0 1 8 2 36 15 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
0 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 0 4 2 1 0 
2 0 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 7 2 
75 17 31 3 149 23 29 6 149 29 433 83 
8.3 1.9 2j6 0.7 5.1 0.8 2.6 OS 7.8 1.5 54 1 * 
F,L 1 First half, Last half of the year 
FO t Fuel o i l 
L 0 1 Lubricating o i l 
C W 1 Cooling water 
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Table 2. Failure of 75MA units 
Inspection rear 




Engine main parts 
Fuel oi l system 
Lub. o i l system 
Cooling nater Bysten 
Starting rail motor gear sys. 
Safety device sensor 
Safety device relay & meter 
BigLne bed & foundation 
Engine stop msch. «c FO, LO, CW 
Supply system 
Gas ejhaust system 
Auto switching system 
Miscellaneous 
T o t a l 
Failures per unit . 
F1963 11963 F1964 L1964 F1964 Total 
21 1 20 6 k 52 
A B A B A B A B A B A B 
2 8 4 1 0 34 3 1 0 1 1 6 0 8 9 8 
6 0 0 0 J O 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
5 1 0 0 7 0 1 0 1 0 1 4 1 
3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 6 0 
4 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 8 2 
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 
17 0 O O 5 1 1 O 2 O 25 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
8 2 2 0 7 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 2 
0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 2 2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
76 8 3 0 6 2 7 1 3 1 2 7 2 U I U 
3.6 0 4 3.0 0 3A 0 4 Z2 02 60 0,5 3.5 035 
F, L 1 First half, last balf of the year 
F 0 1 Fuel o i l ^ 
L 0 1 Lubricating Oil 
C W 1 SMliaf »•*•* 
labia 3 . "B" failure ratas at 5KVA and 75KVA units In stand - tgr,start - up 
conditions and. during operation 




Isår & B U D 
lir hr Nos Boa 
P1963 38510.8 38510.8 8 8 
L196? 57218.5 89729.3 3 11 
V 196J, 125570.7 2I53OO.O 7 18 
1 1964 46742.1 262042.I 1 19 
r 1965 81333.4 343375.5 4 23 
M a l 343375.5 23 
FW63 9046.O 9046.O 3 3 
L1963 4313.O 13359.0 0 3 
F1964 86868.9 100227.9 4 7 
L 1964 25938.8 126166.7 0 7 
F1965 17404.7 143571.4 1 8 








































 c / . 
hr Nos Hos ° '* 
1017.2 9 9 8.7 xuV5 
2414.7 4 13 2.86xlO"3 
4212.0 14 27 7.8 xlO'3 
5517.9 4 31 3.05xlO"3 
7632.5 22 53 5.95x10-3 
53 
771.0 5 5 6.48xlO-3 
826.0 0 5 0 
1797.1 3 8 3.08x10-3 
1966.3 1 9 5.91x10-3 


















6.48xlO"3 j 496 








Notas A : Stand-fes' houra or operating hours 
B : Cuaulativo stand-tir hours or 
operating hours 
of failures _ •,. _ 
D 1 emulative number of failures 
C/A : Failure rates per hr. 
D/B : Cumulative failure rates per hr. 
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Table 4s "B" failure rates excluding deteriorating failures 
Ih stand-by ' start-up conditions 
During operation 
5KVA 
1.76 x 0O"5/hr 
1.18 x 10-3/hr 
75KV* 
3.48 x Wtyhr 
2.34 x 10"3/hr 
3 - 2 W ^ t t M r data 4n JPfft 
JHEB(Japan Power Danonstration Reactor) i s a natural circulation, direct 
cycle BWB plant with 12,500 Kh*e electricity generation. 
(11 Troubles influencing on continuous operation 
Troubles influencing on continuous operation of JPDR from March 1965 
to February 1967 were as follows '• 
unscheduled shutdown 22 
(scheduled shutdown 10) 
start-up delay 7 
It i s seen that the scheduled shutdow of the plant was only 30 
percent, though this figure is much improved at present. 
Die closes of troubles which gave plant shut-downs are show in 
Sable 5. Leakage of steam or water from the primary coolant system 
was observed eight times and this corresponded to almost one third 
of shutdown causes. Failures of component* and malfunctions of 
components caused plant shut down seven and four times, respectively. 
It i s noted that the rupture of diaphram valves in the scram air 
system was avoided after the inspection intM-vals had been leagthensd 
from ones a day to once a week. /", ' a . i S 
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(21 Maintenance records of JPDR 
to review of maintenance records of an electricity generating plant, 
the concern i s not with calendar days or accumulated hours of reactor 
operation, but with accumulated hours of electricity generation, 
because i t could be said that almost hundred percent of components 
were put in service during this period. 
The relations between the accumulated hours of electricity genera-
tion and the numbers of maintenance sheets are shorn in Fig* 2 , 
regarding mechanical, electrical and instrument component, respectively. 
Total numbers of maintenance sheets are also shown. Stepwise increases 
of failures at 2,200, 4,400, 5,200, 7,400 and 9,900 hours correspond 
to the periodic inspection of the plant or refueling work and so on. 
It can be said that the number of failures are nearly proportional 
to the accumulated hours, i f failures during only power generation 
are picked up, and init ial failures are excluded. Total failure 
rates of component groups are derived as follows, based on the slope 
at the end of each curve shown in Fig. 2. 
mechanical cinponent 1.0 
electric component 0.2 
instrument l«t 
total 2.6 
(unit : failures/days of power generation) 
Dominate causes of these failures are (1) water leakage from valves 
(8.1 failuree/month), puaps (4.1 failures/month) in mechanical 
components, (2) failures of motor control panels or anuneiator panels 
(4*5 failuree/month) in electric components and (3) ealinraUen or 
readjustment of nuclear and process indl»tor», wrtrollers in instru-
ment compensate.. It could ba wandered that the failWs éode of •oat 
components Is a random failure, excluding Init ial 1,000 hours. 
lm.Ai&igi,,.,,......, , -- j . , — ^ . , . ,
 k „ .. _.,_....--. i ,i iaammwl 
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(T> Failure data of components in Jfat 
trial to review the reliability of the emergency cooling system in JFDH 
had been nade to survey which coaponent nas dominant for the reliability 
of the system. 2} 
The date of failure rates used to evaluate the system reliability 
were shorn in the last report. Same of then Here derived from the 
maintenance record of JPDR during 27 saiths from July 1964 to September 
1966, and expressed in the form of failure per unit time or unit action. 
In Table 7, failure numbers of the main components of the system are 
shown. Judging from the number of failure samples, derived failure rates 
shoud include considerable statistical deviation, and high confidence 
level can not be expected. But i t can be said that the overall re l ia-
bi l i ty of an emergency cooling system i s much dependent on the operation 
reliabil ity of motor driven valves. To get a more useful failur3 rate 
on a motor driven valve, operation counters nave been installed to both 
relays for open and close valves. Numbers of valves whose operation 
are counted are as follows. 
DC motor valves 25 
MC motor valves 28 
The number of counts i s recorded every week in check sheets, with 
respect to a l l valves. When some abnormal situation i s found at 
either open or dree action of a valve, operation people or maintenance 
people should describe the situation and repairing work in detail . 
After preliminary examination of the counters, the failure rate of 
a motor driven valve was obtained from the data for one year (op to 
Marco 1969). Becorded faulty operations of a valve are tw» for close 
close action and sero for open action. The total eotnts f t dome 
action, were 19*7, which give the ttilurs w t » for clow «ft|«m -
«- ' - v i i 
1 . - — # 1.0al0-3 ImUmw/eleW* 
1*7 
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The confidence level of this figure can not be discussed because the 
number of failure sample j s very scull for statistical treatment. 
It i s hoped that this kind of survc/ would be continued for longer 
tine, for instance, five years, to obtain more reliable informations. 
Table 6. Causes of start-up delay 
CAUSES 
f a i l u r e of CIE Range Switch 
Displacement of Limit Switch 





Abnormal Indication of 
Beactor Level meter 
Rupture of Diaphram Valve 
in Scram Air System 
Leakage through Valve on 
Core Spray System 
Mater Leakage from Cool 
System of Ih-core Monitor 
Total Delay 
- I t -
Table 5« Causes of plant shutdowi 
i \ 
i i > 
IV-
!i 
• I r e * 
'ft , 
i.1 • 
Leak*«« ttf Steam 




• j leakage 
ateelner,81i>ctaige 
«J*-Operatta» 
Oietiniuit a l l u r e 
j. '/ • --"afceu *:u.'i" . 
CAUSE ap moras 
steam leakage from the root valve of reactor level gauge 
steam leakage from the valve on core spray system 
water leakage frcm a union of seal ooolant of oontrol rod 
steam leakage from a drain l ine of HSV 
water leakage from incore monitor cooling system 
turbine trip from malfuction of HSV 
malfunction of primary bypese valves 
malfunction of period meter 
rupture of valve dlarrhram on scram air system 
low suction pressura of FWP 
air inflow to condensate during replacing strainer 
high condenser pressure during start-up 
KSVatick 
fault contact of-operation mode ewitch 
low pressure an o i l system for primary bypass valves 





























Table 7* M l u r e Mode Aram Maintenance Record 
AtUupe of Kotei* 
ftrleen V O n In 
open opeiAtioa 
OB) 
NOK OP FAILURE 
1) themal relay tripped from 
packing hardening 2 
2) motor control center 
burnt 2 
3} fuse molting in control 
elrcuit 2 
FAILURE RATE REMARKS 
4) terminal loosened In 
control circuit 
5) insufficient adjustment 
of torgue switch 
6) failure of auto-manual 
" i t eh 1 
total 9 
1 1650 (opens) 
1 
= 5.4 x 10 J 
failure of Motor 
driten » l » e in 
oloae operation 
(3») 
1) thermal relay tripped from 
packing hardening 
2) insufficient adjustment 
of torque switch 
3) failure of contactor in 
control circuit 
4) EC system ground 
5) others 
total 
• 2 0 < 










1) failure of relay contact 
(for start-up duty) 
2) teminal to battery loo-
• w i tftr »frndrfr Mr) 
total 
1) DC system ground 
2) deviated Indication during 





start up duty 
3
 § 0 0 « - "9.8 .10-3* 
_1_ operation duty 
* Ws) -™**>•*** 
•tand by duty 
i 
2 (failure)
 m 6 x llT6** 
_ 1 _ 331296(hrs.) * *" 
JUS, 
9488(hrs * | - 5.1 * W * " 





(a) * failure rata depending on number of actuation 
(b) aj • fcilur* rate depending on time 
(e) nuabere of aubjeot ara ahorn in parenthesis in "HEM« 






Fig* 2. Accumlatod hours of electricity generation 
VS. nuBber of maintenance sheeta 
total 
instrument 
«f? _. • • * 
mechanical component 
j l -K X < « 
electrical component 
2500 5000 7500 





An approach for the safety evaluation basis, reliability data of mechanical 
components, these subjects presented bare are topics of our comaittee. 
Our comaittee will continue the activities for the work to establish a 
probabilistic procedure on the safety evaluation of the nuclear pomr plant, 
along with the work for the collection of the failure data of various 
components concerning nuclear safety. 
(Reference) 
(1) IAMADA, T., Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Pomr Plant, Proc. IAEA 
Symposium (1962, 493) 
(2) TAKEKDSHI, T., Reliability Assessment of engineered Safeguards of 
Nuclear Power Plants. Second CREST Meeting, Ispra, June, 1968. 
(3) I.C.R.P. Comittee No.l, "The Evaluation of Risks from Radiation" 
I.C.S.F. Publication 8, Pergamon Press (1966) 
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KBCHasTSAL COHPOiregTS OP CCBTBOL BOD UBITB SYSTEM 
Og GAS-COOLBP POULS BBACTOBS 
0PB3ATEB IB TH3 EOBOPSAS COMHUHlTt 
Susm-ry 
Different principles adopted by various suppliers of mechanical parts 
for control-rod drive systems in gas-cooled power reactors operated in 
the European Community are described on a comparative basis. Tho funotion 
of the different systems is demonstrated by reliability block diagrams 
and the reliability analysed for both normal and scram mode of operation« 
The following subjects are traated in detail! 
1. estimation of possible failure rates of mechanical system components. 
Comparison of the analytically determined inherent system reliability 
with the operational system reliability. 
2. Heliability analysis of the oomplete control and safety systems 
(total number of control and safety rods), on the basis of the ana-





1. Control Bod Driro Mechanisms for Oaa-Cooled Power Reactors 
2. Description and Analysis of Control Bod Drive Systems for 
Bel iabi l i ty Considerations 
3 . 2 . 1 . Tbe E3F-2 Boactor Control Bod Drive Nsahanlsm 
2 .2 . The EDF-3 Beactor Control Bod Drive Meabaniem 
2.3* Tho Latins Beactor Control Bod Drive meofcanisa 
3 . Bel iabi l i ty Analysis of Control Bod Drive Systems of Gaa-QOBled 
Fmrar Beaetors 
3 . 1 . Failure Bate Estimation of Control Bod Drive Unit Components 
3 .2 . Bel iabil i ty Analysis of Individual Control Bod Drive Units 
3.3* Comparison of Betimated and Operationally Determined Control. 
Bod Drive System Failure Bates. 




1. CONT30L BOD DRIVE KSCHAKIS1IS FOB OAS-COOLED POKKB REACTORS 
In ga-5-ooolod power roaotors nore thån 100 long (8-10 a) and heavy ^ 50-
500 kg} control roda are aoved in hot gas* A drua and cable or a 
sprocket and chain arrangeaent is used in the drive ascbaniaa aystea. 
The power chain to operate the drive aechanisa ie coapoaed of an 
electrio aotor and a gear systen, hut even a pneuaatic operated piston, 
has boen used to rotate the cahle dzua via the corresponding gearing 
(Hef. 2). 
it i first cables were utilised to lift or to loser the control rods, 
later, in England, because of increased control rod might and insertion 
velocity with the »ore sophisticated Magnox stations (e.g., Dungeness, 
Sisewell, Oldbury and Tjrlfa), the cables were replaced by chains. 
Three control rod drive aeohanisas of different designs used for the 
EBF-2, the SDF-3 and the Latins reactor have been chosen for an analysis 




2. DESgHIPTKW ATP AMI.YSIS OF C08TBOL HOD D3IVS 3TSTBE FOB lTOTimtHT 
C0NSI35JATKMS 
2 .1 . The SDF-2 Eeactor Control Bod Drive Mechanise 
The Fransh ^DF-2 plant at Ohinon ia equipped vith a CO_-coolod power 
reactor. Individual rcable and drun nechaniaae instal led in a presaurs 
casing are used to raiae or to lower the 104 absorber rods in the 
reactor core (Fige. 1 atbi 2) . 
A pneuaetic and •echanioal systea i s eaployed to drive the sable drua. 
Power to rotate the drua i s obtained froa a pneuaatio cylinder which 
i s actuated by the differential preasure between the CO, blower and 
the reactor core. The actuated aoveaent of the piston rod i s trans-
ferred into drum rotation by a differential gear and a aat of bevel 
gears and shafts • 
Two sprung-set, pneuaatioally released, drun-type brakes ara incor-
porated in the drive aochanisa. Their funotiona are tha following« 
- to keep the rod in a given position 
- traneforaation of alternative rack aoveaent into continuous 
rotation •in one direction or the other 
- realisation of a controlled rod drop. 
Platon aoveaent ia transaltted to the aeohanisa by the rack ( l ) 
(Figs, i and 4 ) . Tha nechanie« i s linked to the drum by t t s i i téraa-
diate gearing (4) . The different rod aoviaents a n oasvisd sot adtfc 




The rack (1) rotates the seotor (6) supporting shaft (11) of tho 
sate l l i t e vhioh i s geared into the gear rim (10), which rotates the 
drum by the intermediate gearing (4)* The gear rim (10) i s also 
geared into sector (6) via sector (8) , the sa te l l i t e pinion (9; and 
the conical pinion (7)* A centrifugal friation regulator (13) Kith 
the governor mights fixed to (5) rubs on the inner surface of (10) 
and limits the rod drop velocity to 2 m/s. 
Rod operations 
- Hod l i f t ing 
Each pieton stroke corresponds to an elementary rod movement of 
10 cm called a "quantum". The change of action of the tvo brakes 
allows a continuous rod movement Kith alternating piston movement. 
The time neoessary for a 10 cm elementary movement is 0.5 s. 
- 1a Siraction A of piston (fig. 7) braks FA (2) set, brake F3 (3) open. 
When brake (2) is set, the whole shaft (5) is blocked. Tho rack (l) 
drives the sector (6) and by means of the pinion (7) the sector (6) 
in the opposite direction. Sector (8) drives satellite-pinion (9), 
union rolls on the blocked pinion on shaft (5) and in this way 
drives the gear rim (10), i.e., the drum also, so that tho control 
rod is lifted. 
'ihen the piston reaches the highest position, the brake FA (2} is 
opened and' the brake FB (3) is eet. The brakes are operated by 
eleotrio valves. 
- lb Direction B of piston 
The brake FB (3) is set and hence the brake pulley (12) blocked. 
The raok (1) drives the Motor (6) in the opposite direction in 
relation to movement la. The shaft (11) rolls on (12) blocked and 





- Hod insertion 
The rod is moved downwards in the same way as when liftedj the 
only difference being that the brake action is inverted, e.g., 
piston in direotion A Drake FB (3) set-
piston in direction B brake FA (2) set. 
- Controlled rod drop 
Eod drop i s caused by cutting the power supply to the eleotric 
valves. Both brakes are released and motor aotion ie no longer 
passible. The motor piston i s Btill moving to i t s highest or deepest 
position* 
The oontrol rod rotates the drum by i t s weight, whioh me»ns that 
the gear rim (10) also turns. Then, by means of the satell ite-pinion 
(9) , the shaft (5) i s rotated with the centrifugal regulator (13) 
whUh ie fixed to i t . The speed of (5) and (13) i s much higher than 
In normal operation, so the regulator weights move outwards and 
start to rub on the drum (10), thus stabil is ing the movement) (10) 
and (13) rotates in the opposite direotion. Rod braking and stopping 
at the end of the rod travel i s performed by setting brake FB ( 3 ) . 
The order to brake FB (3) i s given by a oontaot, whioh »loses when 
the rod reaches a predetermined position. 
- Besting position 
In the resting position the rod la fixed', poeeibly in at> interatolate 
position- In this case there la not air supply to the nntuaatlV' 
motor and both brakes ft (2) and TB (3) are applied. W «ai«M i f 
the rod tr ies t o turn the gee* H a (10>. *bVgear'ii« W * ' ' 
sector (6) «r IMÉT tt'i&mltto^%X!h?i~~™'*r*m1.R1!^KH*$ 
are themselv« gearl in ( ^ m i ^ W ^ i ^ ^ ^ m ^ ^ k 




All parts of the mechanian are housed inside a pressurs easing, which 
is divided into three parts 
- the upper part contains the electric valves (pres3uro I recctor 
pressure + 10 b) 
- the niddle part contains all the components of the Beehanism 
(pressure » reactor pressure) 
- the lower part oontains the drum (pressure i re&otor pressure}* 
The middle part can he opened for maintenance purposes. Leakti^htnees 
between this and the lower part is ensured by an adjustable double 
rotary gas seal on the drive shaft between the gear rim and the oable 
drum* 
The lower part of the control rod drive mechanism is installed in a 
•loeve tube fixad to the reaotor pressure vessel* The preesure casing 
with the drive mechanism is supported by the upper part of the sleeve 
tube. Leaktlghtness is guaranteed by a flange seal (Figs. 1 and 2). 
The oontrol rod dimensions arsi 
active length (12 parts) 6.714 m 
total length 7.016 m 
m n m w diameter 68 mm 
weight 36 kg 
lbs oontrol rod is fixed to a cable and oonmists of 12 cylindrical 
absorber parts interconnected by hinge couplings and another cable 
(safety sable) (Fig«. J and 6). 
two types of control rods arm available, black and grey owe. 
The black ones u*» boral (boron/aluminium oarbide) and the gray ones 




The control rod aovee In a graphite channel. A separate deeper l e 
installed on the core support plate. 
The position indication syetea ooaprieeet 
« a pinion mounted on the Bhaft ( i tea 4) 
- a screv and a wheel geared in the pinion aentioned 
- a runner on the sore« to close final position oontaots 
and the contact for Drake setting 
- a seleyn driven by a systsn of »heel and endless sores 
connected to the above-oentioned screv.The sslsyn ie used 
to indicate rod position - the total rod travel corresponds 
to 346«. 
Cable rapture i s indicated by the slack cable switch. 
P i j . 8 shows a block diagran for a EPF-2 reactor control rod drive 
unit drafted for the following re l iabi l i ty consideration«. "St inted 




2.2. Ih« KMP-3 Baaotor Control Hod Brive mechanism 
Tha 3BF-3 Control rod drive mechanism conaiata of an electri? motor 
winch mounted on the upper part of the biological shielding plug 
(Pig. 9). 
Each winch ia compoeed of 
a power chain with 
motor (3 phase aeynohronous ) with brake (closed when not under 
tenaion) and epeed limit device, reduotion gear, differential gear 
and drum 
a eecurity chain with 
drumi differential gear, speod regulator and diao brakj and its 
control 
a tranamiaaion chain with 
drum, sables, slack cable control, oable guido and connecting 
link 
a poaition reproduction chain with 
gears, cam or own, eeleyn (»elf-synchronized motor) and aicroawitohes 
and auxiliaries. 
The gear by whioh motor rotation is tranamltted to the drum la composed 
of 
- a double reduotion gear train betwesa the motor shaft and the 
differential gear shaft with the pinion (item 3) (see ?ig. 10) 
- a differential gear with a rim (item 4) which oan be fixed by 
'*} brake (item 13) (of the safety ohain), a central pinion (3), 





- the junction beteeen the differential gear and tho drum, oon-
Bisting of a pinion (7) driven by the satellite oarrier (6), a 
shaft and a bevel gear (8) to transfer aotor movement to the 
drum (9). 
These parte belong to the pow-dr chain. 
Rod operation 
- rod atop (Pig. 11) 
both brakes are closed, the motor brake ia oloaed automatically 
because there ia no tension and the gear diaa brak* la oloeed 
electrically. Therefore pinion (3), ris (4) and satellite (5) 
can not more and the drum and the oontrol rod are blocked. 
- normal operation (Fig. 12) 
The control rod is lowered or lifted by nhanglng the direction 
of motor rotation. 
The disc brake (of the safety chain) rests set electrically (ss 
stated above). 
The Botur brake is open because motor and brake are under tendon. 
Operating are 
tho double reduotion gear (2), the pinion (3). the satellite (5) 
rolling on the ris (4), blooked by ths safety brake (U) , the 
satellite-carrier (6), the transmission gear (7, 8) and the dni» (9). 
formal rod velocity is 1$ os/s. 
snen in case of an electrical supply failure rod movement If reeigAied, 
the oontrol rod »rives the motor, by its »eight n d via. the.dwivmm« .• 
the poser chain. -,,i ;.
 :tv,. wit S<M* 
Ths motor speed is limited by a oentrifugsl speed limit dstloo te 
1500 rpm. When the •stop reoeivee the stop •Kami tta motor talk* 




The safety chain is composed of 
- the junction between the differential gear and thj drun (see 
6esoription of the power chain) and 
- a rod drop epeed control device with the satellite carrier (6). 
the satellite pinion (5) and the rim (4), on which are futd: 
a centrifugal regulator (12) (the regulator weights rub on 
the surface of the stationary casing) 
a disc of the brake (13) and the brake shoes (with P;rodo 
linings) to brake both sidee of the disc. 
The disc brake is set electrically in normal operation and mache-
nioally at the end of the control rod travel« 
The safety chain is used to scram the reactor* The motor brake is 
set (because there is no supply tension) and the safety brake is 
released beoause there is no power supply to the coil (15) (no tension). 
Then the drum drives the satellite-carrier (6) over (8) and (7). 
The pinion (3) is blocked by the motor brake, on which the satellite 
(5) rolls rotating the planetary gearing (4). 
The weights of the centrifugal regulator device fixed on the plenetii> 
rim start to rub on the surface of the gear oasing. Control rod speed 
is limited to 2 •/«> the starting acceleration is O.J o/s . 
At the end of the rod travel a cam on a rim of the position repro-
duction ohain acts en • shaft, which closes the safety brake and 




Ike control rod cable has a diaaeter of 4.6 aa and consists of »ran 
cordons of seven vires eaoh 0.5 na in diaaster. 
The sslsyn (itam 21, Fi». 10) of the position reproduction chain la 
driven by the can crown (20) and gives the exact rod position at 
any moncot, Ths rotor of the oelsyn is suppliad «ith 127 T, 50 Bs 
current and turns 346° between the two extreme rod positions« 
A. total of 138 control rods are aveilable to ensure safe operation 
of the EDF-3 reactor. 
The aotor vinoh is installed in the upper part of the biological 
shielding plug (Fig. 9). 
The control rods have an outer diaaeter of 62 aa, a total length of 
7354 an (7203 na active length) and a weight of 40 kg. 
There ars 75 "grey" and 63 "black" rods. Black rods contain boron 
csrbido but grey rods only stainless steel as the absorbing sate rial. 
The active part of the control rod is ooapossd of sins slsasnts with 
a length of 765 aa each. The eleaentu are interconnected by hinge 
couplings. For safety reasons a continuous cable is also fitted. 
- scj—,..,, ^ souiiui, is svaiiasie for each control rod on the oors 
support plate. 
Tho working conditions of a control rod drive aeosaniea and the oon-
trol rod in its graphite channel ares 
00. pressure 30 b (noainsl 3$ ») 
tsaperature aeohanisas 80 - 120*C 
control zed* 400*0 
shook absortsrs 22J'C 
ooolant flew 300 «/« 00. at 240*0 




Mé> 15 ehotm a bloolc dlagraa for tbe following re l iab i l i ty studios 
on control rod drive •eohaniSBB for gas-oooled porer raaotors including 
tbe EBT-J. Bstiaated f a l l u n rates for toe different i teas of t i e 




2.3. The Latina Beactor Control Hod Drive Keohanisn 
The Latina reactor control rod drive mechanism conBista essentially 
of a motor-driven, geared chain winding drum, housed in a pressure 
casing (Figs. 16 and 17, item 5). 
A permanent magnet induction (eddy current) brake is fitted co-axially 
to the upper and of tho motor shaft (item 4). 
The weight of the control rod IB entirely supported by the motor torque, 
whathor tha motor is moving or stationary. 
The driving motor of the normal induction type, is designed for three-
phase low frequency supply. Changes in control rod speed and dirootion 
arB sicply carried out by varying the rod motor supply frequency and 
reversing its polyphase rotation. At zero frequency the rod motor 
remains stationary,'holding the rod suspended in the required position. 
When it is desired to initiate a reactor trip the motor-windings a n 
de-ensr3ised and the torque at the drum, because of the rod weight, 
is then sufficient to accelerate the moving parts to allow the control 
rod to fall into the reactor oore from any withdrawn position. 
A freewheel device (item 7) is included to prevent reverse winding of 
the chain if the actor oontinuea driving after the rod has reached 
the fully lowered position. 
A winding gear (item 8) connects the actor shaft with the chain drum 
(item 9 ) . 
The rod end of tho ohain la passed over a spring loaded pulley, tbe 
movement of which operates a aloroswitch in a slack abaia iadloator 




The pressure casing of the oontrol rod aotuator is of welded construction. 
All joints have double 0-ring seals and provision is mc.do for testing 
the inner seal where required. 
The upper oap of the pressure cover can be removed to allow attachment 
of a hand winding gear. 
The control rod consists of a number of absorber inserts (th& active 
position) between a liner and a sheath. The rod is approximately 6 n 
long and its weight is approx. 120 kg. It is suspended by a chain from 
the aotuator and is restrained sideways by a guide tube extending 
between the aotuator Btandpipe and the oore plate. Thj reactor is 
equipped with 100 control rods. 
The inserts are ferro-boron sintered compacts in the form of hollow 
cylinders with an outer diameter of *x/75 ma, an inner diameter of 62 mm 
and a/ 25 mm long. They are stacked to form an active leagth of 7 m 
with a boron content of rv0.58 kg/m. 
The sheath is a seamless 16/8 stainless steel tube, and a thin stainless 
steel liner is fitted on the inside to keep the inserts in position 
should »palling occur in servioo. 
Zf the control rod hoist chain fails, the emergency arrsatiiig device 
incorporated at the lower end of the rod would bring the rod to rest 
without damage to permanent react or components. The arresting device 
is oapable of absorbing the energy in a drop from the fully withdrawn 
position plus one accidental drop during subsequent recovery from the rearer. 
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the clearance betveen the control rods and the channel« has been 
determined for the worst conditions of differential movement due to 
pi_3E,ui-o vessel and core temperature, gas pressurs and core distortion. 
In no C£BE i s the clearance zero. But even i f the effective clearance 
vers to becone reduced to zar o in sow of the channels by scoident 
conditions, the inherent f lex ib i l i ty of the control rods should s t i l l 
permit full insertion. The guide tubes between the standpipes and the 
top of th£ core prevent any tendency for the oontrol -rods to jam in 
the event of a top duot branch failure causing lateral gas loadings 
in the pressure vassal top dons space. 
Accelerated l i f e t e s t s havo been carried out on the control rod actuators, 
o .g . i 
raising and lowering t 0 - 27 f t travel 
Binieaa specified 80 operations, equivalent to four start-ups 
r,nd shut-downs per year for 20 years 
aotu4l number o i l teats carried out (for Bradwell) 306 
rod esorgoncy trip t 27 f t to 0 travel 
minimum specified 160 operationa,equivalent to eight trips per 
year for 20 years 
actual number of tests carried out (for Bradwell) 462 
heat test at 27 ft 
the load on the •sobsnlsm i s th» mnlimnm and i s continuously 
oscil lated through , v 14 • » minimus specified 500,000 operation*! 
actual number of t e s t s carried out (for Bradwell) 511,174 operations. 
auto control test at 13 f t 
the control rod i s o t i i l l a t i d at + 200 a* above t h i s poms, 
minimum spsoifisd opsrations 9X1,000, 




From the results of the Bradvctll accelerated l i f e taBts i t TOB con-
cluded that an/ wear occurring in the actuators wil l not n f f c t thair 
trip re l iabi l i ty or other aspects relating to reactor safety. 
The actuator moving parts are of corrosion resistent material; end 
other ferrous parts axe protected by epoxy resin metal-fr^e paints 
(e .g . ; the pressure casings). High-temperature lower standpi?e parts 
which are not corrosion resistant are coated with colloidal graphite. 
Corroding conditions become significant only during reactor start-up 
with a fresh charge of carbon dioxide and higher than normal water 
and oxygen content. 
Life tes ts in moist carbon dioxide on actuators are performed in an 
atmosphere of commercial-grade bottled carbon dioxide at *\j 10 atfi 
(moisture content normally 400-300 ppm by weight). 
Vo evidence of corrosion or of deterioration of surfaces and finishes 
(other than by mechanical wear of rubbing parts) has trøen found. Ho 
seizing of chain links was observed. Ho significant changes in the 
resistances of windinga or of the insulation were found« 
The rod position indication system consists of a selsyn tranenittor 
in each mechanism which rotates 320° mechanical for the total control 
rod travel. The transmitter i s directly geared to the rod chain without 
s l i p . The backlash in the gears i s small. 3ach actuator transmitter 
i s directly connected to i t s Individual rod position receiver vh i ch-
i t drives a« a slave (positional error 0.5° mechanical). 
Pig. 19 "hows a block diagram for re l iabi l i ty studies on the Latin* 
control rod drive mechanism. Estimated failure rates on the unit 
components are indicated. 
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3 . BBLIABILIOT AHALTSIS OF C08TH0L BOB ERCTB ST3TBB Q> Ot3-C001gl 
3 . 1 . Failure Bate Estimation of Control Bod Drive Unit Component* 
The failure xataa (ase Vabls 1) uBed for the re l iabi l i ty analysie 
are baaed on an operating t ins of 10 reactor hoars. Ho defect s ta -
t i s t i c s for tho drive eystems invsstigated were available, ao the 
failure ratea were estiaated on the basia of experienoe vith e iai lar 
components employed in other branches of industry. In no oase a t It 
possible to examine the critoria on which the failure ratea vers 
based. For this reason the empirical data taken froa the literature 
(Eefa. 8 and 9) are subject to a high margin of uncertainty. 
Tho analysis performed i s not intended to give a quantitative aeeeaeaeat 
of ths rel iabi l i ty of the different control rod drive ayatsaa. I t 
nay oi ly be coneidared aa a comparison of the re l iab i l i ty of ths three 
different systems chosen. Ths failure rates of those components which 
are used in a l l three systems are therefore of no importance for the 
oompariaon. 
3 .2 . Bellabil itv Analyaie of Individual Control Bod Drive Units 
Ths results of the numerical analysis ara l iated in Table 2 and ax* 
baaed both on weekly inspection cycles of ths control rod driv* unit* 
and on quarterly ones in order to demonstrate the iaportano* of the 
inspection period, mainly for unite which am not continuously i s 




The analysis was performed for the Mechanical gystes consonant's only 
and can therefore not bo regarded as complete- For a complotj r e l i a -
b i l i t y analysis a l l the parts of a system must be taken into account, 
i . e . , the aochanical part as well ae the e lectr ica l and electronic 
parts i and the human factor should be included too. The consideration 
of the human factor i s of importance for safety systems whera incorrect 
action by an operator can be a contributing factor in respect xo systes 
fa i lure t especially in the caee of a completely manual safety cysten 
where an operator's action could direct ly lead to fai lure of the system. 
The results of the analysis show that the la t ina control rod drive 
system seems to be somewhat more re l iable (see Tablo Z) than tine two 
SDP-oontrol rod drive eystame, th is being possible because of i t s 
uncomplicated construction. 
To improve the re l i ab i l i t y of the system i t i s not possible in t h i s 
case to arrange parte with redundancy since th is would complii&te the 
whole system oven more without improving i t . I t may even ba impcseible 
to arrange double parts because no additional space would be available. 
The only possible suggestion regarding the results of th* a.ialysie i s 
to short an the t e s t frequency for parts with high fai lure ratas, sush 
as brakes, centrifugal fr ic t ion regulators and gears. 
I f such components could be inspected daily inatsad of weekly tro 
avai labi l i ty of the EJJF-2 control rod drive ma onanism, for instance, 
could be Improved to 0 .9998. 
For th is daily inspection i t would be suff icient t o operate tho drive 




Conparison of Bstipated and Operationally Petarained Control Rod 
Drive Bysten Failure Rates 
Only sparse information is available on the operational reliability 
or control rod drive actuators in gas-cooled reactors* 
The following values were obtained fron a publication (Ref• 5) on 
the operational reliability of the AEA nagnox reactors (Calder Hall 
and Chapel Cross) for the five-year period I96I-65, which was unaffected 
by early cocmissioning and teething trouble. Fron the distribution 
of faults in relation to plant areas it was possible to calculate thai 
- total control rod systea fault occurrences! 
» 3.08 XC"« ^ V h 
- control red Byetem fault occurrences causing interruption of 
operations 
- total control rod syBten fault occurrences related to huoan 
errors 1 
« <>•*> ** s B S f e 
(the human error faults anount to approxlaateljr lOjt of the total 
fault occurrence« 1 ^yjl of the human error, fault* »art reepenetale 
for interruption of reactor operation). 
Another articla (Ref. 6) gives information on tht perf irsaj^Oi it -the 
Berk«l«y, Bredwall and Huntaraton nuclear p»aer atatiooe fax t»e or 
on« yenr'e (Huntaroton) operation. Tnaaa a * at i OJM belong to ttt».,«»— 
ftnoraiion aa th. Latina lnatallatioa. In tWa arttclt.otfaaja-^lf^llaa* -





bo l l en and reactor fuelling. Aa far aa the control rod sretsms 
ara concerned, i t ia atated that the ayateas have proved aati iely 
eatiafaotory and f lexible . Actuator inspections led to the suggestion 
that this good perforaanoe Bight oontinue. Kron Bunteraton's f irst 
year of operation i t was reported that teething troubles with the 
control rod ayaten have been experienced but that thereafter the 
aytem ma performing m i l and no di f f icul t ies »ere enviaaged. From 
the inforaaticn given in the article no quantitative figures for 
control rod drive a/tea re l iabi l i ty could be evaluated, but quali-
tatively one gata the iapresaion that oontrol rod drive ayatsa 
availability should be high and possibly even higher tjan that eva-
luated for the Calder Hall and Chapel Cross reaotors. 
Hore recant information fo l lova froa tab le 4 . 
The figurexgiven for the total control rod ayatea fault oseurxencee 
of the eight Calder Hall and Chapel Cross reaotors of 3.08 1C . f i t ~ 
are baaed on 1920 system-years of operational experience. 
Thia figure comparea very well with a valv.? evaluated for water 
cooled power reactors (Dresden 1, Bumbold Bay, Indian Point, 
Shippingport and Yankee) of 1.4 10 failures per h of oontrol 
rod operation (Hef. 7 ) . This value ia baaed on 775 oontrol rod years 
of operation. 
16 quantitative operational experience waa available for *bo control 
rod drive systems of the SDF gaa-oooled reaotors. 
Operational experience with the Latins nuclear power station »aa, 
however, available so that failure rates for the oontrol rod drive 
system could be evaluated. Plant operating data for 1967-SS tare 
ooneideied, e . g . , for the f i f th year of operation, whisk should 




- total control rod system fault ooeurronoa« 
as 19.4 iO"6 f a*»g 
* systen.h 
(17 occurrences, 100 control rod drives per reaotor) 
- control rod Bystes, fault occurrences causing reactor shut-down 
(35?» °f *he total occurrences) 
£ Be .n"6 f a u l t s 
a s 6 .85 10 r r-
syatem.h 
Host of the total number of defects, e.g., 76.4jS (representing 
14.8 10 -_+... v ) relate to the electrical part of the systsmi 
syslen.a , - -
only 23>6j( (representing 4.6 10 te B p ) are due to defects 
with mechanical parts. 
The failure ratee estimated for the Latina reactor control rod 
drxves are very useful for a comparison with the analytioally 
determined opes. As was stated before, the analytical analysis 
performed only takes the mechanical components into aooouat. A failure 
rate of 8.64 10 estimated for the Latina drive system must be 
oonparod with 4.6 10 obtained for mechanical faults from ops-
rational experience. It must be etsted that both values correspond 
vary well, considering that the failure rates of most of the Is 
components of the drivs system oould have been estimated only with 
K 
a high margin of uncertainty. 
It oan be concluded that an analytical approach to control rod 
drive system re l iab i l i ty i s possible« a« warn shown las t yes« toe 
for water-cooled power reactor« (Bef. t ) . Jo i*qr?mi.Um ennwtsém^.. 
of calculated re l iab i l i ty figures, failure rates for a i l compensat* 
used in a system must be available. _f_ .... p ^ 
Collection and treatment of nuolesr power plant part and tavt«# 
defeot situations la i a > H bank Is essential la «r*rr •*•»*,< 
flad the component failure rates as*4>* for Men m t t t 
r e l i a b i l i t y (fe.ie s »ivse a s«*»»ry #F«f^pffMfpr « « » ! « § ; ' 




3.4. Reliability Analysis for the Entire Control Hod System 
Until no« the reliability of one single control rod mecha,-.i3m or.ly 
has been considarod. In a gas-coolsd reactor approximately a hundred 
oontrol rode Kith their drive eachanisns are arranged in parallel, 
leading to a redundant cystem with inoreaaed reliability. But only 
a few units are allowed to fail, so that safe reactor control ie possible 
and shut-down capacity is always available. 
The reliability of an entire eysten for tho most important screx case 
of operation and r etude rods permitted can be estimated using Poisson's 
law (Bef. 1)» 
?
 |M.'5) 
•• s « 
For the three control rod drive mechanisms considered, a eoram funotion 
reliability analysis has been performed for a complete system uting 
analytically determined failure rates \ which differ only slightly 
from the ones valid for normal operation \ - (see Table 2) because 
•ost Bf the unit oomponents are involved in scram operation slfec. The 
corresponding mean time between failures determined by 
k 
needed for the reliability evaluation with Poisson's law are listed also. 














Th3 calculation of systea reliability was perforasd for two aore 
failuru rates and Bean tiaea between failurea 
.... > B - 3 10"« and 0.6 «T« ( j ^ g S L ) 
© - 2 O 0 0 and 10,000 («eeks), 
which represent data obtained fros Brit i Bh aagnox reactor experience 
for total fault occurrences and for fault occurrences causing interruption 
of operation. The calculations are perforadd for no, ene and t*o stuck 
rods pemitted. 
tne results of the reliability calculations are listed in Sable 3 
and plotted in *igs. 20-22. 
Fig. 20 indicates total systss reliability for the estiaated failure 
rate of the EDP-2 control rod drive unit. gystea reliability decrease* 
with operating tiae but only if no stuok rod is peraittsd for the 
øcraa oase. The decrease in reliability is Basil for one stuck, rod 
psraittod and approxiaately aero for two stuck rods permitted. 
fig. 21 shows aystea reliability for the estiaatsd failure rates of 
the three control rod drive aschanisas considered flspenaently of t)u> 
length of uninspected operating tiae T. 
1 systea reliability greater than 0.9990 is obtainable far aU-taxes __ ^  Y| 
control rod drive types for an uninspected operating tias of less tatn ^. 




In Pig. 23 Bystes reliability is presented versus aean tins betteon 
failures @ > or failure rate \ , uninspected oporatinj timJ t end 
number of stuck rods permitted r. System reliability increases ibvn 
the uninspected operating time is smaller but mainly when one stuck 
rod (r • l) is permitted. Tha system reliability is then approximately 
equal to unity for one week and also for six weeks of uninspected 
operating time for failure rates of between 3 10 and 20 10 
range of poseible values estimated both by analysis and on the basis 
of operational experience with control rod systems in gas-cooled 
reactors. System reliability dscrc±see for a longer uninspected ope-
rating time t and one stuck rod permitted only if tho failuro rate 
is higher than 20 10 (mean time between failures lees than 200 weeks). 
It can be concluded that a high (almost 100$>) reliability of an entire 
control rod system can be expected) nuclear reactor design nasally 
allows ons stuok rod and roaotor operational experienoe Bhows ttat 
failure rates smaller than 20 10 are attainabla. Furthermore, 
the untested operating time of a drive unit will bo less than six 
wesks. It oan be assumed that the individual control rod is oxcicis^d 
in a one or two weok cycle, so that any tendency to stick can be 
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Estimated Failure aataa af PriTe Sratea Components 
Component (aee Pigs . 6,15,19) Failure Bate 




flange or plug KEF-3 with joint 
pneuaatic cylinder and pieton 
o i l regulator 
rack (aas i tea 1 of EDP-2 system) 
planetary gear 
drum type brake 
abaft 
centrifugal fr ict ion regulator 
bevel gear and ?haft 
rotary gaa seal 
oable drum 
cable 
C2'::e guides s^i slizi sibla deri;* 
sa;Le somectiz£ l i=u 
control rod ving coupling 
shock absorber 
control rod channel 
asynchroae or syncbronoua (Latina) -motor 
electrical brake 
speed l i a i t device (corresponding to cen-
trifugal fr iet ion regulate/) 
reduction gear frain 
pressure owing 
eddy current brak* 
vinding gear 
spring leaded pulley 




































Roraal operation by weekly Inspect ions 
Failure Bate 












Ava i l ab i l i t y 




Normal operation by quarterly inapeotion cyolee 
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Control Sod System Scran Rel iab i l i ty 
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control red system fa i lure 
rate Cfault/system.h) 
0.29 • 10"6. 
0.15 . 1C"6 
0,33 . 10~6 
0.98 . 10~6 
0.57 . 10"6 
0.80 . 10~6 
0 
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) 3 . 0 8 10 - " 6 
M1920 system years of ope-
) ration) 
I S . * 10" 6 ( e l ec tr .p . , 
IA.8 10"° 
inch .p . "t.6 1 0 - 6 
™ nech.er . lc . 8.6 1 0 ) 
) 1.4 1 0 - 6 
) (775 system years of 
) operation^ 
OCCURENCES RESPONSIBLE FOR 
INTERRUPTION OF OPERATION 
0.59 10" 6 
6.85 10"° 
0.29 10" 
0.15 10" 6 
O.38 10" 6 
0.98 10 
0.57 10" 6 
0.80 10 
0 
OCCURENCES RELWED TO 
HUMAN ERRORS (SS OF TOTAL) 
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1 - Rack 
2 -Brak* A 
3 -Brak* > 
4 - Iat*m*diat* curing 
5 - Shaft 
6 - Saotor 
7 - Oonioal pinion 
8 - Scoter 
9 - Satellit* pinion 
10 - 0*ar rin 
11 -Shaft 
12 - Irak* pullajr 
13 - 0*ntrifu«al friction regulator 
tUt. 3 i XDV-2 Kaster Oontxol Bad Driv* Neebanian -
P*r*p*atiT* Ti*« of 0*ar and Drua Sratra. 
M 
S i ' 
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1 - Back 
2 - &nk* V 
3 - Srmk* > 
4 - IntT—4i»t» f r i n g 
5 - Shift 
i - t»a%ot 
7 - OwlMl » i * i » 
6 - S«otor 
S - S » t » l l » « piniai 
J - 0«*r ri» 
11 - B*tt 
12 - Brak« pull«j 
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J u i l l e t 1969 
AGENCE EUROPEENNE POUR L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE 
COMITE DES TtiOniQUIS DE SBCD81TE DES REACTEURS 
Réunion de s p é c U l l a t e s en m a t i è r e de f i a b i l i t é 
des ccwpoient t e t d e s e y a t t a e a Mécaniques 
destiné» a eaeurer la sécurité dea réacteurs 
QUELQUES MODELES MMUCOVXENS SE HABILITE 
par M- CHATELAIN 
Très géoéreleaent une unité de production eat xomée d'un euesjble 
dt ccepoaanta (Identiques ou non identiques) organisés en un •ratée» salon une 
certaine structure. 
Dans lea modelai présentée, on détermine aoua certainea hypothèses 
lea caractéristiques de f iabi l i té du système, connaissant * 
* laa caractéristiques de f iabi l i té des composants 
- la ftructura du système 
53e 
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aa-d»lt da catta tadMian da atariHoa. > m i n d* ( N U i m 4* 
f laMlltd eaaaiataat » aftaralaar U atraetara T T ' I l * • ' " • ajatïa» da ««aaa-
aaata n l a t i m n t • M arltara daaad. f i , aa* m a f i a . U critara M U — aat 
calai M cuit alalaal . «a affactaara U U U a drnaaalaat : cott* d'aa parte 
tloaaaaaat * atractura d-oaa fart, caOti «a» «a aarfactieaaaaaat aaraat 
d'dattar d-aatra f a n 
C'ait ardciataaac aaar aaprdclat U aacoad tana aa c« Mlaa au'on 
•ait taralr arcaalr la* caracttrlidanas da fiabilité d'un ayataaa da 
ta . 
2 .1 . Fwawai aat-aartortaai 
2 1 1 Définition» 
•a praeaaaaa a—I •nlunUii (» I.M ) aat na aracaaaaa aldatolra . 
aat M dtalaca d'aa état • aa aatra, caa dcata étaat cfeattla daaa «a aaaaBHaf 
MauatraMa d'dtat» : Ua état» aaccaaalf* «taltaa foraaat aaa ckalaa aa 
Hacha» ac la aracéiiaa atatleaaa daaa aa état aaaaa futur aaa «art* aldatoln 
daat U toi déaaad da cat état aala aaaal aa aalaaat aat aaaa «laitf «taai, 
aa t.tM aat aaa ckalaa da Haras* aaar laaaalla l'acaalla aaa taaaa a «U 
t u 
tlaa aréclaaaaat, la "darda da «la" T da l'aear t adart WtUt) 
aaar foactloa da réaartltlaa, aackaat aaa l'état rainât aara l'état J ; à la 
(la d'aaa darda da *ta da l'état 1 , la caela da l'état aalaaat aat aaaaU • la 
aatrlca «a traaaitloa t • ((*!<)) aè f t . aat 1a araaakltlt* aa f imaa d* 
l'dtat 1 t l'dtat J U aracaaaaa aat coaalètaaaat défiai al l'a» loanft da 
alaa la vactaar à. dea araaabllltda laltlala* aa rlna»« état, 
D* aaaiara équlvalêat* la araeaanM aat défiai aat U aatrUt daa 
répartition* d» traailtloa Q(t) : 
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q t J ( t ) - 0 pour t ^ 0 
La antrlce F(() • ((r (t))> t . t alors définie par 
' t jCt) quelconque. s i r • 0 
U I D u t donc défiai par le triplât . ( g , A, q ( t » 
Va processus aarkovlen de raaoutfallean nt CP.lf.R-) aet un processus 
aléatoire qui rscsiss le in—tiri 4e fols »i<t) «A l'en a triait» chaque état 
possible 1 pendant l e teape [0. t ] avec l'tappatMse en en se déplace d'état 
en état selon m l l l On processus de renoueallenant (e'eat-é-dlr* une eé-
qoeacs de «arUMas aléatoire» son-sénat i n t . indépendantes et de loi ldenti 
ejsn) appatatt ainsi consn an î M.a. a un seul état ; la théorie que noua 
utilisons apparaît canna un aartafe an la thforls des chaînes de Marks* et de 
celle du reaouvellenaot. La référence [ l J dôme tous lss détails sur la llau 
étroit qui 1U les P.» H. et las PU.» 
In fai t , on a"lntérasaara uaiquanent au eaa où le sonore d'états 
•et fini et dans Isa deux aodele» traités. Q,,(t} aéra de la fora* ; 
11 s'agit alors d'un procestus uarkovlaik so cenps continu su pies 
sinplonaat continu 
On aura as plus ; t ^ • 0, V i 
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Nain, on « m que liant certain* cas on p*ut U n r 1 hrpotMse 
de loi esponeatleile 
L excaple qui eult montrera qga la richeaao de la tbéorl* deo 
I I I ait blan adaptée eux problème» de flablUti al l'antratian preneurt 
» u ( t ) . 0 .1 t < t 0 
F w ( t ) - 1 .1 t > t 0 
en notant 1 le fonctionnement et l 1 entretien préventif 
2 1 2 FUncinales relations matricielle» 
Lee résultat» auieanta lont relatlie au ca* d'un nombre fini 
d étate 
notons »[»/») la probabilité de i événement A conditionnée par 
t eetaement l 
SI Uti repréaente 1 dut dan» lequel sa trouée la prscaaaua * 
I instant r 
Cjjtt) - r | » t ( t ) > 0 / Z(0) - 1 } pour t ^ 0 
an notant que pour 1 • J la fonction O t i i t ) in.lut la probabilité pour que 
1* processas reste deo» I état 1 
fie manière équivalente 
0 ( J ( t ) '* [ti^.* I «(0) - 11 »1 l > « 
où I . est l'instant on pour la première fols 2 • ] 
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Cfj(t) «et donc 1« fonction de répartition du tampe Tij de 
praalor peaeaii saturé 4a l'iaecaat on la proceaeoa aotca dane l'état 1 
jusev'e l'iaataat ou 11 antre pour la prealere folt aane l'état J 
///// 
Tempe de premier passage da 1 en j 
t«0 
r t J ( t ) - P[ 8<t) - j / Z(0) - 1 ] peur t ^ 0 
HiJ ( t ) * , t l , j ( t > ' I ( 0 ) " 0 
81 l'en note q*(i). g*(«), p*(a), •*<») lea aatrleaa < 
«lésante laa trenafomeee de Uplece-StieUjee de Q l i ( 6 j . , ?i< at «V», 11 
e*t montré a la référence [ l ] < ' ' 
!*(•) - «•<•)[ 1 - «'(a) J"1 jd [ (I • ««(a))"1 ] l ** 
oa d» représente le matrice obtenue a partir de A en remplaçant l u éléasat* 
es-dehsre da la dlaaonaU principale par dea aérea 
P*(i) - (1 - o*(e)> (I • h* (•)) 
« i i<" 7-Q l j (t) 
• ^ ( t ) - 0 al J t i 
•*<«> • «*(•) [ 1 - a*<e)] "' . [ i - ,*<•)] 
et I eet la aatrlce unité eocreependente 
-1 
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D M » 1 * cas aart lcal lar d'ua arecaaaa* aarkaalaa 
M l «sa 
» , , ( ' ) • 1 • • * U . a l l 'aa « f i a i t l a aatrlea : 
• 0 s i t * J 
««(s) » ( I + * A >*' F 
st las ssuls probleaas pratlquaa dasltnaant 
1') - d i m a r s a t la aatrlea 1 • ( I • I A ) ' 1 P 
2*) - as raasair au* aatricxa originales sans aa'aa sait aasnrs » aatra 
caanalaaanca qaa Isa polyasaaa aa. ataaaiaataut sas laaaas alaat caaa lsars 
saroa rsals 
2.1 1 I ss#r ;a«s dsj taaaa 4» pra^<r_sassa|a 
•Maat Jt at X tas aaafraacaa aaa w l a s l a s alêataaxas 
ayant Taaaactlaaaaat tt.M at Oj.Ct) pour fanctloaa a» ra faz t i t l aa , aa aast 
astaralaar X t J 
_ Dans la cas aoalttuasnt icgaliar ( 1 ) , 11 aalsts sa aactaar-
l laaa N • (1T
 {> aas probabilité» lusltaa a» la chataa a* Mckaw 
I l aat Boats* » l a raférsaca [ * ] . aas* 131 at sulvaata» ' 
ta saat fajalaaaat calcolar dtractaaaat l a varlsaca cortasasadaata Wmt 




tour calculer * 1 ( 0 * 1) *»»a le ea» ©• tout U t état* 
"coaawilauciit" on saut modifier F 4* façon a mndre l ' irat ] abaorbant ; 
aotoaa r la matrice de m m i dee autrea dtate ooo-abeorbente 
l. -
«" m 
«a ((•,_)) * (1 - ?)" j m., reprdeence l'eopfrauce au nombre de «laites 
a l'etar K avec dipart dana 1 é"tat 1 oour la chaîne de Markov asaoclfe 
2 1 4 Maul tau m t é giae l i a i t ; (c'-5";-s-ii ? qi.inJ : J oo) 
Pour un procaaaua markoviea continu (an fait aoua daa hyaoKhtee. 
plua (taéralaa. vola [ l j ) 
»ï - A »,.(*) - -«-*- " *—4 1, t\ 
C 
Il •*„<«« et o - 2 ^ < oO 
"*iml t ' J~ 
t^oo •>•> 
La premier membre reprteer.te an rdglme l ia i te , l'aapiranca du 
eoakre da vlalte* a l ' i tat J par unltd da tempe 
> .». Proreeau. da via at da mort (rdtirance [3]) 
2.1.1 Mfinltioo 
*M<*> - r£ I ( t ) • J / 2(0) • 1 ] tac telle que, quaad t - ) 0 
at «vielle que toit l'origine du tampt. 
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v*> * 
• t t + 0(t) i l ] • l • 1 
b t t + 0<t) I l J • 1 - 1 
l-(«t-M>t)t • 0(t) ( t J • 1 
O(t) dan* Ut *utr«« CM. 
où O(t) u t an laflnlarat patlt 4'ordra supérieur t t 
Un proccstus da nia «t «a mort «at donc un procassu» aarkavlan 
continu particulier où, an utllisaut .'as propriété» cUlslquai 4a la lot 
«xnouaatialU : 
1, l+l » t + »j 1 , 1 1 *1 * b i 
(las autraa «lesrata da la aatrlca F étant auU) at Â , - s • a 
2 .1.2 , ^ l ' . ^ a t n a a ^nraalar naaaa|a 
•oit k U aatrlca : 
"0 -0 
"i - < W 
0 b2 - U ^ ^ a j 
0 0 Ô 0 '*<WW Vl 
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OtiUaona U aacrica A pour « f i n i r im aptttaa da aolpatea 
[?»(»)] » l ' a i * daaa,uala a'aapriaarant alaplaamt I n earactarlatlquaa 
* Habilité du avalisa : 
V' • l 
- x Qj.tx) - 1^ Q^frO - (aj, + br) «^(x) + aK Qt+l(») 
0 < K < H 
Dna raprdaantatloa Intégral» daa probabllltf* da tranaltion 
*jl(e) a» fonction oa eaa polTnaaaa at d'uaa ajaaura dlacrate par rapport 
è jafualla laa psLyaSaaa aent orthoamaiix à «ta obtanua a la référant* 
Il H t établi è U rafaraoca [ î ] < » » ) qua > 
- ?=* al J < i 
w-> 
oa [<«x(a>] aat la ayataaa da polynôaaa eerraapoodaat au wtm procaaan 
MU « ranuaarotant laa étata da talla asrta fua l'état • dartana* 
l'ftat aéra, ace . . . ; laa paraaatraa coaraapanianta Talant : 
H * Vu * \ ' V* 
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U saul probUaa * tdsaudra pour t t m l r a l 'orll latla Otj(t) 
u t 4* actanlnar l«i siras du polygnna «s dsnonlaataur pour Mimaa nur 
«•,(«) w U t a U alaaln* ( l ) . 
2.x.3. SsîîSEî.Jîï.Sîîfi.Sî-KïttK-RSiHi 
1* astarataatiaa 4 » a a n c i (aspfraac* at variants) du taapa 
TJJ «at sxplictt* « ranaraout «n» si J > i , I j , • T0 , • T^. 
«otons B J - « ( t O J ) . . » J - ï ( T O J ) . 
On Mit , sa manant » la dailnitlon de la transformas ds 
Lapine*, ans t . aat *tala, au alfas près, » U valsur priât t l'ortgl. i par 




» - o 
•Uttrantlant 1» ralation da léaumac* définissant l u solrat-
ans, faisant s • o M rtsolmnt par dans auaarl nm sntoasalins, an nattant 
» . ^ . J ^ —î-— m e it 
[j]>. 195»). 
(1) On asoti* ans n u ssros sont taon rssl i at positifs , la daaslti n j j O 
•at donc toujours toastitoaa d'ans sonna d'snsrmantlallss nftrolssanrdl. 
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1 .* .*. Î£SSî5iUïi!.î!.£iti!î.liïiEî 
la procaaaue de HerkoY étaat positivement régulier, notons 
seulement le résultat intéreeecnt : 
PJ - !!. Pij(t) - — 
. w-'i-L
 rt e „ J ei 
C« résul tat provient de la r* let ton eiapi» ODtenue par 
3 - B W B B U CCNIJ1M Bt CLASSIFICATION DBS MODELES 
3.i. ansâiiu 
O n u l u rappel» théoriques, nous venons d'utiliser le «ut 
"dent" ae eau d'"état du pracesauc". 
Roue alloue maintenant utiliser le mot "état" en un sans trée 
différent, calai d'"éttt dee composante", "état du système" pour caracté-
rise-, la charte dleponlble par rapport 4 la charge nominale (des composante 
en du Systems). 
On appelle disponibilité (d'un composent ou du svetiae) la 
gampuat de la qnansltd produite 1 la quantité producclble a charge nominale. 
Dans laa applications aux modelée, le sacs du met "état" sera 




î .1 .1. lfB»Miiii«.»g.tîi-1298SÎÏ!!Sî 
1*) Cfcao.ua ceaaaaant s* faut araaara qua troti ( t i a . la faaettiamaant 
1 chut* aeadaala, l'iadlapoalMlitd cotait, La «barra c'aat-t-ltr* U dla-
aaalMllcd tecala aaaa fonctionnaaant. 
alara qua la tarda de rdaana dipaad da la atroctara du ayatàaa, 
laa darda* 4a tonctiomaaaat at d'IadlaaanlBUltt oa dfpandaac qot du tyaa da 
11—maant. Ia« caractdrlatlaaaa da Hablllrt d'un caaoaaaat aaat faunTtTT-
aatt laa loi» ai arobabillt* da* «uriaa d» fonctloaaaaaat at d'iadtaaenlal-
l i t * . 
la aorte d'indisponibilité d'un caaaeaatit s'avir* fera an «fiât 
ma graadaar ainal lasorcaata qua «a darda aa foncttuiinaaiit. 
1*> Laa loi* daa dur*** aarant aa «tairai aaacaaattallaa. c'aat-a-dir* 
au* laa prakaMUtd* a m taataat aaaaf aa toabar aa pana* aa da tortlr 
d'iodlapoolbllltt earoot avaaoaaa* coaataataa. laa ea* «à te cMsrla «aod-
rala a'aoallana m * daa loi» aoa aaaeaaatlalte» aaraat alaaald* at carde» 
tdrlata. aa aartlcwliar, 11 aaat a'avdrar raalUta a* lUMint aaa arabaM* 
l l td naa suite d* runtm' aa pana M dtkut da tenctlnunaaut. 
au aaia d'an asaa maumani, laa daraaa da faactteaaaaaat at 
d'IndUaaalMUtf aaroat daa vartebla* altateiraa lndfaaadantaa aa prabaai-
l lcd. Laa daraaa ratettva* a an rnaaimni aarant da ataa aupaaada* tgffrrf' 
Jaa£a*. da tout** «alla* rtlatlia* a n aotraa eaaaaaaata. 
*•*•*• ftia^aa^aaa.^atractura 
1*> U faut d'**ard ceanalcra laa canaaaaata daat aat caaatlta* la 
ajataaa : trpa*, aiadma da attaqua typa, doit I te aiadm catal da l a a i l a t t 
t * ) U faat aaialca eaaaattra Un Iff ltt l *» aaatlaa da «ratas* e*aat-a-
dlra 11 «ai m aa aadlflaat U * dtata da ton* la* »afa*inri aaaad aa eaafaaaat 
teaaa aa aaaad au radaaiaat dteaoal'ate. 
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four préciser M * rètlee, «présentons la aystsas » l'aide de 
deux "servions*.: 
• on service D w ccapreaant an* des conposanta disponibles ferai lul-acee 
de deux services : 
• un ssrvlcs F d« conBosonts «a fouet loamauit 
. in servie» S de teapoisats a» stock (on dira autel aa rtiem). 
evaride. 
las coapossaca qui sorteat du asrvlce D sont coca*<téxea ?œee 
- ua ssrvlce I ne conprenaa!: que Jes cofcpcBéats indisponibles for» lui-
snnM de deux services : 
» ua service R où les coaposaata sont repères ou reaalacds 
, un service A on les conposanta «variés atteadeat. 
las ceaaoeaaca fol sortent da service t sont considères eaaaa 
s—fa. c'ast-s-dlre qu'ils ont Basas lois de durée da fonctionna»snt fu'i 








2==5 CoBBOseats disponibles 
* 
(atteste) ^ -kreperatlon)! 
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U s Xlicbes. «1*011*01 U» possibilités de passage <•'"• 
«apostat d'us Htl tct à un autre ; CM passage* sont supposésj 
lu ea MU as dira ou» las coapoaant* dan» S sou «a riam laettl lée. 
U s floches «a trait nlefti sTsaollseat l u possibilités de 
f u i i n i qui aa dépendant que du coapoaant (ou plutôt dt aaa type) : » un 
laataat donné aa eoapaaaat a une certain* probabilité dt devenir ladlspo-
nlble s ' i l sst s i P et une certaine probabilité da devenir dlepoalble «'11 
eat aa a. Ce type de nsstsge d'un coapoaant entra D at I « r a api 
Da a fait les hypothèses réalistes suivantea 
aucun aaut a1eat possible t partir de & et de S, sutrenent dit 
. un cenpoesat a* a* répare pea aa attendant 
: en rtaerva ne eanba pas en penne aaaa paaeer au préa-
lable par t en*» a' i l y reste un teapa trie court («sir le* hypo-
taasss n t le» lois de* durée*). 
- * va laataat donne, 11 aa produit an saut au plu* (la probabilité de data 
saut* on plu* eat au s o i » du second ardre). 
- las saute i nomanitiur le* autre* passa»*, c'est-a-dlre nue tous les 1ns-
tant* de paassga sont des Instants de saut. 
U s f lâchas en trait pointillé ayaboUsaut las poealbillté* de 
passa*» qui sa produisent an aoaeat des sauts et sont déuruleéae par Ue, 
rtlafl d» oaattoy : 
—f> coacamsat 1* ssrrlca I les réglas ds gestion sa résumant sa sa* 
saule : 1* servie* *> set toujours «Ida, c'aat-b-sir* que l'en ansooss «as 
» a as» -essneité" suffisants soar réeoadr* a toutes U s HailMll U 
ndcssslté 4* estes hypothèse rient da fait qu'il sac diffici le d'analyser 
1* grand* dlrsrslté ds* sltustloaa comspoadSBt à l'IaaMMllaatiaa d'un 
uatnrial (soir la paragraphe 4.2 1) . U s psraattraa des tais as darda 
d'IadlapoalMUtd dstroat acre détendues aa tsaast coapte 4e estts aras* 
ta*** foal—satsls «a "latégraat" U dlspsrslea as* durées « U suffit 
peur cala d'esserm la* durée* réelle* d'indisponibilité par sanpaeaat. 
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Lea nadêlea praeentda auront donc l i acMaa autant «a « M 
a6 U t trois "•eralcet" I , | i t I ejnboUeeat lee trel i «tête possible» 
dee conpoeantu - tonctlnnninsnt. Indisponibilité et rtHra 
T « j "j 
T » S 
coneament le service D lee règles de gestion dépendant du nodèle* 
3*) tafia l ' ttat du •rettne aa dépend que dee état» des composant» par 
l'intaradalaln da la fonction da structura t . Catta fonction eet certains. 
Si *l repreeente l'dtat du eonsnoam (t) f<» ,«, , .
 t *_) 
repreeente l'dtat du natta». 
Ua étale du eystène aaroat caractérisés dan chaque nodtla pat 
la charaa dlepoalbla da syatea» eonarlse aatre «are et la charge noalnal». 




1» eneeable da coordonnât (*,, x, *_) aéra neturalle-
aamt epptld m» «oint. Do point c a n e t b l i i UM conflfuratlon «M «tau «m 
eoanoaante du ejaten» et 1* {onction de structure eet « M fonction *• 
pointe, b raleon da l'existence du reilee A* gestion, 11 l ' u t finirale-
•ant pae poeelble d'atteindre ton* lea pointa. 
3 . Î . But rochnrchf 
Ori a défini c« qu'on entendait par caractéristique* da fiabi-
l i t é d'un conposant. De aime let caraeKrletlquee de fiabilité d» eyettae 
•ont lae }pln dee durées dea état» du wotène et les pTob«bqu<» de pea-
aaga d'un état a un autre quand le syetene peut prendre plut de *»u* états. 
ce aont cet lole et cea probabilité* qu'on a'efforcera da 
dftamlnar eeua laa hypotbiaae let plue générale* an cachant Mat* au* cette 
foraulatlon euppoee qu'on syateaa de conpoaantt * eoaportoaant aairkatien, 
a lui-ala* un coaporcanaat Mrkovlen, et qui o'aet paa la caa an finirai 
(voir | 4.2 .», et 5 .4 . ) . 
3 1. Claaalrlcatlon dot aodUa* 
3.3 .1 . Pfflnitlon.de ridtntite de deu^çwtjueaiir; 
Mus caupotents aont réputés ldantlouée (ou da nia* typa) ai 
laa trait conditlono suivante! aont réellaéet : 
• 11* ont aaW loi daa durent de fonctlnnntwt at afae loi det darde* 
d'Indisponibilité at en particulier aauee valeure daa ptrtaltrea, 
• la fonction » etructure ce donc l'état du tytttaa ne tout paa nedijiét, 
auaad un daa donpoaanta prend l'état da l'autre (at vlca-iarea) ajaai» que 
•niant caa état*. 
M, dent le caa de deux coupos*ats> f ( * - , 0 ait la fonction 
de etruetura Ai tytterne, la aeeonde condition t'écrit f 
f ( « v Kt) • f (*j , i v ) V « ^ V xt 
- l ia ont snWe réglai da gestion. 
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1 3 2 P£*Bt«r9tZP**&.!S£^? c o*E2 ,SP t i>id!5H3ï?î 
L état du aystèna ne dépend alors que du nonbre (eu des oonbres) 
de conpossnts dans tel ou te l état Dana la nodtle présenté la fonction da 
•tructure ne dépendra que du nonbre de conposanta indisponibles, c'est-à* 
dira du nonbra de composants dans la sarvtca R 
Ce nodtle classique recouvre une partie daa pro^linas parfois 
connus IOUS 1» non "Froblenes du réparat^ur1''^] pages 139 et suivantes) 
et ae rat-tache aux nodtles de f i l e s d attenta pulaque tous les "clients" 
sont identiques 
Lorsque toutes las lo is des durées sont exponentielles „ on a 
affaira 1 un processus de vie et de nort 
Lorsque lee lois daa durées ne sont pas toutes exponentielles, 
cartains cas seulenaot ont été résolcs en nattant an évidence un processus 
leal-narkovien (F S M ) 
3 3 3 Secondâtvpe_de^iodàle 7 coayoaants^^nop^idantiques 
Four connaître l 'état du système i l faut alors préciser qoela 
conposants sont dans te l ou tel état c est-k-dira connaîtra an quel point 
la System sa trouva. La nonbre da variables dent dépend la fonction da 
structura ast d'autant plus élevé que le ooabra de types da consolants eac 
plus grand 
L'outil nathénatiaue ut i l i sé eat la théorie des F S H a un 
nonbre fini d'états Cette théorie parant da déterainar las traaafomése 
da Laplaca des distribution* des durées des états du systtae 
L'idée générale de la théorie est da conserver la caractère 
•arkovlen du cannortenant du aystèna ; plus préciséwot da choisir les 
instants de transition d'un état a un autre pour qu'an chacun da cas los» 
tante le nouvel étet "réaune11 exbeuetlvenent l'hlatoira du systana 
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Quad tenu* l u loi* *n duréu 4 M «tau dss , 
«noeeatUUu l u idwltata « 1» référence [ l ] s'suUaMat aerfell 
«au ta e u contraire, on easatlt m l — t «Ytl m u * m chais d'iastsata 
de tcaultloa «al •• détralu n u 1* caractère aatfceeUa en f m c u s u . 
Lia 
4.1.1* !Zt*SËK*** !?£.i!!.SS?t?ffïS* 
Lu doréu de ronctloMeant du ceapuants «ont du variables 
aldatolru iadsfsadutaa 4* loi enasantlell* d» |m ut l i • « O U algnl-
fle au* 1* quantité ». ^ t u t U probabilité conditionnant m'a» coapo-
umt tonb* ea «un* dan l ' intarull* Matatlqucsant laflaltaslail 
(*• c • A " eacbast qn'll était encan m tooctluuuaunt a l ' lu t t â t t . 
In nenbu a, appelé tam da panoa, an supposé coûtant et coanun t t a u 
l«a é l éunt i . 
Da a t u U t darda* d'Indisponibilité d u cnaseeaate aoat d u 
uriabla* aléatoire» la4tp*adaat*a da loi tspsasstlella da pmsst t s £ , 
appelé t a u d* "tdatratlM", 
» , 1 J . •tpotMaa>>;or_U_;ÇTuçtnra 
1*) - la ayatau csapread £ ceaposuta ldsstlanet. 
2*) - f d t a t d* anttaai M dépend qui du aaabi* 4 d* ceaaoeanta indus», 
a l b l n . 
•oient t i at 1] dau «alurs d* 1 tollaa a u i l i « £ 1*. 
notant 11, tr *t 12 l u trola états du syatsa* r u p w t i u a u t Te loae-
tloaaaaaat t chats* iwalinla, 1* tonctlminaunf t curai rédnlte étala a 
r V . da la ehataa ooulnle at l'iadliaonlklllté estais, / " ' " 
atanataia f s'écrit i 
MO - tx s i J < tt 
m
 «r rt H<l<H 
• I. 
'2 
e u 1 ^> i j n'ast pu possible 
al 1 - l j est aaus a l l e u «•tr «a* t* 
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J«> - 1 M « n par l u raalaa d» «aitlo» , M O U g la n t n aaalaal d» 
i I I I U M I • foectlooaaat staailt airfaant an F Cinq CM «eut a aavtaaaar 
Misa te n l t w ds 1 prtctCaat Uwldlat aatnf uns fia da foactloaoaasac ou 
d'iadlapaalolllté.. 
a) - t < M - n (S son «14*, F plala) 
Tant coapoaant sortant 4* I va an S. 
Tout coapoaaat sortant da F va an R ; 11 aat Instantanément 
raaplacé par un composant vanaat de 8 
b) - 1 • H - tt (S «Ida, F plais) 
Tout eoaDOaant sortant da • va an S. 
tout composant sortant « P i t m l ; 11 n'aat pas remplacé.. 
c) - M n <[ 1 < i j - 1 (» «Ida, F son plein aa fonctionnement) 
Tout composant sortant ai 1 n n F 
Tout composant sortant da F va an I ; Il n'aat pas remplace. 
d) • 1 » l j - 1 (t vide, F non plein an fonctlounanmat l iait») 
Tout composant sortant de R »e an F, 
Tout coapoaaat sortant da F aa aa R ; 11 a'ast p u remplacé ; 
la* I - i , entras composants da F vont an S. 
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20. 
•> - i • 1. (S ma «14* eauf l U . • I r totalement laaiapeulble et 
vide). * ' 
Tout rneaaaiot tortur à l n a f ; I n II - i j r a t niant» 
de S vont «uleueat ta F 
aucun caapoaant ne peut tomber en panée puisque r e*t «14* i 
U e u 1 ^ - 1 , u t i l donc pu pauible 
tirn*— ' 
t*) - r comprend toujours le giarlawn de .oupoeanta dltpoaiblu ««M toute-
rai* depeuer • 
2*) - Il Mut être logique do pour lj » M o+l, *1 l'on «duc qui o tôt 
calcul* tout Juito pour au* r « M I * la charge ncaiaale ou bien •' i l 
• ' • l i t d'un iratba dit "an •trie" (m devre a l e n pour da plu* If i l ) 
Haia en règle efoeral* t\ ~^ * o+l 
1*) • tour un ayatam* dit "aa parallèle" oa «ara • ! , • ! • • 
4*) • Nua aleeraleaent on pourrait Introduit* d'autraa Molli i j , 
atc correspondant t dlfferenta typu da tetttloaaamsnr a charte 
4 2 Aamlication daa rasaaU thaorlaw» au modela 
Ut 111 ton» la théorie du proceeeu* da Tia at da mort oa 
l'dtat du proceaeue ait dallai par la nombre 1 da coapeaanta ladKpoalblu 
aa ce H J I l'dtat 1 du proeaaaua cor r u pond t un ananakla de { } > aolat» 
(toutaa le* configuration* da* itat* « a eaaaoaaat* correspondent à i 
ceaaoeaats ladlapoalMaa) 
4 2.1 MMradnatlood** et et bj 
( i II att une durée aldatotra d* loi exponentielle d* paramétra / l 
SI Î2 Xl 
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11 • 
ce i l T. M T, «ont indepeodantea eu probabilité1 
al or» U durée T i—iiic aux deux durée» Tj V '-'; ault quand elle a u t 
pas nulle une loi exponentiel le de pkrajuHreAi + X2 Ceci Heulte 
•iapleaent 
1*) - de l'Invariance par troncature t fauche d'une le i exponentielle 
2*) - du calcul du edniaaai de deux earlablea aléatolree lDaepeaaeaeeB 
t*t eulte -
a t • ne al i ^ l-n 
- <»-l> a al Rn «^ t < i j 
• 0 II 1 • l j 
b t - i h 
SI ce» rieultata paralaaeat dlacutablea, c'eat que lea hypo-
thieea aur leeauellee l ia repoaant le eone, A aavolr 
• loia exponeatlellea 
• indépendance dea duréea 
• "capacité" toujouta auffieante du aereice R. 
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t a particulier a l l ladfptadanc* « H dardât d ladlapoolbllltd 
«al tacrafoa l a Uafar l td da taux ai parait I r rda l la ta , 11 tau* aatiaar 
l a * H far aaatraatlae au ayatèac aa l ia» d'aatlaar a par aaaarwloa 
d'un i uaamaai , d alUaura l'arpotaaaa claaalfaa d'aaa "caaaciU" c 
l imita* aa aarvica » (c î f l^ pour «ocra i • l a ) iCTUat au foad è auppo-
aar oaa dipaodaace trèa força aatr* l a i duxaaa d ' IadUpoalbl l l t t a partir 
d u o carcala aaull 
A 
Mala on paut da aaolèra tout auaal r i a l l a ta îaaaj im 
bi qui to i t aodulé en fouet ion da la airoatloa par axoapla 
un aarvica > d'autan plu* afflcaea ou* la ticuatloo aac plu* caodua. 
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b aiaaillia aaalyaa,. t t laudralt voir ai as aaa* alatla-
f a n w n l w caapanati aa'oa rdaa» t t eu> aa'oa i f l i n , tavr 
••ta «l'oa i i l i m , i l aantt «laça l i U n i m t da «air c m aa'oa 
aost acoahar «m H I H U («•aatltaaet * 1 M 1 a u aaaBoaaàta aa raaaraa 
M* iaatallaa aaar laaaaala darda d'iadUBoatalllti • ddlal 4» roaala-
a n t M l a mu— aoar lataual» darda d'IadlaaoaUllitd - étlal 
4'tmmHntnmmÊmt, ««Ira 4* faarlaatloa). 
Dos caa axaapla», c'aat la aaalara dont b t dtpaad da 1 
•ni l'oa atc aa m a (c'oat-a-dlra, an fait l'kTfotbaaa d'ladtfaaaaoca 
du dardaa d'iadtaeealMlitt) «t eoa l'hypothlia da lola axpeaaotiallaa 
(aaivaot laaaalla bi aa dtaand paa du taaaa). 
«.1.2 probabilitéa_at J l * e « l k U U < du •j;ttM_«n_rd|la« lladt; 
(cf, référaoea [4 ] ) , 
fcarlaan» laa arobabllltéa r» • liai ' t , ( t ) 
C-*ao 
daa «alaara d» a^  at b t : 
»•) J « [o,.-.] • rj-Cj <V>J -fc 
(traaeatvra d'vaa loi da Foiaaoa da paraaatra *r* ) . 
2») J « [ M-m. i - - l ] 1 *• - C. Q * * 
(tmacatura d'un» loi blaeaiaala da aaraaatra -*r déf taia 
3«> J - 4 : fj - ffc 
laa ceaataataa Ci at Cz aeat ehoiaiaa aoar au» l«* •*»*••-
lioaa piéeéaaataa aolaat égala» aa »-n at aaar ava 1 
& * 
r» - 1 
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24. 
ta réglas l iait* 1* disponibilité' du syittat vaut a!*r* 
i . - l 12-1 
»"»*l]+ Î5Ô "W " 5 »J* ïfe Ê I». 
J^J J 1 
4 .2 .3 . fîÂ5blUt«sd*_gwgijç_du_;;;tta* (m réglas l iait*) 
E l 
lm système pouvant prendre trois états Ej, Er et E2. o n T* 
déterainer un* de ses caractéristiques de fiabilité : 1* autrlce d*s pro-
babilité* d* passage d'un état t l'autre Quittant l'état ( j , 1* systèaa a 
la probabilité 1 d* prend» l'état Et ; d* ataa «autant 12 11 entre néces-
ealraasnt an Er. Mais quittant Er , la systeas peut aller soit an 11, soit 
an 12 a»*e das probabilité* Pj, et ti qw nous allons déterainar en noua 
plaçant an réglas limite.. 
La nécessité da sa plaçât en renia* l iait* «lent de e* que la 
> de l'état d* aipart, ic i S,, n'est p u suffisant* pour déter-
alner Pi ou Pj dan* le cas général ; aa effet quand la systèae quitta 
l ' i ta t Er entre l'instant t et l'instant t+dt, la processus a* trouve an t , 
soit dans l'état i - i x , «oit dans l'état 1 • i j - l . 
Or an général la probabilité pour que 1* processus sa trouva 
dans un état donné dépend des états antérieurs <P..(t) dépend en général 
de 1) s i bien ^it la déteradnatloo de P| at de *j **lf* une lnfocaatlos plus 
fia* que la aeule connaissance de gr ; nais puisque non* désirons étudier 
les état* du systèaa i l faut constater que le processus n'est en général 
plua aarkavien à ce niveau d'identification. 
En revanche, s i l'on ss place «a réglas Unité., on sait détof 
nlnar dans la cas positivement régulier la probabilité da en trouver t a n 
un état donné du processus • P« « lia '<•<" ".ul ne dépend plus ds i . 
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21. -
alort t ' W n n n r conditionnant A "U eyatèaa quitta I entra 
t et t+dt" a pour probabilité ; 
J* . b . dt + t* • . dt 
i t Vt i 2 - l lj-1 
La probabilité dt l'événement Ai "la eyeraae »a aa ( j aatra t 
at t-Wt" vaut P* . b, , at 
La probabilité de 1 l"éreai£r,c AJ :,le syetèae va en E2 antre t 
oc t+dt" vaut F* , a. , de 
1, 1 ij-1 
Laa probabilicéa cherchée» eont Xaa probabilicéa condltlannallas 
?(Aj / Ar) at FCAj / Ar) 
1 * "i 
1






Dans 1* e u particulier où 1 , 1 • 1, , oo n t m m l u 
valeur* classiques -
b + a 
n l i 
qui «ont exact*! ssase en réglas) non limite puisque l'état B> du erstèaa 
se réduit 1 un seul état du procassis de vie et Je Mort • 
In résuaé la antrice des probabilités de passage s'écrit 
0 1 1 0 
t 
' i i ° I ?2 
0 ( 1 0 
4.2.4 . {^iî.dSî.durtesdes «tetsdu jvsttoe (en région limita) 
SI l'état Initial du système ast Sr w Ï2, la fonction de ré-
partition da la durée de l'état E} esc donnée, avec les notations précé* 
dantas. par C^ j ^ ( t ) 
Si en revanche, l'état initial du système est I j , Il faut 
préciser l 'état initial i„ du processus la premier* duéa de l'état 11 
a pour fonction de répartition G, , (tj et les durées lulvaacu G. . ,
 f. 
La fonction de répartition de la durée de l'ecat te vase 
1' S " 1 " ' c t l m r t t r o v * e l * , o 1 exponentielle a* psi aeitre 1 b 
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Le e u de l'état S, u t plu* conplem : l u fonction! 0^ ,1,-1 
• t Ci,-1, i . «ont «a effet relatives aux tut*»* dee états (* U "2) *c 
( t_U *i>' l l • • ' «aeeesaira on d i c o q n u la dur» da l'état I r «aIon 
qu'alla aat précédée at suivie da durées des étata Ml ou Ej • «a**» marque 
revient à eoutatar que la processus au alvaau d u états du STSteae a 'u t 
pies aexkovlen ou plutôt qu'il u t aarkovlaa d'ordre daux : 
Etat précédent 
Itat suivant 
Cadre du Calcul 
Vr l 
-h- J2 
% - i .




l > * . 
{Les fonctlona Intervenant dau la loi da durées da Bf sont 
eallee du tablaau- On laa a aorllanéaa ou aouliga/ae pour elanifler qua 
lanr détatainatlau doit être effectuée en prenant aoln de rénoaéroter laa 
étata du processus da naniàra * randra laa étata I , ou S, lnaceaaalblaa). 
Plaçons-nous an régis» l ia i ta pour pouvoir laver la condition-
naaant tur l'état précédent at retrouver un syltte» aarkovlen. 
In réglas liait» {relation P* , , b _ , • ?* . a.) la probabilité 
J*1 J+* i 1 
aat égala t la probabilité d'aller 
pour S 2 . 
de venir da I j sachent qu'on entra an I 1 
an «j Menant qu'on vient da E, ; de mène 
far conséquent, la fonction da répartition de la'durée de l'état 
• t aulvla da l'état Ej s'écrit ; 
'1 Vr l < t > + '» V - V1 (t) 
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»e s*mi le fonction de répartition te la durée da l'état » , 
suivie de l'état Bj vaut 
, i 5 1 . i , w + '* V. s' 
On dispose ainsi des deux matrices («aile des probabilités da 
passage et utile daa fonctions de répartition des durées) caractérisant 
an processus saml-markovien a 3 états. 
Ce type de calcul s'étend sans difficulté » un nombre quelew 
que d'étets tels eue Er compris entre Bj et B2^ les seuls passages vers les 
2 états adjacente étant possibles. 
4.2.5. Duré{;_a»)«nMs_d;;_«tst; du {jstéae 
la détermination des durées moyennes da »i peut s'effectuer 
(rlca ans formules Indiquées dans les rsppsls théoriques. 
On prapoee i c i une aéttaode ilreete oui permet da pins 4* déter-
miner U durée moyenne de l'état l t et l'inspire de la référence [*] . 
la durée moyenne de l'état I. peut s'écrire: 
Durée moyenne par unité de temps da l 'état Si 
«cabre moyen par unité de temps da passages par l'état t. 
Le numérateur est égal » la probabilité limita I*(l t) de 
l 'état I i . 
U dénominateur cet égal t 1a probabilité limite divisée par 
dt pour 411a la Systems prenne l'état Et entre t et t + dt . 
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IM duvet aoyanne de l f t a ; 8, vaut donc * 
p* + ?T. V f. V^-> 
4 3.. Ex—jl«a 
Txtl^ons 2 «xtopldi très siuolta aett«nt en évident*-. \* 
facilité d'obtention dt* polynôaM Qg(x) 
0 0 
«1 " • "l - » 
• 2 - 0 h « » 
'5 - fi) <rh>J t**""1 
la disponibilité du «ystea* vavt «n régime l laitc 
g . f* + P* • (——) . 2 J S - , . SixJtÊj) 
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l 
Or : d • . *
 t u t 1* disponibilité an if | 1 M l ia i t* d'un 
• * b 
ratouit puimu» * rapréaanta M dut** marna» da fouetloanaaant, Ç •» 
duxéa aavwsM *" indisponibilité at qua l'état d* rfinn n'asiata PM 
(CM H - «) 
1 - D - (1 - d) 
C'Mt <n et sans fut four cilcular la disponibilité du systèM, 
la wula caractéristique d d* fiabilité du composants suffit dont et 
CM ; Mil 11 » « cUl t que, d»» Qu'il i « réaarva (N > a) )« rflsoonlbi-
l t ç f a imj ramonants ait m» aonnéa Insuffisants pour ca^enja» ** <ttt* 
t< j . . svstsM (voir l'aicsaple 3 2 ) . 
La-* ralatioaa ds récarrsncs donnéas dans laa rappals tbéorl» 
aaaa panactaot d'dcrira : 
^ ( x ) - 1 
Q,(«) - -\— a2 - - T - (3a + b) * + 1 
^ 2a* 2a2 
Vétilles» d'abotâ sas la duré» da l'état l j (indisponibilité) 
du svstiat suit uoa loi axponsatialla dt paraîtra 2b ; la trsnsfomds *» 
Laplaca da la daMlté d* catta loi vaut : 
**.<•> - =* - * * " 
> -b t 
U daMitd vaut donc gjjtc) - 2b . a at la dard* • > • • 
da l'état l j : l f l ». 
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31. 
D* •!•» la tranfoial* te UoUca te la tenait* te U fera* te 
l 'état l i (fottcttimwant) du lyitte» « u t i 
»&<•> 
Q,(-.) J ^ 
V< 
- V - a* + -*? (3a + ») s + 1 
I»1 U* 
«u<«> • 
a(2a • . ) 
(• • »j)(» + »2> 
oa », «t a, sont iaa afeoa te Qj(») 
- ». l • + • i - ' i 
!ll!i . ?il!î 
S 
U tetaa M I M te l'atat I , m * 
• la « a, la ' 2a + » 
| t . g u ( t ) te - (—«-» - . - * > - — r 
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4 3.2. ftï.s.r.4i.î.î.it.ii.;.i2.r-? 
•o • » "o - « 
- , - . b t - b 
2b 
, . î b l 
! - D -
La valaur te 1 • D trouvia l i t plu* patlta gua daaa l'auapla 
practdaat (-; * , ) ; la aiaponlblllci du lyataaa d> l'amanU 
b + 2ab + a 
* J 2. ait alua grand* «w ealle du ajattaa 4 ï . l 11 m'aat daaa aaa Indif-
férant quand on alaaeaa dt daua conaaaanti ldantlanaa dent un aaul M m » 
U nlalna charaa au awtèna tdana lia daaa aaa) «a laa taira lanaelanaar 
ttwitwNm > wffiHtt" ~ «'«» m** «B nnimatmm n rtwoat 
aaind lai dan» aaat alinealbla. H . «a— an Vê aniaata daaa ea naélla. 
la pauata da la raaam au {enetlaauaaant (la connotation) aa fait aaat 




Oitanliioiia laa polynSoea ; 
v-> - » 
••«cric t 
Le dur*» de l'état gj m i t , dan* cet exeaple n u l , une loi 
attel le de paramètre 2b. 
La tranafonée 6e Leplace de la deaalté de la durée da I . 
a + i 
^ a' + (2a + b) a + a2 
* • ». • - ». 
* + »1 » + «I j 
o l i j t t i j «ont laa aixoa de Qj(a) 
i 1 2 ( t ) - (a - a t) a"»1' - (a - tj 
*2 * *1 [ 
, - 2 t 
l a durée i i I i vaut *-3j* " J + \ «ui 
auedileura è U darda eetnapeadante de l'eaaaele prdcddmc aul valait 
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4 .4 . CM d« loi» D M - m w i t l a l l a a 
La e u fliaéral (N at a eualcoaauu, loi* aualcaaasu daa 
dardât d'état a u cacaaaaata) aa aaanlt «tra réaola k l'aida 4a la 
t U a d t d u pncaaaaa •»-', aartaataai pulaau'aa afaéral 11 a'axuta p u 
aa chais d'iaataata aa raangaaaiir a'Haz «al u—ana la caractéra aar-
hoalaa d'_ procaaaa» ; aa affat, l'état 4a ayatèna dapaad as alalral d u 
datai d'aatréa dua la aarvisa t on daaa la aanlca • : dataa 4a détat 
da foactloaaaaaat at da dtkut da "réparatloa" daa cllCéraau coaaouata. 
XI aalsta capaadaat aualquaa caa partlcullara aul eut été 
rdaolaa apraa avoir ala aa éaldaaca l'axlateaca d'aa precaaaua aaal-
aarkorlaa ; noaa an clttrana 4aus. 
4 .4 .1 . CU » ? a - l , l t - I j - , 1 . l°i» aaalaonauu daa duréaa dafaaa-
Siî2!î!Kï.îî.iIi^i»R5iiiLiî* • 
La ajataaa aat coaatltué d'aa aaal < 
"réparatloa" daa «a'i l coûta aa aaaaa at aa fouctlaauaaaut dta aa'il ra-
daalaat diaaaolUa. Oa a affaira » aa aaetaaaaa d u da raaoauallaaaat 
altami (référaoco [ 5 ] , chapitra 7) oa l u 2 «tau (fnarMnnaaaant at 
indlapoulblllté) — aaccidaat da aaattra ajatcaatlaoa aaaa qu'on ait ulaci 
baaola da daturutaur la aatrlca da paaaiaa. Oa faat dira 4a aaalàra éaul-
«alaarta au'il ('agit d'va piocaum aaal aartnrlaa » 2 étata. 
On paat alera utlllaar l u réaultata da l'uaa au l'aatra 
tatorla (raaaaaallaaaat, laai aartmrltn) poar aktaalr laa caractérlatl-
aaaa da fiabilité 4a apataaa. Oa caa aat traité » la référença [ i ] , 
chapitra 3, «action 6. 
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4-4.2, 9**_¥.3ï*àï5?9ï^J> T U-. li-"--2»--.ï*-i-i-^îK5^5-«î-««5î 
da^foactlooMMat .nlola exnoae^tiallç jta* ^ durées ^ i n ^ s g o a l b i l l t é . 
Dca cas ayant mime structure stochastique ont (té résolus 
aux ré&reocet [6] «t [7] 
On indiquera seulement qicla sont las instants de passage de 
la "chaîna" de Markov associée au processus _ ces instants sont ceux 
précédent lanfdletaaent (ou suivant isnéiiatcaant) une panne (c'est-à-
dire une fin de fonctionnement) de l'unique cosspojant qui peut être en 
fonctionnement ; en effet. X(t> représentant le nombre de cosmiosants 
indisponibles, s i t et t sont deux instants consécutifs du type 
précédent, la probabilité . 
?
 l * W " 1 '- «V " * ] 
ne dépend que de 1, j et de la différence ( t _ . - t ) . 
•Tri n 
•o effet : 
i » 1 - noabre de caapoaantt "réparét" « t t t t n et t„+1+l ; or ia proba-
bi l i té d'isa ao&bre K donné de conpoeanta "réparée" pendant la teaae 
(t . . - t ) aat donnée par la fonction de répartition da la variable 
nrx n . 
a léatoireV k s Mena) par «rare croljaant da 1 réalisation* Indépendante» 
d'an* variable aléatoire de loi exponentielle avec la relation % - i-j+1. 
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Dans U» deux modèles traités on lia considérera que doux f f ^ m m i 
(1) et (2), dont les durées de fonctionnement suivront 4c* loi* exponentielle» 
4c paramètres respectifs «i et «2 *t le» durées d'indisponibilité d u loi* 
exponentlellu de psxeattrea respectif» t et b2 . Toutefois, du» le premier 
modèle, on courra considérer une probabilité non nulle de tomber en penne en 
débat du fonctloananent. Les fonctions de structure et les règles de gestion 
seront précisées pour chseun des modèles-
Haas allons utiliser la théorie des processus seal-omrkovlan». alors 
SBC dans le cas de coaposants identiques 1'état du processas était caractérisé 
par le nombre de composants ladlsponlblse et correspondait a un ensemble de 
peints, l ' e u t du processus sera i c i caractérisé par la comrfvgurattsm d u ét'its 
d u composants, c'esc-a-dlrc par un point s c 'u t ce ont "point" que L'on smpliil» 
ra osas l u modale» pour éviter toute confusion, 
L'essentiel d u résultat!, obtenus sons une ferma et par va* attende 
différentes, figure a la référence JV] . 
5 lu » ~ ' * * T**1* 
3,2.1. roactlen.oe strucrure et règles de gestion 
Lee états du système sont au nombre Je 2 ! 
I j : fonctionnement è charge nominale 
ï j : Indisponibilité totale 
Lee point» sont au nombre de 3 
c*,; (1) et (2) fonctionnent 
a, ; (1) est en réserva, (2) est Indisponible 
y ; (1) u t indisponible, (2) est en réserre, 
La non-identité de» 2 composants exlg» m point de plu», 
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y>, • 
Règles de gestion -
«) - Joint **>.. 
Tout composant sortent de F va en i, 
I>'autre composent n a S. 
b) - Jointe., Ç o u j ^ 
Le composent sortant de K va en F. 
L'autre, soit Ci) va de S en F nais a la probabilité K^  d'y rester 
un teups nul pour aller en R (donc pratiquement d'aller directement en B). Le 
corspossnt sortant de R a donc la probabilité t i d'aller en F. d'y rester un 
temps aal pour aller en S. Le composant (i), à La probabilité 1 - fet de séjour-
ner en F pendent une durée non nuLlee 
autrement dit , s i C < ^ 0.. le cœnutation réservé—-> fanctii nnamsnt 
du eoevosaae (i) n'est pas parfaitement fiable. 
On peut résumer ces hypothèses es disant ou on a affaire » un sya-
tsne "en série" ; à ce niveau La généralisation du modèle a H composant» non-
identiques M pose pas de problème,. 
3.2.2. Ujaatxieej£ <«J 
Traduisons u s hypothlsea précédentes à l'aide de la théorie «les 
F*S,H, où lee états du proceeaus sont les points <at . B , V : 
/ 
P - f 
0 
l - ï l 

















-*2* 1 - . 
arbitraire 
ï ( t )p 
IcriYons dlxeeteaent la aaorice des transforaee» de LMlaOt dît deult te 
de t n a s l t i m , « oaettent dtsoraal* d'expliciter l u «e t» du pracaaias : 
«* W 
B + »j + *2 
a - ti>o2 
• + b . 
a - «ÏX»! 
•+« !+• * 
Il *Z 
• + b , 
• + bjL 
5.2.3. S»i»_*«.,*!*S*S i*S St*? *^,•ï•S,5• 
I* loi. te la torfe de l'âta* » i e»t, aaa* calcul, i«e la i uaeaaaileUa 
de paceaetre (e^ + » j ) . 
l a ttawfento te IttUCR te U • • • » « • «* >» * * « • u Vtn* •» • ' * * t l t : 
»**> •V (•)+%(.» »Vc <•> 
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gn effet MU1« la toi marginale de la duré* da l'état E2clapott« pule 
«l'on m «a ir* pat distinguer lea pointa •> i t y » sein da 1 état B2 du sys 
teae ; par a i l l e s » la tranefsrsatlon de LAPUCE ast linéaire. 
•*9«t (a) et g* ifU (a) en écrivant la aatrlca ,
 A On obtient •lapleaent g"< 










8011, apros calcul : 
et g \ * ( s ) . » ' <2>°1 + £ i i l . i 
• + b t • + b i 
où xi , Xj et *3 sont lea cofaeteurs des élénsnca de la prenière ligne da 
X - q* <»). 
Soit pour la tranaforaée de L&P1ACE de la densité de la durée de g 
a ^«jlij (1 - « 2 ) + a2b2 (1 (>1)] + b tb2 (/^ + UjKl - t j «2> 
S + a (bj + b2> + bjb2 (1 - t 1 ^ ) 
Lea racines a, et s , du damai neteux sont réelles, négative» et - b, , 
• bj appartlannent 1 l'Intervalle (a^ i p , La densité est une caablaalson 
linéaire da doux exponentielles décroissantes 
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Dana la caa partlcallar ott d m V
 2 - o. la tranafomte te U i u a 
J i _ . -i ta, 
+ 
«! + «2 I • tat ^ + «2 
•t U tenait* te U terte te l 'eut B, 
V i-h. l * -* -_ " V 
S.2.4. «alaws avganaaa^ at disponibilité fe_t{staa* 
FlutSt ena d'ootaalr Ui dortes aoyannai a partie te» trustante* te 
UIIACt tea loi* par lai noyau elaaslaaM, on psut Us «mlrnlar dlncta—ne aa 
BtiUaaat la cbalaa te Marks* aaaoelte teat on tetaralna la* probabilités an 
réels» llsjlta t 
' l t ï + *2 t l + « • Cl «ï> <«l + *2> 
^ *^U* 
V »2 • • ï « i + e " 6 i Bj> <S + «P 
*V t—*—*-
*l 62 + * 2 B l + ( 2 ' K l «P «•l + V 
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oyamaa du point! dl, |k at V m> qu'il y ait 4a confusion poartbla avae 
t j t t j j j . w i t l t » » : 
( » i + V » • Ci l t 2 ) b , b 2 
£ » ( l " C 1 K P *1 b2 + {*2 + *1 fep "l * <"l * *2 **!> b l 
(•2 + «! t P » l » 2 
« _ ff ' B x e P b l b2 * <*2 * *1 ^2**1 + (*1 * *2 ttl> b2 
* * " « H * - i &i> b i k 2 
Ct* dora» aoyamaa ont un intérêt pratiqua important «a régla» liait* . 
1 rapraaaaca l'aapéraaec do noobre da daaacragm affactlfa par 
unité da taapa. 
1 t par asaapl*>raprfaaata l'aapfraaea da neataa a* réparations (au «• raa-
7T7 
plan—mf») afraccuaaa aor la eoaposant (2) par unité da taapa. 
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U durda mtymat da Vital c 2 » dddalt da i^+ m 
«< ' 
Os a au qu'oo pant dgalaawt obtenir catte dorde n y a n x < 
point •(, asaexbant at aa conatdéraac la aatrica ; 
I - » -
Kx 
at aoa imaraa 
^ • n r t , 
Ui 
o* 
La darda aoyaoM da Ej aat alora U aoycnoa ooaddxda daa durdaa unraa-
poadant aoa aneréaa aolt dana l'dtat f , aolt daaa l'dtat V • 
»KP- ^ " H ' fa • * « 2 , ¥ - i r 
aapraaalon ost radoona la rdavltat "prtctint. 
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OB ptut «nfln anpriuer la dltponibUlti D du syaceae er regine I lai t c a 
l'alaa dta duren aoyannaa daa dtata s^ et E2 -
~ l " 2 
S - "i
 b2 <* e t e,) 
b l b2 ( I - *1 C2J * »1 -b2 + ti V + «2 » 1 + «l "2> 
Dt aanlart eoulvalmtt D ett egalt a la probability limit« t* pour 
qua It proetataa ieat-aarkoviaii aolc dan« l'état oS. -• 
»• _ fc* 
Out la eat partlcullar oi (J. » W • 0. ootona la ralatlM aiapla. 
tvldanta l gdnfeaUaar i 
Dar«. « • * » . d-ladUpo-biUtt a. . » « • . J & " J T « ^ 2 1 T - " 
Duraa aoyaooa da foactlBimaaunt da lyttaw ' duxte aoyanaa la fonetlon* 
otaenr da ccaswtaat t 
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5.3. Second andele 
5.3.1. {oseUonjle atractuta e t j*g l e ( de geetion 
I l y a 2 dtat« du »Tata— : 
- ti i xooctloaneaaat a charge nominal« 
- B2 : 1—ileponlblllte' totale 
Il j a 4 point« : 
** : (1) at (2) tbnetlomwnt 
P : (1) fonctloona, (2) Ht indisponible 
V i (1) eat indUsoalble, (2> foactioana 
S s W •* <4> asm indisponible«. , . . . , 
La aon-idantlM daa 2 conpwanta eH«e ua point da plna. 
La fonctton da atruetora a'eerit l 
f <H) • f <p ) - I ( T, ) - E j 
Laa regie« da geetion aont ainplu : 11 n'y a paa da rlaarva (S aat 
toujour« Tide) ; opal qua æ l t la point aa l'on «e troure, coat r<—pnecnr eortaat 
de T va en R et tout coapoaant aortant de R »a aa F ; eaa taut« n'ont aasuaa 
incidanea aur ceux da 1'autre coapoaant : laa (attiona daa 2 eaepoeanta aont 
Indapeaaantaa. En bref, 11 a'agit d'ia ayetaaa "en parallele". 
5.3.2. La.aatrice qf (i) 

















a1 + b2 
V 
• l 
* l + * 2 
0 
0 









l - 2 l 
1-« * z 
A 








It l * 
A 
-(b «,) t 
- 0 > + O t 
A 
Dorte* aøyamu OM. étati 
•j + *2 
v^r^ 





 + b 2 + " l 
b l 










 + b l + b2 
*1 




. + b l + b 2 
0 
*1 
. + b 2 + « 1 
** 
•
+ b X + *2 
0 
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5.3.3. Lot daa dur4*»_daa«tat«jta srattaM 
La lot da la darda da E, aat tvtliianit ana loi aapoaaatlalla da para-
•acta <bt * bj) . 
La txaaefcwaaa da LUUGB da la danslU da U doraa de Ej a'acrlt ; 
Via * M « + * f y «*•« («> 
Soit, apras aiapliftcatton, pour la transfonafe da la daaatti da 1* 





*iV »2b2)+*i?ibiui+ V W 2 U 2 + V 2 V I *(bi* V V i <V *2 * i + V 
a3+ a 2 « « j * 2 a2+ b,+ b ^ * a [ ( a ^ a ^ C a ^ A ^ H a ^ j * ^ j-MjajfefMj* bj + bj) 
c'aat-a-dlra la caa da 2 C ^ K U U I ldantlquaa, la quaatlt« - <*») ait afro a 
la fol« da atarfrataur at du denaadnataur dont la« dagrda dlalanaat ehaeua c'vw 
unltd J on ratruuve la transfonafa da la daaaltd da la durae da E, ebtanaa I 
l'aaaapla 4.3.1. 
5.3.4. Valaafa aojnaaaa^ee dlaponlbilltig du^agattaa 
Caoas pour la aodtla pzecedant, on calculi las probaMlitda an ragiaa 
liadte da L» chataa da KatJOT aaaeelaa : 
1
 *. JL JL a. -L. 
"l "i b l b2 *1 "l ** "* 
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Oa aa prapoaa done de ddteralner aa regine l i m t i la aatrlea 
aaa repartition at transition det dtatt t. du ayataaa. 
La quantltd f.A. P_„.<!t repreaaate la probablllte a priori pour 
a a op 
an'an rf (Ina l lalta la åretene pateo du point s an point t pendant la tense dt 
la probablllte de paesae* de I an I vaut 
1k li 
Ceaae an 4 .2 .3 . , le caleul de F. - ae pout (tre efraetu* eu'eo 
" j 
rdflas l lalta ear 11 aeeeeelte 1"identification dat points a eyent l^ poor 
lange daaa l'aaalleatloa t; la probabllltd pour eue le apataaa ae trouea ea 
l'aa de eaa polnts ddpand en rfelaa etteleonqne dee pointe precddeata. 
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1« caleul da f n'aat axact an rt|iaa ovalcosout qua at I . 
i'aat l'lawca qua d'uu aaul point. 
U lot F. , <t) 4ai duttu da l'dtat I . aolYl sa t , pant 
*t "i * * 
a'obtaolr a partlr du loia g^ . oil l u a »oot l u points araat C pour 
laata daua l'applleatlon l ; laa lata i ^ aoat dntaratnau dau la cadra 
d'uu ptaeaaaua ayant poor etat« : laa pointa a at l'état I ; ce procaaaua 
aat obtaau a partlr du procoaaua Initial an randaat l u autraa potato tnac-
eaaalblaa. 
Pour obtanlr F. - (t) , i l outfit da pondCrar l u l , pac 
' i 'i * *t 
laa proMblliCéa an rdglaa llarlta d'allar as a vaunt daa dtats du ayatoaa 
autraa qua I , . 
S.S. Caa da loia poa-aaoonaatlaUa« 
fesetta 
laproMaton, dna la c u du ptoalar andala, l u dlagra 













1 ». b. ' a . * b, • t . i. . o, 
j r » . — — i 1 -iry 1 k 
• l m2 b l b2 *1 *2 b l b2 
$i 1«j »• « . p - V - f TfK 
fc
«8 0-, + bp ^ a2 
i . , . f l W . - + b l b * 
SS 6 (bx + b2) ax a2 
<at + bt> (a2 + bj) 
ane la relation, pulaqu'll a'y a paa da réaanre i 
O - W - (1 •• dj) <l - dj) 
d, at d, rapréaentant laa dleponibilltéa dea eoaaeaanu (l) at (2). 
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5 .* . ItntatlT« da tdndtalUatlon tn r«»tt \i-trj 
La aodala aarkovttn dt {lablllté qui nindrallaa 1 « aodalaa 
atudlda att •chtaaclqunanc l« auimat : 
• laa caractdrlatlquai dat coapoaantt tt tta rtglaa dt gaatloo tont rdtuafaa 
par l t proeataut aaad-aurkovlan dt depart dont l t i atata tant l t i point• 
o , p, ttc . . . du tyattat. 
- la fonctlon dt ttructuxt tat una application da l£enambla dat point« 
dana l'anaaabla da« étata E. du aytttaa. 
• la procaaaua d'arrivda dont laa étatt aont laa etat« du ayatcaa riaulta du 
pxocaaaua da depart par l'intamf diaira da la fraction da atructura. 
Dana laa deux axaaplaa préecdanta la. procaaaua d'arrivéa att 
aaurkoalaa aana qu'an alt baaoln dt u placar an rlgla* llatlta. 
Malt nout allona voir qu'll a'aglt l i da caa particullara at 
qua daaa la caa d'uoa fraction da atrueturt qualconaua la procaaaua d'arrl-
vda a'aat plna aarkovlan an rfalaai qutleonqua aaU la radaalau an rtclaa) 
l la l ta . 
Rout ruttront dana la cadrt d'un procaaaua aarkoolan contlnu 
a un noabra flnl d'dtata tal qua ; 
.X at 
' a p « " " I " 
„ - 0, Va 
Da plut U procaaaua att poaitlvaaant téaullar i on paut dons 
calcular laa probabllltée f* pour qua la ayataa* aa trouva an un point 
noun* an rtglaa lladta. 
Indlquont coaaant adoiralltar a ca typa da procaaaua laa rdaul-




Suppotona qu'on •• trouvc aatra 1«> lnatanta 13 ae t4 at qua 
l'oa churcba a dataralnar avac alalia probaMUt« la apataaa aara dut <n 
dtat donni a l'loatant tq. La dernlar Instant da CRanataant d'dtat du •»»-
taaa aat t j : an (t3 + n) l'dtat du coapoaant (2) "rdauaa" conplataanat aeo 
hlatolra pulsqua 1« c o q u u t (Z) auppoti "raala » uauf viant juata da 
eeaaancar una dur*« da foactlonnaaant. In ( t i + a) la coapoaant (1) , aa 
ravaacha, a un cattaln Sga igal I ( t j - t j ) (ear 11 aat an xaaarva da t j a 
ta) ; »1 aa lnl da duréa da tonctlonnaaant a'ait »aa aanonantlalla. l'dtat 
du coapoaant (1) aa "riauna" paa narfaltaaant too hlatolra : 11 fast lul 
ajoutat aon Sga, ca qui obllga a racansar laa dataa daa 3 damlora chaaaa-
aaata d'dtat du ayatena. 
'ar eansCquant l'dtat du aTatnaa. fonetion daa étata daa rnaau 
lanta. na ault pai un proc'aaaua •arkovlan (dont l'éuolutlon futara na ddpan-
drait qua du daxnlar itat at da la darnlara data da chanaaaant d'dtat). La 
thiorla expoaa« na paut done plua noua aarvlr at 11 taut avoir racouta • 
dat procaaaua "a aaanlra". 
SI la lol da durda da goactlonnaaaat du coapoaant (1) aat 
axaonaatlal l«. an amlt au 'a l l« aat Imrarlanta a«T troncatmra a aauclia at 
qu'an ( t 3 + t) la coapoaant (1) aat auaal "nauf" qu'an (t^ + c) : aon itat 
"rtauaa" «lor« parfaltaaant aon hlatolra. 
'ar coaadquant, an (t» + c) dlra qua (1) at (2) (onctloaoant 
dapula t j "réauM" parfaltaaant 1'hlatolra du •Tataat. 
Pour étudlar laa duraaa d'lndlaponlblllté, placona-noua aalnta-
naat an (t2 + a) : l'unlqua lol gouvamant alora l'dvolutlon du ayataaa aat 
call« da la dur*« d' lndlapoolbillta du coapoaant (2) pulaqua (1) aat paaal-
vaaant ao rdaarva : (2) vanant Juata da dibutar una durda d'Indlsponlbllltd, 
aon etat "reauat" coaplataaant 1'hlatolra du arattaa, qualle qua »olt aa lol 
da durta d'tncijpanIMllt«, 
Laa rolaa da (1) at (2) pouvant »tre lnvarada, on conclut aa 
catactara aarfcovlan da 1'dTolutlon du arataaa. 
- i condition qua l u loia daa duraaa da fonctiannaant im taum laa caap* 
aanta aolant aanonantlallaa 
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. aola aoellaa du. aoiant 1«. lo l . daa ant««« d'lndleaonlbllltd. 
Oo aura cefendant tou)oure lntdrlt a eholalr daa lola a trane-
foratee de Leplace rotloanellea (voir la reference [9])pour facilitet la 
letour am original«. 
l»t rdeultete pricddante e'tteadant iaaMlaieaant a on noabre 
quelconqi* da coanoaanta non-ldeetlqaee. 
En regie general«, cheque (oli qua l'dralutlou future da l'etat 
du aTOtéen o* dtpend, aoaantaneeant, qua da la lal d'ua laul caaaoaaat, catta 
lo l paut Strå auclcoaqiie aana dttrulre la caractaro aun-koalan ; catta 
circonatanct aa prodult ayebtnatiqueaettt daaa l'axaaala 4 .4 .1 . ok la ujateaa 
na coapraad qu'oa aaul coapoaant ; m n deux autraa oaa : l'axaaala 4.4.2, 
at la aodUe 5.2. 
Chaqua foil , au cootralre, qua Involution futora landdlata du 
evetataa dtpand daa lola da durie da 1 coapoeaate ou plua. eee lola dolvaat 
»tre toutas exponentiellea pour ceaaervar la caractere aerkovlen daaa te c « 
gtaeral ; catta hypethéee peraat, aa qualqua aorta, la "realae t adra daa 
coapteura daa dureea" dont laa orlgloae dtalaat aa ata*T*l dllfdrentee. la 
andele 5 .3 . aat <ta exaaple da catta clreonataaea : la praeaaaun a'aat æ r -
koalaa que al laa 4 lola da duraa eont axpooaotlallaa. 
*•" XSSSS 
Dana laa modelea preaentda, on aa danae t 
- laa caraeterletiquee da flablllté daa coapoaance, e'eet-l-dlre laa lola da 
probabUit« daa durda• da tonetltmneaant at d'ledUaealMlltd i ebaqua 
eoapoaant paut prendre trola dtata : la fooctloonaaaot, l'ladlapeatbllltd, 
la rieervn (dlapenibilltd aana fonetiooneaaat) 
• la »»niere dont l'auaabte daa coaaoeeet* aat sieealeé aa evataaa. Catta 
organleatioo eoaptand : 
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laa rftalas da eestion ; co—int aont adrda las coapooants Iocs d'uaa 
avsrle ou d'une reals« an dtat ? 
, la xonctlon da structure : coaatnt l'dtat au tyiteas Mpead-11 das 
dtats das eomposanta J 
On dfttarnlne alors ; 
. las lola da probability das durtes daa etats du aystaaa (ou du aolas 
laurs transferases da Laplaca) ; caa duréas sont dsa teapa de premier 
passat«. 
. la aatricc dat probabllltla da paasaea d'iia dtat du ayerfew a im 
autre. 
. les proeabllltta l laltes pour qua le systaas solt daas tal ou tal 
dtat, pulsqua l«s proc«asus de Markov util ises soat positivenen« 
rtgullare. On an dedult diverses fraadeura aovsaaas dont la dlapaal-
blUts du tpatéas an regine l l a l t s . 
four etiectuer ca travail, on eat parti du rappal (x la thdorle 
tres classique das proeaasva da via at da aort qui eoastltua 1'out 11 adaptå 
aur las deus hypotheses : 
- tous les coBfosants sent idsntlauaa (atæs lole des duréas, stase raalas 
da as«tlon, asaa incldanc« sur 1« foaetion d« «truetur«) 
• tous les coaposanca out das lols da durda exaonenttelle«, 
Ca aodele a <td psrfactlona* pour pemttre au aya~£m da pren* 
dre trolt ét at i dont un dtat de dlsponlbillté partlulle. Catt« aistlioration 
• panda de constat«r que lJdtat du systéae ns sulvelt uo processus aarko-
vlan au'ea regis* Hal ts , 
Apris avoir taaarqud qua la thdorle des processus o«al-
aarkovlans paraet, dans csrtalns ca«, da laver l'hypotMsa de Icl« toutea 
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Dan« la eaa d'uaa foacttoa aa ttructnta aaalcoaaua, aa a «oaa-
tat« éaalaaaat eoa l 'at l t da ayataaa a'aaalt aa caaaortaaaot Mtkortaa 
qu'an tdajaa l la l ta . 
tnfla, oa a ladiaua un caa oo l'aa plot lavar laa daaa hypo* 
tMM« « la fala teat aa coattaaaat 1 atUlaar l'outll aarhaalan. 
taa aaealaa da ea typa aaaalaat ttta adapt«t a la datatalaatla 
da la f lablllca daa chataaa da product loo doat laa eoaaoaaata aa aeat pat 
ldaatlatw« aa gaoiral. 
I 
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A. Cuoco, R.Galvagni *, F. I.eonelli * * 
C?r«idl principles ot *L gaiety assessment through reliability 
analysis of the EbSOR plant 
SUMMARY 
For the purpose o! s safety analysis of the ESSOR plant aS com 
prehensive as possible, a probabilistic classification of both 
accident causes and engineered safeguards of the reactor plant 
has been prepared. 
Accident causes have been classified within broad fault rate in-
tervals, using as i basis bsth component design analysis and 
normal industrial practice. 
Engineered safeguards have been classified according to their 
probability of dangerous faults. 
This approach has made possible an homogeneous solution to 
the problem of the credibility of multiple faults. 
INTRODUCTION 
Faults or malfunctions in a nuclear plant could, if not prevented, 
evolve into accidents causing damages to the plant, to the operating 
staff or to the general public. 
Lacking direct experience in the amount of risk deriving in such a 
way to the plant, to the operating staff and to the general public, 
analytical methods were devised to extrapolate existing experiences 
and criteria were set up to compare from a safety point of view 
different plants or different solutions. 
Such a comparison requests in any case criteria of judgement of 
the probabilities along with methods for the appraisal of the da-
mages of the en visage J accidents. 
Therefore an ideal safety evauation of a nuclear plant should consist 
for each of nuclear accident, of: 
the identification of its simple or multiple cnusfco and the 
determination of associated failure rates: 
x Safety and Control Division -CNEN 
x x ORGEL design group - EURATOM 
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the identification of the interventions able to modify its 
evaluation and the resulting final damage and the deter-
mination of their rel: ave dead times; 
the appraisal of the associated damages and probabilites 
for each accident evolution way. 
F rom such an analysis the risk evaluation takes the form of a 
damage-probability spectrum. 
The main difficulty in applying in a rigorous way such a method 
of safety evaluation is the enormous amount of information and 
experiences necessary in order to obtain actually consistent 
results in keeping with the method promises and the paid ana-
lytical effort 
Comparison and acceptability criteria cannot in any case abstract 
from experience on accident evolution paths and from uncertainties 
on extent of resulting damages and associated probabilities. 
These considerations were the basis for the development of a 
schematic method aimed to give an hazards evaluation accept-
able in the framework of the present state of experience on 
expected extent of damages and probability figures and to be 
applicable to complex and even not fully proven plant in any stage 
of the safety analysis. 
The schematization of the method consists in using probability 
i s a discontinuous index rather than i continuous parameter. 
In order to do so > both the accidents initiating faults or rral-
funcaons and the protective actions are divided into four probability 
ranges.respectively fault rate categories and relative dead time 
classes. 
Categories and classes are related to the standard eachoomponent 
or protective system has or should have from the point of view of 
the fault or malfunction considered. The accident analysis along 
with the indexing procedure should be able to point out in schematic 
form the critical plant components that have to be examined more 
carefully from the point of view of accident probability or accident 
consequences. 
The use of categories and classes related to design, construction 
nnd control standards should also give a common understanding 
basis for the designer, the constructor and the safety analyst 
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The method, originally thought i s a multiple failures credibility 
set of criteria, had its initial development and Us first thoroughly 
ipplication in the final safety analysis of thefessOR reactor. At 
that stage ind in view of the complexity of the annlized plant it 
was deemed necesBary to work out a slmbolic system in order 
to analize the coraequehces of i "number as large as possible 
of malfunctlohs. taking due account of their mutual dependence 
or independence and of the final resulting probability of the examined 
course of events. From the probability point of view, the use of 
criteria based on design, construction ind control standards was 
the only solution to overcome in a rational way the lack of data 
based on a firm and direct experience on plants of the same type." 
The method worked out had therefore the characteristics of a method 
of analysis of a plant as it i s built. 
The results of the application of the method were judged so encouraging 
that it was thought wonhwhile further developing it in order to get it 
applicable through the whole design stage, when it could develop its 
full usefulness. 
In the following both the method used in the safety analysis of the 
ESSOR reactor and the method at its present stage of development 
will be described. 
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ESSOR METHOD 
Components and protective systems have to be classified 
according their reliability; such a classification is obtained 
using four reliability groups having from 1 to 4 increasing 
reliability. Groups 1 and 2 are representative of standards 
used in normal industry; group 3 is representative of an 
higher type of standards and can considered as nuclear standard; 
group 4 is representative ol components and protective sy-
stenis absolutely reliable. 
Protective systems are assignedto four reliability classes 
according to the result of the analysis of the monitoring By-
sten*, of the signal elaborating system and of the actuating 
system. Hie protective action is classified in the class 
of that having lowest reliability of the three. 
The criteria for class definition are as follow s : 
a) Class 1 normal industrial systems from design, 
construction, control and maintenance 
points oi view; possibility of having fail 
to danger and not revealed type of faults 
not minimized; 
b) Class 2 high standard industrial systema;possibility of 
having fail to danger type of faults not 
minimized. 
c) Class 3 the higher reliability is obtained by the 
higher degree of fail-safe or by redun-
dancy; 
d) Class 4 intrinsic characteristics of the plant or 
class 3 systems redundancy. 
Components are assigned to four reliability categories with 
regard to any specified failure way. The criteria for categories 
definition are quite similar to those for classes definition. In 
a more definite form they can be found in the description of 
the developed method, that is given in the following, and in Ap-
pendix 2. 
The accidents analysis i s carriedon hypothizing the successive 
malfunctions or failures of the components of category 1,2 and 3, 
of each subsystem of the plant and the concomitan' malfunctions 
of the protective intervention! of class 1,2 and 3, 
Particular attention must be paid to the spurious actions of 
protective systems which could cause accidents or increase 
probability of components malfunctions. 
The aim of the analgia to assess the adequacy of the safety 
preventions and protections along any path of evolution of 
foreseable accidents, taking into account as far as possible 
also the minor accidents which could develop into serious ac-
cidents, increasing the serious accidents probability. 
The fundamental criteria of such an assessment are the following: 
an accident caused by a fault or a malfunction cf a com-
ponent of category 4, as long as the fault or malfunction 
of the envisaged type is concerned, should be looked at 
ae incredible; 
an accident caused by a fault or a malfunction of a compo-
nent of category 3 should be analyzed for the consequences 
to the environment. In assessing such consequences the 
protective actions on the accident path should be evaluated 
both for capability and reliability. As long as the reliabi-
lity is concerned, it should be looked at missing interven-
tion Of protective systems of class 4 or at missing interven 
tion of redundant andindependent class 3 protective systems 
as incredible. If the independent class 3 protective systems 
are not equivalent from the point of view of damage redi>£ 
tion. it is hypoth-zed that the active one is the less effective 
on damage reduction; 
an accident caused by a fault or a malfunction of a compo-
nent r.f category 2 should be analyzed for the consrquences 
both to the environment and to the operating staff. In assess 
ing the consequences to the environment the criteria should 
be those aforementioned but the resulting damages should 
be of one order of magnitude less than those arising from 
the most serious of category 3 accidents. 
In assessing the consequences to the operating staff full 
advantage can be taken of the protective actions of das* 3 
or of equivalent redundance of class 2 { redundance fr«n 
the reliability point of view, with effectiveness of the fc** 
effective on damage riduction). 
602 
6 
The reliability assessment of the ESSOR reactor protective 
systems is carried out for each of the three fo lowing main 
plant systems: 
1) Nuclear and cooling system 
2) Pressure and fire protections and containment 
system 
3) Fuel handling system 
The components are then classified into categories and com-
ponents categories and protective actions classes are listed 
for each of the following subsystems of each of the main system 
1- Nuclear and cooling system 
Reactor 
Driver zone cooling system 
Moderator zone cooling system 
Experimental organic zone cooling system 
Experimental light water zone cooling system 
Electric power sypply system 
2) Pressure and fire protections and containment system 
Containment system 
Pressure and fire protective syst cms 
3) Fuel handling system 
Charging and discharging machines 
Handling stations system 
An example of the classification of the protective actions and 
components of the Driver zone cooling sy ;tetr. is given in 
Appendix 1. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE METHOD 
The aim of the extension and of the reorganization of the 
method is to keep the designer fully informed of the safety 
evaluation criteria, setting those in a form as precise as 
possible at the present stage. 
The method should therefore s upply a working tool for 
the definition of design solutions which are equivalent from 
a safety Standpoint. 
The procedure to be followed for the assessment is divided 
into the following steps: 
a) Listing of altfKpreseable accidents with the fault or 
malfunction of the components causing them; 
b) Classification of accidents causes into categories 
according to fauure rates criteria. 
If a specific failure rate value is not available, the 
category is defined according to design criteria, to 
contraction, test and control standards anti to type 
and periodicity of controls and maintenance during 
operation, taking into account their bearing on the 
specific component failure considered; 
c) Division into classes of protective systems, capable 
of preventing or limiting the listed accidents; the 
classification should be made according to relative 
dead time criteria. 
If t he relative dead time is not availabe the class 
is defined according to design criteria, construc-
tion test standards and to type and periodicity of controls 
and maintenance during operation; 
d) Evaluation of the risks associated with the Ustfd ac-
cidents, taking into account causes categories and 
effective protective actions classes. 
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a) Accidents identification 
The accidents identification and the evaluation of their 
consequences are carried out ace or ding to traditional 
safety analysis criteria and methods. 
But in order to have a meaningful probabilistic asses-
sment it is necessary to analyse in a fully systematic 
way all foreseable accidents and the effects on their conse 
quences of each protective system which can modify * 
the accident »volution . 
During the application of the method at the design stage 
it is necessary to re-examine ccntinuosly both the 
classes and the consequences of accidents as the compo-
nents and the protective systems gain a better defini-
tion and as one makes a selection among a number of 
possible equivalent solutions. 
b) Accidents causes classification 
The aim of the components categorization is to put 
together components having comparable reliability in 
front of the examined type of fault or malfunction. Such 
a collection should be based as far as possible on pra£ 
tical industrial criteria. 
At the present stage, it ia proposed to use in the components 
classification four categories, characterized by increasing 
reliability: 
- Cat. 1 
-Cat. 2 
- Cat. 3 
- Cat. 4 
Cat.l 
normal industrial - type reliability 
high industrial-type reliability 
aeronautics-type reliability 
almost absolute reliability 
This is among the four tb« category whoa* boundaries are most 
difficult to define precisely and probably the largest one. 
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AU industrial components both those which have not been and those 
which cannot be subjected to standard specifications, to 
standard tedts or to effective inspections and maintenance, 
are classified into cat. 1. Components that can malfunction 
as consequence of bad maintenance during plant operation 
without possibility of effective and timely control are also 
classified into cat. 1. 
From a safety point of view such kind of components should 
be demonstrated not to cause nuclear accidents. 
Cat. 2 
Components classified into this category should have ? high 
industrial standard with respect to the examined functional 
requirement. Characterizing components are those which 
in the working conditions satisfy official normal industrial 
type standards both as fabrication and tests and as periodical 
inspections are concerned. Components in cat. 2 are also 
those which are used as a consequence of a selection derived 
from a significant experience on their behaviour in the work-
ing conditions. In any case missing official tests and control 
standards, appropriate standards must be defined and adopted . 
Components which could have better classification but which 
are liable to malfunction as consequence of bad maintenance 
are also classified in cat. 2 if not protected against by appro-
pi iate alarms or interventions. 
Cat. 3 
Components classified into this category should satisfy higher 
standards than normal industrial official standards. 
The larger safety margins could result from: 
working conditions sensibly less stringent than the cor-
responding ones admitted by normal industrial official 
standard)* 
preventive maintenance ( e.g. of aeronautics type) 
If there are multiple components of category 2, which ara in-
dependent , separately proof-tested and singly assuring the 
complete requested function, loss of such a function can be 




This category is Upical of functions of almost absolute relia-
bility. It is referred to the expected rate of a specific and wad 
defined fault type of the component, rather than to the compo-
nent failure rate. The almost absolute reliability can be 
obtained by_: 
redundancy of components of category 3, which are 
independent, separately proof tested and which can 
independently assure the complete requested function; 
demonstrated and safe impossibility in the particular 
working conditions of the happening of the type of fault; 
unless this may develop as an evolution of faults of 
the lower categories. A further condition is that the 
lower category fault be detected in due time, so to 
avoid a further fault evolution. 
On the basis of the definition of reliability, the criteria is 
proposed that, from a safety standpoint, the happening of 
-faults or malfunctions of category 4 be considered incredible. 
Protective systems classification criteria 
A classification of components into four categories, with 
respect to their possible malfunctions, should allow the 
subdivision of the causes which could initiate accidents into 
four classes, homogeneous from an extimated rate standpoint. 
In order to continue the analysis of damage probability it is 
necessary to evaluate safety protective actions. 
In any of the protective systems we can identify a detection 
system, which can pick out abnormal situations, a process-
ing system, which can transform a detection into a logic 
decision, an actuating system which actuates the logic deci-
sion in such a way as to correct or contain the evolution of 
the abnormal situation. 
The detector, the processing system and the actuator can be 
classified independently on the basis of the respective relative 
dead time. In doing so, a reliability class is attributed to any 
one of them. The entire protective action has a characteristic 
reliability class which is the lowest o* the three. 
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In the first stage of the setting up of reliability criteria the 
classification of detectors, processing systems and actuators 
can be made by arranging them according to prattical criteria, 
using as far as possible industrial-type concepts in more or 
less homogeneous reliability intervals. 
At the present stage, we propose to use for them too a 
classification into four classes, defined as follows: 
- Class 1: normal industrial-type reliability 
- Class 2: high industrial-type reliability 
- Class 3: aeronautics-type reliability 
- Class 4: almost absolute reliability 
Class 1 
Class 1 i s typical of those systems in whose design has 
not been deemed appropriate to use particular design pre-
cautions and particular choice of components in order to 
drastically reduce the relative dead time. THIS class has 
the distinctive features of a normal industrial standard, has 
no fault detection s ystem, is subject to maintenance after 
the fault has been detected; this detection is carried out 
at time intervals suggested by normal use. This class 
includes all those interventions which without following any 
particular procedure or initiating alarms, could either be 
by-passed or be made inoperative by wrong maintenance. 
Furthermore, this class includes operator interventions 
which should be carried out in emergency conditions and 
which are not univocally defined. 
Class 2 
Class 2 has the distinctive features of a high industrial Stan 
dard, is not supposed to have a high fail-safe degree, and 
is subjected to very attentive and frequent maintenance. This 
class includes all those interventions which could be by-pas 
sed during operation with particular procedures which involve 
multiple reaponsiblities; it does include as well those inter-
ventions which could be made inoperative by wrong maintenance 
and which, even though in this condition do initiate control 
alarms, do not initiate an automatic exclusion or fail-safe ac-
tion. It does also include operator interventions which should 
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carried out in times of the cruer >f several minutes on 
the basis of written orders. 
Class 3 
Class 3 is typical of those systems where not only a particular 
choice of components and preventive maintenance, but also 
redundancy, an high degree of fell-safe and autochejk System, 
reduce the relative dead time to values which can not be obtain_ 
ed by an industrial standard, even by a high one. 
These systems are typical of nuclear plants (e. g. high flux 
trip systems, etc); they have been defined "aeronautics standard" 
only to point out the results which can be obtained trough an 
analysis of failure rates, preventive maintenance, an appropriate 
testing system, and the importance of obtaining such results. 
A common need of these systems is that they should not be by-
passed in normal plant operation, but only during shut-downs, 
to program particular operating cycles. 
Class 4 
Class 4 is typical of those systems which use, in order to 
obtain protective actions, o r well known intrinsic characteristics 
of tae nuclear reactor or of the plant itself or are obtained 
through redundancy of independent class 3 systems, or which 
have so advanced and well,defined fail-safe or autocheck cha-
racteristics to be equivalent from a relative dead time point 
of view to redundancy of independent class 3 systems. 
Speaking about the whole classification system, it can be of 
interest to note that if there are any uncertainties deriving 
from alack of specific experience on a given system, on its 
effective working conditions on its independence from the systems 
with which it does redundate a degradation of the reliability class 
of the action to which the system belongs i s mandatory. 
On the other hand, redundancy, testing methods at meaningful 
time intervals and a counterchecked preventive maintenance 
can upgrade the reliability class. 
A number of examples of component classification into cate-





By definition, risk is the product of damage and its probability 
Damage evaluation is performed through an analysis of the 
typical accidents with the usual approximation. 
Probability evaluation can be performed for any typical ac-
cident taking into account the category of the accident cause 
and the classes of the associated interventions. It is thus 
possibile to reach a symbolic definition of the probability 
interval of the damage. This technique lends itself to an ela-
boration of acceptance criteria based either on the multiple 
failure cencepiMCA - type criteria) or on the definition of a 




1. Equivalent solution: technical solutions through 
which it IB possible to obtain values of risk (da-
mage times probability) of the same order of mag_ 
nitude. 
2. Ccmponent: system which has a complete and well 
defined physical function with respect to the type 
of accident under consideration. 
3. Type of accident: accident defined through its 
nature,evolution intime and consequences, 
taking under examination capability and effec -
tiveneea of single and multiple interventions which 
could prevent or limit it. 
A d d e n d u 
APPLICATION EXAMPLE OF THE METHOD ON THE ESS OR REACTOR 
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OH THE DRIVER ZONE COOLING CIRCUITS (Fig. l) 
In table 5 are listed all causes of accident« on the 
DRIVER ZONE cooling. To any component failure will be associated the rela-
tive category, following the criteria already explained before. 
In table 4 are listea and classified all protective 
actions, designed to prevent or reduce the accidents of loss of cooling of 
the driver elements. 
The parts of the protective systems are classified in 
the following tables : 
- Table 1 : monitoring systems 
- Table 2 ; elaborating systems 
- Table 3 : actuators. 
With the aim to keep the example simple, it will not 
be extended to other protection systems as f.e. 
- emergency cooling system 
- containment, etc. 
Ve have l i m i t « the analys is to the most severe a c c i -
dents of the family A. 
LOSS OF FLOW ACCIDENTS IN THE PRIMARY CIRCUIT 
The most severe accident of family A l i s t e d i n table b 
i s i HA * "All primary pumps stopped and no auxi l iary puspa started", t* l ca 
•ay be regarded as well ai the maximum accident of this family. 
Safety Interventions linked to M M 
a) Power setback or control rod run-down 
1) one primary pump stopped 
2) two primary pumps stopped 
3} COSE outlet lov flow 
4) high outlet temperature and low outlet flow 
for each channel 
5) COBB outlet high temperature 
b) Scran 
1) three primary pumps stopped 
2) CORK outlet low flow 
3) high outlet temperature and low outlet flow 
for each channel 
4) CORE outlet high temperature 
The probability of a reactor shut-down is represented 
by the independant interventions i 1 . C2 + 2 . C3. 
These protective actions and their relative class of 
reliability assure that the reactor will be shut-down following the failure 
K M . 
Evalutatlon of the accidents 
Under assumption that no protective action is forscen 
for accident M M and considering only the inertion of the pumps fly wheels, 
with the reactor at nominal power, the temperature of driver zone hot spot 
will encrease with 2.5*C/sec and the coolant outlet temperature with 0,8*0/ 
Given the reliability of the protective interventions, 
and the slow ness of the temperature increase, the reactor will be abut down 
























after a complete stop pf a l l priaaiy pumps, navural 
c irculat ion w i l l occur with the improbable Feas ib i l i t i e s of nucleate boiling 
during the f i r s t minutes. 
Vuts. tfct srceraent %\1 taen tre -raouAogUail conse-
quences while no fuel damage wi l l occur. 
Table 1 : CUSS OF HOKITOEmG SYSTEMS 
He storing system 
Outlet channel temperature 
(16 channels) 
Outlet core temperatur? 
Outlet channel flow 
Outlet core flow 
Expansion tank pressure 
Expansion tank level 
Primary pump stop signal 

















Moiutorrd for minimum reading 
2/16 combination of T1 
Monitored for mini*ua reading 
2/16 combination of Fl 
2/3 monitored presture switch« 
dr-celi monitored for minimum 
reading 
Closed to open contact on pump 
oraker 
Idea 
2/3 level switches 
•/.. 
•f*f • 
Table 2 I CLASS OF BLABOgATDB 8VSTBI 
Elaborating System 
Scram logic system 
Power set-back system 
Control rod run-down system 
Pressure reduction system 
Auxiliary pumps starting system 
Feeding pumps starting system 




















Table 3 I CLASS OF ACTUATORS 
Actuator 
Safety rods group 1 or 2 
Control rods 
Motor driven valves 
Feeding pumps start 
Auxiliary pumps start 
















The safety rods are divided late 
2 independent groups (drop of 2/4 







High outlet teaperature ami lov 
outlet flov for each chaanel 
Core outlet high teaperature 
Core outlet lov flov 
Expansion tank high pressure 
Expansion tank lov level and 
channel outlet lov flov 
3 primary puaps stopped 
3 secondary pumps stopped 
Moderator high level ' 
Run dovn and set back 
High outlet temperature and 
lov outlet flov for each 
channel 
Core outlet high temperature 
Core outlet lov flov 
Primary pimps stopped 1/3 
Primary pump* stopped 2/3 































T2 / 3 
W / 3 
B1 A 
B1 / 2 











SS-2 / 2 
SS-C / 2 
SS-2 / 2 
SS-2 / 2 
SS-3 / 2 

































Protect ive act ion 
Deoressurisation of the 
Expansion tank 
Expansion tank l o v l e v e l and 
moderator high l e v e l 
Expansion tank lov l e v e l and 
channel out le t flow 
primary guana deenergize 
Expansion tank low l e v e l and 
moderator h i $ i l e v e l 
Expansion tank l o v l e v e l and 
channel out l e t l ov f l o v 
Feeding pumps s t a r t 
Expansion tank low l e v e l 
Expansion tank minimum l e v e l 
Auxil iary pumps s t a r t 
Expansion tank l o v l e v e l and 
channel out l e t lov flow 
Expansion tank lov l e v e l and 

















L l . F l / 2 
LI .1,2/2 
LI . F l / 2 
M / 2 
M / 2 
11 .F l /2 
L1.L2/2 














V-4 / 2 
V-4 /i 
V - 2 / 2 
V-2 / 2 
V-3 / i 










T a b l e 5 / 1 I CATEGORY Of CAUSES OF ACCIESHT 
Causes of accident 
A - Loss of flov 
- Primary pumps stopped 
- 2 prinary pumps stopped 
- 3 primary pumps stopped 
- 3 prinarv pumps stopped and no auxiliary 
pump started 
-• Feeding pump not stopped 
- Feeding pump not started 
- Primary circuit valve accidentally closed 
- Primary circuit completely blocked 
B - Loss of coolant 
- Leakage from primary circuit to reactor 
tank 
- Pump tealin" leikagé 
- Valve sealing leakage 
- 6.A.A.A. joint leakage 
- Flange leakage 
- Instrumentation pirk-up leakage 
- Leakage through B.S.D. 
- Loss of coolant due to an accident heat 
exchanger dumping valve opening 
- Expansion tank overflow valve opening 
- Expansion tank depressurization valve 
opening 
- Instrumentation pick-up breakage 
- Heat exchanger breakage 
— Primary piping bread's* 
- Inlet primary circuit collector breakage 
























































Causes of acc iden t 
- Channel i n l e t p iping breakage 
- Channel o u t l e t piping breakage 
C - Loss of cooling 




- Secondary praps stopped wi thout emergency 
system s t a r t e d 
- Secondary coolant of heat exchanger i s o -
l a t i o n 
- Drainage of secondary coolan t f ron hea t 
exchanger 


























A d d e n d u m 
ACCIDENT CATEGORIES AMD CUSSES OF PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS 
I) EXAMPLES Of ACCIDENT CAUSES CATECOIIES 
A) Components, causes of accidents of the first category (Gl) 
a) Mechanical components 
Bearings Normal, not monitored and not subjected to preventive 
maintenance (at intervals defined by endurance tests) 
Seals Seals on moving systems, without leak detection, and 
not subjected to preventive 'maintenance (at intervals 
defined by endurance tests) 
Valves Normal valves, operating under environmental conditions 
different from commissioning conditions, and without 
preventive maintenance 
Static components Tubing, expansion joints, supports, not specially 
tested by commissioning institutions (ANCC-T.B.V. 
etc.) operating under not exactly known conditions, 
and not rubjected to periodic inspection or preventive 
maintenance 
Control valves Operatin« under stressed conditions and not subjected 
to inspection or preventive maintenance 
b) Electrical components 
Operating under stressed conditions and not subjected 
to inspection and preventive maintenance 
Circuit breakers Operating under stressed conditions, and not install«* 
in closed cabinets 
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Electric cables Unarmoured and unprotected cables installed in 
damaging environment 
Electronic equip- Not subjected to inspection or preventive nainte-
ment nance 
Electric motors Not protected, operating under damaging environaen-
tal conditions and under overload - frequent start 
and stop under load. 
c) 0perator_interventiO(is_ 
- Positioning of actuators, not equiped with out of range alarms 
- Manual aetpolnt adjustments 
- Direct Interference on interblock by-passes-
B) Components, causes ot accidents of the ^nd category JGZ) 
a) Mechanical^congonents 
Bearings Special bearings operating according coanissioning 
conditions monitored for temperature and luhrifica-
tloo. and equiped v/lth alarm trips permitting in 
time corrective intervention fcy the operator 
Seals Seals on moving parts operating according commissio-
ning specification monitored for leaks and equiped 
with alarm trip' permitting corrective intervention 
by the operator 
Valves (check and Quality valves, operating according commissioning 
control valves) specification, subjected to inspection and preventive 
maintenance 
Safety valves Safety valves dimensioned and designed according the 
rules of national safety institutions (AMCC - T.B.V, 
etc.) or equivalent 
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b) Electric components 
Belais Quality relais in base current, installed in cabinet* 
or at least in non aggressive environmental condi-
tions, and subjected to inspection and preventive 
maintenance 
Circuit breakers Operating in non aggressive environment and installed 
in closed cabinets 
Electronic circuits Subjected to preventive Maintenance 
Electric motors Operating in non aggressive environment, largely over-
dimensioned and not subjected to frequent starts and 
stops under load 
c) Operator interventions 
- Positioning of actuators, equiped with out of ran$e alarms 
- Set point adjustment or by-pass consent with key interblock 
c) Component failures^ causer, of third category accidents .(Gj) 
a) Mechanical components 
- Gripping of lubrifirated and monitored bearings, when bearings are at 
least of the 2nd category 
- Major rupture of primarv main tubings when these tubinys are at least 
?M£-30X overdesignad with respect to the effective operation conditions, 
taking into account thermal and vibrational stresses 
- lfeuble seals of the second category type, with monitored interspace. 
b) Electrical components 
Cables Short circuit on armoured or protected cables, ins-
talled iM non aggressive envii onwnts 
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Distribution Short circuit on busbars installed in closed ca* 
busbars binets 
D) Failures, causes of fourth category accidents (G4) 
a) Accidents due to mechanical failures 
- Contemporaneous rupture of a dou -e vailed tubing, each containment 
independent and of category 3 and each continuously monitored 
- Major ruptur« of the reactor vessel which is designed and conmiasioaed 
according unclear standards ami regularly inspected 
II) CLASSES OF PROTECTIVE BVSTEKS 
The reliability of a control system or of a measuring channel depends nearly 
exclusively on the design critsrious and on the working conditions of the va-
rious elementary components. 
The following elements ar> taken into insideration to judge the realiability t 
1) Type of failure : - fail-safe 
- fail to danger signalized or not signalised 
2) Possibility and nvcedurcs of switching off 
3) Possibilities and conditions of inspection and verification. 
a) Systems of nlaat 1 
Protective system« of class 1 do not require a reliability evaluation 
B) Systems of class.2 
All components of- a .protective eyutem of class 2 must be of a proven type 




a) Detectors _ and measurements 
- Protected thermocouples (well aounted) of an ample life Mae under 
the operation conditions, and with preventive substitution 
- Instruments of good industrial standard, tested under effective ope-
ration conditions, subjected to preventive maintenance 
b) Elaboration systems and control circuits 
- Simple solid state logic, or relate without base current, equiped 
with a control system "a posteriori" 
- fielais logic with base current, subjected to preventive maintenance 
and equiped with a faDure alarm 
All logic of class 2 should be installed in closed cabinets. 
c) Actuators 
- Electrical motors operating in non aggressive environment and of a 
proven type vith regards the effective operation conditions 
- Circuits breakers, operating in non aggressive environment and installed 
in closed cabinets 
* Valves, control valves or remote controlled check valvea, subjected to 
preventive maintenance 
C) Protective systems of class 3 
For these systems a reduction of the relative deal time to values net re-
gularly obtainable with common industrial standards may be realised with 
the following rules i 
1. The use of everdeslgned components (resistor, diode, etc. at <0H) 
Si. The use of »fail-safe« logic or the addition of an autocontrol system 
which translates nan fail-safe failures in fail-safe ones 
3. Redundancy - beside an increased reliability, redundancy la general 
permits maintenance during operation 
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4* Preventive maintenance by which single components will be submitted 
at 70% of their guaranteed life tine. 
Bule 4 nay be applied when it is not possible to design according to rule 2. 
a) Measuring_ system 
Constituted of redundant number of measuring channels of good industrial 
standard, equiped vith a continuous autocontrol system, in case of fai-
lure, the autocontrol system triggers an intervention equivalent to the 
level trip. Beside that, the systea nust be equiped vith a cosnon alarm 
to indicate any channel failure or any alarm trip. 
b) Elaboration system 
The logic and control system should be vith base current, and equiped 
vith an autocontrol system, which translates any non fail-safe failure 
in a fail-safe one. 
The logic circuits associated to more than one intervention pf class 3 
beside being extremely reliable, eventually has to be duplicated in 
order not to impair the degree of redundancy of the interventions, the 
autocontrol system should test al l duplicated lines separately ana in-
dependant ly. 
c) Actuators 
The actuators have to be fail-safe as far as possible and of the base 
current type. 
In a detail study all possible failure should be examined, passive as 
veil as active* From this detailed study can be deduced whether a re-
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1 - IffmODUGTICff 
Le bref expose" qui v£ S-'ivre est le réBuae', d'xme part dna reaarrues que 
noua avons pu faire au cours de l'ezercice de nos aetivites quotidiennas 
qui s'exercent dans des døaaines cocne l'aérodynsmique, l'électxouique, 
la thermique, l'autonatique, et d'autre part dea analyses bibliogrephiquas 
que nous faisona d'une facon continue et au sujet desquelles on trouvera 
en annexe quelques references. 
De tout tempo les ionatructeurs ont chercfaé a oonférer a leurs fabrications 
une aGrené de fonctionneraent eatiafaisante pour les utilisateurs, nala 
pendant tres longteaps cette sureté de fonctionnaaeirt determines pir des 
essais de laborvtøire ou lss resultats de fonctionneaent en clientele ne 
grésentait qu'un caractere qualit^tif ou s i une valsur quantitative en 
était donnée aucun traitenent mathéoatique ne pennettait d,en generaliser 
la signification. 
- C est depuis la seconde guerre Kondi ale qu'^st apparn la besoin de 
quantifier la sfireté de fonctionneaent. Ce basoin s donne* naiseance a 
une discipline nouvelle que noua appelona ec francais flabilit4 et que 
les anglais noaøent reliability. 
Bien qu*inseparable de la notion de conception de aystea-ws, la fiabilité 
s'es distingue par les connaissances m t^héaafcqnes et statiatiques au'elle 
requiert. C1 est une branche de la recherche øpératiO-inelle, 
Parai les noabreuses causes qui sont k 1'origins du bøsoin de quantifier 
la sureté de fonct onneaent nou* retLendrons t 
- la na 1 usance de technique« nouvellas dont la rapidité d'evolution ne 
peraet pas aux technicians de se retirer a des resultats d'expérienoes 
passées d'ou la necessity de posséder des netnodes qui permettent de 
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prédire, puis d'an&iorer la fiab lité* de s?steMB nouveaux. 
- la c iiplezité crcissante des systsmos n« "Ticrøt^ ent plus d'estlnsr les 
suretés de fcnctionnc&e ~t grace N 1* unique bon SKIS 
- des p'„rf«nnances de s st aes tou^ours plus élevées, iapliquant d'utiliser 
1-s sstériaiut auz l u i t e s de leurs posg b- l i t 's co qui exclue 1'utilisation 
de larges coefficients do sécxité ou d'ignorance. 
- une concurrence éconoojque trss vive obligeant 1'Industrie a optinaliser 
ses choix pour réduiro los coflts, a organiser rationnellavent la aainte-
iance, a rcduiie les stocks, ICL tenps d" immobilisation des •achinea, etc . . . 
d'ou la naissance de nombreux concepts derives de celui de fiabilité, 
telles la disponlbilité, la pertinence, etc . . . 
- la conception d'jnstallation ou de machines dont la. défaillanee peut 
©ntralner la sort (avlons, fusées, roacteur nucléalre, s t c . ) avec en 
plus des implications finanderec et psychologiques. 
Avant d'aller plus c vant, nous easaierons de dasser 1*28 systéaes que 
l'on d compose généraleaent en sous aysteses ou sous ensembles eux-sAaes 
decomposes en cenposants ou pieces élesøntairøs. 
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2 - DIW?r»TO THT-S DS SI3FSTS 
IJbua propogons de dist?nguer douz famil ies de syBt^aea : 
l s s systomea structuraux <-<t i e a aystemes infornr.tionnels 
Les praaiers aont ceux dont ?a fonct on pr* neddale conaiflte a tranantettre 
des ef forts ou assurer des positionnementa t e i s l a poutre d'un pont, la 
membrane d'uno a i lo d'rvion ou le tube d'un telescope. 
L>. foection principale des seconds est de tronsnøttre des informations 
qui peuvent 8tre : une force, un debit, une pression, un déplacement, 
e t c . . . On. rangera *ins cet te famille l e s systémes éleetriques e t é l ec tro -
niques et ausai lefl systemt-s néc&niqiies comme l e s asservisssuønts liydrou-
l iqucs prr ezeaple. 
Ces derniera systenes a nt composes d'organes de structures qui trans-
mettent dee efforts , l e corps d'une varme pr,r example, et d'organes de 
l i a i s o n couane l e s jo ints d'é'tanchéité'. 
Lo type de panaes sub ua p^r !.ee ^stenefl powrant, d'une part caraeté-
r i s er ces sysVocts e t , d*artre part définir l e s netnodes c& calcul dø 
l a f i a b i l i t é -k u t i l i s e r , nous rappellorona, dans lo p. ragtaphe øuivant, 
des definit ions re lat ives auz déf a l l iances t e l l e s qu* e l l e s aont expriméee 
par IlensJeurs CHAFOUITJ/J e t D' F/.ZZIS dans La reference B 6 page 8 . 
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3 - DJ'FIrTTTON D £> D, .PålLUITCHS 
D^^Ltøtto i Pin de 1'aptitude d'un diapositif & aooomplir sa fbnotion 
requise. 
M£a£^anoe epjadaJjae : Défaillnnce qui n'aurait p s^ pu $tra nrévue par un 
exaaan aatcrieur des caractéristiquea. 
^f^lla^o.j»«ÉP^8^-Te .Défaillaxwe qui aumit pu fttre prevue par un 
ozamen antér eur des caractaristiques. 
Défaillence partielle sDéfaillanca resultant de deviations d*une ou des 
caractdristiqueB au-delX das li-oites spédfiées Bais tellea qu'elles 
n'entralnent pas une dispar tion oo. plots de la fonotion requise. 
Déjfoil122P&. JXPP.lJ-te s Défaillance resultant de deviations d'une ou des 
cr-ractéristiques, tellos qu*elles entxatnent une disparition de la fonotion 
requise. LOB limites oorreepoDdant a eette categoric sont des Unites 
speciales Bpécifiées dazs ce but. 
J^e^llanpe oataleptique i Défaillance qui est a la fa.* s soudaine ot 
complete*. 
Mfftj.lJjMHjw pJJ jtéfiradatlpn i Défaillance qui est a la fois progressiTe 
et partielle. 
Défaillanoe a'exploitation t Défaillanoe oauaée par le aøn-raspoot des 
reglas d'exploitation øpecifié'eB ou par des influsnoes eztérieures dépas-




4 - MTH D:S GCnr-åLTS UTILiaVTS N^ UL3CTR0SIQDS 
Lee étudee da fiahilité se sont cons: dérableaent dévsloppé'es eveo l'esaor 
de l'électronique et cela pour trois ra^sons principales i 
- les systemes électroniquea sont constitués de centeines de conposants 
et en raiaon de la complexite' qui en découle, leur flabilité* ne peut 6tre 
determined que grftce a das méthodea tres élaboréss. 
- les ooapo santa éleotronlquaa ont généralement un tauz de pnnae constant 
c'est-OHilre une loi da eurvie exponentielle, forne aathematiqus qui ne 
conduit pas X dea oalcula trop inextricables. 
- le grand noabre de composanta qui confers una extrSns cosplexité atiz 
systimen, présento l'avantage de pensettre des estimations atatiatiquea 
préc .sea en raiaon aftne de ces grands affcetifa. 
Hoiia avonø vu dans les definitions qua l'on dratinguait las défaillanosø 
aaudainca at les défalllancea progressives. 
A cea de ix types da défaillanee on peut f^ire correspondre deux familias 
de calcul. 
Dans le premier cas on decompose le systeme en sous systemes cu nødulas 
et on represents les liens entre ces demiors du point de vue de la 
fiabilité par un schema dit b loc-diagrantae de flnbili t<S auqusl on applique 
lea regies du calcul des probobilités. Pour améliorar la fiaMlité d'ua 
systems, on peut, d'une part ohoisir das cømpoaants plus flablaa ou let 
raller sulvant un sohesia plus sur c'eat-k-dire en utillaant par example 
la redondanos qu'elle soit active ou de substitution. 
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Dana lo oaa des d^fai'lances ircjgressives, 1'etude de fiab l ité c-nsiate, 
a prxtir du jiiagrwue fonjatji onriel , a "''flair coiment v r ien t lea pram' Vraa 
de sortio an fonction de 1*. variation des ^raaetrea d'entree, ce que lea 
américains appellent ?VA ou parametre valu' analysis. 
On jwut dasser les Er-tliodes de F7 A er deux families suivant que l'on 
ae fait -as ou au csntrclra quo l'oc f^it iatervenir la 4 strlbution 
probabiliste des parametres. 
L'analyse de la sensibilité et l'étudc du cas le plus défavorable (worst 
case) so présentent dans le premier cas, l'aailyac des moments, la methods 
de convolution et les netnodes de Mbnte Carlo apparaiasent dans le second« 
1
 - . jtude. de senaibilUé 
La sensibilité d'un syste:e caractérise l.i variation d'un ou dss parametres 
Y. de sortie en fonction de la variation d'un ou des parametres d'entree 
déflnie mathématiquement par : 
s 
Son etude peimet de determiner les parametres dont la derive influenoera 
le plus les performances du systems. 
Dans oe type d*etude, lea variations des parauwtres d'entree sont foibles. 
Si au oontrain on donne a ces paremfctres des amplitudes de variation 
extremes on fait una analyse du ess. _le_ glua_ défavorable (ou worst case 
analysis) qui correspond a la verification d'un fonctionceme.it eatisfai-




2 - Iorsque l'on dtfsire connnltre le probability de voir la val*ur 
doe parametres do sortie dé'passer 23 tolerances, on fait appel il la 
méj^ pde dite des moments, nonnee ici car elle porte sur lea deux premiers 
moments de la distribution des paramatrea d'entree, c'est-vWire, la 
moyenne et la variance, catte rétbode est auasi dénoiamée methods de.A° 
j ^ j K ^ t t o n de_ la j^irajaee« Elle suppose des distributions normales at 
das parametres de sortie variant li»éaireae>-t en fonction des rnxatietres 
d1 entree. 
La methods. deTjcpjiypjbJtjion n'implicjie pas une d atribution normale des 
parametreB d'eutrée, elle a pour bas*s l'Ivpøthese que la variation totale 
d'un parametre de sort e est la som te des variations partielles de ce 
oftue para^-:tre de sortie, causees par chacun des oaraaetr*.s d'entree. 
Sans le cas
 br\s general 011 les distributions sont quelconques et les 
systemes tres conpliqués on oeut faire appel aux ét .odes de tfonte Carlo 
qui out pour bass le theorems de Glivenko- Cantelli et correspondent a 
UDO veritable experiment vtion sur ordinatsur. Mies coziduisent souvent 
h. dec temps de c&lcul eleven et Ji des dépasseaoiits de capacité. Kiles 
sont par contre tres générales, 
Enfin, une method© générale qualitative consists a analyser les causes 
et les effets d'un certain nombre de défaillances de compoaants (failures 
modas ond effects analysis). 
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5 - JTABIIIIE MMtTOmj 
Apres avoir brlevenent rappelé les aétbodes utillséss pour las calcule 
de fiabilité an électronique, nous aborderons le cas de la fiabilité en 
aécaoique. 
Nous eøsaierons d'abord de distinguer en quoi la flabilité aécanique pré-
aente un caractere original, noua enunexerona ansuite les netnodes ut i l i -
sables dans les etudes de fiabilité aécaniqua, noua concluerons enfiii en 
suggérant lea travaui qu'il nous seable soubaitable d'entreprendre pour 
fairs progresBsr la flabilité mécanique. 
La particularity essentielle des systetaas nécaniaues reside en la diffi-
culté d'obtenir des resultats statistiquss aignificatifs. Cette oarenca est 
due au fait que les systeaas aécaniques aont généralanent oonatrults en 
nombre restraint et que de plus leurs conditions d'utilisation et de sain-
tenance sont extremeaent variables. Cette difficult!« de fairs de la atatia-
tique en fiabilité mécanique apparslt bien s i l*on comparo la definition 
ds la fiabilité Hannes par las electroniciens a cella énoncée par l'Jeadéole 
des Sciences et qui se veut plus generals. 
"Probsblllté qu'vm dispoaitif accoaplisM une fonction requise dans des con-
ditions d'utiliaation st pour una periode de temps determines", 
Péfinition de l'ieadesde-
•Qrsndeur oaraotérisant la séourité de fonctlramenent, on assure de la 
probabilité de fonetionneaent d'un appanillage salon das nonaw preaeritee". 
Outre sette difference foraelle, notans que la fiabilité das oonposants 
aéosnlques depend cwae les caaposants éleetmniquss de l'emrironnooant 
(tenpérature, ribrationa) aaia est da plus wasible a l'interaotion des 
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pieces voiaines et dee caractéristiquea de lour liaison. 
iinsi on peat constatex une forte difference entre la fiabilité intriiiseque 
d*uc composant telle au'elle eat determines au laboratoire et la fiabilité 
operationelle du dit compoaant. Un exemplo significatif eet celui des roule-
nents & billes dont la durée da vie peut ©tre Binguliercaerrt écourtée par 
un montage inadequate 
Une autre particularité de la fiabilité des syslernes mécaniques eat que 
ces deraiers sont reparables, ce qui a des consequences, en particulier pour 
løs systémes infoimatiomels, que nous évoquerons plus loin. 
Abordons oaintenant lea différentes etapes de la determination de la fiabilité 
méoanique. Rappeløns d'abord que 1 A fiabilité se pjrftLLt au stade du pro jet, 
s'estime au niveau du prototype et s'evalue au niveau de la serie* 
- Fiabilité^ des orgjanag. 
Lorsque les composants sont tres nømbreux, les netnodes génørales utilisées 
en électronique et en centrale de qualité s'appliquent bien pour estiaer la 
fiabilité intrinøeque. Le meilleur exsople est celui des roulensnts å billes. 
U peut ausei étre interessant, lorsque l'on a affaire a une lienée d'organes 
senblaolee, de determiner, au laboratoire, sur do grands effect if s, la famille 
a loquslle appartient la loi de fiabilité. Des essais en noabre réduit sur 
l'exgane particulier qui nous interesse auffiront ensuite a determiner les 
parametres de la loi dans ce oas particulier. Noue pensons icl tout spéoia-
lenent au cas ou la loi de Yeibull s'applique, l'on sait qu'elle se repré-
sente per una droits arsc les coordoimeea du diagramme d'Alan Plait, ce qui 
réduit théoriauemant å deux les easels nécessains. 
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,- ft^d^^ionjte 3ft-flebj^£éjihui grgaxa 
L'on aait que le noabro doe corps aiaples est de 1'ordre de lCTf le nosibre 
des organes de 1'ordre de lCr et le nombre des ensenolee de 1'ordre da iCr. 
Partant de cette constatation, il semble plus staple d'abordor l'étude de la 
fiabilité au niveau des matéxiaux constituents plutdt qu'aw niveau des 
ensembles. 
Pour ce fairs, on eat conduit a comparer la position respective da la loi de 
distribution des charges & la loi de distribution de la contrainte adniaal-
ble pour le materia«. 
Os point de TUB eBt original oar d* ordinaire on so content« de comparer 
una valeur aoyemie de contrainte a, una valeur moyenne da la resistance du 
oateriau en ayant pris la precaution d'introduJre \m coefficient de eécurité 
ou d* ignorance qui pexmet de aaintenir calle-ci ioférieure a. celle-lå. 
Cette method© presents va aapect statistique implicite qui reside dans le 
ohoix répété d'une valeur dtumee pour le coefficient de eécurité. 
Lorsque I1 on desire une fiabilité élevée et de hautes performances, ce pre-
cede apparait inodéquat car ne tenant pos compte de le dispersion das efforts 
et des resistances. 
Lea forces oppliquées sont diapsrsées en raiaon des hypotheses de la "Resis-
tance des Katéxiaux" (homogénéité' et isotropie des maWriaux) et de la dis-
persion des caraotéristiques géométriques dea structures. 
D'outre part, la diaparaion des caroctéristiques dea natériaux a'eiplique 
par la nature seme de oes derniers* Laura caractérietiques sont fonotion 
des lacuneB répartiea aléatoirement en U u r sein. Cb salt, en affat, qua 
dans le oas des matericuc tres purs et tres homogenes, oas des trlohites 
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(ou viskens), on constate des resistances daa disaines 4« fois øupériauree 
am valeurs cøurantes. 
- tlabi^Lté dea BjQrtenes mfeaniqueg 
Elle est justiciable des mtees netnodes atatistiqucs que celles utilisées 
en électronique. 
, - grf^ttaajle ^J^WJitf i 
Si la fiabilité* des cooposents eat comme, lea méthodoa utiliséea en élec-
tronique sozit applicables, c'est-a-dire établiaseaeat d'un diagramne bloc 
de fiabilité auqual on applique le calcul des probabilitée. 
La notian de redondance utiliaée en électronique se txoduit per la notion 
de systime fall-eafe pour les structures aécaniquoa. Oela aigrifie par ezan-
pie qu'uoe poutre naltresae sera renpl&cée par n poutrw placées en parsl-
lfele de telle sorte que Bi l'une vient s se rompre, Isa efforte sont repris 
par les n - 1 poutres reatantes avec toutefois un coefficient ie sécurité 
noizidro, i l sat rrai. mais suffisant pour achsver la mission* 
Le princips fail-safe est psrticuliereiamt utiliaé en céronautique. 
Oitre æ type dø redonftance, un aoyen d'anélioror la fiabilité est do déta-
rer les organs«, c'eat-a-diro de les utiliser sous des charges inférlsures 
s laur charge nominals. 
Four les systems inforontionnala, les méthodeø d'analyse de variation des 
paraaetrea sont appliooblas des que l'en dispose d'un models de fonctioraifi-
nent* Os nodelo ost generalagent mathénatiqtift. Dans lo cos d*un systems 
hydrauliquB, par exeople. U s'agiro des equations de In nécaniaue das 
639 
- 1 3 -
fluides. Lorsque les phénøBenos aont en partis inconnus, i l est possible 
de construire un aodele physique ou maqustte & partir duquel on act ou point 
une expression aathématique convenable pour la fonction de transfert. 
La possession d'un modele ost e*trtoement interessant cor i l permet de 
determiner 1'évolution des performances du systems en fonction de l 'é tat 
des Organos composonts« Cette connaissonce permet d'appairer les organes 
eonposcnta d'un dispositif neuf pour avoir les performances optimales ou de 
determiner los cotea d'une piece de rechangc pour naintenir a l'optiram les 
performances d'un systems qui n'est pas totalament rénové. 
Ce genre de determination nécessite généraleuent 1'usage d'un ordiucteur• 
Amelioration de la f iebi l i té . -
L' analyse des sources de panne et de leurs consequences pear un systene, 
et La connaissance des sources de panne et de leurs consequences pour des 
systems seablables pemettect d'aoéliorer la fiabilité des Bystenes aéca-
niques en améliorant les regies de l ' a r t pour la construction et lo cholx 
des parties Les plus vulnerables. 
A t i t re d'example, on trouvera ci-dsssous quelques renseignements de cette 
nature t i rés de la reference A»2. pour deux types d*installation, c 'est-t-
dire la repartition dos pourcentagee des praniers orgonos défaillants. 
CoBPregaour centrifuge d'installations d'air conditionné.-
- Pallers de butée 36 $> 
- Vaxme d'admission 22 ji 
- Pallors portent des charges 
radiales 14 > 
- Wftuseur 11 # 
- Aooouplement 8 % 
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QPBpreaagtr cmtri,fu« ( M W « ) -
- Fallers 62,4 1« 
- Bouet 13,8 £ 
- Etancbelté aur l'nrbre et 
acoouplaaent 18,8 p 
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6 - SOGGESIKHS KOR VS PROGRAHKE B'ETOHE 
De ces quelquea renenjuee, nous concluerons que, pour oaéliorar la fiabilité 
das enaeoblas odconiques, i l ost eouhaitable : 
- d'établir des sxctistiques sur les causes et les consequences des défail-
lances d'organes dons des installations exist&ntes. 
- 4'øbtenir une »l l leure cornisissonce de la dispersion des caroctéristlques 
des aatériam et cela grftce k des essais systéoatiquøs. 
- d'étudier la lo i de fiabilité des organes les plus couronts, 
- d'étudier les fonctions de tronsfert des systesss les plus couronts. 
- d1 eatreprendre une etude hibliographique sur tous les sujets ci-fl—JOS« 
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